• ETRI Journal
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• v.28 no.5
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• pp.621-630
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• 2006

Observation of the effects of a handset subsidy on the mobile telecommunication industry has revealed two different aspects. The activation of various mobile services and the handset market, has led to the rapid acceleration of the related technological development, which is a desirable result, while rising prices and the overspending of related resources are undesirable. A great deal of research has been conducted to assess both desirable and undesirable factors using qualitative methods. However, quantitative studies into the effects of a handset subsidy are rare. In this study, we consider the positive and negative effects on consumer welfare of a change in demand and prices brought about by a handset subsidy. Then, we quantitatively compare the positive and negative effects and analyze their direct effects on consumer welfare.

• Informatization Policy
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• v.17 no.2
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• pp.86-103
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• 2010

This paper computes the economic impact of handset subsidies using the recent Input-Output Tables and compares the results with other alternatives which telecommunications companies can choose. The first scenario is that telecommunications companies give handset subsidies to consumers and sales agents. The second is that the companies do not give the subsidies to them, but instead spend the same amount of subsidy on facility investment. The third is that the companies lower the prices of their mobile communications services and consumers spend the saved expenses on other goods and services. The result is that the production, value added, import, job, employment inducement coefficients of the first scenario is larger than those of the second and third scenarios. The reason is as follows. The handset subsidy results in the incentive to consumers for handset purchase or the incentive for sales agents to sell the telecommunication services of the companies. The former has larger production and import inducement effect, and the latter also has larger value-added, job, and employment inducement effect than those of other scenarios.

• The Journal of the Korea Contents Association
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• v.14 no.11
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• pp.389-397
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• 2014

Studies on switching intention have been one of the most interesting topics. In this paper we investigate empirically the factors influencing the mobile communication service switching intention. Our research model includes the relationship between 'switching intention' and 'habit', 'alternative attractiveness', 'present service satisfaction'. In addition, we try to find the effects that 'habit' and 'alternative attractiveness' give to 'switching intention' through 'present service satisfaction'. Finally, the moderating effects of 'handset subsidy' are examined. We analyze the model by Multiple Group Structural Equation Model. This proves that 'habit', 'present service satisfaction', and 'alternative attractiveness' give direct effects to 'switching intention'. And 'habit' and 'alternative attractiveness' give the indirect effects to 'switching intention' through 'present service satisfaction'. In addition, 'handset subsidy' has the moderating effects between 'switching intention' and 'habit'.

• Journal of Distribution Science
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• v.15 no.12
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• pp.53-60
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• 2017

Purpose - This paper analyzes the effect of the handset subsidy and the Mobile Number Portability subscriber subsidy regulation, which are the main regulation adopted in "Law on the Improvement of the Mobile Terminal Distribution System" (Mobile Terminal Distribution Act), on the social surplus, the consumer surplus and profits of telecommunications carriers. We focus our analysis on whether the service charge competition is stimulated enough so that it can compensate for the loss of subsidies. Research design, data, and methodology - We use simple economic model to assess the impact of the handset subsidy and the Mobile Number Portability subscriber subsidy regulation. Unlike the former researches on this topic, we depart from using Hotelling model, and instead use the switching cost model, which uses switching cost as a parameter of market powers of telecommunications carriers. We also study the effect of the two different regulations when they are adopted both independently and concurrently. Results - If the market powers of telecommunications carriers are over certain threshold, contrary to the regulatory agency's assertion, the service charge competition would not be stimulated enough to compensate for the deduction in the subsidies, and thus the consumer surplus is compromised. Number Portability subsidy, especially, undermines the rival's market power and thus reduces the service charge. On the other hand, the regulations will also increase the profits of telecommunications carriers. However, social surplus is maximized when both of the regulations are present because the regulations reduces the frequency of switching handsets inefficiently. Conclusions - In enacting the Mobile Terminal Distribution Act, the telecommunications regulatory agency asserted that the regulation on subsidies will stimulate service charge competition, and in the long run, enhance the consumer surplus. However, contrary to the regulatory agency's assertion, subsidy regulation, especially the regulation on Number Portability subsidy, reduces consumer surplus. On the other hand, the Mobile Terminal Distribution Act can also increase the profits of telecommunications carriers because it decreases competition among the telecommunications carriers. However, the Mobile Terminal Distribution Act can increase the social surplus because it reduces inefficient switching of handsets.

• Journal of Digital Convergence
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• v.12 no.7
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• pp.11-20
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• 2014

This paper finds that the ultimate source of problems facing Korean mobile telecommunications such as excessive subsidies of handsets, waste of resources, and a vicious circle of expensive handsets and high prices for services, is bundling of handset and subscription. The analysis suggests that bundling causes consumers to confuse about prices of handsets and services, and firms focus on handset subsidy competition rather than on upgrading service qualities and lowering prices due to anti-competitive effects of bundling. Because most of the cost of bundling is passed on to consumers, the welfare of consumers decline. In particular, equality among consumers worsens due to price discriminations. To resolve these problems, unbundling of handset and subscription is a necessity. Mixed bundling allowing separate selling of handsets under bundling does not seem to work as a cure because bundling tends to be a dominant strategy. The best regulatory policy is a complete separation of handset and subscription.

• Proceedings of the Korean Operations and Management Science Society Conference
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• 2004.10a
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• pp.17-20
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• 2004

This research is focusing on industry dynamics of Korean Mobile Telecommunications Industry. Industry data from 1997 to April 2004 are used to analyze industry dynamics through variety use of case study and system dynamics modeling. As results, we found the importance of initial endowment, firm reputation, and handset subsidy strategy. Along with these player-based characteristics, government impacts on dynamics of competition are also investigated.

• Journal of the Korea Institute of Information and Communication Engineering
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• v.19 no.8
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• pp.1893-1900
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• 2015

The government has the responsibility to prevent abuses of monopoly and promote competition in order to maximize consumer welfare. The government should address the asymmetry in the information as much as possible and ensure consumer choice. The subsidy seems to reduce the burden on the consumer service charges and handset prices but it actually distorts the market through price discrimination. The government caused the principal-agent problem by neglecting their appropriate role to prevent distortion of the mobile telecom market. The money used as subsidy is part of excess profit and could be transferred to down the price of mobile phone and charges and it would become a benefit to consumers. Separate announcement of subsidies by Mobile Communications Terminal Distribution Structure Improvement Act is a little developed policy but it was not actually realized. The market price close to that from perfect competition structure is plausible, ultimately.

• Proceedings of the Korean Institute of Information and Commucation Sciences Conference
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• 2015.10a
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• pp.136-138
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• 2015

Recently, with the rapid expansion of the mobile phone, such as the high price of the smartphone is being constantly handset subsidies at issue in the social harm caused by excessive competition in the mobile communications market. In this research, we aim to analyze factors influencing of the policy to subsidy regulatory on decision to continue purchasing intention of consumers. Predictor factors were selected the perceived usefulness, the perceived ease of use and the policy to subsidy regulatory on the previous study. Participants of this study be going to 200 mobile users in Busan Gyeongnam and Jeonbuk province in accordance with convenience sampling. IBM SPSS Statistics 19 were employed for descriptive statistics, Smart PLS(partial least squares) was employed for confirmatory factor analysis and path analysis of casual relationship among variables and effect. This study suggests practical and theoretical implications based on the results.

• Proceedings of the Korean Institute of Information and Commucation Sciences Conference
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• 2014.10a
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• pp.933-936
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• 2014

The government has the duty to prevent abuses of monopoly and promote competition in order to maximize consumer welfare. In order to promote competition we have to address the asymmetry in the information as possible and to ensure consumer choice. The subsidy seems to reduce the burden on the consumer service charges and handset prices but it virtually distort the market through price discrimination. The government caused the principal-agent problem by avoiding their appropriate role to prevent distortion of the mobile telecom market. The money used as subsidy could be transferred to down the price of cell phone and charges and it would be a benefit to consumers. Separate notice of subsidies by Mobile Communications Terminal Distribution Structure Improvement Act is a developed policy but it was too late. It, the market price close to that from perfect competition structure, is plausible, ultimately.

• Journal of the Korea Institute of Information and Communication Engineering
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• v.21 no.12
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• pp.2387-2393
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• 2017

The Moon government, launched in May 2017, regards telecommunication service as part of people's welfare and is trying to save telecommunication costs. However, the direction of policy presented is assessed as symptomatic approach. This is largely attributable to the a partial improvement approach from the framework of the present mobile telecommunication industry. However if we restart from an essential point of view, the result is likely to be much better. The nation's mobile communication costs are not adequate because the government's role was not sufficient. There is a problem with the mobile phone supply chain, the subsidy payment mechanism, and the billing system. Addressing these complex issues requires the establishment of an independent system of handset distribution from telecommunication companies, ban on discriminative subsidies payment, and adoption of volume rate system. Telecommunications Business Act that defines the service charges to normalize the market might be somewhat useful, but the normal application of the Fair Trade Act is more important.