• Journal of the Daesoon Academy of Sciences
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• v.37
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• pp.229-262
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• 2021

The debate on the treatment of animals has accelerated as a social issue in the West since the 1970s. In 1975, Peter Singers argued in his book, Animal Liberation, that speciesism should be banned. This led to an explosion in research on animal welfare in the philosophical and social sciences. Following Singer, Tom Regan suggested considering the animal rights as being on the same level as human rights. Their arguments were that animals should be imbued with some intrinsic weight sufficient enough to remind humans of their social responsibility to animals at least to a certain degree. In this regard, social responsibility for animal welfare as well as animal rights has formed an axis that organizes human morality in modern society. Such arguments regarding animal welfare can be perceived as an active and creative effort which accords with the free will of human beings who in Daesoon Thought are understood as facing the era of human nobility. This argumentation also aligns with the doctrine of grievance-resolution for mutual beneficence as a practical creed due to the way in which modern bioethics implies that animal welfare could become a practical communal morality integrated into legal systems prior to adoption as a system of individual morality. From within this context, this study discusses the nature and limits of modern animal welfare and animal rights from the perspective of the grievance-resolution which Kang Jeungsan promised to animals.

• Korean Journal of Forensic Psychology
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• v.12 no.1
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• pp.35-51
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• 2021

People's belief in free will is important in determining the causes and responsibilities of human behavior. Over the past decades, there has been debate about belief in free will in the fields of neuroscience, philosophy, ethics, and criminal law. The Free Will and Determinism Scale (FAD-Plus; Paulhus & Carey, 2011) is a test tool that measures the components related to the belief in an individual's free will. This study conducted a confirmatory factor analysis of 1,000 ordinary people of various age groups and socio-economic backgrounds based on previous studies that conducted an exploratory factor analysis (Study 1). The author has secured the reliability and validity of a number of measures. Furthermore, it was examined how the sub-item of the FAD-Plus scale, 'belief in free will,' was related to correspondence bias and locus of control (Study 2). As a result of analyzing a total of 83 subjects, high belief in free will had a positive correlation with punishment judgment for negative behavior and internal attribution, but there was no significant relationship in reward judgment for positive behavior. Based on the study results, it was proven that the FAD-Plus is valid for the general public as well, and the relationship between belief in free will, attribution bias, locus of control and behavior judgment was examined. The limitations of this study, policy implications, and research directions are discussed.

• Sim-seong Yeon-gu
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• v.37 no.2
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• pp.49-76
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• 2022

This study is to illuminate the problem of shadows and evil appearing in contemporary events in the midst of a period of upheaval through Inferno of Divine Comedy. First, the concept of shadow and evil were briefly summarized in analytical psychology and discussed the importance of considering the concepts with the empirical aspect of relativity and ethics in the field of psychotherapy. The 14th century, the age of Dante, was the embryonic period of the Renaissance beyond the end of the Middle Ages. It was when Dante, who was writing Divine Comedy, had to take off his persona forcibly and live in exile. In a nutshell, it was a transition period for both the individual and the collective. The dark forest is a nigredo, darkness and chaos we face in this transition, but it can be a place of transformation and rebirth. The three beasts (leopard, lion, and she-wolf) encountered in the forest can be considered as the instinctual images that Dante ignored and alienated, which the medieval Christian world had suppressed and eliminated. Especially at the collective level, as destructive instincts, ferocious beasts roam throughout society when a crisis breaks dominant laws of values. The three beasts of Inferno appear as phenomena of shadows and evil. The aspect of leopard was explored Cerberus and Chiaco(pig) as a symbol of greed, and the lion, Farinata as the form of violent passion. The aspect of the she-wolf was examined as Geryon, a deceitful monster with a beast nature hidden behind goodness, the giants in the frozen lake of Cocytus, and Branca D'Oria, who betrayed and murdered the country and family. Inferno reveals the "state" of being trapped when one yields to the evil hidden within oneself and falls into prey.

• Journal of the Daesoon Academy of Sciences
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• v.32
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• pp.77-108
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• 2019

The purpose of this paper is to clarify the characteristics of 'Podeok' in Daesoon Jinrihoe. The term Podeok can cause some misunderstanding as the same word Deok (德 virtue) has long been used in the Eastern Tradition. In other words, for most people who are used to traditional thought, Podeok may be conflated with the similar word 'Deok (virtue)' as used within Confucianism. People who are familiar with Confucian culture might thereby misunderstand the term Podeok as an aspect of Confucian moral ethics, or they could misconstrue Daesoon Jinrihoe as having appropriated and misused Confucian ideas. Furthermore, there are other problems that could arise if people compare Daesoon Jinrihoe's 'Podeok' with 'Deok (virtue)' as used by Laozi. While Deok in Laozi's usage represents the ability of an individual who can exercise his or her rationality with excellence, Deok in Daesoon Jinrihoe indicates the idea of actualizing Mutual Beneficence and the conditions that enable Mutual Beneficence. If one understands Deok as used by Laozi to contain the meaning of Mutual Beneficence, then it is possible to think that the two tradition share a similar meaning of Deok as Podeok in Daesoon Jinrihoe pursues Mutual Beneficence as its ultimate value. In order to preemptively correct these misunderstandings, I need to clarify how the idea of Deok was born out of traditional thought and what meanings it embodies. Additionally, it is necessary to examine how it became meaningful in Confucianism, and how it was criticized and ascribed new meanings in Laozi's thought. Through these clarification, it will become clear that Deok originally indicated a religious ritual that the king of the Zhou Dynasty performed after receiving the heavenly mandate and assuming rule over the nation. Later, this idea was transformed into a moral virtue and norm by Confucius. This moral virtue and norm was criticized by Laozi as an unnatural form of control as it was understood by Laozi as a teleological argument justifying whether or not lives were to be saved or sustained based on the perceived merits of each individual. On the contrary, Deok in Daesoon Jinrihoe and traditional thought stand on a totally different theological bases. Deok in Daesoon Jinrihoe is a means to practice and realize the truth of the earthly paradise of the Later World and the truth of Mutual Beneficence which were posited to the world through Kang Jeungsan's Works of Haewon (grievance resolution) that resolved the pattern of mutual conflict that characterized the Former World. Therefore, the idea of Podeok in Daesoon Jinrihoe gains completion only on the premises of Haewon Sangsaeng (resolution of grievances for mutual beneficence) and Boeun Sangsaeng (reciprocation of favors for mutual beneficence), and the way to practice Podeok is to practice Haewon Sangsaeng and Boeun Sangsaeng. In addition, the subordinate virtues such as loyalty, filial piety, and faithfulness that exist within Daesoon Jinrihoe's religious practice are not same as those of traditional thought. They are new concepts of virtues drawn from the cosmological laws of Daesoon Jinrihoe. To be specific, the virtues of Daesoon Jinrihoe are not rules that create discrimination and mutual conflict, but are instead ethical rules established upon the basis of Heaven and Earth having been newly organized, and thus, they will bring virtuous concordance, harmonious union, and mutual beneficence. The idea of 'Podeok' in Daesoon Jinrihoe can be understood as a religious practice that requires doctrinal understanding and tangible practice in daily life of followers. In other words, it is not the same Deok of earlier traditional thought in East Asia, but is instead a religious truth by which practitioners realize the truth of Sangje's Works of Haewon in human world as they practice Haewon Sangsaeng and Boeun Sangsaeng.

• Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
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• no.96
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• pp.39-70
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• 2012

In order to locate Kant's concept of the highest good within ethics and the theory of moral religion, it needs to be approached with some qualifications: there are two rough ways to be suggested. The first way is to focus on the concept of the highest good that is explained in terms of the happiness in proportion to a rational being's virtue or to his/her worthiness to be happy. But the happiness determined in the sense outlined above would be (increasingly or decreasingly) changeable according to each one's individual morality-this is what is meant by each one's 'worthiness' here-, and would not be seen as the perfect one. It might even be said that this kind of happiness is possible in a sensible world generally taken, if the existence of God thought of as harmonizing natural phenomena and the moral order is successfully presupposed. The other way is to understand the concept of the highest good literally: in this view, the highest good shows that a rational being's character is completely appropriate to the moral law and for him/her, its corresponding idea, i.e., the perfect happiness, is considered with full justification. But the highest good in the sense sketched above-along with the existence of God and the immortality of the soul-is expected to be realized only in an intelligible world generally taken. This means that it should be appraised as an ideal of the highest good that includes the so-called 'physical happiness' specified in terms of the first way as its element. In this regard, it is seen to be somewhat restricted. Between the two concepts of the highest good already touched upon, the highest good of the possible world would be the one established in terms of the first way. In other words, it is not the highest good in an intelligible world, but the highest good in this world. Of course, it is true that we cannot help but assume the existence of God-a being as higher, as moral, as most holy, and as omnipotent-in order to explain the highest good in this world (namely, in order to establish the possibility of the combination of the happiness and the worthiness). For as long as both morally good acts and the happiness are considered to happen in a natural world, the cause of the nature (i.e., the existence of its creator), that is, God, must be able to be presupposed. In this vein, Kant interprets that most people view that the key of the Bible is to show that the best world which is characterized by an intelligible or heavenly kingdom is also actually feasible in this world. The wish of the people who have the morally good character is that God's kingdom comes and his will is properly achieved in this world. But we cannot know what God really does in order to realize his world in this world. Nonetheless, we are fully aware of what we should do in order to make ourselves a member of his world. It is specified like this: we should do our ethical duties and further proceed to establish an ethical community. Viewed this manner, it is concluded that an ethical community is not a merely ideal thing like the kingdom of the ends, but a human apparatus or institution that exists in this world.

• (The)Study of the Eastern Classic
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• no.37
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• pp.441-471
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• 2009

Both in the East and the West, the most classical question in political philosophy was 'what is truly a good life?' 'Good life' and 'good politics' are thus essentially tied together. Mencius (孟子, B.C385-303/302) was not exception to this belief. It is not an exaggeration that his Mencius, the treatise that encapsulates his whole views, begins and ends with good life and good politics. He began with new definitions of good life and politics and the rest elaborates why they are so. This paper attempts to systematically approach to what Mencius thinks as a good life in terms of political thoughts. Confucius, his intellectual mentor, asserted that the most humane human life is a civilized life and it means to realize the value of 'Yin (仁: Grace)' and thus set his good life from previous ones. Mencius concurred that Confucius's explication of the good life was right. Moreover, he argued that to realize this, political practice should follow. The 'good life' for Mencius consists of 1) the life in which the ruler does not monopolize joy but shares it with people, that is '$Y{\breve{o}}mindongrak$(與民同樂)' or '$Y{\breve{o}}minhaerak$(與民偕樂)' and 2) the life, based on this political foundation, that pursues the life of 'Five Ethics (五倫)' in which each individual member of society has its share in it. Mencius discussed about 'Four Virtues (四德)', the essential goodness of human, confirmed by 'Four Clues (四端)' to talk about the possibility of realizing the good life. On the other hand, he devised the political device of '$YinJ{\breve{o}}ng$ (仁政: Gracious Politics)' as a practical tool for it. Furthermore, he asserted 'Good people theory (養民論)' as the first condition for the good politics, '$YinJ{\breve{o}}ng$' and 'Education of people theory (敎民論)' as the final one. As Mencius inherited Confucius effort for a good life with the theory of '$YinJ{\breve{o}}ng$', the so-called Zhuxi scholars inherited his as 'Sugichiin (修己治人: cultivate yourself and then order society)' after 1500.

• (The)Study of the Eastern Classic
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• no.35
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• pp.161-188
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• 2009

Confucianism's concept of Ye is ruled by the absolute principle of the universe on one hand, and by "the rules of Ye(節文)" and "the rules of ceremony(儀則)", the principle of relative articulation on the other hand. The realizations of the absolute principle of Ye is depending on its usage in everyday life which is fundamentally conditioned by time and space. Thus, Ye's usage can be maximized when the fundamental principle and the condition of its usage make a mutual harmony. Of course, Ye and Ak(樂) are doing complementary roles for each other, since Ye is a principle of a division and Ak is a principle of combining features. However, the essence of Ye can be figured out as the characteristics of mutual reciprocity among things of hierarchy between the classes. Not only in Modern one But also in the medieval society, Ye was not a one-sided force. The essence of Ye does not retain the interests of an individual and the power of a group. If so, the formal aspects of Ye had been distorted. Confucianism demands a strict morality and ethics of a normal person as well as of the ruler. The characteristics of Ye is democratic and open to the condition of time and space. Yegyo should be rooted in everyday lives and realized as a usualness. Therefore, Shirak was an inevitable feature of Yegyo. During the 16th and the 17th century, Ye insinuated into everyday lives of the public in the Korean society. Yulgok Yiyi(李珥)'s Haejuhyangyak(海州鄕約) was estimated as the exemplary feature of Shirak.