• Culinary science and hospitality research
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• v.15 no.1
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• pp.254-270
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• 2009

As consumers are becoming more conscious about food safety and high quality standards, they are getting more interested in influencing the food policy-making process. Triggered by FTA (Free Trade Agreement) ratification between the Republic of Korea and the U.S. in 2008, a sharp conflict was created in importing U.S. beef between the government of Republic of Korea and its people. Food selection is known as a complex mental process of consumers, which incorporates social and cultural values, personal tastes, and other psychological factors. This study utilized the concept of antinomy which was signified by Immanuel Kant in his thesis. The concept of antinomy indicates a contradiction between conclusions which seem equally logical, reasonable or necessary. This study is designed to investigate the changes in the amount of beef consumption among Korean consumers after the Republic of Korea resumed U.S. beef imports and the impact of a consumer's trust in the U.S. on his/her antinomic acceptance. Also, it examined the effects of antinomic acceptance and whether a consumer is a potential restaurateur or a general consumer on the changes in the amount of beef consumption.

• Trans-
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• v.4
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• pp.65-86
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• 2018

In this paper, I chose one of various agenda for life in a philosophical film world view and explored the core of dialectical relation between free will and responsibility. Freedom and responsibility, Existential and inferiority, etc, The conflict of humanity on the crisis of faith have been A comparative study based on the discussions of East Asian religious philosophy and Western philosophy. Including compare the three commonalities and differences with Jean Paul Sartre's 'subjectivity ideology due to the existence of free will' on existentialism in contemporary Western philosophy and The theory of the 'moral autonomy originating in the good will' of the Enlightenment philosopher Immanuel Kant and Concept of 'consciousness' of the life essence of Keiji Nishitani Based on the analysis of the film. In addition, the problem of free will in the viewpoint of nature, along with the individual's point of view, is comprehensively supplemented by the idea of the "nothingness" of the philosopher Zhuang Zhou. A selection of the Polish film Dekalog: Eight and make a basic conclusion of the final by argumentation and analysis as a case of the dialectical relation between the free will and responsibility.

• Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
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• v.131
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• pp.131-163
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• 2014

This Paper aims to elaborate on the origin of thinking mind. And this is a cooperative project between philosophy and neuroscience and brain science. I have written this paper in admiration for the achievements of twentieth century neuroscience and brain science, and out of desire to assist the subject in future. Much of the history of modern philosophy, from Descartes and Kant forward, consists of failed models of brain. As Edward O. Wilson precisely said, the shortcoming is not the fault of the philosophers, who have doggedly pushed their methods to the limit, but a straightforward consequence of the biological evolution of the brain. Guiding that investigation down pathways that will illuminate brain research is a task of neuroscience and brain science. Investigating logical relations among concepts is a philosophical task. If we are to understand the neural structures and dynamics that make perception, thought, intentional behaviour possible, clarity about these concepts and categories and their relations is essential. Hence our joint venture of philosophy and science. Sure, it is human beings that perceives, not parts of its brain. And it is human beings that who think and reason, not their brain. But the brain and its activities make it possible for human beings-not for it-to perceive and think, to feel emotions, and to form and pursue projects. Thus We try to investigate and reveal the origin of thinking mind as follow: 1) The difference between chimpanzee and human beings 2) brain and mind 3) the origin of thinking 4) the wisdom of nature.

• Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
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• v.129
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• pp.247-265
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• 2014

In this paper I will undertake three tasks: first, to identify the difference between John Rawls's liberal conception of liberty and Will Kymlicka's; second, to briefly examine the problems with liberal conception of liberty; finally, to propose a certain alternative that will be able to make liberal conception of liberty more meaningful In Kymlicka's view, Rawls seems to fail to make the best defence of freedom of choice because he wants to explain of individual freedom on the basis of Kant's moral theory about liberty. Kymlicka thinks that it is not a desirable way of defending liberal conception of liberty. According to his liberal theory, Rawls's defence of freedom of choice might make us think that we should have our freedom of choice for its own sake because freedom is the most valuable in the world. So Kymlicka wants to provide stronger argument to defend freedom of choice in liberalism. He insists that it is our projects and tasks that are most important things in our lives. Furthermore, he argues that we should conceive our freedom of choice as a precondition for pursuing those projects and practices that are valued for our good lives. Now I want to look at two concepts of liberty in liberalism with Rawls's theory and Kymlicaka's. In this paper, I shall look at criticisms of the liberal account of freedom of choice. These would give us a certain chance for understanding true freedom.

• Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
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• v.130
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• pp.23-45
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• 2014

It can be said that Scheler's theory of perception is the theory of drive-conditioned perception, in more detail the theory of drive-motoric conditions of perception. Scheler tells us that Immanuel Kant and Ernst Mach were mistaken in their assumption that sensations are purely receptive and primary in all experience. He claims that sensations are not primary but subsequent to a subliminal attention of vital drives(called 'Vor-Liebe und Vor-Interesse' by him). And because sense perception cannot take place without a vital energy of drives that account for the ongoing activity of perception, no object can be perceived unless it stimulates movement in an organism which exercises a count-movement against objects and thereby resisting objects. According to Scheler, an order of foundation such as the preexistence of images prior to perception; the priority of perception with regard to functions of senses; the priority of sense functions with regard to sensations has to be kept in mind. And it has to be kept in mind that the essence of life is pre-empirical, is pure becoming(Werden) and unbecoming(Entwerden), a process in which its two empirical sides are not yet separated. Then it is easy to see that perception is conditioned by vital drives. The drive-conditioned theory of perception is also supported by the fact that the motility of an organism determines its sensory apparatus, an organism has an alphabet of senses that can serve as signs of luring and noticing objects that are meaningful for its drive-motoric behavior. For example a lizard remains undisturbed by a gun shot but runs away from the slightest noise in the grass.

• Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
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• v.148
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• pp.357-377
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• 2018

In order to concludes that human being is in the making, not a being already perfectly made, this paper goes through four steps. The first step raises a question that human being is only a being of reason. The Kant's assertion that human being has a moral capacity of 'good will' seems to be distorted portrait of human being. The second step calls into a question that human being can obey universal moral laws. Any universal moral law can't be obeyed by moral agent, because he can't exclude his external situations which are ceaselessly changing. Nevertheless imperatives of reason which require to obey the universal moral laws seems to be a 'unfortunate legacy' to human being. The third step demonstrates that imperatives of reason are originated from dualism which have dichotomize "mind vs. body" as "internal capacity vs. external situation". According to dualism, imperatives of reason require internal capacity to exclude emotions or desires which are sensitive to external influences. The fourth step discusses that interacting of inner and outer is to be necessary for human being. Then, reason is to be really in one glove with emotions which are beginning form externals, otherwise reason can't stop being powerless to any external situation. Concludingly any human being is to be processing to a new being, not situating any extreme antagonism of "reason vs. emotion". Because of emotional human animal, not a perfect god, humans being is in the ceaseless process into the making a new self.

• Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
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• v.123
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• pp.441-465
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• 2012

In der Kritik der reinen Vernunft entfaltet sich die Lehre des $Selbstbewu{\ss}tseins$, die in sich die verschiedene Auffassungen ${\ddot{u}}ber$ das transzendentale Ich $enth{\ddot{a}}lt$. $Demgem{\ddot{a}}{\ss}$ ist das transzendentale Ich einerseits das Ich als reine $Selbstt{\ddot{a}}tigkeit$. Die Vorstellung des Ich $dr{\ddot{u}}ckt$ insofern als die intellektuelle Vorstellung ${\ddot{u}}ber$ die spontane Handlung des denkenden Ich die numerische Einheit oder die Einfachheit der verschiedenen Handlungen desselben aus. Aber andererseits ist das transzendentale Ich im $Selbstbewu{\ss}tsein$ das Ich als den Gegenstand ${\ddot{u}}berhaupt$. Das Ich als Gegenstand ${\ddot{u}}berhaupt$ ist gerade das Ich als Gegenstand des inneren Sinnes oder das empirische Ich ${\ddot{u}}berhaupt$. In diesem Sinne $dr{\ddot{u}}ckt$ das $Selbstbewu{\ss}tsein$ die unbestimmte Wahrnehmung ${\ddot{u}}berhaupt$, oder apprehensio simplex aus. Auf diese Weise $enth{\ddot{a}}lt$ das transzendentale Ich im Selbstbewusstsein in sich die doppelseitigen Momente. Das Ich im $Selbstbewu{\ss}tsein$ ist einerseits das Ich als das denkende Subjekt, $n{\ddot{a}}mlich$ das logische Ich, aber andererseits zugleich das Ich als das wharnehmende Subjekt, das psychologische Ich ${\ddot{u}}berhaupt$. Und diese doppelseitigen Momente des Ichs unterscheiden sich voneinander, aber zugleich auch $dr{\ddot{u}}cken$ in sich ein und dasselbe Ich aus. Dennoch ist das Problem der Einheit und Entzweiung des Ich im Selbstbewusstsein bleibt in der Kritik der reinen Vernunft als ein $unerkl{\ddot{a}}rbares$, $unaufl{\ddot{o}}sbares$ $R{\ddot{a}}tzel$. Eben mit diesem Problem setzt Kant sich im Opus potumum ernsthaft auseinander und $l{\ddot{o}}st$ dieses Problem durch eine neue Lehre des $Selbstbewu{\ss}tseins$ oder die Lehre der Selbstsezung auf.

• Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
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• v.120
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• pp.109-130
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• 2011

The main purpose of this paper is to examine Putnam's recent conception of ethics, and show that it gives rise to an ineluctable incoherence with his rationalism. This suggests that Putnam's philosophy has to be far more naturalized to make his new position cogent. Putnam recently has shown some explicit turn toward pragmatism a la James and Dewey under the name of "pragmatic pluralism." Putnam says that traditional ethics has presupposed some form of ontology in one way or another, which he sees is based on an unnecessary pursuit of a misleading conception of objectivity. Putnam tries to get rid of any notion of ontology in ethics, whereby we can talk about a third view which runs between traditional objectivism and nihilistic relativism. In this sense, he defines pragmatism as "fallibilism cum antiskepticism." Putnam's suggestion makes a good sense as far as it goes. However, his continuous transition toward pragmatism is critically impeded by his own adhesion to the normative conception of "reason." In this light, Putnam himself is wobbling between Kant and Dewey, just as he describes ethics is. Dewey's pragmatism does not have recourse to the very notion of reason to secure objectivity necessary to make sense of moral experience. Putnam needs to be far more naturalized to reach cogently where he espouses, and this can be done only by renouncing the normative conception of reason.

• Journal of Ethics
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• no.82
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• pp.73-125
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• 2011

This article aims to search for moral educational implication of J. D. Greene's recent neuro-scientific approaches to deontological ethics. Recently new technique in neuroscience such as fMRI is applied to moral and social psychological concepts or terms, and 'affective primacy' and 'automaticity' principles are highlighted as basic concepts of the new paradigm. When these principles are introduced to ethical theories, it makes rooms of new and different interpretations of them. J. D. Greene et al. claim that deontological moral judgments or theories are just a kind of post hoc rationalization for intuitions or emotions by ways of neuroscientific findings and evolutionary interpretation. For example, Kant's categorical imperative in which a maxim should be universalizable to be as a principle, might be a product of moral intuition. Firstly this article tries to search for intellectual backgrounds of the social intuitionalism where Greens' thought originates. Secondly, this article tries to collect and summarize his arguments about moral dilemma responses, personal-impersonal dilemma catergorizing hypothesis, fMRI data interpretations by ways of evolutionary theory, cultural and social psychological theories, application to deontological and consequential theories, and his suggestion that deontological ethics shoud be rejected as a normative ethical thought and consequentialism be a promising theory etc. Thirdly, this tries to analyse and critically exam those aspects and argumentation, especially from viewpoints of the ethicists whose various strategies seek to defeat Greene's claims. Fourthly, this article criticizes that his arguments make a few critical mistakes in methodology and data interpretation. Last, this article seeks to find its implications for moral education in korea, in which in spite of incomplete argumentation of his neuroscientific approach to morality, neuroethics needs to be introduced as a new approach and educational content, and critical materials as well.