• Korean Security Journal
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• no.39
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• pp.319-353
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• 2014

Cyber-based technologies are now ubiquitous around the glob and are emerging as an "instrument of power" in societies, and are becoming more available to a country's opponents, who may use it to attack, degrade, and disrupt communications and the flow of information. The globe-spanning range of cyberspace and no national borders will challenge legal systems and complicate a nation's ability to deter threats and respond to contingencies. Through cyberspace, competitive powers will target industry, academia, government, as well as the military in the air, land, maritime, and space domains of our nations. Enemies in cyberspace will include both states and non-states and will range from the unsophisticated amateur to highly trained professional hackers. In much the same way that airpower transformed the battlefield of World War II, cyberspace has fractured the physical barriers that shield a nation from attacks on its commerce and communication. Cyberthreats to the infrastructure and other assets are a growing concern to policymakers. In 2013 Cyberwarfare was, for the first time, considered a larger threat than Al Qaeda or terrorism, by many U.S. intelligence officials. The new United States military strategy makes explicit that a cyberattack is casus belli just as a traditional act of war. The Economist describes cyberspace as "the fifth domain of warfare and writes that China, Russia, Israel and North Korea. Iran are boasting of having the world's second-largest cyber-army. Entities posing a significant threat to the cybersecurity of critical infrastructure assets include cyberterrorists, cyberspies, cyberthieves, cyberwarriors, and cyberhacktivists. These malefactors may access cyber-based technologies in order to deny service, steal or manipulate data, or use a device to launch an attack against itself or another piece of equipment. However because the Internet offers near-total anonymity, it is difficult to discern the identity, the motives, and the location of an intruder. The scope and enormity of the threats are not just focused to private industry but also to the country's heavily networked critical infrastructure. There are many ongoing efforts in government and industry that focus on making computers, the Internet, and related technologies more secure. As the national intelligence institution's effort, cyber counter-intelligence is measures to identify, penetrate, or neutralize foreign operations that use cyber means as the primary tradecraft methodology, as well as foreign intelligence service collection efforts that use traditional methods to gauge cyber capabilities and intentions. However one of the hardest issues in cyber counterintelligence is the problem of "Attribution". Unlike conventional warfare, figuring out who is behind an attack can be very difficult, even though the Defense Secretary Leon Panetta has claimed that the United States has the capability to trace attacks back to their sources and hold the attackers "accountable". Considering all these cyber security problems, this paper examines closely cyber security issues through the lessons from that of U.S experience. For that purpose I review the arising cyber security issues considering changing global security environments in the 21st century and their implications to the reshaping the government system. For that purpose this study mainly deals with and emphasis the cyber security issues as one of the growing national security threats. This article also reviews what our intelligence and security Agencies should do among the transforming cyber space. At any rate, despite of all hot debates about the various legality and human rights issues derived from the cyber space and intelligence service activity, the national security should be secured. Therefore, this paper suggests that one of the most important and immediate step is to understanding the legal ideology of national security and national intelligence.

• The Korean Journal of Air & Space Law and Policy
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• v.26 no.1
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• pp.271-297
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• 2011

Recently, risk of space accident possibility increased in according to commercial space activity and space debris. It failed launch satellite second times in South Korea. Therefore was discussed on liability and insurance issue. Generally, discuss of space insurance be divided two type. Firstly, space insurance relevant to launching satellite and in-orbit. Satellite Launch Insurance and In-Orbit Insurance by the Satellite Operator Secondly, space insurance relevant to Third Party Liability. The former is to protect owner of satellite and operator. The latter is to liable and indemnify owner of satellite and operator's liability. US, UK, France, Russia, South Korea forced to buy space insurance following to domestic law. This is a brief overview of risk allocation and insurance practices in the commercial space transportation industry today. We begin with traditional space transportation, i.e., commercial satellite launches. This is a mature industry with known players. Industry practices have developed and legislation has been adopted in the U.S. and other countries over the past decades to address liability and insurance issues. The primary focus here is on U.S. law, but the discussion of industry practice applies more generally. We then move on to a more exotic form of space transportation: Commercial human space flight. Several private companies are now signing up space tourists for commercial suborbital human space flight, advertised to become available in the near future. The United States amended its launch legislation in 2004 to promote commercial human space flight. But questions remain as to how this new industry will respond to the risk allocation regime established by the U.S. legislation, which leaves both the space flight operator and space tourist exposed to risk and potential liability. As a general proposition, state statutes and contractual waivers alone cannot be relied upon to provide adequate liability protection, and insurance will be required. Federally mandated contractual waivers by space flight participants or liability caps would be helpful to complement insurance solutions. Eventually, as the industry matures, such practices could be extended to an international legal regime. For all the issues mentioned above, I have studied the existing international treaties and several country's domestic law to the space by referring U.S's Commercial Space Launch Amendment Act of 2004 and concluded that uniform legal regime to govern these insurance issues should be established domestically and internationally in the future.

• The Korean Journal of Air & Space Law and Policy
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• v.28 no.2
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• pp.349-384
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• 2013

The Sputnik 1 launching in 1957 made the world recognize the necessity of international regulations on space development and activities in outer space. The United Nations established COPUOS the very next year, and adopted the mandate to examine legal issues concerning the peaceful uses of outer space. At the time, the military sector of the U.S.A. and the Soviet Union were in charge of the space development and they were not welcomed to discuss the prohibition of the military uses of outer space at the legal section in the COPUOS. Although both countries had common interests in securing the freedom of military uses in outer space. As the social and economic benefits derived from space activities have become more apparent, civil expenditures on space activities have continued to increase in several countries. Virtually all new spacefaring states explicitly place a priority on space-based applications to support social and economic development. Such space applications as satellite navigation and Earth imaging are core elements of almost every existing civil space program. Likewise, Moon exploration continues to be a priority for such established spacefaring states as China, Russia, India, and Japan. Recently, Companies that manufacture satellites and ground equipment have also seen significant growth. On 25 February 2012 China successfully launched the eleventh satellite for its indigenous global navigation and positioning satellite system, Beidou. Civil space activities began to grow in China when they were allocated to the China Great Wall Industry Corporation in 1986. China Aerospace Corporation was established in 1993, followed by the development of the China National Space Administration. In Japan civil space was initially coordinated by the National Space Activities Council formed in 1960. Most of the work was performed by the Institute of Space and Aeronautical Science of the University of Tokyo, the National Aerospace Laboratory, and, most importantly, the National Space Development Agency. In 2003 all this work was assumed by the Japanese Aerospace Exploration Agency(JAXA). Japan eases restrictions on military space development. On 20 June 2012 Japan passed the Partial Revision of the Cabinet Establishment Act, which restructured the authority to regulate Japanese space policy and budget, including the governance of the JAXA. Under this legislation, the Space Activities Commission of the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science, and Technology, which was responsible for the development of Japanese space program, will be abolished. Regulation of space policy and budget will be handed over to the Space Strategy Headquarter formed under the Prime Minister's Cabinet. Space Strategy will be supported by a Consultative Policy Commission as an academics and independent observers. By revoking Article 4 (Objectives of the Agency) of a law that previously governed JAXA and mandated the development of space programs for "peaceful purposes only," the new legislation demonstrates consistency with Article 2 of the 2008 Basic Space Law. In conformity with the principles laid down in the 1967 Outer Space Treaty JAXA is now free to pursue the non-aggressive military use of space. New legislation is the culmination of a decade-long process that sought ways to "leverage Japan's space development programs and technologies for security purposes, to bolster the nation's defenses in the face of increased tensions in East Asia." In this connection it would also be very important and necessary to create an Asian Space Agency(ASA) for strengthening cooperation within the Asian space community towards joint undertakings.

• Journal of Legislation Research
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• no.53
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• pp.525-551
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• 2017

This Article discusses the current trend of European competition damage actions focused on the recent Damage Directive and its transposition by the United Kingdom and Germany. The relevant Directive was signed into law in November 2014, and it requires the EU Member States to adopt certain measures to support competition damage actions. The required measures and principles by the Directive include right to full compensation, rebuttable presumption of harm, extensive disclosure of evidence, use of pass-on for defense and indirect purchaser suits. Although many Member States did not meet the deadline to transpose the Directive, the end of 2016, it is reported that 23 Member States have now, as of September 2017, made enactments according to the Directive. When we look at the transposition done by the United Kingdom and Germany, the revisions on their competition laws closely follow the contents of the Directive. However, it will take quite a long time before the amended provisions apply to actual cases since most of the new provisions apply to the infringement that take place after the date of the amendment. A similar situation regarding application time may happen in some other Member States. Furthermore, even if the terms of the competition laws of the Member States become similar following the Directive, the interpretations of the laws may differ by the courts of different countries. EU also does not have a tool to coordinate the litigations that are brought in different Member States under the same facts. It is true that the EU made a big step to enhance competition damage actions by enacting Damage Directive. However, it needs to take more time and resources to have settled system of competition private litigation throughout the Member States. Korea has also experienced increase in competition damage actions during the last fifteen years, and there have been some revisions of the relevant fair trade law as well as development of relevant legal principles by court decisions. Although there are some suggestions that Korea should have more enactments similar to the EU Directive, its seems wiser for Korea to take time to observe how EU countries actually operate competition damage actions after they transposed the Directive. Then, it will be able to gain some wisdom to adopt competition action measures that are suitable for Korean legal system and culture.

• Korean Security Journal
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• no.48
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• pp.259-285
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• 2016

As the need for anti-terrorism legislation has been continuously argued, Anti-terrorism act has been enacted and enforced. On the other hand, there still remain a lot of points to be discussed regarding the definition of the concept of terrorism, matters of human rights violations, strengthening authority of the investigation and intelligence agencies, and mobilization military forces for the suppression of terrorism. Also, reviewing Anti-terrorism act and its enforcement ordinance draft, this legislation seems to regulate terrorist groups like IS. If so, in the case of terrorism of North Korea or domestic anti-government organizations, whether this law would be applied could become an issue. In the case of terrorism of North Korea, Ministry of National Defense has a right of commandership in the military operations, however, it is also possible to apply the article 4 of Natural Security Act a crime of performing objective-or a crime of foreign exchange on Criminal law as legal grounds for not military terrorisms but general investigations. Therefore, it is necessary to involve consideration about this matter. Furthermore, in the view of investigation, Anti-terrorism act and its enforcement ordinance draft do not mention Supreme Prosecutors Office and Ministry of Justice that conduct investigations. In the case of terrorism, the police and prosecution should conduct to arrest criminals and determine crimes at the investigation stage, however, any explicit article related to this content in Anti-terrorism act and its enforcement ordinance draft was unable to be found. Although Anti-terrorism act is certainly toward preventive aspects, considering some matters such as prevention, actions on the scene, maneuver after terrorism, arresting terrorists, investigation direction, cooperation, and mutual assistance, it is necessary to reflect these contents in Anti-terrorism act. In other words, immediately after terrorists attacks, it is possible to mobilize the military operations by Integrated Defense act in order to arrest them in the case of military terrorism. Nevertheless, because both military terrorism and general one are included in the investigation stage, it needs to begin an investigation under the direction of the prosecution. Therefore, above all, a device for finding out the truth behind the case at the investigation stage is not reflected in the current Anti-terrorism act and its enforcement ordinance draft. Accordingly, if National Intelligence Service approaches information at the prevention level in this situation, it may be necessary to come up with follow-up measures of the police, the prosecution, and military units.

• Korean Security Journal
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• no.46
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• pp.113-140
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• 2016

Right to counsel means a defendant has a right to have the assistance of counsel (i.e., lawyers), and if the defendant cannot afford a lawyer, requires that the government appoint one or pay the defendant's legal expenses. The right to counsel is generally regarded as a constituent of the right to a fair trial. Historically, however, not all countries have always recognized the right to counsel. The right is often included in criminal law and constitutional law etc. First, any person who is arrested or detained shall have the right to prompt assistance of counsel. When a criminal defendant is unable to secure counsel by his own efforts, the State shall assign counsel for the defendant as prescribed by act in article 12(4) of the constitutional law. Second, the defense counsel or a person who desires to be a defense counsel may have an interview with the defendant or the suspect who is placed under physical restraint, deliver or receive any documents or things and have any doctor examine and treat the defendant or the suspect in article 34 of the criminal law. Nonetheless, problems about guarantee of the rights to counsel to the national security violators like spy terrorist and etc will be important for Koreans to consider. That is because national security violators's cases are qualitatively different from general criminal offense's cases and historically, lawyer obstruct a investigation in the process of examination of a suspect for national security violators. Therefore, this study suggest a way that a restriction the rights to counsel with an attorney in cases of the national security violators. To this end, in this paper, I touch on restriction of right to counsel during interrogation in the England and Germany etc in comparison to that of Korea and review Korea's Supreme Court decision and Constitution Court decision to understand the prospective and trends for Korean investigation procedure improvement.

• Korean Security Journal
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• no.29
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• pp.193-222
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• 2011

Our country successfully hosted the G20 summit in Seoul in November, 2010. Afterwards, however, the Yeonpyungdo shelling incident took place by the North, and the North Korean nuclear issue have strained interKorean relations. Our country is going to host the nuclear security summit, which is of great significance at this point of time. The nuclear security summit is to be attended by 47 countries. The participant countries of this summit is larger in number than those of the ASEM, APEC and the G20 summit that our country has ever hosted. That is a large-scale international conference that invites the UN, the IAEA and the EU, which are three major nuclear-related international organizations. A successful hosting of the nuclear security summit will serve as an opportunity to boost our country's national prestige, and is likely be beneficial to the settlement of the North Korean nuclear issue. Like other international submits in foreign countries, however, violent anti-globalization demonstrations are expected to occur when the nuclear security summit is held in April next year. The purpose of this study was to make a case analysis of demonstrations during multilateral international conferences hosted by foreign countries over ten years between 1999 and 2009, to examine the controversial points over the demonstrations, and ultimately to seek ways of ensuring safety against possible assemblies and demonstrations during the forthcoming nuclear security summit, which is scheduled to be held in April next year. The findings of the study on feasible security measures are as follows: First, information and intelligence gathering should be reinforced, and the inspection should be stepped up. Second, pacification among domestic NGOs and the supplementation of the existing legal devices are required. Third, publicity should be strengthened. Fourth, riot police officers should be selected as early as possible to bolster their education and training, and more reinforced emergency measures should be taken. It's needed to seek assistance from the military as one of emergency measures, and national defense readiness should be bolstered across the nation in collaboration with the Ministry of National Defense when the summit is near at hand. Finally, CBR countermeasures should be taken in preparation for CBR terrorism.