• Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
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• no.116
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• pp.1-28
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• 2017

Axel Honneth's recognition-theoretical conception of morality is most often characterized as a teleological or ethical foundation of morality and understood in simple consequentialist sense. Besides teleological or consequentialist components, however, there are obviously Kantian deontological ones too in his moral conception of Recognition. This study is intended to provide a consistent and coherent interpreta-tion of it, which is largely adopting main features of the moral philosophy of Kant. This interpretation makes a deontological restructuring of Honneth's moral conception of recognition necessary. It is in this way that the moral aspect of recognition will be able to satisfy the intention and whole project of Honneth's theory of recognition.

• Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
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• v.123
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• pp.57-86
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• 2012

Many contemporary philosophers argue that modern philosophy is only the philosophy being imprisoned in subject and consciousness without communicating other subjects with language. They criticize that it is solipsistic. Today, those who are taking part in the communication theory, hermeneutics, and de-constructivism are trying to overcome this problem. The practical philosophers, especially those who advocate communintarianism criticize that modern libertarianism is not free from the isolated autonomy and breaks the solidarity of the traditional community with treating formally others. They criticize Kant's philosophy in the same way. But it is unreasonable. Because Kant was not the philosopher who pursued the same philosophy of subjectivity and liberalism as the earlier modern philosophers pursued. He tried to criticize its limits and overcome them. Especially he did not remain within the modern subjectivity, but rather tried to come up with the inter-subjectivity communicating between subjects. He showed this side through the 'sensus communis'. He thought of a judgement of taste as an effect resulting from the free play between imagination and understanding, and postulated the 'sensus communis' as a ground of the universal validity of this judgement. Therefore this 'sensus communis' is the subjective principle of a judgement of taste. Furthermore, he did not treat this 'sensus communis' merely as a self-relation of a subject, but rather developed it into an communicative relation among subjects. This position of Kant enables us to seek the harmony between the aesthetic sphere and social-moral sphere, and to overcome the conflicts between the autonomy of the liberalism and the solidarity of the communitarianism. Especially, his 'sensus communis' can be developed into the 'critical hermeneutics' and the 'relational autonomy'. Therefore his 'sensus communis' has the possibility to overcome the negative points of the traditional community and the modern community, and to overcome the conflicts among the isolated selves occurring in today's society. Hence Kant's 'sensus communis' has still the important values in the contemporary philosophy, especially in the practical philosophy being now discussed over the relation between autonomy and solidarity.

• Journal of Elementary Mathematics Education in Korea
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• v.18 no.1
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• pp.1-17
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• 2014

Instructions for the commutative property of multiplication at elementary schools tend to be based on checking the equality between the quantities of 'a times b 'and b' times a, ' for example, $3{\times}4=12$ and $4{\times}3=12$. This article critically examined the approaches to teach the commutative property of multiplication from Kant's perspective of mathematical knowledge. According to Kant, mathematical knowledge is a priori. Yet, the numeric exploration by checking the equality between the amounts of 'a groups of b' and 'b groups of a' does not reflect the nature of apriority of mathematical knowledge. I suggest we teach the commutative property of multiplication in a way that it helps reveal the operational schema that is necessarily and generally involved in the transformation from the structure of 'a times b' to the structure of 'b times a.' Distributive reasoning is the mental operation that enables children to perform the structural transformation for the commutative property of multiplication by distributing a unit of one quantity across the other quantity. For example, 3 times 4 is transformed into 4 times 3 by distributing each unit of the quantity 3, which results in $3{\times}4=(1+1+1){\times}4=(1{\times}4)+(1{\times}4)+(1{\times}4)+(1{\times}4)=4+4+4=4{\times}3$. It is argued that the distributive reasoning is also critical in learning the subsequent mathematics concepts, such as (a whole number)${\times}10$ or 100 and fraction concept and fraction multiplication.

• Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
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• v.147
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• pp.215-237
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• 2018

The purpose of this study is to illuminate the precise nature and the central line of Kant's proof of the causal principle stated in the Second Analogy of the 2nd. edition of the Critique of Pure Reason. The study argues for the following thesis: 1. The proof of the Second Analogy concerns only the causal principle called the "every-event-some-cause" principle, and not the causal law(s) called the "same-cause-same-event" principle. 2. The goal of the proof is to establish the possibility of knowledge of an temporal order of successive states of an object. 3. The proof is broadly an single transcendental argument in two steps. The 1st. step is an analytic argument that infers from the given perceptions of an oder of successive states of an objects to the conclusion that the causal principle is the necessary condition for the objectivity of dies perceived order. The 2nd. step is a synthetic argument that infers from the formal nature of time to the conclusion that the causal principle is a necessary condition for die possibility of objective alterations and of empirical knowledge of these alterations. 4. The poof involves not the 'non sequitur' assumed by P. F. Strawson, that is, Kant infers not directly from a feature of our perceptions to a conclusion regarding the causal relations of distinct states of affairs that supposedly correspond to these perceptions.

• Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
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• no.99
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• pp.69-100
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• 2012

Die Gegenwart steht den Tatsachen der Gewalt gegenüber. Wesentlich destruktive Techniken können den kollektiven Tod des Menschen als Gattung produzieren. Die Destruktivität dieser Techniken ist durch Skeptizismus geistesgeschichtlich gerechtfertigt. Ebelings Fundamentalpragmatik ist Reflexionstheorie der widerstandsfähigen Vernunft, welche einer Sozialisierung derjenigen Gewalt widersteht, die in einer gegenwärtigen Aussicht auf universale Selbstdestruktion des Menschen Tod produziert. Selbstbewußtsein (Apperzeption) ist bei Kant Selbstbewußtsein in Gegenstandsbewußtsein. Mit kritischer Auslegung von Kant zeigt Heidegger endlich, daß der Tod der Selbstbeziehung des konkreten Daseins als des In-der-Welt-seins gehört. Aber seine existenziale Analytik berücksichtigt nur individuelles Dasein zum Tode und vernachlässigt die Allgemeinheit des menschlichen Todes bzw. die dem allgemeinen Untergang widerstehende Vernunft. Apel kritisiert ein solipsistisches Erbe von Kants Bewußtseinsphilosophie und präsentiert ein Argument der Letztbegründung zur Überwindung des Skeptizismus. Aber seine Transzendentalpragmatik vernachlässigt die Endlichkeit des menschen und zeigt ein Defizit der fundamentalpragmatischen Vereinigung der Vernunft und des Todes. Aufgrund des gegenwärtigen Todesbewußtseins, das Heideggers Todesdeutung transformiert, rekonstruiert Ebelings Existentialpragmatik Heideggers Dasein zu Existenzsubjekt. Seine Fundamentalpragmatik vollzieht diejenige Erstbegründung, die zwischen der existentialpragmatischen Endbegründung des Todes und der transzendentalpragmatischen Letztbegründung vermittelt, und damit bestimmt sie Vernunft als Widerstandsbewußtsein (das bewußte Sein) gegen den Tod. Also ist sie neue transzendentalphilosophische Bewußtseinsphilosophie, die mit der neuen Selbstbestimmung der Vernunft entwickelt wird.

• East Asian mathematical journal
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• v.27 no.4
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• pp.453-470
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• 2011

Arithmetic education is based not only on concept but also fundamentally on intuition. Pestalozzi understood time, a Kant's transcendental intuition, as numbers, a form of cognition, so that he considered intuition essential in arithmetic education. Pestalozzi and Herbart also recommended the intuitive arithmetic education. Significance of the arithmetic education based on intuition resides in the fact that arithmetic, an expression of nature and the world, is succeeded to modern arithmetic education because numbers, a cornerstone of mathematics, are symbolized as a law of mind reasoning.

• East Asian mathematical journal
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• v.28 no.4
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• pp.403-417
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• 2012

We can understand in the context of kant's philosophy the intuitive geometry education arguing that geometry education should begin with intuition. Both Pestalozzi and Herbart advocate a connection between geometry and intuition as well as a close relationship between geometry and the world. Significance of the intuitive geometry education resizes in the fact that geometry becomes both an example of and a principle of general cognition. The intuitive geometry education uses figures as an educational foundation in the transcendental condition for the main agent of cognition. In this regard, the intuitive geometry education provides grounds for the human character development.

• Journal of Dental Anesthesia and Pain Medicine
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• v.24 no.3
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• pp.223-225
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• 2024

• Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
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• no.89
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• pp.37-67
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• 2010

The 21 Century is definded as an age of culture or image characterized by the fact, that modern society are being overwhelmed with virtual reality, that is full of visual images. The cultural concentration on the visual image and the excessive tendency to attend it become not only today but also ever as the leading style of culture. Nevertheless, it is particularly noteworthy that the visual image has become so one of the basic conditions of modern society, that one holds it as the society of the spectacle. So can the problem of seeing that resulted from the oculocentric culture, that is the problem of the fundamental relationship between the world and the eyes of human beings, be examined in the phenomenological sense. For this study, I believe that 『Phenomenologie de la Perception』 of Merleau-Ponty provides a important approach. The theme of this study is to refer, first, how man has dealt with the seeing in the history of philosophy, such as Plato, Kant, and Merleau-Ponty, who although not the anti-oculocentricism, but also makes serious reflection about an excess of visual images. Second, it is to explain what characteristics and problems are located in these considerations, and thirdly, it must be brought into the light, what is the essence of the seeing with regard to the beauty, the truth and the morality.

• Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
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• v.131
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• pp.165-197
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• 2014

In this paper, I investigate on the human nature in philosophy of Wang Yang-Ming and Buddhism from a Kantian point of view. The core argument of the philosophy of Wang Yang-Ming, Buddhism and Kant is that all human beings have the pure abilities a priori to overcome themselves, to realize their own potentialities. This is called immanent transcendence. At this time human beings can be free. Kant, Wang Yang-Ming and Buddhism claim that all human beings themselves will overcome their desires from their mind and body through the immanent transcendence, reflection and contemplation on their own. When we give up the external knowledges, throw away obsessions with the selfish desires and go back to our inside, we can see our original nature. To have an insight into this inner nature, to respect the moral law a priori, this is to overcome the ourselves, and to be a Grate Man(聖人) and a Buddha. This way is the only way to be a Grate Man and a Buddha. The main proposition of Wang Yang-Ming's philosophy is expressed 'There are no things without mind.'(心外無物) The core of Kant's transcendental philosophy is called the Copernican Revolution by himself. Copernican Revolution means the transition from the object-centered epistemology to the subject-centered epistemology. 'Innate Knowing'(良知) and 'Perform Innate Knowing'(致良知), 'All human beings have the mind of Buddha'(一切衆生悉有佛性) contain the apriority, immanence of Moral Law. In this respect, the theory of Innate Knowing in Wang Yang-Ming and mind of Buddha in Buddhism, pure Moral Law in Kant has the same structure grounded in subjectivity. Even if we have the mind of Buddha, innate Knowing, moral law a priori, the reason why we don't know our original nature is that we fall into the obsessions with selfish desires, and that we have inclination to external interests. So the moment you see our original nature, ordinary people themselves turn into a Buddha. These changes and transitions are immanent transcendence. All human beings have the ability to do this changes and transitions. Buddha does not exist outside of us, but it exists with our reflections on our human nature. Buddha can not existed without our insight into the our innate Ego. Where there is our original nature, there is a Buddha. So Buddha is called the another name of the original figure of human beings.