• Journal of Environmental Policy
• /
• v.8 no.4
• /
• pp.75-94
• /
• 2009

The process of obtaining third-party financing contacts was analyzed via a two-stage game model: a "signaling game" for the first stage,and a "principal-agent model" for the second stage. The two-stage game was solved by a process of backward induction. In the second stage game, the optimal effort level of the energy saving company (ESCO), the optimal compensation scheme of the energy user, and the optimal payoffs for both parties were derived for each subgame. The optimal solutions forthe different subgames were then compared with each other. Our main finding was that if there is some restriction on ESCO's revenue (e.g. a progressive sales tax) that causes ESCO's revenue toincrease at a decreasing rate, then the optimal sharing ratio is uniquely determined at a level of strictly less than one under a linear compensation scheme, i.e. a unique balance exists. Subgames have a unique equilibrium arrived at separately for each situation,. Within this equilibrium, energy users accept energy audit proposals from H-type ESCOs with high levels of technology, but reject proposals from L-type ESCOs with low levels of technology. While L-type ESCOs cannot attain profits in the third-party financing market, H-type ESCOS can pocket the price differential between L-type and H-type audit fees. Accordingly, revenues in an H-type ESCO equilibrium increase not only in line with the technology of the ESCO inquestion, but also faster than in an L-type equilibrium due to more advanced technology. At the same time, energy users receive some positive payoff by allowing ESCOs to perform third-party financing tasks within their existing energy system without incurring any extra costs.

• International Journal of Internet, Broadcasting and Communication
• /
• v.13 no.1
• /
• pp.26-36
• /
• 2021

The Internet was created as a decentralized and autonomous system of interconnected computer networks used for data exchange across mutually trusted participants. The element technologies on the Internet, such as inter-domain and intra-domain routing and DNS, operated in a distributed manner. With the development of the Web, the Web has become indispensable in daily life. The existing web applications allow us to form online communities, generate private information, access big data, shop online, pay bills, post photos or videos, and even order groceries. This is what has led to centralization of the Web. This centralization is now controlled by the giant social media platforms that provide it as a service, but the original Internet was not like this. These giant companies realized that the decentralized network's huge value involves gathering, organizing, and monetizing information through centralized web applications. The centralized Web applications have heralded some major issues, which will likely worsen shortly. This study focuses on these problems and investigates blockchain's potentials for decentralized web architecture capable of improving conventional web services' critical features, including autonomous, robust, and secure decentralized processing and traceable trustworthiness in tamper-proof transactions. Finally, we review the decentralized web architecture that circumvents the main Internet gatekeepers and controls our data back from the giant social media companies.

• International journal of advanced smart convergence
• /
• v.11 no.3
• /
• pp.132-141
• /
• 2022

We look at the rocket life stages of NaverZ's metaverse platform scaling and investigate the ignition and scale-up stage of its metaverse platform brand, Zepeto based on the Rocket Model (RM). The results are derived as follows: Firstly, NaverZ shows the event strategy by collaborating with K-pops, the piggybacking strategy by utilizing other SNSs, and the VIP strategy by investing in game and entertainment content genres in the 'attract' function. In the second 'match' function, based on the matching rule of Zepeto, the users can generate their own characters and "World" with Zepeto Studio. However, for strengthening the matching quality, NaverZ is investing in the artificial intelligence (AI) based companies consistently. In the 'connect' function, NaverZ's maximization of the positive interaction is possible by inducing feed activities in Zepeto & other SNSs and by uploading attractive content for viral effects in the ignition. For facilitating this, NaverZ expands the scale to other continents like Southeast Asia and Middle East with the localization strategy inclusive investment. Lastly, in the 'transact' function, based on three monetization experiments like Coin & ZEM, user generated content (UGC) fee, and advertising revenue in the ignition, NaverZ starts to invest in NFT platforms and abroad blockchain companies.

• Journal of Game and Entertainment
• /
• v.2 no.2
• /
• pp.75-84
• /
• 2006

In terms of creating widespread popularity and a high value added business, TV drama is recognized as an unrivaled entertainment content above any other TV program genres Although recently some broadcasting companies have been trying to set up a drama production system, it seems that a well-structured system has not been established, yet. This study analyses the practices and mechanisms of drama producing processes based on the in-depth interviews with the experts in the drama production fields in three major broadcasting companies. It is found that the Korean drama production system is 'a producer-director system' and that the strategies for the windowing effects are not systematically applied from the pre-production stage. For the broadcasting companies to strengthen the competitiveness through drama, the expert-producer system should be introduced, the production elements should be systematically managed, and the multi-use strategies should be effectively established.

• The Journal of the Korea Contents Association
• /
• v.19 no.8
• /
• pp.93-105
• /
• 2019

This study want to identify problems related to mobile in-app payment from the perspective of consumers and suggest ways to solve them. Three scenarios have been developed to achieve the objectives of this study. This suggests the situation of in-app payment problem that consumers often experience. Then 323 consumers in their 20s and 30s read the scenario, identified the problem in each situation and assessed who was responsible. Consumers were aware of in-app payment problems due to problems with in-app payment readability, problems with app market responsibility, problems with responsibility of game companies, and problems of consumer responsibility. And different consumers had different levels of assessment on the problem of in-app payment. According to the research, consumers have high demand for improvement of the lack of readability in related laws, including strengthening the readability of the in-app payment indicator. In addition, the company confirmed the importance of cooperative efforts by consumers, businesses, and the government due to high consumer expectations for the role of the distribution company App Market other than the content developer game company.

• Journal of Wetlands Research
• /
• v.26 no.1
• /
• pp.10-20
• /
• 2024

The conservation and restoration of wetlands are essential tasks for the sustainable development of human society and the environment, providing vital benefits such as biodiversity maintenance, natural disaster mitigation, and climate change alleviation. This study aims to analyze the strategic interactions and interests among various stakeholders using game theory and to provide significant grounds for policy decisions related to wetland restoration and development. In this study, hypothetical scenarios were set up for three types of cities: large, medium, and small. Stakeholders such as governments, development companies, environmental groups, and local residents were identified. Strategic options for each stakeholder were developed, and a payoff matrix was established through discussions among wetland ecology experts. Subsequently, non-cooperative game theory was applied to analyze Nash equilibria and Pareto efficiency. In large cities, strategies of 'Wetland Conservation' and 'Eco-Friendly Development' were found beneficial for all stakeholders. In medium cities, various strategies were identified, while in small cities, 'Eco-Friendly Development' emerged as the optimal solution for all parties involved. The Pareto efficiency analysis revealed how the optimal solutions for wetland management could vary across different city types. The study highlighted the importance of wetland conservation, eco-friendly development, and wetland restoration projects for each city type. Accordingly, policymakers should establish regulations and incentives that harmonize environmental protection and urban development and consider programs that promote community participation. Understanding the roles and strategies of stakeholders and the advantages and disadvantages of each strategy is crucial for making more effective policy decisions.

• The Korean Journal of Financial Management
• /
• v.14 no.3
• /
• pp.319-339
• /
• 1997

This paper provides an empirical analysis of the winner's curse in the context of corporate takeovers. The study analyzes conditions which make overpayment likely. For a sample of corporate takeovers completed between 1982 and 1993, the analysis shows that the volatility of targets relative to that of acquirers (not the uncertainty of the target or acquirer alone) has a definitive impact on the magnitude of the winner's curse. Also, the incidence is more pronounced in multiple-bidder than in single-bidder contests. Specifically, white knights are more likely to overpay than other acquirers in multiple bidding situations. Furthermore, the study finds that the process of competitive bidding is a zero sum game since the greater returns to the shareholders of target firms in multiple-bid contests come at the expense of the acquiring companies, Overall, the evidence suggests that the bidders need to become more conservative, particularly as the relative uncertainty of the target's 'true' value and the number of bidders increase.

• The Transactions of The Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers
• /
• v.56 no.7
• /
• pp.1199-1204
• /
• 2007

In a cost based pool market, the generation capacity can be used as strategic bids by generation companies (Gencos) with the cost functions open to the market. Competition using strategic capacities is modeled by Cournot and Perfect Competiton (PC) model, and transformed into two by two payoff matrix game with Gencos' decision variables of Cournot and PC model. The payoff matrices vary when capacity payments are given to Gencos in accordance with their capacity bids. Nash Equilibrium (NE) in the matrices also moves with capacity price changes. In order to maximize social welfare of the market, NE should locate in a certain position of the payoff matrices, which corresponds to a PC NE. A concept of a critical capacity price is proposed and calculated in this paper that is defined as a minimum capacity price leading to PC NE. The critical capacity price is verified to work as a tool for suppressing a strategic capacity withholding in simulations of a test system.

• The Transactions of the Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers A
• /
• v.52 no.6
• /
• pp.333-339
• /
• 2003

Competition among electric generation companies is a major goal of restructuring in the electricity industry. In electricity market, a huge volume of commodities will be traded through competitive bidding. The choice between uniform and pay-as-bid pricing for electricity auction has been one of most important issues in deregulated electricity market. This paper proposes a constrained Bertrand model for analyzing the electricity auction market of price competition model. The issue of the two pricing rules of uniform and pay-as-bid is studied from the viewpoint of consumer's benefit. This paper also shows that transmission congestion depends on the pricing mechanism. Pay-as-bid pricing gives less possibility of transmission congestion by price competition, and less burden to consumers in the simulation results.

• The Transactions of the Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers A
• /
• v.53 no.6
• /
• pp.350-357
• /
• 2004

In a deregulated electricity generation market, the sufficient capacity of transmission lines will promote the competition among generation companies (Gencos). In this paper, we show that Gencos' possession of rights to collect congestion rents may increase the competition effects of the transmission lines. In order for concrete analysis on this effect, a simple symmetric market model is introduced. In this framework, introducing the transmission right to the Gencos has the same strategic effects as increasing the line capacity of the transmission line. Moreover, the amount of effectively increased line capacity is equal to the amount of the line rights. We also show that the asymmetric share of the financial transmission rights may result in an asymmetric equilibrium even for symmetric firms and markets. We also demonstrate these aspects in equal line rights model and single firm line rights model. Finally, a numerical example is provided to show the basic idea of the proposed paper.