• Nuclear Engineering and Technology
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• 제51권6호
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• pp.1540-1553
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• 2019

A nuclear power plant (NPP) is a highly complex system-of-systems as manifested through its internal systems interdependence. The negative impact of such interdependence was demonstrated through the 2011 Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster. As such, there is a critical need for new strategies to overcome the limitations of current risk assessment techniques (e.g. the use of static event and fault tree schemes), particularly through simulation of the nonlinear dynamic feedback mechanisms between the different NPP systems/components. As the first and key step towards developing an integrated NPP dynamic probabilistic risk assessment platform that can account for such feedback mechanisms, the current study adopts a system dynamics simulation approach to model the thermal dynamic processes in: the reactor core; the secondary coolant system; and the pressurized water reactor. The reactor core and secondary coolant system parameters used to develop system dynamics models are based on those of the Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station. These three system dynamics models are subsequently validated, using results from published work, under different system perturbations including the change in reactivity, the steam valve coefficient, the primary coolant flow, and others. Moving forward, the developed system dynamics models can be integrated with other interacting processes within a NPP to form the basis of a dynamic system-level (systemic) risk assessment tool.

• Nuclear Engineering and Technology
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• 제51권1호
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• pp.104-115
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• 2019

Since the Fukushima Daiichi accident, there has been an emphasis on the risk resulting from multi-unit accidents. Human reliability analysis (HRA) is one of the important issues in multi-unit probabilistic safety assessment (MUPSA). Hence, there is a need to properly identify all the human and organizational factors relevant to a multi-unit incident scenario in a nuclear power plant (NPP). This study identifies and categorizes the human and organizational factors relevant to a multi-unit incident scenario of NPPs based on a review of relevant literature. These factors are then analyzed to ascertain all possible unit-to-unit interactions that need to be considered in the multi-unit HRA and the pattern of interactions. The human and organizational factors are classified into five categories: organization, work device, task, performance shaping factors, and environmental factors. The identification and classification of these factors will significantly contribute to the development of adequate strategies and guidelines for managing multi-unit accidents. This study is a necessary initial step in developing an effective HRA method for multiple NPP units in a site.

• Mycobiology
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• 제46권4호
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• pp.388-395
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• 2018

Radionuclides were deposited at forest areas in eastern parts of Japan following the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant incident in March 2011. Ectomycorrhizal (EM) fungi have important effects on radiocaesium dynamics in forest ecosystems. We examined the effect of colonization by the EM fungus Astraeus hygrometricus on the uptake of cesium (Cs) and potassium (K) by Pinus densiflora seedlings. Pine seedlings exhibited enhanced growth after the EM formation due to the colonization by A. hygrometricus. Additionally, the shoot Cs concentration increased after the EM formation when Cs was not added to the medium. This suggests that A. hygrometricus might be able to solubilize Cs fixed to soil particles. Moreover, the shoot K concentration increased significantly after the EM formation when Cs was added. However, there were no significant differences in the root K concentration between EM and non-EM seedlings. These results suggest that different mechanisms control the transfer of Cs and K from the root to the shoot of pine seedlings.

• Nuclear Engineering and Technology
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• 제44권3호
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• pp.225-236
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• 2012

The Fukushima-Daiichi accident shook the world, as a well-known plant design, the General Electric BWR Mark I, was heavily damaged in the tsunami, which followed the Great Japanese Earthquake of 11 March 2011. Plant safety functions were lost and, as both AC and DC failed, manoeuvrability of the plants at the site virtually came to a full stop. The traditional system of Emergency Operating Procedures (EOPs) and Severe Accident Management Guidelines (SAMG) failed to protect core and containment, and severe core damage resulted, followed by devastating hydrogen explosions and, finally, considerable radioactive releases. The root cause may not only have been that the design against tsunamis was incorrect, but that the defence against accidents in most power plants is based on traditional assumptions, such as Large Break LOCA as the limiting event, whereas there is no engineered design against severe accidents in most plants. Accidents beyond the licensed design basis have hardly been considered in the various designs, and if they were included, they often were not classified for their safety role, as most system safety classifications considered only design basis accidents. It is, hence, time to again consider the Design Basis Accident, and ask ourselves whether the time has not come to consider engineered safety functions to mitigate core damage accidents. Associated is a proper classification of those systems that do the job. Also associated are safety criteria, which so far are only related to 'public health and safety'; in reality, nuclear accidents cause few casualties, but create immense economical and societal effects-for which there are no criteria to be met. Severe accidents create an environment far surpassing the imagination of those who developed EOPs and SAMG, most of which was developed after Three Mile Island - an accident where all was still in place, except the insight in the event was lost. It requires fundamental changes in our present safety approach and safety thinking and, hence, also in our EOPs and SAMG, in order to prevent future 'Fukushimas'.

• 한국정보처리학회:학술대회논문집
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• 한국정보처리학회 2013년도 춘계학술발표대회
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• pp.311-314
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• 2013

본 논문에서는 일본의 (주) 동경전력이 공개한 후쿠시마 제 1 원자력발전소 2 호기 원자로건물 지하에 위치한 S/C (Suppression Chamber) 주변의 Vent 관 조사 동영상들을 분석하였다. S/C 는 donut (환형) 모양의 구조물로 PCV (격납용기) 와 연결된 8 개의 Vent 관을 통해 원자로의 압력을 억제한다. 후쿠시마 사고 원자로의 용융 핵연료를 인출하기 위해서는 원자로 압력용기 및 PCV에 물을 채워서 방사선 선량율을 떨어뜨려야 한다. 물을 채운 후에 누설이 되면 안되기 때문에, PCV 와 S/C 사이에 연결된 Vent 관에 대한 방사능 오염수의 누설지점을 찾는 것이 중요하다. 이를 위한 사전공정으로 (주) 도시바의 4 족보행 로봇 탑재 카메라를 이용하여 8 개 Vent 관 모두를 육안 검사하였다. (주) 동경전력이 공개한 영상을 분석한 결과 고선량 감마선에 의한 Speckle 들이 관측되었다. 본 논문에서는 이러한 Speckle 분포의 특성을 분석하여 S/C 와 PCV 를 연결하는 8개 Vent 관중 방사능 오염물질이 많은 곳을 특정하고자 하였다.

• 한국유체기계학회 논문집
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• 제17권6호
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• pp.84-88
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• 2014

A long term passive cooling system is considered as the most important safety feature for the nuclear design after the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant accident in 2011. The conventional active pump driven safety systems are not available during a station Black Out (SBO) accident. The current design requirement on cooling time of the Passive Auxiliarly Feedwater System (PAFS) is about 8 hours only. To meet the 72 hours cooling time, the pool capacity of cooling water tank should be increased as much as 3~4 times larger than that of current water cooling tank. In order to extend the cooling time for 72 hours, a new passive air-water combined cooling system is proposed. This paper provides the feasibility of the combined passive air-water cooling system. The current pool capacity of water cooling system is preserved, and the cooling capability is extended by an additional air cooler.

• 방사선산업학회지
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• 제9권3호
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• pp.127-130
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• 2015

Since the accident at the Fukushima Daiichi power plant, Prussian blue (PB) has attracted increasing attention as a material for use in decontaminating the environment. We have focused the fundamental mechanism of specific $Cs^+$ adsorption into PB in order to develop high-performance PB-based $Cs^+$ adsorbents. The ability of PB to adsorb Cs varies considerably according to its origin such as what synthesis method was used, and under what conditions the PB was prepared. It has been commonly accepted that the exclusive abilities of PB to adsorb hydrated $Cs^+$ ions are caused by regular lattice spaces surrounded by cyanido-bridged metals. $Cs^+$ ions are trapped by simple physical adsorption in the regular lattice spaces of PB. $Cs^+$ ions are exclusively trapped by chemical adsorption via the hydrophilic lattice defect sites with proton-exchange from the coordination water. Prussian blue are believed to hold great promise for the clean-up of $^{137}Cs$ contaminated water around nuclear facilities and/or after nuclear accidents.

• Nuclear Engineering and Technology
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• 제53권10호
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• pp.3236-3246
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• 2021

Lessons learned from the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant accident directed that multiple failures should be considered more seriously rather than single failure in the licensing bases and safety cases because attempts to take accident management measures could be unsuccessful under the high radiation environment aggravated by multiple failures, such as complete loss of electric power, uncontrollable loss of coolant inventory, failure of essential safety function recovery. In the case of the complete loss of electric power called station blackout (SBO), if there is no mitigation action for recovering safety functions, the reactor core would be overheated, and severe fuel damage could be anticipated due to the failure of the active heat sink. In such a transient condition at CANDU-6 plants, the seal failure of the primary heat transport (PHT) pumps can facilitate a consequent increase in the fuel sheath temperature and eventually lead to degradation of the fuel integrity. Therefore, it is necessary to specify the regulatory guidelines for multiple failures on a licensing basis so that licensees should prepare the accident management measures to prevent or mitigate accident conditions. In order to explore the efficiency of implementing accident management strategies for CANDU-6 plants, this study proposed a realistic accident analysis approach on the SBO transient with multiple-failure sequences such as seal failure of PHT pumps without operator's recovery actions. In this regard, a comparative study for two PHT pump seal failure modes with and without coolant seal leakage was conducted using a best-estimate code to precisely investigate the behaviors of thermal-hydraulic parameters during transient conditions. Moreover, a sensitivity analysis for different PHT pump seal leakage rates was also carried out to examine the effect of leakage rate on the system responses. This study is expected to provide the technical bases to the accident management strategy for unmitigated transient conditions with multiple failures.

• Nuclear Engineering and Technology
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• 제52권10호
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• pp.2221-2229
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• 2020

After the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant (NPP) accident, level 3 probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) has emerged as an important task in order to assess the risk level of the multi-unit NPPs in a single nuclear site. Accurate calculation of the radionuclide concentrations and exposure doses to the public is required if a nuclear site has multi-unit NPPs and large number of people live near NPPs. So, there has been a great need to develop a new method or procedure for the fast and accurate offsite consequence calculation for the multi-unit NPP accident analysis. Since the multi-unit level 3 PSA is being currently performed assuming that all the NPPs are located at the same position such as a center of mass (COM) or base NPP position, radionuclide concentrations or exposure doses near NPPs can be drastically distorted depending on the locations, multi-unit NPP alignment, and the wind direction. In order to overcome this disadvantage of the COM method, the idea of a new multiple location (ML) method was proposed and implemented into a new tool MURCC (multi-unit radiological consequence calculator). Furthermore, the MURCC code was further improved for the multi-unit level 3 PSA that has the arbitrary number of multi-unit NPPs. The objectives of this study are to (1) qualitatively and quantitatively compare COM and ML methods, and (2) demonstrate the strength and efficiency of the ML method. The strength of the ML method was demonstrated by the applications to the multi-unit long-term station blackout (LTSBO) accidents at the four-unit Vogtle NPPs. Thus, it is strongly recommended that this ML method be employed for the offsite consequence analysis of the multi-unit NPP accidents.

• Journal of Radiation Protection and Research
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• 제41권4호
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• pp.350-353
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• 2016

Background: Various characteristics such as size distribution, chemical component and radio-activity have been analyzed for radioactive aerosols released from Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant. Measured results for radioactive aerosols suggest that the potential transport medium for radioactive cesium was non-sea-salt sulfate. This result indicates that cesium isotopes would preferentially attach with sulfate compounds. In the present work the attachment behavior of fission products to aqueous solution aerosols of sodium salts has been studied using a generation system of solution aerosols and spontaneous fission source of $^{248}Cm$. Materials and Methods: Attachment ratios of fission products to the solution aerosols were compared among the aerosols generated by different solutions of sodium salt. Results and Discussion: A significant difference according as a solute of solution aerosols was found in the attachment behavior. Conclusion: The present results suggest the existence of chemical effects in the attachment behavior of fission products to solution aerosols.