• 대한전기학회논문지:전력기술부문A
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• 제54권2호
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• pp.88-96
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• 2005

At present, the Korean electricity industry is undergoing restructuring and the Cost Based-generation Pool(CBP) market is being operated preparing for Two Way Bidding Pool(TWBP) market open. As the circumstance of the traditional system is changed according to power system deregulation, the simulation tool which should reflect market code providing market operating mechanism is needed to analyze an electricity market. This paper presents the development of an unique market simulator, Market Modeling and Price Simulator(MMPS) that is designed to imitate the Korean electricity market considering uniform price. The MMPS is developed in VB.NET and is composed of two modules that consist of market modeling and price simulation interfacing access database program. To evidence the features and the performance of MMPS, a small two way bidding market with 12-bus system and one way bidding market for generator competition will be presented for the electricity market simulations using MMPS.

• 대한전기학회논문지:전력기술부문A
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• 제53권1호
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• pp.67-72
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• 2004

This paper addresses the bidding strategies of generating firms in a competitive market where the firms are provided with payment for generating reactive power. Reactive support for voltage control is an integral and critical part of power system operations. Since reactive support is unbundled in a competitive market under open access transmission, it is treated as one of ancillary services. The operation costs and opportunity costs for reactive support are compensated by payment to the firms, hence their bidding strategies will be affected. The opportunity costs are evaluated from the foregone profits of a generator in making sales in real power market by providing reactive support instead of real power. Game theory approach is used to analysis the transaction strategies of real power by the bimatrix method in this paper. Through computing the Nash equilibrium in a sample system, an incentive of a generator for improving the reactive generating capacity is found to be effective and the variations of the profits are analyzed as the demand power factor changes.

• 대한전기학회논문지:전력기술부문A
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• 제54권4호
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• pp.199-204
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• 2005

In an electricity market with an imperfect competition, participants make plans of bidding and transaction strategies to maximize their own profits. The market price and the quantity are concerned with the operation reserve as well as the bidding system and demand curves in an electricity market. This paper presents a market model combined by an energy market and an operating reserve market. The competition of the generation producers in the combined market is formulated as a gaming of selecting bid parameters such as intersections and slopes in bid functions. The Nash Equilibrium(NE) is analyzed by using a hi-level optimization; maximization of Social Welfare(SW) and maximization of the producers' profits.

• 대한전기학회논문지:전력기술부문A
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• 제54권9호
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• pp.461-466
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• 2005

This paper addresses the bidding strategies of a hydro generator in an electricity market, and their effect on the electricity market in accordance with some parameters: the water volume, the demand elasticity, and the hydro unit performance. The competition of a hydro generator is formulated as a hi-level optimization problem, and the solving scheme for the equilibrium condition is proposed as a set of nonlinear simultaneous equations. The equilibrium of the oligopolistic model is evaluated by comparison with that of a perfect competition model from the viewpoint of a market power. Simulation results show some parameters have an influence on the market power of an electricity market including a hydro generator.

• 대한전기학회논문지:전력기술부문A
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• 제52권6호
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• pp.333-339
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• 2003

Competition among electric generation companies is a major goal of restructuring in the electricity industry. In electricity market, a huge volume of commodities will be traded through competitive bidding. The choice between uniform and pay-as-bid pricing for electricity auction has been one of most important issues in deregulated electricity market. This paper proposes a constrained Bertrand model for analyzing the electricity auction market of price competition model. The issue of the two pricing rules of uniform and pay-as-bid is studied from the viewpoint of consumer's benefit. This paper also shows that transmission congestion depends on the pricing mechanism. Pay-as-bid pricing gives less possibility of transmission congestion by price competition, and less burden to consumers in the simulation results.

• 대한전기학회논문지:전력기술부문A
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• 제53권6호
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• pp.334-339
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• 2004

In this study, a new UC (Unit Commitment) algorithm is proposed to consider the uncertainty of a daily load profile. The proposed algorithm calculates the UC results with the lower load level than the one generated by the conventional load forecast and the more hourly reserve allocation. In case of the worse load forecast, the deviation of the conventional UC solution can be overcome with the proposed method. The proposed method is tested with sample systems, which shows that the new UC algorithm yields completely feasible solution even though the worse load forecast is applied. Also, the effects of the uncertain hourly load demand are statistically analyzed especially by the consideration of the average over generation and the average under generation. Finally, it is shown that independent power producers participating in electricity spot-markets can establish bidding strategies by means of the statistical analysis. Therefore, it is expected that the proposed method can be used as the basic guideline for establishing bidding strategies under the deregulation power pool.

• KIEE International Transactions on Power Engineering
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• 제5A권1호
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• pp.16-21
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• 2005

In this study, a new Unit Commitment (UC) algorithm is proposed to consider the uncertainty of a daily load profile. The proposed algorithm calculates the UC results with a lower load level than that generated by the conventional load forecast method and the greater hourly reserve allocation. In case of the worst load forecast, the deviation of the conventional UC solution can be overcome with the proposed method. The proposed method is tested with sample systems, which indicates that the new UC algorithm yields a completely feasible solution even when the worst load forecast is applied. Also, the effects of the uncertain hourly load demand are statistically analyzed, particularly by the consideration of the average over generation and the average under generation. Finally, it is shown that independent power producers participating in electricity spot-markets can establish bidding strategies by means of the statistical analysis. Therefore, it is expected that the proposed method can be used as the basic guideline for establishing bidding strategies under the deregulation power pool.

• 대한전기학회:학술대회논문집
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• 대한전기학회 2000년도 하계학술대회 논문집 A
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• pp.400-402
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• 2000

This paper presents a game theoretic approach for power transactions analysis in a competitive market. The considered competitive power market is regarded as PooICo model, and the participating players are restricted by only two generating entities for simplicity in this paper. The analysis is performed on the basis of marginal cost based relations of bidding price and bidding generations. That is, we assume that the bidding price of each player is determined by the marginal cost when the bidding generation is pre-determined. This paper models the power transaction as a two player game and analyzes by applying the Nash eauilibrium idea. The generalized game model for power transactions covering constant-sum(especially zero-sum), and nonconstant-sum game is developed in this paper. Also, the analysis for each game model are performed in the case studies. Here, we have defined the payoff of each player as the weighted sum of both player's profits.

• 대한전기학회논문지:전력기술부문A
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• 제51권12호
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• pp.597-602
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• 2002

The restructuring of power industry is still going on all over the world for last several decades. Many kinds of restructuring model have been studied, proposed, and applied. Among those models, power pool is more popular than other. This paper assumes the power pool market structure having competitive generation sector, and a new method is presented to build a bidding strategy in that market. The utilities participating in the market have the perfect information of their cost and price functions, but they don't know which strategy to be chosen by others. To define one's strategy as a vector, we make utility's cost/price functions into discrete step functions. An utility knows only his own strategy, so he estimates the other's cost/price functions into discrete step functions. An utility knows only his own strategy, so he estimates the other's strategy using Nash equilibrium or stochastic methods. And he also has to forecast the system demand. According to this forecasting result, his payoffs can be changed. Considering these all conditions, we formulate a bidding game problem and apply noncooperative game theory to that problem for the optimal strategy or solution. Some restrictive assumption are added for simplification of solving process. A numerical example is given in Case Study to show essential features and concrete results of this approach.

• 대한전기학회:학술대회논문집
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• 대한전기학회 1999년도 하계학술대회 논문집 C
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• pp.1344-1346
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• 1999

This paper presents a game theoretic approach for power transactions analysis in a competitive market. The considered competitive power market is regarded as PoolCO model, and the participating players are restricted by only two generating entities for simplicity in this paper. The analysis is performed on the basis of marginal cost based relations of bidding price and bidding generations. That is, we assume that the bidding price of each player is determined by the marginal cost when the bidding generation is pre-determined. This paper models the power transaction as a two player game and analyzes by applying the Nash eauilibrium idea. The generalized game model for power transactions covering constant-sum(especially zero-sum), and nonconstant-sum game is developed in this paper. Also, the analysis for each game model are Performed in the case studies. Here, we have defined the payoff of each player as the weighted sum of both player's profits.