• 한국콘텐츠학회논문지
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• 제11권6호
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• pp.127-134
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• 2011

지방자치단체의 경영개념이 도입되면서 지역경제 활성화와 도시마케팅수단으로서의 지역 문화축제의 개최는 이제 각 지역마다 필수적인 수단이 되었다. 각 지자체마다 각 지역의 특성을 살린 차별화된 축제의 기획으로 단기간 최대의 효과를 얻으려고 노력하고 있다. 하지만, 많은 축제들이 비슷한 프로그램 기획으로 차이점을 보이지 않고 특성화를 꾀하지 못하고 있다. 아산시에서는 매년 4월 이순신 장군의 탄생일을 시작으로 '성웅 이순신 축제'를 개최하고 있다. 다른 축제와 차별화를 꾀하고 다양한 계층을 유입하기 위해 아산시는 호서대학교 게임공학과와 '충무공 해상대전' 온라인 게임을 만들어 이를 소재로 e-sports대회를 개최하였다. 그 결과 기존 축제와 e-sports대회의 결함이란 새로운 시도라는 평가와 함께 축제의 소외계층이었던 청소년들을 대거 축제 안으로 끌어들일 수 있었으며 축제의 다양성과 흥행에 이바지 할 수 있었다.

• 산업경영시스템학회지
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• 제40권1호
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• pp.105-113
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• 2017

Network externality can be defined as the effect that one user of a good or service has on the value of that product to other people. When a network externality is present, the value of a product or service is dependent on the number of others using it. There exist asymmetries in network externalities between the online and traditional offline marketing channels. Technological capabilities such as interactivity and real-time communications enable the creation of virtual communities. These user communities generate significant direct as well as indirect network externalities by creating added value through user ratings, reviews and feedback, which contributes to eliminate consumers' concern for buying products without the experience of 'touch and feel'. The offline channel offers much less scope for such community building, and consequently, almost no possibility for the creation of network externality. In this study, we analyze the effect of network externality on the competition between online and conventional offline marketing channels using game theory. To do this, we first set up a two-period game model to represent the competition between online and offline marketing channels under network externalities. Numerical analysis of the Nash equilibrium solutions of the game showed that the pricing strategies of online and offline channels heavily depend not only on the strength of network externality but on the relative efficiency of online channel. When the relative efficiency of online channel is high, the online channel can greatly benefit by the network externality. On the other hand, if the relative efficiency of online channel is low, the online channel may not benefit at all by the network externality.

• 한국게임학회 논문지
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• 제14권4호
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• pp.53-66
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• 2014

게임을 하지 않던 신규 이용자들의 모바일 게임시장 진입으로 인해 전체 게임시장은 확대되었음에도 불구하고 온라인게임 시장은 정체국면에 처해 있다. 게다가 외산 온라인게임의 국내 점유율이 높아지면서 국내 온라인게임 시장은 급속도로 성장이 저하될 수밖에 없었다. 아직까지 해외 시장에서는 온라인게임의 성장 가능성이 점쳐지고 있고 국내 온라인게임도 꾸준히 인기를 얻고 있다. 하지만 국내에서의 문제가 극복되지 않는다면 해외 게임들과의 경쟁에서 뒤쳐지는 것은 시간문제에 불과하다. 가장 큰 문제점은 경쟁력의 저하와 지원책의 부재이다. 이에 본 연구는 현재 온라인게임 시장의 현황을 분석하고, 소비자들의 이용 실태와 전문가들의 의견을 분석해 온라인게임 활성화 방안을 제시하였다.

• 정보과학회지
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• 제29권2호
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• pp.48-54
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• 2011

• Journal of Communications and Networks
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• 제18권4호
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• pp.658-669
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• 2016

The tremendous increase in mobile data traffic coupled with fierce competition in wireless industry brings about spectrum scarcity and bandwidth fragmentation. This inevitably results in asymmetric-valued long term evolution (LTE) spectrum allocation that stems from different timing for twice improvement in capacity between competing operators, given spectrum allocations today. This motivates us to study the economic effects of asymmetric-valued LTE spectrum allocation. In this paper, we formulate the interactions between operators and users as a hierarchical dynamic game framework, where two spiteful operators simultaneously make spectrum acquisition decisions in the upper-level first-price sealed-bid auction game, and dynamic pricing decisions in the lower-level differential game, taking into account user subscription dynamics. Using backward induction, we derive the equilibrium of the entire game under mild conditions. Through analytical and numerical results, we verify our studies by comparing the latest result of LTE spectrum auction in South Korea, which serves as the benchmark of asymmetric-valued LTE spectrum auction designs.

• 한국게임학회 논문지
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• 제15권1호
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• pp.89-100
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• 2015

본 연구는 경쟁이 치열해지고 상품 주기가 짧아지는 소셜 네트워크 게임의 한계를 극복하고자 게임 개발사가 채택한 크로스 프로모션 전략에 주목하여, 게임 몰입에 미치는 영향에 대해 알아보았다. 연구결과, 게임을 적게 할수록 오락성, 자기표현 요인이 게임 몰입에 영향을 주는 반면, 게임을 많이 할수록 자기표현과 경쟁심리가 게임 몰입에 영향을 주는 것으로 나타났다. 또한, 게임 이용수준과 프로모션 이용 수준에 따라 프로모션에 대한 유용성과 성가심에 대한 인식이 차이가 있는데, 게임을 많이 하고 프로모션을 많이 이용할수록 프로모션의 유용성을 더 많이 인식하고 몰입도가 커지는 것으로 나타났다.

• Asia pacific journal of information systems
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• 제23권2호
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• pp.67-86
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• 2013

This study first provides a stylized model that captures the essential features of the SC (Social Commerce) business and the competition process. The model focuses on the relationship between key decision issues such as marketing inputs and market value. As more SCs join the industry, they are inevitably faced with fierce competition, which may lead to sharp increase in the total marketing and advertising expenditure. This type of competition may lead the industry away from its optimal development path, and at worst, toward a disruption of the entire industry ecosystem. Such being the case, another goal of this study is to examine the possibility that the ToC (Tragedy of the Commons) may occur in the SC industry. We build game models, each of which assumes homogeneity and heterogeneity of SC providers, respectively, and derive explicit equilibrium solutions from both models. Our basic analysis presents Nash equilibria in both models and shows that SC providers are inevitably faced with fierce competition, which may lead to sharp increase in the total marketing expenses. We also compare the game outcomes with one with a hypothetical social planner who determines the total marketing level that optimizes the entire market value. Then, ToC can be defined to describe the situation where the total marketing efforts exceed the socially optimal level of marketing efforts. In both models, we examine the possibility of the ecosystem disruption and specify the conditions under which ToC may occur. However, the chance of avoiding ToC is higher with heterogeneous players than with homogeneous players. To supplement our analytical results, we develop a simulation model which incorporates a market dynamics based on the gap between actual marketing efforts and socially optimal marketing level. Simulation experiments present some lessons and insights which also confirm out findings from equilibrium analysis. For example, heterogeneity in SC providers alleviates the severity of ToC and makes it faster for survivors to escape from the ToC trap. As a result, the degree of industrial concentration tends to increase, which also explains the 'rich-get-richer' phenomenon observed in some empirical studies on the SC industry. Lastly, based on our analytical and experimental results, we come up with some measures to avoid ToC and overcome the shortcomings intrinsic to the current business model. And further discussions provide strategic implications and policy directions to overcome the possible trap of ToC in this ecosystem, and eventually help the industry to sustainably develop itself toward the next level. To name a few examples of policy measures, regulations on the marketing activities so that the overall marketing expenses cannot go beyond the socially optimal level; institutional guidelines and rules to straightening up the distortions in the way that SC providers view the marketing costs (the current marketing costs are underestimated, thereby encouraging SC providers to increase marketing expenditure); and so on.

• 한국게임학회 논문지
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• 제18권5호
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• pp.59-66
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• 2018

이 논문에서는 전통게임중 하나인 고누게임에 대한 구현과 실험이 수행된다. 고누게임을 구현하기 위한 기법으로 미니맥스알고리즘이 적용되었다. 미니맥스 알고리즘에 게임을 구현하기 위해 평가함수를 제안하였다. 고누게임의 구현 이후 성능향상을 위해 알파베타 가지치기에 대한 알고리즘의 효율성을 분석한다. 게임의 승패에 영향을 미치는 최적의 분석을 위해 가중치 분석이 수행되었다. 가중치 분석을 위하여, 사람과 컴퓨터의 대국, 컴퓨터와 컴퓨터의 대국으로 실험하였다. 그 결과 최적의 공격과 방어를 할 수 있는 가중치를 제시하였다.

• Asia Marketing Journal
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• 제16권1호
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• pp.35-69
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• 2014

The impact of competition on pricing has been studied in the context of counterfactual merger analyses where expected optimal prices in a hypothetical monopoly are compared with observed prices in an oligopolistic market. Such analyses would typically assume static decision making by consumers and firms and thus have been applied mostly to data obtained from consumer packed goods such as cereal and soft drinks. However such static modeling approach is not suitable when decision makers are forward looking. When it comes to the markets for durable products with indirect network effects, consumer purchase decisions and firm pricing decisions are inherently dynamic as they take into account future states when making purchase and pricing decisions. Researchers need to take into account the dynamic aspects of decision making both in the consumer side and in the supplier side for such markets. Firms in a two-sided market typically subsidize one side of the market to exploit the indirect network effect. Such pricing behaviors would be more prevalent in competitive markets where firms would try to win over the battle for standard. While such qualitative expectation on the relationship between pricing behaviors and competitive structures could be easily formed, little empirical studies have measured the extent to which the distinct pricing structure in two-sided markets depends on the competitive structure of the market. This paper develops an empirical model to measure the impact of competition on optimal pricing of durable products under indirect network effects. In order to measure the impact of exogenously determined competition among firms on pricing, we compare the equilibrium prices in the observed oligopoly market to those in a hypothetical monopoly market. In computing the equilibrium prices, we account for the forward looking behaviors of consumers and supplier. We first estimate a demand function that accounts for consumers' forward-looking behaviors and indirect network effects. And then, for the supply side, the pricing equation is obtained as an outcome of the Markov Perfect Nash Equilibrium in pricing. In doing so, we utilize numerical dynamic programming techniques. We apply our model to a data set obtained from the U.S. video game console market. The video game console market is considered a prototypical case of two-sided markets in which the platform typically subsidizes one side of market to expand the installed base anticipating larger revenues in the other side of market resulting from the expanded installed base. The data consist of monthly observations of price, hardware unit sales and the number of compatible software titles for Sony PlayStation and Nintendo 64 from September 1996 to August 2002. Sony PlayStation was released to the market a year before Nintendo 64 was launched. We compute the expected equilibrium price path for Nintendo 64 and Playstation for both oligopoly and for monopoly. Our analysis reveals that the price level differs significantly between two competition structures. The merged monopoly is expected to set prices higher by 14.8% for Sony PlayStation and 21.8% for Nintendo 64 on average than the independent firms in an oligopoly would do. And such removal of competition would result in a reduction in consumer value by 43.1%. Higher prices are expected for the hypothetical monopoly because the merged firm does not need to engage in the battle for industry standard. This result is attributed to the distinct property of a two-sided market that competing firms tend to set low prices particularly at the initial period to attract consumers at the introductory stage and to reinforce their own networks and eventually finally to dominate the market.

• 한국콘텐츠학회:학술대회논문집
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• 한국콘텐츠학회 2007년도 추계 종합학술대회 논문집
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• pp.647-651
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• 2007

어느 순간부터 게임은 한 기종의 타이틀로 발매되기 보다는 멀티 플랫폼으로 발매되기 시작하였다. PS(Play Station)나 XBOX와 같은 경쟁기종의 경우에 '파이널 판타지' 나 '기어 오브 워' 등의 대표작이 있다. 하지만 게임의 타이틀이 멀티 플랫폼으로 제작되기 시작하였고 이는 게임의 제작비 상승에 따른 위험을 최소화하기 위한 게임 개발자들의 선택으로 많은 게임이 멀티 플랫폼으로 제작되고 있는 단계이다. 본 연구는 이러한 멀티 플랫폼 환경에서 게임 캐릭터 개발 방법에 관하여 멀티 플랫폼의 개요와 멀티 플랫폼 환경에서의 게임캐릭터를 분석 및 사례제안을 통하여 멀티 플랫폼에 대한 방향을 제시를 위한 기초 자료로 활용하고자 한다.