• Strategy21
• /
• 통권31호
• /
• pp.220-250
• /
• 2013

South Korean national security strategy should be developed to effectively handle and counter increasing maritime threats and challenges. There are three major maritime threats South Korea faces today; maritime disputes on the EEZ boundary and Dokdo islet issues, North Korean threats, and international maritime security. Maritime disputes in the region are getting intensified and turned into a military confrontation after 2010. Now regional countries confront each other with military and police forces and use economic leverage to coerce the others. They are very eager to create advantageous de facto situations to legitimize their territorial claims. North Korean threat is also increasing in the sea as we witnessed in the Cheonan incident and Yeonpyoung shelling in 2010. North Korea resorts to local provocations and nuclear threats to coerce South Korea in which it may enjoy asymmetric advantages. The NLL area of the west sea would be a main hot spot that North Korea may continue to make a local provocation. Also, South Korean national economy is heavily dependent upon foreign trade and national strategic resources such as oil are all imported. Without an assurance on the safety of sea routes, these economic activities cannot be maintained and expanded. This paper argues that South Korea should make national maritime strategy and enhance the strength of naval forces. As a middle power, its national security strategy needs to consider all the threats and challenges not only from North Korea but also to maritime security. This is not a matter of choice but a mandate for national survival and prosperity. This paper discusses the importance of maritime security, changing characteristics of maritime threats and challenges, regional maritime disputes and its threat to South Korea's security, and South Korea's future security strategy and ways to enhance the role of naval forces. Our national maritime strategy needs to show middle and long term policy directions on how we will protect our maritime interests. Especially, it is important to build proper naval might to carry out all the roles and missions required to the military.

• Strategy21
• /
• 통권44호
• /
• pp.142-176
• /
• 2018

So far, the main threat to South Korea was North Korea. That is why South Korea established a strategy based on the threat of North Korea and most of the budget on defense was used to deter North Korea. Even though the neighboring countries(China, Japan, and Russia) are growing as a real threat with abilities and intentions based on their powerful naval forces, South Korea has not yet been able to establish a strategy that regards neighboring countries as a threat. But the decades-old structural mechanism of the Korean security environment is undergoing a radical change on April 27, 2018, through the South-North summit and the Panmunjom Declaration. Under the changing security environment, South Korea was placed in a complicated dilemma that had to deal with threats of two axes(China), three axes(China, Japan), and four axes(Japan, Russia). If the one axis threat(North Korea) is dominated by land threats, the second, third and fourth axis threats are threats from the sea. This paper analyzed the maritime strategy of Korea within the framework of maritime-geopolitics, in other words recognition and expansion of the sphere of maritime. I have designed that the maritime defense space that we can deny from threats is divided into three lines of defense: 1 line (radius 3,000km), 2 lines (2,000km), and 3 lines (1,000km). The three defense zones of the three lines were defined as an active defense(1 line), defensive offense(2 line), active offense(3 line). The three defense zones of the three lines were defined as the sphere of core maritime, As a power to deny the sphere of core maritime, it was analyzed as a maneuvering unit, a nuclear-powered submarine, the establishment of missile strategy, and the fortification of islands station. The marine strategy of South Korea with these concepts and means was defined as 'Offensive Maritime Denial Strategy'.

• Strategy21
• /
• 통권30호
• /
• pp.63-98
• /
• 2012

Northeast Asia has a multi-layered security structure within which major economic and military powers both confront one another and cooperate at the same time. Major regional powers maintain mutually cooperative activities in the economic sphere while competing one another in order to secure a dominant position in the politico-military arena. The multifarious threats, posed by the North Korea's nuclear development, territorial disputes, and maritime demarcation line issues demonstrate that Northeast Asia suffers more from military conflicts and strifes than any other region in the world. Specifically, major maritime security threats include North Korea's nuclear proliferation and missile launching problems as well as military provocations nearby the Northern Limit Line(NLL) as witnessed in the Cheonan naval ship and Yeonpyong incidents. The ROK Navy has been supplementing its firm military readiness posture in consideration of North Korea's threats on the NLL. It has performed superb roles in defending the nation and establishing the Navy advanced and best picked. It also has been conducive to defend the nation from external military threats and invasion, secure the sea lanes of communications, and establish regional stability and world peace. In order to effectively cope with the strategic environment and future warfares, the ROK Navy needs to shift its military structure to one that is more information and technology intensive. In addition, it should consolidate the ROK-US alliance and extend military cooperative measures with neighboring countries in the Asia-Pacific region. Evolved steadily for the last 60 years, the ROK-US alliance format has contributed to peace and security on the Korean peninsula and in the Northeast Asian region. In conclusion, this manuscript contends that the ROK Navy should strive for the establishment of the following: (1) Construction of Jeju Naval Base; (2) Strategic Navy Equipped with War Deterrence Capabilities; (3) Korean-type of System of Systems; (4) Structure, Budget and Human Resources of the Naval Forces Similar to the Advanced Countries; and (5) Strategic Maritime Alliance and Alignment System as well as Domestic Governance Network for the Naval Families.

• 해양환경안전학회:학술대회논문집
• /
• 해양환경안전학회 2003년도 추계학술발표회
• /
• pp.99-104
• /
• 2003

미국에서 발생한 항공기 테러 사건이후 해상의 보안위험성이 높게 인식되고 있다. 본 논문에서는 국내 해상범죄 데이터를 바탕으로 해상보안위험의 현황을 파악하고 특성을 분석하였다. 또한, 해상보안위협을 예방하고 효율적으로 대처하기 위한 대응 방안을 제안하였다.

• 해양환경안전학회지
• /
• 제13권3호
• /
• pp.199-206
• /
• 2007

연안여객선 보안위협과 관리제도 현황을 분석하고 관련 종사자들에 대한 보안의식을 설문조사하여 분석함으로서 연안여객선의 보안취약성과 보안위협의 특성을 도출하였다. 이러한 여객선의 보안위협에 효율적으로 식별, 대응하여 보안 취약성 제고를 위하여 보안문화 구축방안을 제안하였다. 또한 국내 연안여객선 현장에서 다양한 보안위협에 대응하기 위한 시스템을 제안하였다.

• Strategy21
• /
• 통권37호
• /
• pp.32-64
• /
• 2015

This paper examines the types and trends of North Korea's military provocations and regional maritime threats against South Korea, and is focusing on the Republic of Korea's naval development and modernizations by the Republic of Korea Navy (ROKN) on future actions, what directions of the ROKN has taken thus far in response, as well as an examination of how the ROKN might respond to vulnerabilities identified throughout modern history. Importantly, this paper does not consider the domestic, bilateral, multilateral, regional and global political dimensions of the situation on the Korean Peninsula; nor does it consider the North Korea's transitional power politics, but including North Korea's nuclear program and submarine-launched ballistic missile developments, as a caveat, this paper is based on open sources in Korean and English language, and thus information concerning provocations is indicative only.

• 한국정보통신학회:학술대회논문집
• /
• 한국정보통신학회 2013년도 추계학술대회
• /
• pp.847-850
• /
• 2013

해양에 설치되는 플랜트는 태풍, 해일 등과 같은 환경적인 요소와 화재나 선박의 충돌 등과 같은 인공적인 요소에 의한 위협에 노출되어 있다. 본 논문에서는 이러한 위협으로부터 해양플랜트를 안전하게 보호하기 위하여 카메라, AtoN AIS를 이용한 IT융합 해양플랜트 원격 감시 시스템 설계에 관한 내용을 다룬다. 해양플랜트의 주변 환경에서 발생할 수 있는 각종 상황들을 영상 및 각종 데이터를 이용하여 원격으로 감시함으로써 보다 신속하게 적절한 대처가 가능해지며 안전한 해양플랜트의 운영에 도움을 준다.

• 해양환경안전학회:학술대회논문집
• /
• 해양환경안전학회 2017년도 추계학술발표회
• /
• pp.283-283
• /
• 2017

• 해양환경안전학회지
• /
• 제9권1호
• /
• pp.17-23
• /
• 2003

2001년 9.11 테러사건 이후 선박과 승무원의 안전과 보안문제가 해양산업에서 새로운 화제로 대두되고 있다. 고 위험 테러시대에 선주와 항만당국 뿐만 아니라, 선박 종사자들도 그들의 업무와 행동에 있어서 테러위협에 대한 경각심과 대응책이 요구되고 있다. 본 논문에서는 먼저 해양보안관리의 개념과 원칙에 입각하여 상선의 보안 취약성과 주요 요소를 분석하여 상선보안관리원칙을 도출하였다. 그리고 ISPS 규정에 입각하여 선내의 보안조직과 보안업무를 설정하고 승무원의 보안문화 정착을 위한 PTC 프로그램과 선박보안 시스템을 구성하였다.

• Strategy21
• /
• 통권39호
• /
• pp.163-197
• /
• 2016

The completion of Jeju Naval Base on February 2016 made the Republic of Korea Navy(ROKN) review the size and role of the Maritime Task Flotilla(MTF). The new strategic environment for the 12st century and the new challenges require the Navy to counter North Korea's provocations and prevent potential enemy's threat. The Navy is also required to take part in the variety of international roles and missions commensurated with Korea's global status to maximize the national interest. Despite these changes, Korea's military construction concept is still unable to break away from the old paradigm of the North Korean threat largely centered. In order to develop the current MTF into the Task Group with the construction of Jeju Naval Base, the Navy must newly not only establish new force development plan and fleet management concepts but also go to persuade and convince policy decision makers. To this end, the following efforts should be promoted. First, the ROK Navy steps up efforts in order to share with the Task Group's vision and strategy. The Navy should also provide the size and structure as well as the missions and roles of the Task Group to react to new maritime security environment. Second, the Navy analyse the MTF's ability and what is required and necessary to perform its duty. After that, it must set out the direction of the Task Group's force development. Third, the current missions and roles of the MTF should be re-established to respond various threats. Finally, accommodating of new technology to the MTF should intensify its strengths. The ROK Navy has a mixed force structure consisting of three fixed- base fleets and a MTF. The fixed base fleet has a passive force to defend and protect its own sea areas, but the MTF should actively not only counter North Korea's threats, including ballistic missiles, but also fight potential threats and takes international missions as a primary task force. However, the MTF has a limited capability to accomplish given missions and long-range operations, and thus, the ROK Navy is strongly required to construct the Task Group.