• The Journal of Fisheries Business Administration
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• v.36 no.3 s.69
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• pp.119-139
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• 2005

The purpose of this paper is to provide information that will help both fishing industry and fisheries authority understand the principals of individual transferable quota(ITQ) fishery management. Theoretical frameworks and primary features of ITQ fishery managemenet are the assignment of exclusive property rights for harvest of common - property fisheries resources. An ITQ fishery management is fundamentally different from the conventional fishery management and it gives an individual fisherman the right to catch a specified quantity of fish, his quota. With ITQ, fisherman's quotas are transferable, in whole or in part. An ITQ is a property with certain rights of use, namely, the right to catch a given quantity and species of fish in a specific location during a specific period of time. The right is exclusive in the sense that no one else has the right to use the quota without the owner's permission. The property may be assigned, traded, and exchanged; i.e., the owner has the right to transfer an ownership to others. An ITQ fishery management leads to both economic efficiency and resource conservation. Motivations to overexploit stocks and to overcapitalize should be lessened because fishermen no longer have to compete for limited resources. There are significant positive net benefits and advantages with ITQ fishery management than without. The potential benefits and advantages of ITQ fishery management include increased profits, economic stability, improved product quality, safer working conditions, less gear conflict, elimination of the race - to - fish phenomenon, less by - catch, less gear loss, improved investment climate, mitigation of market gluts, waste reduction, addition to fisherman's wealth, and compensation for fisherman exiting the fishery. As an independent observe to Red Crab Trap Fishery some of the benefits, problems, and effects, an ITQ fishery management in Red Crab Trap Fishery is still far from to be implemented. Many different and difficult aspects (biological, socioeconomics, administrative) are involved considering the implementation of ITQ fishery management in Red Crab Trap Fishery. Among other fishery management tools, the implementation of ITQ fishery management in Red Crab Trap Fishery is considered to be the best in achieving the better conservation of fisheries resources and their more economic and rational exploitation. Korean fisheries authority should pay great attention to the experience of the economic effects of the ITQ fishery management in Red Crab Trap Fishery in the hope of being able to implement at least some of those experiences into the Korean fishery management.

• Environmental and Resource Economics Review
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• v.18 no.1
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• pp.1-22
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• 2009

The primary purpose of ITQ (individually transferable quota) is to reduce the overcapitalization problem in the open-access fishery. It has been argued that the least cost-efficient vessels under ITQ may exit first from the fishing by selling their quotas, thereby also reducing the excess capital. The purpose of this paper is to provide a case when ITQ may prompt the exit of less cost-inefficient vessels in the presence of irreversible exit cost which is proportional to the cost-inefficiency. Real option model is adopted in order to analyze the source of hysteresis associated with fishery exit decision. By linking the interaction between vessels' adjustment costs, cost-efficiency of harvest and uncertainty of fishery return, we show that cost-inefficient vessels will not exit always first from the fishery in contrast to the conventional wisdom. Relevant policy implications is discussed.

• Bulletin of the Korean Chemical Society
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• v.27 no.10
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• pp.1693-1696
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• 2006

• Journal of Fisheries and Marine Sciences Education
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• v.13 no.2
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• pp.212-235
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• 2001

인간의 주요한 경제행위로서의 어업은 현재 전세계에 걸쳐 여러 가지 문제들로 많은 어려움을 겪고 있는데, 그 가운데서 주된 내용이 자원유지와 어업행위와의 조절이다. 이에 따라 어업문제에 대한 해결과 지속적인 어업 발전의 실현에 대한 열망으로 세계 각지에서는 각기 다른 학문영역, 예를 들면 생물학, 경제학, 사회학 등 각 분야의 전문가들이 모여 생태보호 주의적 접근법(Conservation-minded techniques)이나 시장 기구에 의한 방법(Market-based instruments), 그리고 공동체에 기초한 관리(Community-centered approaches) 등과 같은 여러 가지 어업관리정책을 제시하고 있다. 이러한 여러 접근 방법 중에서 현재 세계적으로 폭넓은 지지를 받고 있는 것이 재산권에 기초한 ITQs과 협동어업관리제도(Co-management)이다. ITQ제도는 어업행위에 대한 사적 재산권의 설정을 근간으로 한다. 그러나 어업자원은 회유성이라는 자원의 본질적 성질에 의해 진정한 의미의 사유화는 어렵다. 따라서 어업자원은 완벽한 사유화가 이루어진다 하더라도 특히 어업 인구가 거대한 지역 또는 자원이 한정된 국가에 있어서는 충허용어획량의 개별 할당량이 어업에 있어서 규모의 경제와 같은 경제적 운영을 도모해 나가기에는 너무 적을 수도 있다. 그렇다면 여기에서 어떻게 어업관리를 합리적으로 운영하면 ITQ의 제도적인 이점을 이용하고, 동시에 ITQ제도의 경제적 제약을 극복할 수 있는지에 대해서 묻게 된다. 본 연구의 주목적은 이러한 의문으로부터 출발한 것으로, 협동어업관리제도에 의한 어업 할당량의 공동소유는 ITQ제도의 경제적 약점을 제거하는 동시에 그 이점을 누리는 최고의 해결책이 될 수 있다고 보고, 다음과 같은 내용에 대해 고찰하였다. 어업 문제의 본질은 어떻게 인식되는가, 어업문제 해결의 전통적 방식과 새로운 패러다임은 무엇인가, 그리하여 본 논문에서는 결론적으로 어업문제 해결의 새로운 패러다임으로서 협동어업관리 제도의 본질을 이해함과 아울러 재산권에 기반을 둔 협동업관리 제도의 통합모형을 제시하였다.

• Environmental and Resource Economics Review
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• v.17 no.4
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• pp.775-812
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• 2008

This paper provides a theoretical approach to the New Zealand's Catch-Balancing Regime (CBR) with a reporting requirement under the Individual Transferable Quota (ITQ) system. The enforcement strategy depicted draws on recent literature regarding practical applications of the Revelation Principle. New Zealand's use of CBR-specific instruments such as deemed values, remains to be improved. However, some of its features can constitute a valuable example for regulators seeking to improve their methods of dealing with issues as bycatch or overfishing in order to maintain Total Allowable Catch (TAC) levels under emerging ITQ systems. The enforcement strategy analyzed has the potential to provide a more sustainable and efficient management of the fish stock, reduce discarding and stabilize monitoring costs, while improving the level of reporting compliance.

• Journal of Fisheries and Marine Sciences Education
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• v.7 no.1
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• pp.76-110
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• 1995

• KSCI Review
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• v.15 no.1
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• pp.287-301
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• 2007

• Proceedings of the IEEK Conference
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• 2008.06a
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• pp.409-410
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• 2008

This paper presents nonlinear and parallel design for synchronous pipelining in IP-based H.264 decoder implementation. Since H.264 decoder includes the dataflow of feedback loop, the data dependency requires one NOP stage per pipelining latency to drop the throughput into 1/2. Further, it is found that, in execution time, the stage scheduled for MC is more occupied than that for CAVLD/ITQ/DF. The less efficient stage would be improved by nonlinear scheduling, while the fully-utilized stage could be accelerated by parallel scheduling of IP. The optimization yields 3 nonlinear {CAVLD&ITQ}|3 parallel (MC/IP&Rec.)| 3 nonlinear {DF} pipelined architecture for IP-based H.264 decoder. In experiments, the nonlinear and parallel pipelined H.264 decoder, including existing IPs, could deal with full HD video at 41.86MHz, in real time processing.

• The Journal of Fisheries Business Administration
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• v.26 no.1
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• pp.41-54
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• 1995

Recently our government intended to change the present fisheries management system into the allocated catch quota system, which is to increase the income of fishermen and to recover the depleted resources up to a desirable level. This paper is to find out the difficulties of introducing the allocated catch quota system into our fisheries mangement system and to reduce the possible errors for the enforcement of this system. The allocated catch quota system can be devided by two kinds, the one is to allocate among industries or fisheries with total allowable catch(TAC) and the other is to allocate among fishermen or individual vessels with individual fish quota(ITQ). The latter is a much advanced control system compared with the former and is what this study treats. This paper reviewed the case of Newzealand and Canada where the ITQ system is introduced earlier and classified the problems by two parts for successful introduction into Korea as follows : (1) allocation method problems, (2) enforcement problems. For the first part the problems to be considered are 1) a scientific oath qouta calculation system is necessary, 2) the quota must be opened, 3) by-catch problems. 4) interactions with adjoining countries. For the second part the problems to be considered are 1) monitoring system, 2) quota transferability, 3) quota flexibility, 4) the enforcement of the system must be connected with the reduction of fishing power, 5) a mass communication and decision making system between government and fishermen is essential.

• Journal of Fisheries and Marine Sciences Education
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• v.26 no.1
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• pp.108-125
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• 2014

Although South Korea had managed fishery resources based on elements included in the fishery like fisheries licence, after agreeing on UN Convention on the law in 1999, it became inevitable to adopt TAC that regulates yield. Therefore, currently operating an indecisive system by maintaining the fisheries license system while applying TAC only to some fisheries. However, it became imperative to find ways to improve the current system as it dose not solve problems such as decrease of fishery resources and catch per unit effort, excessive input of fishing boats, rising costs for fishery management, and shortage of fishery population. For those reasons, it is time to review ITQs, which is recognized globally as the most innovative fisheries management system. To adopt the ITQs, it seems necessary to compare how the fisheries act of New Zealand which is currently most successfully operated and Fisheries Resources Management Act of Korea. To do so, in this study, the provisions on TAC of the two countries are compared to analyze the institutional necessity for Korea to adopt ITQs. The following conclusions have been made : First, it will be necessary to gradually expand the species and fisheries for which TAC is enforced, and accumulate correct data on fisheries resources. Second, while forcing traders to obtain license as well, the species and quantity of traded fisheries must be reported separately for cross-checking with the catch reported by the fisheries. Third, the number of observers must be increased and report the species and quantity of the catch to person in charge at the relevant port, and observers must check the report before disembarkation. Fourth, penalty for violating Fisheries resources management act must be enhanced, especially regarding false report of fishery activities and catch.