• Journal of Korea Technology Innovation Society
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• v.5 no.3
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• pp.396-411
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• 2002

This is an analysis of international mobile displays industry. There has been severe competition in market and technology. In technology, There has been competition between Japan, USA and Korea. On the other hand, there has been competition in the products market between Korea, Japan and Taiwan. Recently Korea has catched-up Japan in mid-size display industry. The response of Japanese firms are as follows: technological collaboration with Taiwanese firms in mid-size and concentration in small and large size displays. New competition, however, has started, since new technologies such as TFT-LCD and OELD have been used in products.

• Journal of Electrical Engineering and Technology
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• v.12 no.6
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• pp.2157-2165
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• 2017

This study deals with the design of the mechanism in which demand response (DR) resources are traded in the power generation market. In general, a DR aggregator (DRA), which extends DR resources and provides technical support, is central to this mechanism. In this study, power users, called DR customer (DRC), participate in load reduction and are also modeled to participate directly in DR-related bidding. The DRA provides incentives to the DRC, indirectly impacting the market, and the DRC use the bid parameters strategically. We present the conditions for finding Nash Equilibrium (NE) in game problems of various participants including market operators, and analyze the characteristics of DRA and DRC related models. It also analyzes the impact of the participants on the market according to various types of competition and coalitions between DRA and DRC.

• Proceedings of the Technology Innovation Conference
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• 1999.06a
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• pp.203-225
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• 1999

In this paper, I tried to analyze the relationship between the market structure of teleommunicatin industry and market performance using Economides and Lehr's results considering composite goods methods. And I took three policy scenarios into account. First, government tires to implement the policy which divides the integrated monopoly into network operator and service provider, then invite competition to service part. Second, government tries to implement the policy which invite the competition to service part only. Third, government tries to implement the policy which invite the competition to integrated duopoly. I gained the best result in the third scenario. So we can conclude that Parallel vertical integration is the best market structure. I also specially checked the relationship between the market structure and service quality. I gained the best service quality in the third scenario. So we can conclude that Parallel Vertical Integration is also the best market structure with regard to the service quality.

• Asia Marketing Journal
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• v.21 no.3
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• pp.47-64
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• 2019

We analyze and study competition in differentiated product market using public data source. Understanding competitive market structure is critical for firms to assess how their products compete against other firms in a given market. In this paper, we estimate consumer demand, extend clout and vulnerability framework, and study competition among multi-product manufacturers in differentiated product market. For our empirical analysis, we adopt choice-based aggregate demand model and estimate consumer demand while accounting for unobserved product characteristics. Once we estimate consumer demand, we compute full price elasticity matrix and investigate intra- and inter- manufacturer substitutions among consumers. This research offers a framework for marketers to analyze and understand market structures, leading them to informed decisions.

• International Area Studies Review
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• v.13 no.3
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• pp.3-27
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• 2009

This paper measures market power in the Mongolian banking sector using bank level panel data for commercial banks over the period of 1999 - 2006. In the literature, studies on banking competition have largely focused on the banking sectors of developed economies. However, banking competition in developing countries such as Mongolia has been largely neglected. This paper is an attempt to fill this gap. We find that both the monopoly hypothesis and the perfect competition hypothesis are rejected and that the Mongolian banking sector is instead characterized by monopolistic competition. We thus find that the Mongolian banking sector is more competitive than market concentration measures may suggest. We infer that the entries of new banks have strengthened market competitiveness.

• International Journal of Computer Science & Network Security
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• v.22 no.2
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• pp.47-56
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• 2022

The article defines the principles of formation of digital marketing strategy of enterprises in the conditions of intensification of competition on the international market. The stages of development of digital marketing strategy of enterprises in the conditions of intensification of competition in the international market are substantiated, which includes: setting goals, which envisages observance of the principles of SMART-scheme; product or service analysis; monitoring of competitors; analytics of definition and segmentation of the target audience of the enterprise; selection of digital marketing tools and channels for promotion on the international market of products or services; formation of a unique, unique trade offer, selection of indicators for evaluating the effectiveness of digital marketing strategy and its tools. It is proved that according to the principle of SMART method of goal setting it is necessary that the goals have: specificity, measurability, achievability, relevance, achievement of the goal should be limited in time, have specific deadlines. To increase the effectiveness of digital marketing strategy, it is necessary to analyze the internal and external environment using the method of SWOT-analysis, the advantage of which is a comprehensive assessment of the company, competitors and the industry as a whole in the face of competition in the international market. The main indicators of evaluation of the effectiveness of digital marketing strategy in the conditions of intensification of competition on the international market are substantiated.

• Proceedings of the Korean Institute of Building Construction Conference
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• 2012.11a
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• pp.277-278
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• 2012

After the introduction of CM(construction management) for improving productability in construction industry, the CM market was shown to actively grow shape until 2007 but suddenly appears passive movement of the market after in 2008. However, on one hand, the CM corporations has increased, because the construction supervision market come to the CM market area by reduction their work place. Because of this, it was discussed that will intensify competition between companies in the CM market. Therefore, this paper want to analyze to status of the CM market structure for studying about the CM industry status and change during last 3 years. As a result, by decreasing the Market concentration, the CM market competition rate did not too high with business despite that CM market downsize and has been increased the number of companies.

• Journal of the Korean Operations Research and Management Science Society
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• v.35 no.4
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• pp.55-79
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• 2010

This study deals with a model for platform competition in a two-sided market. We suppose there are both direct and indirect network externalities between suppliers and users of each platform. Moreover, we suppose that both users and suppliers are distributed in their relative affinity for each platform type. That is, each user [supplier] has his/her own preferential position toward each platform, and users [suppliers] are horizontally differentiated over [0, 1]. And for analytical tractability, some parameters like direct and indirect network externalities are the same across the markets. Given the parameters and the pricing profile, users and suppliers conduct subscription game, where participants select the platform that gives them the highest payoffs. This game proceeds according to a replicator dynamics of the evolutionary game, which is simplified by properly defining gains from participant's strategy in the subscription game. We find that depending on the strength of these network effects, there might either be multiple stable equilibria, at which users and suppliers distribute across both platforms, or one unstable interior equilibrium corresponding to the market tipping in favor of either platform. In both cases, we also consider the pricing power of competing platform providers under the framework of the Stackelberg game. In particular, our study examines the possible effects of the type of competition between platform providers, which may constrain the equilibrium selection in the subscription game.

• KIEE International Transactions on Power Engineering
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• v.5A no.4
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• pp.396-402
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• 2005

In an electricity market with imperfect competition, participants devise bidding plans and transaction strategies to maximize their own profits. The market price and the quantity are concerned with the operation reserve as well as the bidding system and demand curves in an electricity market. This paper presents a market model combined by an energy market and an operating reserve market. The competition of the generation producers in the combined market is formulated as a gaming of selecting bid parameters such as intersections and slopes in bid functions. The Nash Equilibrium (NE) is analyzed by using bi-level optimization; maximization of Social Welfare (SW) and maximization of the producers' profits.

• Journal of the Korean Operations Research and Management Science Society
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• v.34 no.1
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• pp.85-100
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• 2009

An online marketplace, such as eBay, is an example of two-sided markets. In online marketplaces, there are transactions between sellers and buyers and direct competition effects among sellers and among buyers. Previous research on two-sided market has not handle these competition effects and mostly focused on indirect network externalities between sellers and buyers. We analyze the fee structure of an online marketplace considering direct competition effects among sellers and among buyers. We find that when fees for sellers and buyers can be imposed, an auction or fixed-pricing rule can be chosen according to the characteristics of a product traded. But when only fees for sellers can be imposed, an auction can be taken as a trading mechanism solely.