• KDI Journal of Economic Policy
• /
• v.32 no.4
• /
• pp.153-195
• /
• 2010

The recent global financial crisis has been the outcome of, among other things, the mismatch between institutions and the reality of the market in the current global financial system. The International financial institutions (IFIs) that were designed more than 60 years ago can no longer effectively meet the challenges posed by the current global economy. While the global financial market has become integrated like a single market, there is no international lender of last resort or global regulatory body. There also has been a rapid shift in the weight of economic power. The share of the Group of 7 (G7) countries in global gross domestic product (GDP) fell and the share of emerging market economies increased rapidly. Therefore, the tasks facing us today are: (i) to reform the IFIs -mandate, resources, management, and governance structure; (ii) to reform the system such as the international monetary system (IMS), and regulatory framework of the global financial system; and (iii) to reform global economic governance. The main focus of this paper will be the IMS reform and the role of the Group of Twenty (G20) summit meetings. The current IMS problems can be summarized as follows. First, the demand for foreign reserve accumulation has been increasing despite the movement from fixed exchange rate regimes to floating rate regimes some 40 years ago. Second, this increasing demand for foreign reserves has been concentrated in US dollar assets, especially public securities. Third, as the IMS relies too heavily on the supply of currency issued by a center country (the US), it gives an exorbitant privilege to this country, which can issue Treasury bills at the lowest possible interest rate in the international capital market. Fourth, as a related problem, the global financial system depends too heavily on the center country's ability to maintain the stability of the value of its currency and strength of its own financial system. Fifth, international capital flows have been distorted in the current IMS, from EMEs and developing countries where the productivity of capital investment is higher, to advanced economies, especially the US, where the return to capital investment is lower. Given these problems, there have been various proposals to reform the current IMS. They can be grouped into two: demand-side and supply-side reform. The key in the former is how to reduce the widespread strong demand for foreign reserve holdings among EMEs. There have been several proposals to reduce the self-insurance motivation. They include third-party insurance and the expansion of the opportunity to borrow from a global and regional reserve pool, or access to global lender of last resort (or something similar). However, the first option would be too costly. That leads us to the second option - building a stronger globalfinancial safety net. Discussions on supply-side reform of the IMS focus on how to diversify the supply of international reserve currency. The proposals include moving to a multiple currency system; increased allocation and wider use of special drawing rights (SDR); and creating a new global reserve currency. A key question is whether diversification should be encouraged among suitable existing currencies, or if it should be sought more with global reserve assets, acting as a complement or even substitute to existing ones. Each proposal has its pros and cons; they also face trade-offs between desirability and political feasibility. The transition would require close collaboration among the major players. This should include efforts at the least to strengthen policy coordination and collaboration among the major economies, and to reform the IMF to make it a more effective institution for bilateral and multilateral surveillance and as an international lender of last resort. The success on both fronts depends heavily on global economic governance reform and the role of the G20. The challenge is how to make the G20 effective. Without institutional innovations within the G20, there is a high risk that its summits will follow the path of previous summit meetings, such as G7/G8.

• International Area Studies Review
• /
• v.13 no.2
• /
• pp.643-666
• /
• 2009

When it comes to current balance, both of Korea and China enjoy the trade surplus in goods while both countries suffer trade deficit in service. This facts demonstrate that two countries have comparative disadvantages in service industry. In order to identify the international competitiveness of trade in service between Korea and China, several indexes such as TSI, RSCA and IMS was calculated, using the IMF's balance of payments (BOP) statistics as proxy. The results of this analysis are as follows. Korea has a comparative advantage in four sectors (Transportation services, Financial services, Royalties & license fees and Personal cultural recreation), while China has a comparative advantage in five sectors (Travel, Communication services, Insurance services, Computer & information services and Other Business services). Construction services are indeterminate. However, the competitiveness of the two sectors-communication and computer & information-which China has a comparative advantage will be transferred to Korea if some effort to reinforce the competitiveness is added because the gap is being narrowed.

• International Commerce and Information Review
• /
• v.15 no.2
• /
• pp.345-364
• /
• 2013

This paper analyzed the Trade Structure of environmental industry in Korea and some major countries in preparation for The Doha Development Agenda (DDA) Trade Liberalization Negotiation in the environmental goods. Based on 161 environmental goods list proposed by OECD, this paper examined the Trade Returns of worldwide environmental goods during the past 10 years from 2002 to 2011. The analysis showed that Korean environmental goods' International Market Share(IMS) in the world was 3.2%; trade specialization index(TSI) -0.128; Revealed Comparative Advantage(RCA) 1.002 in 2011. And Korea Export Similarity Index(ESI) to Japan was the highest rank in the world market. According to the results of investigation, it is clear that International Competitiveness of the Korean Environmental Industry was received a relatively poor evaluation compared with Korean trade scale. To strengthen the competitiveness, it is required that Korean government should make an effort to boost domestic environmental industry and promote systematically Trade Liberalization Negotiation including the enforcement of transient period for Korean environmental goods in the next DDA Negotiation.