• Korean Journal of Logic
• /
• v.22 no.1
• /
• pp.151-182
• /
• 2019

According to the realization criterion that distinguishes deductive argument from inductive argument, the realized necessity relation between the premises and the conclusion defines deductive argument. In this case, 'invalid deductive argument' is an oxymoron. According to the intention criterion, the intended necessity relation between the premises and the conclusion defines deductive argument. In this case, 'invalid deductive argument' is not an oxymoron. In this paper, we will argue for the intention criterion. The realization criterion cannot classify an elliptical argument without referring to the intention represented in the argument. It cannot distinguish an argument from a set of propositions that is not an argument either. On the other hand, the problem that an intention may not be recognized in an argument can be resolved by referring to the principle of charity. Moreover, by distinguishing the expressions showing the conviction or the attitude to the argument from the intention of the argument, we conclude that the intention criterion successfully distinguishes deductive argument from inductive argument.

• Korean Journal of Logic
• /
• v.23 no.1
• /
• pp.25-53
• /
• 2020

Hong and Yeo choose the intention criterion instead of the realization criterion for distinguishing deductive and inductive argument in their paper. This study aims to criticize their argument. I contend that their argument confuses argument reconstruction and argument classification[evaluation], and is making the mistake of utilizing the realization criterion when attempting to make up for the difficulties of the intention criterion. Also, most logicians, including Hong and Yeo, support the division of the argument into deductions, inductions, and bad arguments. Here I insist on a binary division of only deduction and induction. Finally, I argue that there is no need to teach the distinction between deduction and induction when teaching logic.

• Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
• /
• v.141
• /
• pp.187-202
• /
• 2017

The aim of this paper is to clarify the difference between the concept of deduction-induction and Aristotle's concept of syllogismos-epagoge. First, Aristotle does not use the expression 'invalid syllogismos'. But a valid deduction is distinguished from a invalid deduction in modern logic. Second, from Aristotle's point of view syllogismos is paralleled by epagoge. Because syllogismos is equivalent to epagoge in logical form. But a disturbing lack of parallelism exists between deduction and induction by which the standards for establishing inductive conclusions are more demanding than those for deductive ones. Third, instructors in introductory logic courses ordinarily stress the need to evaluate arguments first in terms of the strength of the conclusion relative to the premises. Accordingly, students may be told to assume that premises are true. But Aristotle does not assume that premises are true. A syllogismos start from the conceptually true premise and a epagoge start from the empirically true premise.