• Proceedings of the Korea Technology Innovation Society Conference
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• 2006.05a
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• pp.3-17
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• 2006

Ideas do not become exhausted, and there are no diminishing returns in the creation of knowledge. Nonetheless, growth ultimately ceases in this simplest model of endogeneous innovation. But, if we treat knowledge capital as a public capital considering of its non-appropriable benefits, economic growth can be sustained in the economy. We showed that considering goodness of fit of regression model, we can see that the empirical evidence is strongly in favor of the character of knowledge as the public knowledge capital. So, we can expect that by product differentiation, economic growth can be sustained in the Korean economy.

• KIEE International Transactions on Power Engineering
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• v.5A no.4
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• pp.396-402
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• 2005

In an electricity market with imperfect competition, participants devise bidding plans and transaction strategies to maximize their own profits. The market price and the quantity are concerned with the operation reserve as well as the bidding system and demand curves in an electricity market. This paper presents a market model combined by an energy market and an operating reserve market. The competition of the generation producers in the combined market is formulated as a gaming of selecting bid parameters such as intersections and slopes in bid functions. The Nash Equilibrium (NE) is analyzed by using bi-level optimization; maximization of Social Welfare (SW) and maximization of the producers' profits.

• The Transactions of the Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers A
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• v.54 no.4
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• pp.199-204
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• 2005

In an electricity market with an imperfect competition, participants make plans of bidding and transaction strategies to maximize their own profits. The market price and the quantity are concerned with the operation reserve as well as the bidding system and demand curves in an electricity market. This paper presents a market model combined by an energy market and an operating reserve market. The competition of the generation producers in the combined market is formulated as a gaming of selecting bid parameters such as intersections and slopes in bid functions. The Nash Equilibrium(NE) is analyzed by using a hi-level optimization; maximization of Social Welfare(SW) and maximization of the producers' profits.

• The Transactions of The Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers
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• v.66 no.1
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• pp.16-22
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• 2017

In order to reduce costs of electricity energy at periods of peak demand, there has been an exponential interest in Demand Response (DR). This paper discusses the effect on the participants' behavior in response to DR. Under the assumption of perfect competition, the equilibrium point of the electricity market with DR is derived by modeling a DR curve, which is suitable for microeconomic analysis. Cournot model is used to analyze the electricity market of imperfect competition that includes strategic behavior of the generation companies. Strategic behavior with DR makes it harder to compute equilibrium point due to the non-differential function of payoff distribution. This paper presents a solution method for achieving the equilibrium point using the best response function of the strategic players. The effect of DR on the electricity market is illustrated using a test system.

• Environmental and Resource Economics Review
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• v.11 no.3
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• pp.415-446
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• 2002

Due to its cost effectiveness, tradeable emission permits (TEP) system has been effectively used in the USA and many other advanced countries. But, academic many researchers have been argued that TEP system would not work as an efficient regulatory tools when there are imperfect competition in permits and/or products markets. Sartzetakis (1997), however, show that TEP system can serve as an effective environmental regulation under the certain demand/cost conditions even though duopolistic production market is not competitive. In this paper we extend Sartzetakis's analysis into the differentiated products markets under the same cost conditions, and examine the relative efficiency of TEP system by comparing it with the command and control system. We then show that the main results of Sartzetakis can hold if two differentiated products markets have the symmetric demands. In particular, it is revealed that social welfare will be increased under TEP system even though consumer surplus may be decreased.

• Proceedings of the KIEE Conference
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• summer
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• pp.713-715
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• 2004

In an electricity market with an imperfect competition, participants make plans of biddings and transaction strategies to maximize their own profits. The market price and the quantity are concerned with the operation reserve as well as the bidding system and demand curves in an electricity market. This paper presents a model of the combined market , energy market and operating teserve market. The Nash equilibrium is analyzed by using a hi-level optimization , maximization of Social welfare (SW) and maximization of the producers' profits.

• The Transactions of the Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers A
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• v.52 no.6
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• pp.347-353
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• 2003

In models of imperfect competition of deregulated electricity markets, the key task is to find the Nash equilibrium(NE). The approaches for finding the NE have had two major bottlenecks: computation of mixed strategy equilibrium and treatment of multi-player games. This paper proposes a payoff matrix approach that resolves these bottlenecks. The proposed method can efficiently find a mixed strategy equilibrium in a multi-player game. The formulation of the m condition for a three-player game is introduced and a basic computation scheme of solving nonlinear equalities and checking inequalities is proposed. In order to relieve the inevitable burden of searching the subspace of payoffs, several techniques are adopted in this paper. Two example application problems arising from electricity markets and involving a Cournot and a Bertrand model, respectively, are investigated for verifying the proposed method.

• The Transactions of the Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers A
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• v.51 no.4
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• pp.196-201
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• 2002

An important aspect of the study of power system markets involves the assessment of strategic behavior of participants for maximizing their profits. In models for imperfect competition of a deregulated system, the key tack is to find the Nash equilibrium. When the constraints are not considered in the power market, the equilibrium has the form of a pure strategy. However, the constraints are considered, the equilibrium has the form of a mired strategy. In this paper the bimatrix game approach leer finding a mixed equilibrium is analyzed. The Nash equilibrium of a mixed strategy will be used adequately for the analysis of market power.

• Proceedings of the KIEE Conference
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• 2002.07a
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• pp.380-382
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• 2002

An important aspect of the study of power system markets involves the assessment of strategic behavior of participants for maximizing their profits. In models of imperfect competition of a deregulated electricity system the key task is to find the Nash equilibrium. In this paper, the bimatrix approach for finding Nash equilibria in electricity markets is investigated. This approach determines pure and mixed equilibria using the complementarity pivot algorithm. The mixed equilibrium in the matrix approach has the equal number of non-zero property. This property makes it difficult to reproduce a smooth continuous distribution for the mixed equilibrium. This paper proposes an algorithm for adjusting the quantization value of discretization to reconstruct a continuous distribution from a discrete one.

• Proceedings of the KIEE Conference
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• 2003.07a
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• pp.615-617
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• 2003

In electricity market with a imperfect competition, participants make plans of biddings and transaction strategies to maximize their own profits. The market price and the quantity are determined by bidding systems and market demands. Practically the characteristics of power demand have rather two forms; elastic region and inelastic region, than constant slope elasticity. Furthermore the price cap in the market can be modelled as a region of perfect elasticity in the demand function. This paper analyses supplier's bidding strategies which are reflected the characteristics of practical demand. Equilibrium strategies are solved by using the Bertrand model and payoff matrices.