• Strategy21
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• s.39
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• pp.114-139
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• 2016

Korea and China are neighboring countries with close contacts in many areas from long time ago, and have shared interests in maintaining peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula, and in deepening economic relationship which has been mutually complementary in their nature. Therefore their bilateral relations has been developed at a remarkable pace to the extent that it can't be better than now. However, the differences in their responses to North Korean nuclear test and ensuing long-range ballistic missile test-fire and the Chinese strong concern on the possible deployment of THAAD (Terminal High Altitude Air Defence) anti-missile system in Korea show that there are some weaknesses in their relations. For example, Korea is not still confident that China would fully implement the sanction measures contained in the UNSC resolution and I argue that Chinese proposal of parallel negotiation of the denuclearization and the replacement of Korean armistice with the Peace Agreement is not much persuasive. In THAAD issue, if Korea comes to conclusion in the future that THAAD is the most effective way to counter North Korean threats, Korea should make every efforts to assure China that Korea-US alliance is not targeting China, and the THAAD is a defensive system, not damaging Chinese security. In the longer-term, deepening strategic distrust and competition between the US and China in this part of East Asia, changing nature of economic cooperation between Korea and China, and the revival of 'great country mentality' by Chinese people together with the rising nationalism in both Korea and China would cast shadow on Korea-China relation in the years ahead, unless properly handled. In this regard, I suggest that the security communications between the two countries be further strengthened, and the tri-lateral dialogue channel be established among the three countries of Korea, the US and China, particularly on North Korean issues. I also suggest the new pattern of economic cooperation be sought, considering the changing economic environment in China, while strengthening the efforts to understand each other through more interactions between the two peoples.

• Journal of the Korean Society of Marine Environment & Safety
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• v.21 no.6
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• pp.679-688
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• 2015

Stability and security of energy resources are one of the most important factors for a national-development. In this research, we analyzed the Republic of Korea's policy making system on energy security and identified the problems from an innovation system perspective. In terms of the actors, they had limitations that ROK's navy do not have enough strategic plan for energy transportation. The links between innovation actors except defense area were relatively good, but links between the military area(navy) and other innovation actors had weak linkage. The infrastructure did't have enough consideration for military force development. For the institution; the role of the military area on energy security was not completely established. Therefore, participation of the defense area(navy) is required to be stated institutionally.

• Strategy21
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• s.39
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• pp.82-113
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• 2016

This paper analyzes the contents and the effects of the UNSC 2270, and its implications to South Korea's defense strategy and navy. The UN Security Council passed strong sanctions against North Korea which punish North Korea's 4^th nuclear test. The sanctions compared to the previous ones require international society to take practical actions such as comprehensive trade bans as well as diplomatic isolation which will put significant pains on North Korea. Especially, these measures would greatly hamper economic development policy of Kim Joung-un regime. Because Kim Jung-un regime has inherent legitimacy problems which stems from the third family succession of the power, economic difficulties may play an important cause on the regime instability in the long term. In fact, the United States sees this possibility as an option to coerce North Korea in which North Korea choose denuclearization for its regime survival. Nevertheless, the prospects of the UN sanctions are not so optimistic. Considering North Korea's willingness for nuclear development and its level of nuclear technology, North Korea will try to play a gambit with the US and South Korea by exploiting its strategic advantages. North Korea's response will have three following strategies. First, it would actively pursue political and economic survival strategy by using China's support for the regime, strengthening its power grip in the name of countering US hostile policy, and enhancing peace propaganda. Second, North Korea will accelerate efforts to position its status as a nuclear de facto state. For this purpose, it could create nuclear crisis on the peninsula. Third, it would exploit local provocations as an exit strategy to get over the current situation. In order to counter North Korea's actions and punish North Korea's behavior strongly, South Korea needs following strategies and efforts. It should first make all the efforts to implement the UN sanctions. Strong and practical nuclear deterrence strategy and capability with the U.S. should be developed. Effective strategy and capabilities for the prevention and deterrence of North Korea's provocation should be prepared. For this purpose, North Korea's provocation strategy should be thoroughly reviewed. Active international cooperation is needed to punish and coerce North Korea's behavior. Finally, South Korea should prepare for the possible occurrence of North Korea's contingency and make use of the situation as an opportunity to achieve unification. All these strategies and efforts demand the more active roles and missions of South Korea's navy and thus, nullify North Korea's intention militarily.

• Strategy21
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• s.30
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• pp.99-142
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• 2012

Withe increased North Korea's security threats, the South Korean navy has been faced with deteriorating security environment. While North Korea has increased asymmetric forces in the maritime and underwater with the development of nuclear weapons, and China and Japan have made a large investment in the buildup of naval forces, the power of the Pacific fleet of the US, a key ally is expected to be weakened. The biggest threat comes from China's intervention in case of full-scale war with North Korea, but low-density conflict issues are also serious problems. North Korea has violated the Armistice Agreement 2,660 times since the end of Korean War, among which the number of marine provocations reaches 1,430 times, and the tension over the NLL issue has been intensifying. With tension mounting between Korea and Japan over the Dokdo issue and conflict escalating with China over Ieo do Islet, the US Navy has confronted situation where it cannot fully concentrate on the security of the Korean peninsula, which leads to need for strengthening of South Korea's naval forces. Let's look at naval forces of neighboring countries. North Korea is threatening South Korean navy with its increased asymmetric forces, including submarines. China has achieved the remarkable development of naval forces since the promotion of 3-step plan to strengthen naval power from 1989, and it now retains highly modernized naval forces. Japan makes an investment in the construction of stat of the art warship every year. Since Japan's warship boasts of its advanced performance, Japan's Maritime Self Defense Force is evaluated the second most powerful behind the US Navy on the assumption that submarine power is not included in the naval forces. In this situation, naval power construction of South Korean navy should be done in phases, focusing on the followings; First, military strength to repel the energy warship quickly without any damage in case of battle with North Korea needs to be secured. Second, it is necessary to develop abilities to discourage the use of nuclear weapons of North Korea and attack its nuclear facilities in case of emergency. Third, construction of military power to suppress armed provocations from China and Japan is required. Based on the above naval power construction methods, the direction of power construction is suggested as follows. The sea fleet needs to build up its war potential to defeat the naval forces of North Korea quickly and participate in anti-submarine operations in response to North Korea's provocations. The task fleet should be composed of 3 task flotilla and retain the power to support the sea fleet and suppress the occurrence of maritime disputes with neighboring countries. In addition, it is necessary to expand submarine power, a high value power asset in preparation for establishment of submarine headquarters in 2015, develop anti-submarine helicopter and load SLAM-ER missile onto P-3C patrol aircraft. In case of maine corps, division class military force should be able to conduct landing operations. It takes more than 10 years to construct a new warship. Accordingly, it is necessary to establish plans for naval power construction carefully in consideration of reality and future. For the naval forces to safeguard maritime sovereignty and contribute to national security, the acquisition of a huge budget and buildup of military power is required. In this regard, enhancement of naval power can be achieved only through national, political and military understanding and agreement. It is necessary to let the nation know that modern naval forces with improved weapon system can serve as comprehensive armed forces to secure the command of the sea, perform defense of territory and territorial sky and attack the enemy's strategic facilities and budget inputted in the naval forces is the essential source for early end of the war and minimization of damage to the people. If the naval power construction is not realized, we can be faced with a national disgrace of usurpation of national sovereignty of 100 years ago. Accordingly, the strengthening of naval forces must be realized.

• Maritime Security
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• v.5 no.1
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• pp.85-112
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• 2022

The maritime blockade has long been used as a means of war in that it serves as a bridge for economic warfare by paralyzing enemy maritime transport, although it is not a decisive battle, and in the Korean War, U.N. forces have achieved significant results in the war with limited maritime blockade through the Clark Line. However, with China emerging as a maritime powers based on its strong naval power, there is a lack of consideration on how to set up a blockade to block maritime activities and how to respond neutral ships or carrying wartime contraband products if war breaks out again on the Korean Peninsula, In addition, since maritime blockade should be used as a sensitive and flexible naval force projection in that it has interests with neutral countries, it should be carefully reviewed in that it can be used only through careful and reasonable judgment considering the principle of ensuring the legality of maritime blockade Therefore, in this study, Reexamine the process of change in the application of the International Law of Blockade, and through this, Derive the basic principle of ensuring the legitimacy of maritime blockade. In addition, by reviewing the application of these basic principles in the waters off the Korean Peninsula at wartime, we presented answers to research questions by reviewing what needs to be done to neutral ships and ships carrying wartime contraband products, and considered the implications for us

• Maritime Security
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• v.6 no.1
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• pp.37-56
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• 2023

Recently, with the rapid development of ICT(Information and Communication Technology) and AI(Artificial Intelligence) technology industries, the emergence of MASS(Maritime Autonomous Surface Ship), which were thought only in the distant future, is approaching a reality. Along with the development of these amazing technologies, changes in the private law sector, such as liability, compensation for damages, and maritime insurance, as well as in the public law sector, such as maritime safety, marine environment protection, and maintenance of maritime order, have become necessary in the field of maritime law. In particular, with the advent of a new type of ship called MASS that does not have a crew on board, the kind and type of liability, compensation for damages, and insurance contracts in the event of a marine accident will also change. In this paper, the general theory about concept, classification, effectiveness and future of MASS and the general theory about concept and various obligations and responsibilities under the maritime law for discussion of MASS are reviewed. Next, in addition, regarding the problems that may occur in the event of a marine accident from MASS, the status as a ship, the legal relationship of the chartering contract, obligation to exercise due diligence in making the vessel seaworthiness, subject of responsibility, and liability for damages and immunity are reviewed from the perspective of maritime law. In addition, in the degree four of MASS, the necessities of further research to clarify the attributable subjects and standards of responsibility in the event of a marine accident, as well as the necessities of institutional improvement such as technology development, enactment and amendment of law and funding are presented.

• Strategy21
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• s.41
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• pp.232-260
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• 2017

The purpose of this paper is to open a debate about what kind of deterrent strategy the ROK military should pursue in the era of NK's weapons of mass destruction and missile threats. I argue that the ROK military needs a comprehensive deterrent strategy that reflects the international security situations and trends and that builds on clear understanding of the basic concepts and how deterrence operates. The paper starts with surveying the basic knowledge of deterrence from the perspectives of both theory and practice. Then, it provides explanations on why deterrence against NK can be particularly difficult given the security environment in and around the Korean peninsula. For example, South Korea and North Korea hardly share 'common knowledge' that serves as a basic element for the operation of deterrence. Deterrence against North Korea involves complex situations in that both deterrence and compellence strategies may be relevant particularly to North Korea's WMD and missile threats. It also involves both immediate and general deterrence. Based on the discussion, I suggest several ideas that may serve as guidelines for establishing a deterrent strategy against NK. First, our threats for deterrence should be the ones that can be realized, particularly in terms of the international norms. In other words, they must be considered appropriate among other nations in the international community. Second, there should be separate plans for the different kinds of threats: one is conventional, local provocations and the other is WMD/missile related provocations. Third, we should pursue much closer cooperative relations with the U.S. military to enhance the effectiveness of immediate deterrence in the Korean peninsula. Fourth, the ROK military should aim to accomplish 'smart deterrence' maximizing the benefits of technological superiority. Fifth, the ROK military readiness and structure should be able to deny emerging North Korean military threats such as the submarine-launched ballistic missiles and intercontinental ballistic missiles. Lastly, in executing threats, we should consider that the current action influences credibility and reputation of the ROK, which in turn affect the decisions for future provocations. North Korea's WMD/missile threats may soon become critical strategic-level threats to South Korea. In retrospect, the first debate on building a missile defense system in South Korea dates back to the 1980s. Mostly the debate has centered on whether or not South Korea's system should be integrated into the U.S. missile defense system. In the meantime, North Korea has become a small nuclear power that can threaten the United States with the ballistic missiles capability. If North Korea completes the SLBM program and loads the missiles on a submarine with improved underwater operation capability, then, South Korea may have to face the reality of power politics demonstrated by Thucydides through the Athenians: "The strong do what they have the power to do, the weak accept what they have to accept."

• Proceedings of the Korean Institute of Information and Commucation Sciences Conference
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• 2009.05a
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• pp.717-722
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• 2009

대한민국은 국가경제발전의 기반을 무역에 두고 있는 대외 지향적 통상(通商)국가이다. 현재 한국의 무역은 화물량 기준 거의 100%를 해운에 의존하고 있다. 한나라의 경제 특성을 나타내는 지표로서 '무역의존도'가 있는데 2007년도 한국의 무역의존도는 75.09%로서 일본의 30.15%의 약 2.5배, 중국의 67.07%에 비해 현저하게 높은 세계최고 수준이다. 이는 한국경제 나아가 한국의 안전과 발전이 절대적으로 해양을 통한 무역에 의존하고 있다는 의미로 이해할 수 있다. 대외무역에 국가의 사활을 걸고 있는 한국에서 국가해양활동의 안전이 확고하게 지켜지지 못해 무역에 차질이 발생한다면 이는 국가 경제 나아가 국가안보에 심대한 악 영향을 미칠 수밖에 없다. 반면 최근 소말리아 근해 해적의 피해확대로 한국은 주력 전투함을 파견하여 한국선박보호와 인근해역의 해양안전유지를 위해 국제적 해양안보활동에 참여하고 있다. 이는 한국의 국가경제활동이 전 세계로 확대됨에 따라 해양에서의 안전도 다방면에서 위협을 받고 있어 군함까지 파견해야 할 정도로 위협이 확대되고 있다는 방증이기도 하다. 이에 반해 한국에서는 해양안보에 대한 국민적 관심과 체계적인 대비책개발을 위한 노력이 아직은 미흡한 실정이다. 따라서 한국은 지금부터라도 국가적 차원에서 해양안보에 대한 관심과 대비책마련을 본격적으로 서둘러야 한다. 우선 한국은 해양안보위협을 북한으로 부터의 군사적 위협과 동일한 개념의 안보문제로 간주하여 대비해야 나가야 할 것이다. 또한 현재 정부 각 부처에 분산된 해양안보 관련 기능을 유기적으로 통합하여 수행할 수 있는 중심기구의 설치를 검토하여야 할 것이며, 국제적인 해양안보노력에도 적극적으로 참여함으로써 해양의 안전을 확고하게 유지하여 한국의 지속적인 국가번영을 보장하여야 한다.

• Maritime Security
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• v.3 no.1
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• pp.187-210
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• 2021

In recent years, many countries are committing to environmental conservation. Following this trend, successful policy implementation of SDGs with ESG management extended to the public sector is emerging as a keyword determining the success or failure of the capital market, countries, and individual companies. Accordingly, many countries are implementing various policies related to the environment. One of them is to implement national policies by introducing environmental taxes. These policies use environmental taxes to control pollution by indirectly influencing the behavior of producers or consumers through economic incentives rather than directly interfering with environmental pollution behavior. This study examines the status of environmental taxes in marine tourism sites in Korea, reviews the effectiveness of such policies, and suggests how to improve them by identifying limitations of the current system.

• Strategy21
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• s.40
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• pp.190-215
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• 2016

As North Korea's asymmetric threats are growing, there have been numerous discussions to find out effective counter-measures and many official plans and procurements efforts have been established. However, discussions on ROK Navy's roles in countering North Korea's asymmetric threats have been taken place very limitedly. Decision makers and military planners put enormous efforts in getting counter-measures, however, most of the options on the table are systems of Army and Air Force. This is true if one looks at components of Kill-Chain, KAMD, and KMPR. With worsening security environment of the Korean peninsula, it has been said by many commentators that ROK Navy needs to consider expanding its roles in countering against North Korea's asymmetric military threats. They asked ROK Navy to go beyond the mind-set that has confined Navy's roles in deterring North Korean naval threats. That is, ROK Navy should fight 'from the sea' as well as fight 'on the sea.' If ROK Navy begins to think about fight 'from the sea,' there would be many possibilities for the Navy to be a part of countering North Korea's asymmetric military threats. In order to pursue proactive roles in countering North Korea's asymmetric threat, ROK Navy needs to consider various options. Massive missile forces, nuclear-propelled submarines, naval special forces may be some of them. With those measures, ROK Navy would launch massive and decisive attacks from the sea without risking survivability of our forces. Considering North Korean Navy's weakness, it is very probable that sea would be safer place than ground or sky. Expanding ROK Navy's roles and being a proactive deterrent forces against North Korean asymmetric threats would provide very reliable counter-measures to South Korean military. Thus, military planners should think how to take the best advantage of expanded ROK Navy's roles and capabilities against North Korean asymmetric threats.