• The Journal of the Korea Contents Association
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• v.19 no.4
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• pp.394-402
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• 2019

This study examines the effect of managerial ownership on the value of firms' cash holdings. According to the management entrenchment hypothesis, managers have incentives to make decisions that can undermine shareholders' value for their own private interests. In this situation, as the managerial ownership increases, investors may evaluate that the cash held by the company may be utilized inefficiently and the value of the cash holdings may decrease. On the other hand, based on the incentive alignment hypothesis, the value of cash holdings may increase as investors perceive cash holdings to be effectively used to increase corporate value as managers' interests are in agreement with shareholders. Empirical results show that the value of cash holdings decreased as managerial ownership increased. This study finds a contribution in that it presents empirical evidence on whether the cash held by the company is differentially evaluated according to the level of the managerial ownership.

• Management & Information Systems Review
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• v.37 no.2
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• pp.187-207
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• 2018

This study examines the negative relationship between accounting conservatism and excess executive compensation and examines whether their relationship increases as managerial incentive compensation intensity increases. For this purpose, a total of 2,755 company-years were selected for the analysis of the companies listed on the Korea Stock Exchange from December 2012 to 2016 as the final sample. The results of this study are as follows. First, there is a statistically significant negative relationship between accounting conservatism and manager overpayment. This implies that managers' incentives to distort future cash flow estimates by over booking assets or accounting profits in order to maximize their compensation when manager compensation is linked to firm performance. In this sense, accounting conservatism can reduce opportunistic behavior by restricting managerial accounting choices, which can be interpreted as a reduction in overpayment to managers. Second, we found that the relationship between accounting conservatism and excess executive compensation increases with the incentive compensation for accounting performance. The higher the managerial incentive compensation intensity of accounting performance is, the more likely it is that the manager has the incentive to make earnings adjustments. Therefore, the high level of incentive compensation for accounting performance means that the ex post settling up problem due to over-compensation can become serious. In this case, the higher the managerial incentive compensation intensity for accounting performance, the greater the role and utility of conservatism in manager compensation contracts. This study is based on the fact that it presents empirical evidence on the usefulness of accounting conservatism in managerial compensation contracts theoretically presented by Watts (2003) and the additional basis that conservatism can be used as a useful tool for investment decision.

• The Journal of Asian Finance, Economics and Business
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• v.6 no.3
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• pp.67-79
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• 2019

This study examines the impact of corporate governance on capital structure decisions based on a large panel of Chinese listed firms. Using the system Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimator to control for unobserved heterogeneity, endogeneity, and persistency in capital structure decisions, we document that the ownership structure plays a significant role in determining leverage ratios. More specially, we find that managerial ownership has a positive and significant impact on firms' leverage, consistent with the incentive alignment hypothesis. We also find that managerial ownership only affects the leverage decisions of private firms in the post-2005 split share reform period. State ownership negatively influence leverage decisions implying that SOEs may face fewer restrictions in equity issuance and may receive favourable treatments when applying for seasoned equity ¿nancing, thus use less debt. Furthermore, our results show that while foreign ownership negatively influences leverage decisions, legal person shareholding positively influences firms' leverage decisions only for state controlled firms. We also find that the board structure variables (board size and the proportion of independent directors) do not influence firms' capital structure decisions. Our findings suggest that recent ownership reforms have been successful in terms of providing incentive to managers through managerial shareholdings to take risky financial choices.

• Journal of Digital Convergence
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• v.11 no.4
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• pp.177-188
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• 2013

This study examines how managerial ownership structure affects the borrower's choice of private versus public debt using 2,608 firm-year data for 2006-2008. This paper investigates the relationship between managerial ownership structure and debt choice. Managerial ownership is measured using number of stocks and unexercised stock-options and debt is classified public and private debt. The results find that there is a positive association between managerial ownership and the private debt dependence and also find that when firms finance additional funds, higher managerial ownership leads managers to choose private debt not public debt. Since private debt can be classified into bank debt and non bank debt, this paper examines the relationship between managerial ownership and a choice of bank debt. The results indicate that managers with higher ownership are more likely to use bank debt over public debt and non bank debt. By examining the relation between managerial ownership and a debt choice, this paper has following contributions. First, this study shows that managerial ownership affects the choice of the source of financing using three different proxies of managerial ownership. Second, this study classified private debt into bank debt and non-bank debt and provide the evidence of preference toward private debt especially bank debt among other financing sources. Finally, there are extensive studies related to capital structure and managerial ownership, but there is little empirical research on the debt choice and managerial ownership. Thus, this paper adds to literature by exploring the effects of managerial ownership on a debt choice.

• Journal of Korean Society of Industrial and Systems Engineering
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• v.21 no.46
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• pp.1-18
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• 1998

The purpose of this study is to identify critical factors facilitating JIT innovation process for Korean component manufacturers. In order to find the answers to this issue, this study has empirically studied the corelations among JIT innovation culture, competitiveness, and incentive factors. Cluster, ANOVA, and regression analyses were performed from 92 collected survey data. It has found that Korean component manufacturers strongly rely on their inner JIT innovation culture to improve competitiveness. It has also found that the organizational resource and managerial priority should be focused on establishing clear goals and objectives for improvement, and creating open atmosphere with respect to operational process.

• Journal of the Korea Convergence Society
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• v.6 no.1
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• pp.71-76
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• 2015

Using a sample of publicly-traded Chinese firms, this study examines a relationship between managerial ownership and corporate debt maturity decisions. China has transformed dramatically into a market capitalist economy over the past decades. However, so far, little attention has been paid to the role of professional managers. In this situation, this study explores the effect of stock grants to managers as incentive system by providing evidence that managerial ownership affects corporate debt maturity decisions. The findings are as follows: First, I find that like US firms, managerial ownership is negatively related to the proportion of long-term debt. Second, I divide the entire sample into two subsamples of state-owned and privately owned firms. For the privately owned firms, I find that there is a negative relationship between managerial ownership and the proportion of long-term debt. In contrast, for the state-owned firms, the relationship is positive and insignificant.

• The Korean Journal of Financial Management
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• v.24 no.2
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• pp.81-111
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• 2007

The agency relationship between managers and shareholders has the potential to influence decision-making in the firm which in turn potentially impacts on firm characteristics such as value and leverage. Using an agency framework, we examine the relation between ownership structure and capital structure during post-IMF period. We used the balanced panel data for 378 korean listed companies during the 1999-2005. The panel data sets consist of time-series observation on each of 378 cross-sectional units. The results indicate a non-linear U-shaped relation between the level of managerial share ownership and leverage with the relation reaching a minimum at 58.48 per cent of management share ownership. As managerial share ownership increase from a low level, managers have incentive to reduce the debt level for decreasing the financial risk, resulting in a lower lever of debt. However, when corporate managers hold a significant proportion of a firm's shares, managers have incentive to increase the debt level for leverage effects, resulting in a higher lever of debt.

• Journal of the Korean Regional Science Association
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• v.15 no.2
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• pp.155-187
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• 1999

The East Asian Region has experienced remarkable economic growth and transformation of interurban networking over the past three decades, and urban competiti veness for a networking hub in this region has become a critical issue confronting cities. Competitiveness of the Seoul capital region for a networking hub in Northeast Asia is outstripped by other competing cities in East Asia, notwithstanding its geo-politically and geo-economically advantageous location in this region. In this paper, we aim to appraise the Seoul capital region's competitiveness in terms of logistics distribution, financial function and logistics distribution, financial function and agglomeration of transnational corporations (especially of RHOs and other managerial functions), and to advance the networking strategies of the region for a Northeast Asia hyb. As a result of analysis, we suggest that the Seoul capital region be developed as a Northeast Asian center for regional headquarters or leading global corporations and financial services for being a strategic nodal point in Northeast Asia in the 21st century. A recent survey shows that where to locate an RHQ is influenced by various factors, such as potential market and manufacturing site in the city's hinterland, quality of life, such things as culture, health, safety, education, a well-educated, English-speaking population, reliable air transport, state-of-the-art communications, and an active policy to offer foreign companies generous incentives. The Seoul capital region, which is located at a strategic nodal point advantageous as a springboard for its Northeast Asian hinterland, cannot meet the other conditions mentioned above. To overcome these drawbacks in attracting transnational capital and to create competitiveness as a strategic hub of RHQs in Northeast Asia, it is urgent to initiate a structural reform of the Korean economy, politics, and overall society, to minimize the regulation of FDI, and to provide various incentives for foreign investment. Moreover, we propose the construction of an 'International Business Town' in the Seoul capital region, as a medium to intermediate these strategies and to shape them in a spatial scale. The projected 'International Business Town(IBT)' will be a 'free city' open to international business in which liberal economic activities are guaranteed by special legislation and administration, infrastructures needed for international and improved accessibility to the airport are furnished, and the preference of foreign high-income investors for cultural and living environment are satisfactorily met. IBT is conspicuously differentiated from a raft of other cities' incentives in that it combines deregulation and incentive programs to attract the investment of transnational capital, with a spatial program of offering an urban environment preferred by the high-income investors for cultural and living environment are satisfactorily met. IBT is conspicuously differentiated from a raft of other cities' incentives in that it combines deregulation and incentive programs to attract the investment of transnational capita, with a spatial program of offering an urban environment preferred by the high-income and managerial class. Furthermore, it can be an excellent way of overcoming the xenophobia that has spread among the Korean population by concentrating foreign businesses and their lifestyles in a specific foreign businesses and their lifestyles in a specific zone. In conclusion, 'International Business Town', in line with other legislative and administrative incentive programs, will function as a driving force to make the Seoul capital regional more competitive as a regional business hub in Northeast Asia.

• KDI Journal of Economic Policy
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• v.27 no.2
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• pp.205-237
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• 2005

This paper analyzes a mechanism through which product market competition affects allocation of the managerial efforts. There are two types of firms, incumbents and entrants. Each incumbent firm delegates its control to a manager and cannot observe the manager's total effort. The managers of incumbent firms allocate their effort to two different activities: cost reduction (productive effort) and rent protection (unproductive effort). An increase in competition, measured by the number of incumbent firms, has two effects: an "output effect" which decreases the managerial incentive for productive effort, and an "effort substitution effect" that makes managers exert more productive effort and less unproductive effort. This paper identifies the conditions under which product market competition lowers the cost of providing incentives for productive effort and hence, to the conclusion that increased competition leads to increased efficiency.

• Journal of Korea Technology Innovation Society
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• v.3 no.3
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• pp.36-52
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• 2000

This study takes an issue of efficiency analysis in the presence of network effect utilizing the DEA (Data Envelopment Analysis) framework. Network effect has important policy implication for the regulation of local monopolies which undertake their business through physical network, such as electricity, natural gas, local telephony, etc. If the difference in spatial condition between companies is not controlled properly, the performance comparison and associated incentive regulation bear significant bias. In this study, we propose a methodology to measure the true managerial or technical efficiency apart from efficiency difference accruing from the difference in spatial condition. A series of modified DEA efficiency models are combined to investigate the extent of exogenous and endogenous efficiency component in the Korean natural gas distribution companies. Empirical results show that the network effect plays significant role in determining superficial performance difference.