• Journal of Distribution Science
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• v.14 no.1
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• pp.39-49
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• 2016

Purpose - Considering industrialization development stages, an economic effect of ASEAN free trade agreement (FTA) on foreign direct investment (FDI) flows into the ASEAN countries was analyzed. Research design, data, and methodology - utilizing macro-level panel data from 2001 to 2012, panel regression analysis was conducted with a model constructed based on the knowledge-capital model. Results - As for overall ASEAN countries, ASEAN FTA was positively effective to attract vertical FDI to this region, while horizontal FDI was dominant before ASEAN FTA. Meanwhile, for the diversified economy relevant to Singapore, ASEAN FTA was not effective to attract FDI. For the ongoing industrialization economy relevant to Thailand, Malaysia, and the Philippines, ASEAN FTA was negatively effective to attract FDI; ASEAN FTA became a strong incentive to replace foreign investments with trade transactions for the horizontal firms, but an influence of market potentials after ASEAN FTA, which induces to third-country effects such as export platform FDI, has increased. For the incipient industrialization economy relevant to Indonesia, Vietnam, and Cambodia, ASEAN FTA was positively effective to attract vertical FDI. Conclusions - The effectiveness of FTA on FDI inflows varied considerably by the industrialization development stages of host countries.

• Economic Analysis
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• v.25 no.2
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• pp.132-176
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• 2019

We use a time-varying parameter vector auto regression (TVP-VAR) model to understand the impact of U.S. monetary policy normalization on Korean financial markets and capital accounts. The U.S. monetary policy is represented by the federal funds rate, term premium and credit spread. During the U.S. monetary contraction period of 2004 to 2006, changes in the federal funds rate presented negative pressure on Korean financial markets. The changes in federal funds rate also led to a simultaneous contraction in inward and outward capital flows. However, the effects of a federal funds rate shock has been reduced since 2015. On the other hand, the effects of U.S. term premiums is getting stronger after the period of quantitative easing (QE). The influence of the U.S. credit spread also significantly increased after the global financial crisis. Simulation results show that a rise in the U.S. credit spread, which can be triggered by a contractionary monetary policy, can pose a larger adverse impact on the Korean economy than a rise in the federal funds rate itself. As for capital flows, a U.S. monetary policy contraction causes an outflow of foreign investment, but the repatriation of overseas investment by Korean residents can offset this outflow.

• KDI Journal of Economic Policy
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• v.32 no.2
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• pp.1-26
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• 2010

This paper empirically examines whether Korean monetary policy is independent of U.S. monetary policy during the post-crisis period in which capital account is liberalized and floating exchange rate regime is adopted and during the pre-crisis period in which capital mobility is restricted and tightly managed exchange rate regime is adopted. Before capital account liberalization, monetary autonomy can be achieved in view of the trillema, even under tightly managed exchange rate regime, as capital mobility is restricted. On the other hand, for the period after capital account liberalization, monetary autonomy can be also achieved in view of the trillema, as exchange rate stability is given up. Securing monetary autonomy, however, may not be easy under liberalized capital account for a small open economy like Korea. Huge capital movements can generate excessive instability in foreign exchange and asset markets. Strengthened international economic linkages may also be another factor to prevent monetary policy from being independent. Using block-exogenous structural VAR model, the effects of U.S. monetary policy shocks on Korean economy are examined. Empirical results show that Korean monetary policy is not independent of U.S. monetary policy for both periods before and after capital account liberalization. For the period after capital account liberalization, Korea does not seem to have implemented floating exchange rate policy in practice, which may lead Korean monetary policy to be dependent on U.S. monetary policy. For the period after capital account liberalization, portfolio flows respond dramatically to the U.S. monetary policy, which may also keep Korean monetary policy from being independent.

• Korea Trade Review
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• v.42 no.1
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• pp.217-236
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• 2017

The purpose of this study is to analyze the effects of IFDI on the regional growth of 16 subregions in Korea during 2000~2014 by applying the System GMM. As a result of the analysis, the IFDI flowed into Korea has showed a positive effect on regional economic growth such as capital formation, job creation, and export expansion. but import has showed a negative effect. and Human capital has showed a positive effect but not statistically significant. meanwhile, IFDI which was flowed in the regions has showed a positive effect on the GRDP of DK regions including Daegu and Kyongbuk, while the GRDP of Metropolitan including Seoul, Incheon and Gyeonggi and BUK regions including Busan, Ulsan, Kyongnam has showed a negative effect. there were observed similar trends in the complementarities between IFDI inflows and human capital. This study has confirmed that IFDI flows into Korea are an important factor for regional growth, but the growth effect on GRDP in the region differs according to regional characteristics. Therefore, this study has suggested that it is urgent to reorganize the industrial structure along with the IFDI attraction strategy suitable for regional characteristics in order to expand the growth effect of IFDI flowed into the regions.

• The Journal of Asian Finance, Economics and Business
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• v.8 no.8
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• pp.335-343
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• 2021

This paper investigates the effect of institutional quality on FDI inflows by using FDI outflows from Asian countries from 2009 to 2017. We used the FDI data from five major Asian economies, which are South Korea, China, Japan, Singapore, and Hong Kong. The gravity model was used to examine the effect of institutional quality on FDI flows. The regression model considers several independent variables, and we select the most appropriate variables by using the Bayesian Model Averaging (BMA) estimator. We have shown that foreign direct investment from Asian countries depends on the size of home and the partner countries, geographical distance, trade interaction between two countries, economic freedom, labor supply, tariff rate, and capacity of the government. The results of different estimation techniques emphasize that multinational enterprises prefer to invest in those countries which have a higher income, which shows the evidence for Lucas's paradox. The results also show that economic freedom and control of corruption have a positive impact on FDI inwards. The regression results show that better institutional quality in host countries encourages more FDIs from Asian economies. It suggests that the state should control corruption and create a free economic environment to attract FDIs.

• East Asian Economic Review
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• v.24 no.2
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• pp.165-184
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• 2020

Applying Ismailov and Rossi (2018), I newly construct the Korea FX uncertainty based on the density distribution of historical forecast errors. This uncertainty index properly captures the rare but significant events in the Korean currency market and provides information distinct from other uncertainty measures in recent studies. I show that 1) FX uncertainty arising from unexpected depreciation has a stronger impact on Korea-U.S. exchange rates and that 2) macro variables, such as capital flows or interest rate differentials, have predictive ability regarding Korea FX uncertainty for short horizons. These findings enable us to predict the events of sudden currency crashes and understand the Korea-U.S. exchange rate dynamics.

• Journal of the Economic Geographical Society of Korea
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• v.19 no.3
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• pp.491-511
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• 2016

This paper attempts to understand the nature and dynamics of global value chains in the auto industry using the OECD TiVA 2015 edition on the bilateral foreign value added in exports over the period 1995-2011 and employing the techniques of social network analysis such as the computation of network measures and visualization of value added trade flows. It is shown that there has been a tendency towards increasing production fragmentation both within and across regions. The automotive value-added network is found to have small-world properties with a hierarchical, clustered and dense structure. The differences among the US, Germany and China as major suppliers of foreign value added in global automotive value chains are remarkably revealed. Although the fragmentation of production has been developed on a global scale, a dichotomous tension between center and periphery and domestic and foreign capital lies behind it.

• The Journal of Asian Finance, Economics and Business
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• v.8 no.4
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• pp.55-67
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• 2021

This study aims to measure the lower tail dependence as risk contagion from the U.S. economy to 18 developing countries affecting FDI inflows using time-series data from 2005 to 2019. Firstly, we utilize four dynamic copula models, namely, Student-t, Clayton, rotated survival Gumbel, and rotated survival Joe, to measure the tail dependence structure between the U.S. and each developing country's real GDP growth. Secondly, we use the regression model to explore the contagion effects on FDI inflows. The results show that there is evidence of the tail dependence between the U.S and developing economies, indicating the presence of the contagion effects. Primarily, we observe that the degree of contagion effects of the global financial crisis varies across countries; a strong impact is observed in Chinese, South African, Russian, Colombian, and Mexican economic growth. Furthermore, we found significant contagion risk affecting FDI inflows positively in China, Indonesia, Columbia, Morocco, and negatively in the Philippines, Bulgaria, and South Africa. This study demonstrates the usefulness of the copulas model in terms of examining contagion. Our findings shed light on the influence of sound policies and regulations to cope with both positive and negative consequences of the contagion on the capital movement.

• KDI Journal of Economic Policy
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• v.32 no.4
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• pp.153-195
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• 2010

The recent global financial crisis has been the outcome of, among other things, the mismatch between institutions and the reality of the market in the current global financial system. The International financial institutions (IFIs) that were designed more than 60 years ago can no longer effectively meet the challenges posed by the current global economy. While the global financial market has become integrated like a single market, there is no international lender of last resort or global regulatory body. There also has been a rapid shift in the weight of economic power. The share of the Group of 7 (G7) countries in global gross domestic product (GDP) fell and the share of emerging market economies increased rapidly. Therefore, the tasks facing us today are: (i) to reform the IFIs -mandate, resources, management, and governance structure; (ii) to reform the system such as the international monetary system (IMS), and regulatory framework of the global financial system; and (iii) to reform global economic governance. The main focus of this paper will be the IMS reform and the role of the Group of Twenty (G20) summit meetings. The current IMS problems can be summarized as follows. First, the demand for foreign reserve accumulation has been increasing despite the movement from fixed exchange rate regimes to floating rate regimes some 40 years ago. Second, this increasing demand for foreign reserves has been concentrated in US dollar assets, especially public securities. Third, as the IMS relies too heavily on the supply of currency issued by a center country (the US), it gives an exorbitant privilege to this country, which can issue Treasury bills at the lowest possible interest rate in the international capital market. Fourth, as a related problem, the global financial system depends too heavily on the center country's ability to maintain the stability of the value of its currency and strength of its own financial system. Fifth, international capital flows have been distorted in the current IMS, from EMEs and developing countries where the productivity of capital investment is higher, to advanced economies, especially the US, where the return to capital investment is lower. Given these problems, there have been various proposals to reform the current IMS. They can be grouped into two: demand-side and supply-side reform. The key in the former is how to reduce the widespread strong demand for foreign reserve holdings among EMEs. There have been several proposals to reduce the self-insurance motivation. They include third-party insurance and the expansion of the opportunity to borrow from a global and regional reserve pool, or access to global lender of last resort (or something similar). However, the first option would be too costly. That leads us to the second option - building a stronger globalfinancial safety net. Discussions on supply-side reform of the IMS focus on how to diversify the supply of international reserve currency. The proposals include moving to a multiple currency system; increased allocation and wider use of special drawing rights (SDR); and creating a new global reserve currency. A key question is whether diversification should be encouraged among suitable existing currencies, or if it should be sought more with global reserve assets, acting as a complement or even substitute to existing ones. Each proposal has its pros and cons; they also face trade-offs between desirability and political feasibility. The transition would require close collaboration among the major players. This should include efforts at the least to strengthen policy coordination and collaboration among the major economies, and to reform the IMF to make it a more effective institution for bilateral and multilateral surveillance and as an international lender of last resort. The success on both fronts depends heavily on global economic governance reform and the role of the G20. The challenge is how to make the G20 effective. Without institutional innovations within the G20, there is a high risk that its summits will follow the path of previous summit meetings, such as G7/G8.

• Journal of the Korea Academia-Industrial cooperation Society
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• v.12 no.10
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• pp.4359-4368
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• 2011

Among several macroeconomic missteps blamed for the recent global financial crisis including the social problems of income distribution and the lack of proper financial remedies, two of them have received particular attention: the global BOP(Balance of Payment) imbalance and the misguided monetary policy. Such BOP imbalance was blamed for massive foreign exchange investment flows from Asia into the U.S., triggering the financial and real estate bubble in America. The latter refers to the excessively loose monetary policy of the U.S. Federal Reserve, which pushed financial institutions and households into reckless investment behavior in search of higher returns. Given the abuse of certain innovative financial techniques and new investment instruments that have been created in recent decades, both collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) and credit default swaps (CDS) enjoyed a symbiotic and toxic relationship prior to the financial crisis This paper is organized as follows: The first section analyzes the real causes of the recent financial crisis. The second details the role of CDOs and CDS. Then, to identify key determinants of the CDS spreads in an emerging capital market, the sample data of major Korean firms' CDS spreads are used to estimate the risk premium by utilizing the multiple regression analysis. The empirical test result indicates that Korean 3-year treasury bond rate(TYIELD), market to book value ratio(MV/BV), and assets size(INASSETS) are shown to demonstrate statistically significant influences on the changes of the CDS premium for sample firms.