• Korea Trade Review
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• v.44 no.1
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• pp.301-319
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• 2019

This study is to review the Joseon government's attempt to recover the tariff autonomy lost in the course of entering into the unequal treaty with then-Japan government, as well as the practical effort to realize such an attempt. Among other attempts, the Joseon government ① began imposing tariffs starting September 1878 by establishing Dumopo Customs Office in Busan, ② dispatched on April 1881 a group of investigators to the competent authorities to review and look back the Joseon's tariff system against Japan and ③ entered into a tariff negotiation with then-Japan government on September 1881 with the emissary (Susinsa) Byeong-ho Jo representing the Joseon government. A series of these attempts, in line with each other, represents the Joseon government's ceaseless, constant effort to recover the tariff autonomy, which is what this study intends to review from the modern-day perspectives. Authored by Byeong-ho Jo to capture an advantageous position in the 1881's tariff negotiation against then-Japan government, 「Joilseui」 successfully represented the Joseon government's position on matters of ① the Japanese tax-autonomous district in Korea, ② defining tariff rates, ③ use of Japanese Yen for payment of tariffs, ④ effective period of the treaty and ⑤ export restrictions on grains. Failure of the Joseon government's attempt to recover the Tariff autonomy was attributable not only to, as 「Joilseui」 defined, ① governments' non-cooperative attitudes on the negotiation table, ② lack of authorities that the entrusted bodies had, ③ import tariffs defined high and ④ export restrictions on grains and red ginseng, but also to loss of the tariff autonomy in 1876 and the 1881's negotiation broken down that were plotted by then-Japan government's invasive policy.

• International Commerce and Information Review
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• v.14 no.1
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• pp.273-299
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• 2012

Japan's customs ensure the safety of international trade and trade facilitation has been pursuing. To do this, AEO was introduced to this system and expanding the supply chain currently maintain security and improve customer convenience is necessary to continue to be pursued. In addition, the imposition of customs duties in accordance with changes in the environment to Tariff offenders and increased the amount of tax evasion, smuggling of narcotics, including amphetamines and response, the increase in access is required. In this paper, Japan's tariff and customs administration for the change in the future for Japan-related materials around the Treasury Department's analysis will attempt to draw implications for this.

• International Area Studies Review
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• v.13 no.2
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• pp.41-65
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• 2009

This study based on international input-output model shows various static analyses of the effects by estimating the intermediary goods' trade volume that affects the industrial production. When concluding tariff removal between Korea and Japan, as intermediary goods import increases, Korea's trade balance deficit with Japan is expected to grow more than before. However, Korea's increase in export to the world is the largest benefit Korea can earn from tariff removal between the two countries.

• Journal of Contemporary Eastern Asia
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• v.15 no.1
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• pp.41-63
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• 2016

Energy policy is known to have higher path dependency among policy fields (Kuper and van Soest, 2003; OECD, 2012; Kikkawa, 2013) and is a critical component of the infrastructure development undertaken in the early stages of nation building. Actor roles, such as those played by interest groups, are firmly formed, making it unlikely that institutional change can be implemented. In resource-challenged Japan, energy policy is an especially critical policy area for the Japanese government. In comparing energy policy making in Japan and Germany, Japan’s policy community is relatively firm (Hartwig et al., 2015), and it is improbable that institutional change can occur. The Japanese government’s approach to energy policy has shifted incrementally in the past half century, with the most recent being the 2012 implementation of the “Feed-In Tariff Law” (Act on Special Measures Concerning Procurement of Renewable Electric Energy by Operators of Electric Utilities), which encourages new investment in renewable electricity generation and promotes the use of renewable energy. Yet, who were the actors involved and the factors that influenced the establishment of this new law? This study attempts to assess the factors associated with implementing the law as well as the roles of the relevant major actors. In answering this question, we focus on identifying the policy networks among government, political parties, and interest groups, which suggests that success in persuading key economic groups could be a factor in promoting the law. Our data is based on the “Global Environmental Policy Network Survey 2012-2013 (GEPON2)” which was conducted immediately after the March 11, 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake with respondents including political parties, the government, interest groups, and civil society organizations. Our results suggest that the Feed in Tariff (FIT) Law’s network structure is similar to the information network and support network, and that the actors at the center of the network support the FIT Law. The strength of our research lays in our focus on political networks and their contributing mechanism to the law’s implementation through analysis of the political process. From an academic perspective, identifying the key actors and factors may be significant in explaining institutional change in policy areas with high path dependency. Close examination of this issue also has implications for a society that can promote renewable and sustainable energy resources.

• Korea Trade Review
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• v.45 no.1
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• pp.101-118
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• 2020

This study aims to quantify the effects of non-tariff measures (NTMs) on exports in the Korean manufacturing industry. To do this, we employ product-level export data that includes information about whether or not a product is affected by NTMs. One of the main results is that NTMs (SPS/TBT) on average led to reduction in Korean exports. However, the effects of NTMs differed depending on the income level of the NTM-imposing country. The NTMs imposed by high-income countries, such as U.S.A. and Japan, were found to impede Korean exports, whereas the export effect of NTMs imposed by low-income countries such as China was found to not be statistically significant. In addition, the results analyzed based across industries, income level, and types of NTMs are as follows. First, NTMs imposed on textile-related products generally hindered exports regardless of the type of NTMs, but its negative impact on exports was noticeable in the case of NTMs originating from high-income countries. On the other hand, chemical product-related NTMs were found to lead to an increase in Korean exports, and it had a positive effect in the case of SPS imposed by low-income countries. In other industries except for textile- and chemical-related products, the effects of NTMs on exports were either statistically insignificant or showed inconsistent patterns.

• KDI Journal of Economic Policy
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• v.14 no.2
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• pp.29-54
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• 1992

Recent studies on the economic effects of trade liberalization and economic integration have emphasized the significant gains associated with product differentiation and scale economies. Securing access to markets in other countries will make it possible to increase product variety and capture scale economies, thus, expanding the gains from trade. Liberalization is also expected to introduce foreign competition into the previously closed market. Concurrently, the liberalization will improve the competitive market environment for firms selling in the domestic market. Firms will be pressed to either exit or reduce cost. The output per firm, then, will increase due to the exit of rival firms, and the average total cost will decline due to the economies of scale. 'Rationalization' of the production process will eventually follow. This paper addresses the economic effects of (counterfactual) bilateral tariff elimination between Korea and Japan. It computationally assesses the gains from liberalization as well as the resource allocations and welfare effects associated with the tariff reduction. The endogenous determination of the key parameters distinguishes this paper from others. The firm's perceived elasticity of demand and elasticity of substitution in the present model are calibrated to be consistent with the base year data. Korea, Japan, and the rest of the world are modeled explicitly. The sectoral coverage of the model includes twenty-three tradable product categories based on three-digit SITC industries and seven nontradable categories based on one-digit SITC industries. Product categories are also classified into perfectly competitive and imperfectly competitive ones. In the imperfectly competitive industries, product differentiation exists at the firm level, while the perfectly competitive industries are characterized by national product differentiation. The simulation results of bilateral tariff reduction are reported. Tariff elimination tends to increase intra-industry trade flows so that the total amount of exports and imports of both countries expand. Yet, Japan is expected to increase the bilateral trade surplus in the wake of the mutual tariff reduction. Terms-of-trade for Korea will not change, while for Japan it will deteriorate. Equivalent variations reflecting the change in consumer surplus (welfare) will favor Korean consumers. Total output, however, will not change substantially, recording 0.5 and 0.6% for Japan and Korea, respectively. An interesting finding in the analysis is that the gains from increased competition and scale efficiency are not as prevailing as expected in theory.

• Journal of Industrial Convergence
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• v.21 no.5
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• pp.43-50
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• 2023

The South Korean government announced its plan to pursue membership in the CPTPP in 2022, aiming to establish a stable supply chain within the Asia-Pacific region. The CPTPP, led by Japan, was ratified in 2018 by 11 countries with the goal of eliminating tariffs and establishing new trade rules. According to our analysis, since the implementation of the CPTPP, there has been a trade promotion effect among Japan and member countries, with greater effects observed in countries with higher GDP per capita and closer geographical distance. As long as tariff elimination and reduction proceed as planned, the trade promotion effects are expected to expand gradually. However, the expansion of trade between Japan and CPTPP member countries may also indicate a relative contraction in trade with non-member countries, potentially posing a threat to the stable supply chain in the Korean industry within the Asia-Pacific region. As Japan is Korea's fourth-largest trading partner, it is necessary to carefully consider the impact of CPTPP on Japan's future trade with member countries and engage in discussions regarding Korea's participation and negotiation content based on a thorough examination of the matter.

• Korea Trade Review
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• v.43 no.5
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• pp.47-66
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• 2018

This study analyzes the potential economic effects of a trade war between the U.S. and China. The CGE model is used to estimate the macroeconomic variables of each country and the change in imports/exports by industry by considering three different scenarios: (i) the US imposes a 25% of tariff on China; (ii) the US and China impose a 25% tariff bilaterally; (iii) the United States expands protection in vehicles and metals to Korea, Japan, and the EU. According to the results of the study, when the US and China initiate a trade war, GDP and welfare of both countries decline. China's decline in GDP and welfare are larger than those of the United States, which implies a trade war is more favorable to the U.S. than to China. In the long run, China's GDP and welfare decline widens further. While the trade volumes of the US and China are greatly reduced, the trade volumes of other countries does not significantly fluctuate. Finally, if the US extends protection policy to Korea, Japan and the EU, it creates undesirable effects on the US. In particular, damage to the US jeopardizes its advantageous position in a trade war with China. In order to emphasize the unfairness of protectionist policy and the damage to Korean industry, Korea needs to establish a strategy to counter US protectionist policy.

• International Journal of Advanced Culture Technology
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• v.7 no.4
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• pp.63-68
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• 2019

Recently, the United States and China have declared a 25% retaliatory tariff for the partner country products of 50 billion dollar scale. "Trade war" is getting full swing. Such conflicts between economic powers may spread to Japan like the domino phenomenon following the EU (European Union) and become bigger in the global trade war. As a result, Korea has an economic system with a high degree of external dependence, and there is an expert's analysis that it will become the largest victim of the global trade war. If the WTO Dispute Settlement Authority approves this US 301 retaliation measure in the same way as the past case (US-EU hormone-treated beef imports), the United States will not import any Chinese imported products Chinese products) can be imposed. If the US launches a special 301 or super 301, which is stronger than the regular 301, then China is very likely to enforce US retaliation against it, and the trade war between the two countries could become a reality. This phenomenon is likely to have a negative impact on Korean companies. In particular, Korea, which is highly reliant on intermediate goods exports to China, is expected to suffer a great deal of damage. Therefore, Korea needs flexible response at home and abroad, it is necessary to enhance the autonomy of companies and protect export industries. Adjusting corporate tax rate as well as domestic industry height will be one way. The long-term (21 months) trade war between the United States and China has resulted in economic uncertainty. The resulting damage must be compensated. It is necessary to prepare the compensation through the economic council between countries. In the future, the punitive damage compensation system should be introduced.

• Journal of Navigation and Port Research
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• v.26 no.4
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• pp.363-372
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• 2002

Recently, mutual economy cooperation in Northeast Asia has leaded steady growth among main countries of it and rather promoted a single economy circle. In this region, Busan container port competes with min container ports in China, Taiwan and Japan in it for attracting transshipment container traffic of north-Shanghai in China and for-east Russia. Therefore, this paper aims to suggest competitive strategies for Busan container port to attract container traffic in Northeast Asia To do so, it evaluates the preference of important ports in the competitive situation and competitiveness edgy of important ports in Northeast Asia, and finally proposes the relative order of important factors. Based on the evaluation of it, first, the Busan ports hue tn strengthen port facilities to attract more traffic and in detail, reinforce the number of berth, yard areas and handling equipment Second, they also have to provide high quality of services to deliver cargos in time, not being damaged and swiftly response to shipowner and shipper's claim, Third, they need to review the strategy to adopt flexible tariff policy and to invest the profit from tariff in port service and facilities, as providing higher port tariff level by a regular rate.