International Monetary System Reform and the G20

국제통화제도의 개혁과 G20

The recent global financial crisis has been the outcome of, among other things, the mismatch between institutions and the reality of the market in the current global financial system. The International financial institutions (IFIs) that were designed more than 60 years ago can no longer effectively meet the challenges posed by the current global economy. While the global financial market has become integrated like a single market, there is no international lender of last resort or global regulatory body. There also has been a rapid shift in the weight of economic power. The share of the Group of 7 (G7) countries in global gross domestic product (GDP) fell and the share of emerging market economies increased rapidly. Therefore, the tasks facing us today are: (i) to reform the IFIs -mandate, resources, management, and governance structure; (ii) to reform the system such as the international monetary system (IMS), and regulatory framework of the global financial system; and (iii) to reform global economic governance. The main focus of this paper will be the IMS reform and the role of the Group of Twenty (G20) summit meetings. The current IMS problems can be summarized as follows. First, the demand for foreign reserve accumulation has been increasing despite the movement from fixed exchange rate regimes to floating rate regimes some 40 years ago. Second, this increasing demand for foreign reserves has been concentrated in US dollar assets, especially public securities. Third, as the IMS relies too heavily on the supply of currency issued by a center country (the US), it gives an exorbitant privilege to this country, which can issue Treasury bills at the lowest possible interest rate in the international capital market. Fourth, as a related problem, the global financial system depends too heavily on the center country's ability to maintain the stability of the value of its currency and strength of its own financial system. Fifth, international capital flows have been distorted in the current IMS, from EMEs and developing countries where the productivity of capital investment is higher, to advanced economies, especially the US, where the return to capital investment is lower. Given these problems, there have been various proposals to reform the current IMS. They can be grouped into two: demand-side and supply-side reform. The key in the former is how to reduce the widespread strong demand for foreign reserve holdings among EMEs. There have been several proposals to reduce the self-insurance motivation. They include third-party insurance and the expansion of the opportunity to borrow from a global and regional reserve pool, or access to global lender of last resort (or something similar). However, the first option would be too costly. That leads us to the second option - building a stronger globalfinancial safety net. Discussions on supply-side reform of the IMS focus on how to diversify the supply of international reserve currency. The proposals include moving to a multiple currency system; increased allocation and wider use of special drawing rights (SDR); and creating a new global reserve currency. A key question is whether diversification should be encouraged among suitable existing currencies, or if it should be sought more with global reserve assets, acting as a complement or even substitute to existing ones. Each proposal has its pros and cons; they also face trade-offs between desirability and political feasibility. The transition would require close collaboration among the major players. This should include efforts at the least to strengthen policy coordination and collaboration among the major economies, and to reform the IMF to make it a more effective institution for bilateral and multilateral surveillance and as an international lender of last resort. The success on both fronts depends heavily on global economic governance reform and the role of the G20. The challenge is how to make the G20 effective. Without institutional innovations within the G20, there is a high risk that its summits will follow the path of previous summit meetings, such as G7/G8.

세계금융위기의 근본적인 원인은 시장과 제도의 괴리에서 나오는 '제도의 실패'라고 할 수 있다. 특히 현재의 국제통화제도는 무제도(non-system)나 다름없다고 할 수 있다. 현재 당면하고 있는 국제통화제도의 문제점들을 볼 때 개편 방향의 핵심은 (1) 수요 측면에서는 과대한 외환보유고를 축적하려는 인센티브를 어떻게 줄일 수 있을 것인가 하는 것이며, (2) 공급 측면에서는 현재 미국 달러화에 주로 의존하고 있는 제도를 탈피, 보다 다양한 국제통화 혹은 대체적 외화준비자산(SDR을 포함하여)으로 전환해 나가거나 혹은 보다 근본적인 개혁방안으로서 새로운 세계통화(global reserve currency)를 창출하는 것이다. 그리고 (3) 이러한 변화를 뒷받침 하기 위해 필요한 기구적 개편, 특히 IMF의 개혁을 추진하는 것이다. 이러한 개편은 현실적 국제역학관계로 볼 때 오직 점진적으로 일어날 수 있는 것이다. 따라서 현재 세계경제의 안정적 성장을 위해 중요한 것은 이러한 개편을 점진적으로 추진함과 동시에 주요국 간의 거시경제정책공조를 이뤄 나가는 것이다. 이러한 과정을 원활히 해나가기 위해서는 효율적인 세계경제 지배구조를 갖추는 것이 필수적이다. 세계금융위기 이후 출범한 G20 정상회의가 효율적인 협의체가 되기 위해서는 의사결정이 원활히 이루어질 수 있는 방안과 장치를 세워나갈 필요가 있다. 사무국(secretariat) 혹은 그와 유사한 기능을 행사할 수 있는 조직의 설립과 위원회제도 같은 것을 활용할 필요가 있을 것으로 보인다.