• Strategy21
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• 통권40호
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• pp.5-36
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• 2016

Recently, the Japanese government revised the three guidelines of its security policy, the National Security Strategy(NSS), the National Defense Program Outline and Midterm Defense Buildup Plan, exceptionally at one time. This means Japan has been seeking the new strategy and strengthening military power considering changing regional security environment. Moreover, Japan revised the security laws for the right to collective self-defense, which authorized the use of force even when Japan is not under attack. Also, Japan renewed the Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation in twenty years, and has expanded JSDF's scope of activity to a worldwide level. These changes imply Japan would constantly seek to build military forces focusing on naval forces. Because Japan's naval forces, the JMSDF is the means that allow Japan to use its force at anywhere overseas and expand its roles and missions in international society by the basis of the right to collective self-defense. This research will analyze Japan's new maritime strategy and trend of force development and eventually look for the implication on our maritime security These days, Japan has perceived Chinese rapid increase of naval power and pursuing of maritime hegemony as a grave threat. In response to this, Japan is designing new maritime strategy, which are "remote islands defense and recapture" and proactively develop a new type of naval forces to accomplish this new strategy. The Japan's "remote island defense and recapture strategy" is to harden its defensive posture in Nansei islands which correspond to China's 1st island chain for chinese A2/AD strategy and directly encounter with China and to protect its own dominium and maritime interest while supporting US national strategy in East Asia. Japan continues to build compact, multi-functional ship to accomplish "remote island defense and recapture strategy" and keep strengthening its maritime power projection capability to include build of new amphibious ship, and large, multi-functional ship which can provide effective C2. These changes imply that Japan is shifting its strategy from passive and defensive to proactive and aggressive way and continues to pursue naval buildup.The implication of Japan's new maritime strategy and naval buildup needs to be observed carefully and we need to keep developing naval power required to protect our maritime sovereignty and interest.

• Strategy21
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• 통권43호
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• pp.175-199
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• 2018

Recent marine territorial disputes in the East China Sea and the South China Sea have come to us as a great threat. China, which has recently established the China Coast Guard and has rapidly developed maritime security forces, is trying to overcome the various conflict countries with its power. Japan is also strengthening intensively its maritime security forces. Since Korea, China, and Japan are geographically neighboring and sharing maritime space in Northeast Asia, there is no conflict between maritime jurisdiction and territorial rights among the countries. The struggle for initiative in the ocean is fierce among the three coastal nations in Northeast Asia. therefore, Korea needs more thorough preparation and response to protect the marine sovereignty. As the superpowers of China and Japan are confronted and the United States is involved in the balance of power in strategic purposes, the East Asian sea area is a place where tension and conflict environment exist. China's illegal fishing boats are constantly invading our waters, and they even threaten the lives of our police officers. The issue of delimiting maritime boundaries between Korea and China has yet to be solved, and is underway in both countries, and there is a possibility that the exploration activities of the continental shelf resources may collide as the agreement on the continental shelf will expire between Korea and Japan. On the other hand, conflicts in the maritime jurisdictions of the three countries in Korea, China and Japan are leading to the enhancement of maritime security forces to secure deterrence rather than military confrontation. In the situation where the unresolved sovereignty and jurisdiction conflicts of Korea, China and Japan continue, and the competition for the strengthening of the maritime powers of China and Japan becomes fierce, there is a urgent need for stabilization and enhancement of the maritime forces in our country. It is necessary to establish a new long-term strategy for enhancing the maritime security force and to carry out it. It is expected that the Korean Coast Guard, which once said that it was a model for the establishment of China's Coast Guard as a powerful force for the enforcement of the maritime law, firmly establishes itself as a key force to protect our oceans with the Navy and keeps our maritime sovereignty firmly.

• Strategy21
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• 통권38호
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• pp.13-46
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• 2015

Dokdo issue reaches beyond economic and security interest to Koreans, as it is regarded as symbol of her independence. Albeit the fact that Japan has merely no legitimate title over Dokdo, Japan has been tenaciously insisting their jurisdiction over Dokdo since the independence of Korea. Under such circumstances, public outrage towards Japan is most certainly understandable. Yet, mere outrage itself, lacking in logic and factual grounds, can contribute little if not any, to the desirable solution of the problem. Precedents reveal that dealing maritime issues amid lack of profound understanding in international law has often led to undesirable results, such as the inclusion of Dokdo in the Joint Management Fisheries Zone in 1999 Korea-Japan Fisheries Agreement. In a sense, adroit use of international law is a critical element in preserving Korea's sovereign rights against persistent Japanese plans to rob Dokdo once again. The Dokdo issue is inextricably bound to international law; the legal status of Dokdo as island, the equitable solution of maritime boundary delimitation and effective control, existence of dispute. Yet, the public policies and arguments made by pundits are generally in lack of understanding in international law. It is now the time for Korea to commence on long-term cross-academia / department plans to establish Dokdo strategy as part of the nationwide maritime strategy effectively using international law as its stronghold.

• Strategy21
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• 통권44호
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• pp.142-176
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• 2018

So far, the main threat to South Korea was North Korea. That is why South Korea established a strategy based on the threat of North Korea and most of the budget on defense was used to deter North Korea. Even though the neighboring countries(China, Japan, and Russia) are growing as a real threat with abilities and intentions based on their powerful naval forces, South Korea has not yet been able to establish a strategy that regards neighboring countries as a threat. But the decades-old structural mechanism of the Korean security environment is undergoing a radical change on April 27, 2018, through the South-North summit and the Panmunjom Declaration. Under the changing security environment, South Korea was placed in a complicated dilemma that had to deal with threats of two axes(China), three axes(China, Japan), and four axes(Japan, Russia). If the one axis threat(North Korea) is dominated by land threats, the second, third and fourth axis threats are threats from the sea. This paper analyzed the maritime strategy of Korea within the framework of maritime-geopolitics, in other words recognition and expansion of the sphere of maritime. I have designed that the maritime defense space that we can deny from threats is divided into three lines of defense: 1 line (radius 3,000km), 2 lines (2,000km), and 3 lines (1,000km). The three defense zones of the three lines were defined as an active defense(1 line), defensive offense(2 line), active offense(3 line). The three defense zones of the three lines were defined as the sphere of core maritime, As a power to deny the sphere of core maritime, it was analyzed as a maneuvering unit, a nuclear-powered submarine, the establishment of missile strategy, and the fortification of islands station. The marine strategy of South Korea with these concepts and means was defined as 'Offensive Maritime Denial Strategy'.

• Strategy21
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• 통권38호
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• pp.47-82
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• 2015

To control the sphere, it required a strategic understanding to sphere and a power for overcome to it. In the early 20th century, the Pacific-War is a confrontation between the U.S. and the Japan for holding supremacy a pacific ocean sphere, building on maritime geopolitical perception. The Pacific ocean is a large of sphere, so if a country pursues a Pacific region supremacy, it needs a strategic perception and capability to control the sphere. After the U.S. has unified the continental, it has formed geopolitical perception in the Pacific ocean and by the way to control the Pacific ocean selected a naval power. The U.S. must have overcome a Pacific sphere for getting through to the Pacific region, this concept has developed the War Plan Orange(war plan relations with the Japan). Meanwhile, at this point of time, the Japan has recognized to a geopolitical point of view about security environment in the Pacific ocean. like as the U.S. has the War Plan Orange in mind for building on geopolitical perception of the Pacific ocean, the Japan also has learned geopolitical perception from the U.S. Because of this, the Japan has established the Interception-Attrition strategy(war plan relations with the U.S.). If we don't have overcome a sphere of the Pacific ocean, we don't hold hegemony of the Asia-Pacific region. So the analysis of perspective maritime geopolitics about the Pacific war is a meaningful study.

• Strategy21
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• 통권44호
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• pp.54-78
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• 2018

The core of the current constitutional amendment pursued by the Abe administration depends on the status of the Japanese Self-Defense Forces, which include the right to engage in war, in the legal and regular military positions. This is an important turning point for the Abe administration, which aims to become a normal country for Japan, and it is a series of steps that followed in the revision of the U.S. and Japan guidelines in 2015 and the overhaul of the security law in 2016. In this paper, we propose building "A navy Attractive to Alliances" as a way to secure Korea's maritime security under the current security environment. The term "attraction" refers to the alliance "first priority" especially in the United States. The way to do this is to transform the paradigm of the ROK-U.S. alliance into a naval hub in the vast seas, which will allow us to strengthen our national defense and even deter threats from neighboring countries. To this end, our navy needs to have a more active approach to U.S. East Asian strategy. If we can convince the United States to be a nation that contributes more to its East Asian strategy, it will only lead to a strengthening of the status of its alliance and expansion of its unilateral support and military capability against Japan, thus minimizing Japan's influence.

• Strategy21
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• 통권30호
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• pp.177-199
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• 2012

As is generally known, the sovereignty dispute over the Senkaku Islands between China/Taiwan and Japan was triggered by a report commissioned by the UN in 1968, which reported the possibility of a substantial amount of petroleum and natural gas buried in the South China Sea. When the administrative authority over the Ryukyu Islands was transferred from the US to Japan in 1972, jurisdiction over the Senkaku Islands was also transferred. A dispute ensued between China (Taiwan) and Japan over the Senkaku Islands except during the period in which formal relations were established between the two states. This paper will take a look particularly at the events that occurred in the 2000's and discuss their recent trends and aspects of the dispute. Though China and Japan agreed to joint resource development in 2008, the agreed zone was a very small area adjacent to the Korea-Japan Joint Continental Shelf Development Zone, and the points of agreement have not been implemented. China has been developing four oil fields including Chunxiao in its waters adjacent to the median line asserted by Japan. However, China also has been excluding the participation of Japan, while Japan has been strongly objecting to the unilateral development of oil fields by China. If indeed the oil fields on China's side are connected past the median line asserted by Japan, then China's unilateral development will infringe upon the potential sovereign rights of Japan, thereby violating international law.

• Ocean and Polar Research
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• 제30권1호
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• pp.119-128
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• 2008

Japan's new Basic Ocean Law took effect in 20 July 2007. This law contains that 1) calls for the consolidation of eight government offices that previously worked separately on maritime issues; 2) establishes a basic plan for maritime matters, and; 3) creates a comprehensive maritime policy headquarters, run by the Prime Minister. The result is a structure for the integrated promotion of maritime policy. The Minister of Land, Infrastructure and Transport has been appointed to the newly established position of maritime minister. Japan has been in conflict with Korea and China over EEZ and territory, which has caused the country to turn to ocean. If Japan puts more emphasis on sea, it will be on a collision course with neighboring countries such as Korea, China, Russia, and Taiwan. Japan has been at odds with these countries; with Korea over Dokdo islets, with China over the Senkaku Islands and the East China Sea, where gas fields lie, with Taiwan over fishery rights in the East China Sea, with Russia over the Kuril Islands. Korea's position about the establishment of Japan's new Basic Ocean Law is followed: 1) expression of Korea's position in maritime resourcces of east china sea, 2) understand of strategy for maritime resources development and maritime delimitation in China and Japan, 3) a caution for extention of EEZ and maritime activities, 4)effective and comprehensive policy establishment, and strength in R&D, 5) construction of active and responsive system for maritime issues in neighbor country.

• 해양안보
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• 제2권1호
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• pp.125-149
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• 2021

후쿠시마 원전 사고가 일어난 지 10년이 지난 지금까지도 일본은 매일 생성되는 원전 오염수 문제를 해결하지 못하고 있다. 그들은 오염수 저장탱크가 한계에 다다를 것으로 예상되자, 안전성에 관한 한국의 우려에도 일방적으로 원전 오염수를 해양에 방출하기로 했다. 문제는 한국의 대응에도 불구하고, 여전히 일본이 『유엔해양법협약』상 의무를 성실히 이행하지 않은 채 해양 방출을 준비하고 있다는 데 있다. 원전 오염수의 방사성물질로 인한 해양오염은 물론, 한국의 해양주권 침탈까지도 우려되는 상황이다. 특히 한번 환경이 오염되기 시작하면 본래의 상태로 되돌리기 어렵기에, 당장 안전성이 보장되지 않는 한 원전 오염수의 해양 방출은 반드시 막아야 한다. 본 논문은 일본과 한국이 원전 오염수 해양 방출 사안으로 빚은 갈등을 해결하기 위한 한국의 대응 전략을 제안한다. 한국은 일본과의 협력, 잠정조치, 주변국과의 공조를 통해 다양한 측면에서 일본의 원전 오염수 해양 방출에 대응해야 할 것이다.

• Strategy21
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• 통권36호
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• pp.94-120
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• 2015

The Asia-Pacific Region has emerged as a arena of geopolitical competition between the U.S. and China. The Obama administration of the U.S. had laid out the concept of rebalancing strategy toward the region, concentrating its 60 percent of Naval Forces to the region till 2020 and consolidating its network of allies and partners. Whereas Chinese leader Xi Jinping also put forward the concept of new type of major power relations concerning its relations with the U.S. and a concept of 'the Asian Community of Common Destiny' aiming at a more intensified mutual relation among countries in the region. In doing so, Asia-Pacific region gradually became the arena where mutual competition and cooperation between the U.S. and China has crossfired. As a close ally to the U.S. and a partner to Japan, South Korea should develop trilateral naval cooperation by holding joint naval drill with the aim of humanitarian support and disaster relief. At the same time, Seoul also should make efforts to proceed mutual confidence building with Beijing by deepening military-to-military cooperation. These policy options will be helpful to enhance Seoul's security posture in the region.