• Asian Journal of Business Environment
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• v.10 no.2
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• pp.5-15
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• 2020

Purpose: This study examines the impact of individual reciprocal preferences on coalition formation. The reciprocal model considers a player's own payoff, the player's perception of others' payoffs, and others' perceptions of the player's payoff. Research design, data and methodology: A reciprocal model is built to illustrate how reciprocity influences individual decisions in a coalition game and its formation. The prediction is examined with experimental evidences from a dictator game and a membership game. Results: The theoretical result suggests that the coalition formation could be unstable due to negative reciprocal kindness. The experimental findings support that negative reciprocal kindness could lead players participating in a coalition, no matter their dominant strategies are. When subjects were essential to make contributions to a coalition, they were more likely to cooperate if they were treated badly. In contrast, when subjects were unnecessary, the reciprocal kindness could enhance cooperative tendencies. Conclusions: This study reveals that the reciprocal behavior could influence individual decisions and reshape the coalition formation. In terms of policy implications, this study has shown that coalition formation could be reshaped by reciprocal prefe rences. Due to the strategic and complicated decision process in an interactive environment, a comprehensive investigation of factors would be required in a climate coalition in practice.

• Asia pacific journal of information systems
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• v.23 no.2
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• pp.67-86
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• 2013

This study first provides a stylized model that captures the essential features of the SC (Social Commerce) business and the competition process. The model focuses on the relationship between key decision issues such as marketing inputs and market value. As more SCs join the industry, they are inevitably faced with fierce competition, which may lead to sharp increase in the total marketing and advertising expenditure. This type of competition may lead the industry away from its optimal development path, and at worst, toward a disruption of the entire industry ecosystem. Such being the case, another goal of this study is to examine the possibility that the ToC (Tragedy of the Commons) may occur in the SC industry. We build game models, each of which assumes homogeneity and heterogeneity of SC providers, respectively, and derive explicit equilibrium solutions from both models. Our basic analysis presents Nash equilibria in both models and shows that SC providers are inevitably faced with fierce competition, which may lead to sharp increase in the total marketing expenses. We also compare the game outcomes with one with a hypothetical social planner who determines the total marketing level that optimizes the entire market value. Then, ToC can be defined to describe the situation where the total marketing efforts exceed the socially optimal level of marketing efforts. In both models, we examine the possibility of the ecosystem disruption and specify the conditions under which ToC may occur. However, the chance of avoiding ToC is higher with heterogeneous players than with homogeneous players. To supplement our analytical results, we develop a simulation model which incorporates a market dynamics based on the gap between actual marketing efforts and socially optimal marketing level. Simulation experiments present some lessons and insights which also confirm out findings from equilibrium analysis. For example, heterogeneity in SC providers alleviates the severity of ToC and makes it faster for survivors to escape from the ToC trap. As a result, the degree of industrial concentration tends to increase, which also explains the 'rich-get-richer' phenomenon observed in some empirical studies on the SC industry. Lastly, based on our analytical and experimental results, we come up with some measures to avoid ToC and overcome the shortcomings intrinsic to the current business model. And further discussions provide strategic implications and policy directions to overcome the possible trap of ToC in this ecosystem, and eventually help the industry to sustainably develop itself toward the next level. To name a few examples of policy measures, regulations on the marketing activities so that the overall marketing expenses cannot go beyond the socially optimal level; institutional guidelines and rules to straightening up the distortions in the way that SC providers view the marketing costs (the current marketing costs are underestimated, thereby encouraging SC providers to increase marketing expenditure); and so on.

• The Journal of Fisheries Business Administration
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• v.42 no.3
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• pp.31-39
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• 2011

This paper attempts to extend such analysis to the rather more difficult problem of optimal management of transnational fish stocks jointly owned by two countries. Transboundary fish such as Mackerel creates an incentive to harvest fish before a competitor does and leads to over-exploitation. This tendency is especially poignant for transnational stocks since, in the absence of an enforceable, international agreement, there is little or no reason for either government or the fishing industry to promote resource conservation and economic efficiency. In the current paper I examine a game theoretic setting in which cooperative management can provide more benefits than noncooperative management. A dynamic model of Mackerel fishery is combined with Nash's theory of two countries cooperative games. A characteristic function game approach is applied to describe the sharing of the surplus benefits from cooperation and noncooperation. A bioeconomic model was used to compare the economic yield of the optimal strategies for two countries, under joint maximization of net benefits in joint ocean. The results suggest as follows. First, the threat points represent the net benefits for two countries in absence of cooperation. The net benefits to Korea and China in threat points are 2,000 billion won(${\pi}^0_{KO}$) and 1,130 billion won(${\pi}^0_{CH}$). Total benefits are 3,130 billion won. Second, if two countries cooperate one with another, they reach the solution payoffs such as Pareto efficient. The net benefits to Korea and China in Pareto efficient are 2,785 billion won(${\pi}^0_{KO}$) and 1,605 billion won(${\pi}^0_{CH}$) or total benefits of 4,390 billion won : a gain of 1,260 billion won. Third, the different price effects under the two scenarios show that total benefit rise as price increases.

• The Journal of Bigdata
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• v.5 no.2
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• pp.231-240
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• 2020

With the development in the IT industry and the growth in the game industry, user's game data is recorded in seconds according to various plays and options, and a vast amount of game data can be analyzed based on Bigdata. Combined with business, Bigdata is used to discover new values for profit creation in various fields, but it is utilized in the game industry in insufficient ways. In this study, considering the characteristics of the subdivided lines, we constructed a win-loss prediction model for each line using the game data of League of Legends, and derived the importance of variables. This study can contribute to planning of strategies for general game users to get information about team members in advance and increase the win rate by using the record search sites.

• Asia-Pacific Journal of Business
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• v.9 no.4
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• pp.49-65
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• 2018

This paper illustrates the competition between the mobile pay and credit card systems by utilizing the theory of two-sided markets. Two firms, as platforms, maximize the profit collecting fees from consumers on one side and from retailers on the other side. Consumers pay to buy goods and services with mobile pay, credit card, or cash. The basic model is one that each platform maximizes its profit. We show that the fees for credit card holders and retailers are higher than the respective costs. The fee for retailers of the mobile payment is higher than its cost, while the buyer's fee may be higher or lower than its cost. Applied model is the one that employs the delegation game model. The total profit of the mobile pay system is composed of its profit and the weighted demand for the mobile pay. It is shown that buyers' fee under the applied model is lower than that under the basic model, resulting in an increase of the demand for the mobile pay. The fee for the retailers rises, albeit the sum of fees for the buyers and retailers falls. The profit for the mobile pay system is increased, while that for the credit card company stays the same.

• Proceedings of the Korea Contents Association Conference
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• 2008.05a
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• pp.431-435
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• 2008

Thanks to the development of internet, on-line market expands exponentially and corresponding solid business models are drawn attentions. Most of on-line trading items are limited with selling game related items however, Linden Lab made its turning point by introducing cyber reality game to shape the cyber life with creating his own Avatar in 2003. After 2003, Second life has grown sharply that over 12 million users around the world. While former games are progressed within fixed scenario, the concept of avatars who live his or her own lives at the cyber space that successfully differentiate from former online game. Further, cyber money, Linden Dollar can be used to buy real estate, cloth, shoes just like at real economy system. Not only for using corporate marketing, various areas of activities; promotion of public sector, politics, education are also functioned at the cyber life. In Korea, Korean version of Second life was introduced at the end of 2007 that draws attentions from the users. In this study, I examine various business models of cyber through Second life and suggest feasible culture-contents applying models.

• Journal of Korea Game Society
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• v.5 no.2
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• pp.19-27
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• 2005

The core price policy of on-line game marketing are FPP(Fixed Pre Paid model and PPU(Pay Per Use) model. These two models have been a on-line game company's billing system and a fundamental of MMORPG in Korea. However, they took root billing system only for first movers recently. In now, the market share of several first movers is exceeding 80%, late movers witch have same billing system cannot take part in pair competition. Even though in MMORPG, many games of late movers were favorably noticed by a lot of gamers during Evaluation. Test, a lot of companies are bankrupt before make business. Late Movers declare free game first thing, they maintain their existence and win over customers in on-line game market. And next, they guarantee item selling, give multiple experience value and game money, at last, induce their customers to pay service. As it makes trouble between pay user and free user, and it linked up with the collapse of game contents balance that designed for FPP billing system, And then meet unexpected result which reduction of game life cycle. In this Paper, we classified several contents services based on game contents, and suggested contents premium services which adopted low cost strategy lead to micro payment. we hope it will apply to late movers' new billing system in MMORPG.

• Journal of Korean Society of Industrial and Systems Engineering
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• v.39 no.3
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• pp.47-55
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• 2016

The proliferation of the Internet and related technologies has led to a new form of distribution channels, namely online retailers. The conventional offline and the new online retailers have different transaction costs perceived by the consumers in the following perspectives: the accessibility to the product information, the traffic cost and the opportunity cost for the time to visit the store, the delivery time and the possibility of 'touch and feel' to test the quality of the product. In particular, the online retailers have lower distribution cost structure in that they do not have physical stores, which results in lower selling price. Thus they continuously offer price competition against offline retailers using the lower selling cost as competitive weapon. Moreover the emergence of the social commerce is likely to intensify the competition between the online and offline retailers. To survive in this fierce competition, the offline retailers are trying to defend their business interests by sticking to offline transaction in anticipation of increased customer loyalty, customer's preference for 'touch and feel' style shopping, and others. Despite of these efforts, customers who touch and feel a product in an offline store but purchase the product through an online retailer are increasing. To protect such customers, recently, some of the offline retailers began to provide the mobile discount service (MDS) which enables the offline customers to purchase a product at a discounted price through the mobile applications. In business competitions, the price discount strategy is usually considered to secure more market share at the cost of lower profit. In this study, however, we analyze the effect of MDS as a weapon for securing more profit. To do this, we set up a game model between the online and offline retailers which incorporates the effect of the MDS. By numerically analyzing the Nash equilibrium of the game, some managerial implications for using the MDS for more profit are discussed.

• Journal of Korea Game Society
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• v.9 no.3
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• pp.43-52
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• 2009

Online game is the most popular representative example of the fast growing virtual world. Also, influence of interaction between virtual and real world is getting greater, and much discussion about virtual world and economy. However, it is often overlooked that the types of virtual economy can be very diverse depending on conditions of social and legal environment and policies of companies. Therefore, the influence of interactions between virtual world and real world is not managed by government and companies properly enough. We propose that virtual world is a system which has six types of agents and five types of transactions. Then there are twenty-four combinations, and we illustrated four typical combinations among them to explain practical applications of our model. The purpose of our categorization is not only to help to understand characteristics but also to provide insights for management and improvement for virtual worlds.

• The Journal of Society for e-Business Studies
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• v.19 no.1
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• pp.43-61
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• 2014

This research is an application of game theory to developing the supplier selection and demand allocation mechanism, which are the essential and major research areas of supply chain planning and operation. In this research, the most popular and widely accepted mechanism, the progressive reverse auction is analyzed and compared with the other game theoretic approach, Kalai-Smorodinsky Bargaining Solution in the viewpoint of holistic efficiency of supply chain operation. To logically and exquisitely compare the efficiencies, a heuristic algorithm based on Genetic Algorithm is devised to find the other optimal demand allocation plan. A well known metric, profit-cost ratio, as well as profit functions for both suppliers and buyer has been designed for evaluating the overall profitability of supply chain. The experimental results with synthesis data and supply chain model which were made to mimic practical supply chain are illustrated and analyzed to show how the proposed approach can enhance the profitability of supply chain planning. Based on the result, it can be said that the proposed mechanism using bargainging solution mayguarantee the better profitability for the whole supply chin including both suppliers and buyer, even though quite small portion of buyer's profitability should be sacrified.