• Strategy21
• /
• 통권31호
• /
• pp.120-141
• /
• 2013

Korea, China, and Japan forms triangle structure which mixed complicatedly on the history and maritime territorial disputes. Nationalism lies on the basis of triangle structure, and it is a main factor which increase tension and conflicts among three countries. Considering dynamics of changing nationalism circumstance, Ieodo issue needs to prepare active countermeasures which considers cope with nationalism confrontations. The aim of this article is suggests preparations of active countermeasures cope with nationalism provocative actions. First, I will specify nationalism as a factor of territorial dispute, and review characters of Ieodo issue. Second, I will analyse China's nationalism to Ieodo through analysis of China's media contents and coverage trend of Ieodo issue (2006~2008). I will suggest necessity of active defense measures coup with China's nationalism, basis of these analysis. As a result, China's nationalism might be a criterion which measures of China's desire for Ieodo. Stimulating Ieodo coverage of China's state media can be a criterion which predicts China governments's for Jurisdiction of Ieodo. We need active measures coup with China's nationalism Which evolves into a much more bold and assertive.

• Strategy21
• /
• 통권31호
• /
• pp.142-163
• /
• 2013

Ieodo is a submerged rock within a Korea's Exclusive Economic Zone(EEZ) in the East China Sea with its most shallow part about 4.6m below the sea level which has no specific rights for the EEZ delimitation. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) stipulates that any coastal state has the rights to claim an EEZ that stretches up to 200 nautical miles from its shore, except where there is an overlap with a neighboring country's claims. Korea claims that Ieodo is within its EEZ as it sits on the Korean side of the equidistant line and the reef is located on the Korea section of the continental shelf. China does not recognize Korea's application of the equidistance principle and insists that Ieodo lies on its continental shelf. According to UNCLOS, Ieodo is located in international waters, rather than one country's EEZ as the two countries have failed to reach a final agreement over the delimitation of the maritime border. This study seeks to understand the evolution of the People's Liberation Army Navy(PLAN) strategy as main obstacles for the EEZ delimitation between Korea and China. PLAN's Strategy evolves from "coastal defense" to "offshore defence", since the late 1980s from a "coastal defence" strategy to an "offshore defence" strategy which would extend the perimeter of defence to between 200 nm and 400 nm from the coast. China's economic power has increased It's dependence on open trade routes for energy supplies and for its own imports and exports. China want secure Sea Lane. PLAN's "offshore defence" strategy combines the concept of active defence with the deployment of its military forces beyond its borders. China's navy try to forward base its units and to achieve an ocean going capability. China's navy expects to have a 'Blue Water' capability by 2050. China insists that coastal states do have a right under UNCLOS to regulate the activities of foreign military forces in their EEZs. China protests several times against US military forces operating within It's EEZ. The U.S. position is that EEZs should be consistent with customary international law of the sea, as reflected in UNCLOS. U.S. has a national interest in the preservation of freedom of navigation as recognized in customary international law of the sea and reflected in UNCLOS. U.S. insists that coastal states under UNCLOS do not have the right to regulate foreign military activities in their EEZs. To be consistent with its demand that the U.S. cease performing military operations in china's EEZ, China would not be able to undertake any military operations in the waters of South Korea's EEZ. As such, to preserve its own security interests, China prefers a status quo policy and used strategic ambiguity on the Ieodo issue. PLAN's strategy of coastal defence has been transformed into offensive defence, Korea's EEZ can be a serious limitation to PLAN's operational plan of activities. Considering China'a view of EEZs, China do not want make EEZ delimitation agreement between Korea and China. China argues that the overlapping areas between EEZs should be handled through negotiations and neither side can take unilateral actions before an agreement is reached. China would prefer Ieodo sea zone as a international waters, rather than one country's EEZ.

• 대한지리학회지
• /
• 제45권3호
• /
• pp.414-429
• /
• 2010

이어도 영유권 분쟁에 있어서 인접국인 중국의 부당한 주장에 대해 한국으로서 정합적인 논리를 개발 설득함으로써 문제를 평화적으로 해결하는 데 본 연구의 목적이 있다. 이를 위해 먼저 이어도의 자연경관의 특징과 형성과정을 자연지리학으로 정리하고. 이를 토대로 중국의 견강부회적인 주장에 대해 구체적이고 객관적인 반박 논리를 개발한다. 지질 지형과 관련한 지질사를 봤을 때 이어도가 제주도의 부속암초라는 사실이 그대로 드러나고 있으며, 중국이 주장하는 인문학적 증거, 즉 $\ll$산해경$\gg$에 대한 중국측의 해석은 우려할 정도로 왜곡되고 있다. 뿐만 아니라 중국측이 주장하는 논리가 북해대륙붕사건에서 독일의 논리를 도입하고 있으나 중국은 대향국간과 인접국간의 경계획정을 혼동하고 있어 정합성이 전혀 없다고 해도 과언이 아니다. 본 연구 결과는 강단지리학에 관심을 갖도록 할 뿐만 아니라 나아가 국민을 계도하고 관계기관이 상대국과 협상할 때 주요자료와 이론으로 활용할 수 있다.

• Strategy21
• /
• 통권33호
• /
• pp.37-64
• /
• 2014

The year 2010 has been regarded as a year of China's assertive diplomacy. A series of China's behavior--including China's critical reaction to the U.S. for its sales of weapons to Taiwan, the Dalai Lama's visit to President Obama, China's arbitrary designation of 'core interests' over the South China Sea, China's inordinate reactions to the sinking of the Cheonan and Yeonpyeong bombardment, and China's activities in the Senkaku/Diaoyu island areas--has served as the witnesses to China's assertive diplomacy in 2010. The major causes of China's assertive diplomacy can be summed up by three factors: potential power transition from U.S. to China; emerging China's nationalism; and the recession of the Tao Guang Yang Hui as a diplomatic principle. But a majority of Western sinologists claim that China's assertive diplomacy is defensive in terms of its character. China's neighboring states, however, perceive its assertive diplomacy as diplomatic threat. Due to these states' geographical proximity and capability gaps with China, these neighbors experience difficulties in coping with China's behavior. In particular, China's coercive economic diplomacy, in which China tends to manipulate the neighbors' economic dependency on China for its diplomatic leverage, is a case in point for China's assertive diplomacy. China's assertiveness seems to be continued even after the inauguration of Xi Jinping government. Although the Xi government's diplomatic rhetorics in "New Type of Great Power Relationship" and the "Convention for Neighboring States Policy" sound friendly and cooperative, its subsequent behavior, like unilateral announcement of Chinese Air Defense Identification Zone (CADIZ), does not conform with its rhetoric. Overall, China's assertiveness has been consolidated as a fashion of its diplomacy, and it is likely to continue in its relations with neighbors. As a neighboring state, the ROK should approach to it with more balanced attitude. In addition, it needs to find out a new diplomatic leverage to deal with China in accordance with its security environment, in which China plays a growing role.

• 해양안보
• /
• 제4권1호
• /
• pp.83-113
• /
• 2022

중국의 해상 민병대는 긴 역사에 비해 잘 알려지지 않았으나, 최근 주변국과의 다양한 해양 분쟁을 통해 주변국들의 우려와 심각한 위협으로 부상하고 있다. 따라서, 현 시점에서 중국 해상 민병대의 실체에 대한 명확한 이해가 필요할 때이다. 중국 해상 민병대의 편성과 역할 검토를 통해 중국의 해상 민병대는 '중국의 해양이익 보호와 신장을 위한 해상 민병대의 기여'라는 목적에 맞춰 중국 정부와 인민해방군에 의해 조직적으로 관리되고 운용되는 조직이라는 것을 알 수 있었다. 또한, 중국의 해상 민병대가 운용 되었던 주변국과의 해양 분쟁 사례 검토를 통해 이들의 위협요인을 도출할 수 있었다. 첫 번째, 중국 해상 민병대는 '회색지대전략'을 수행하며, 두 번째, 정부와 인민해방군의 지원을 받는 체계화된 조직이다. 세 번째, 전 세계에서 가장 큰 규모의 민병조직으로 간과할 수 없는 해양세력이며, 네 번째, 생업 종사와 해상 민병이라는 이중임무 수행이 가능한 전략적 유연성을 갖추고 있다는 점이다. 중국 해상 민병대의 위협은 남중국해에 위치한 동남아시아 국가들만의 문제가 아니다. 우리나라도 이어도 문제, 서해 해상 경계선 획정 문제 등 중국과의 해양 분쟁에서 자유로울 수만은 없는 국가이다. 따라서 중국과 발생할 수 있는 가장 가능성 높은 2가지 사례에 대해 시나리오 기법 분석을 통해 예상 시나리오와 대응방안을 살펴보았다. 마지막으로, 중국 해상 민병대의 실체를 직시하고 이들이 향후 어떻게 운용 및 발전될 것이며, 우리는 어떻게 대응해 나가야 할 것인지에 대한 고민을 제시하였다.