• Journal of the Korea Convergence Society
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• v.4 no.4
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• pp.1-5
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• 2013

This study aims to define the positive relationship among reverse logistics capability, firm's profits, and collaboration satisfaction. In the previous literatures about reverse logistics mainly focus on the importance of relationship between manufacturers and customers, but less likely on the potential positive effects of between collative firms. To implicate reverse logistics gives firms assets recovery, cost reduction through recycling which affects greater profits. Reverse logistics capability would be positively related with increasing profits for collaboration and satisfaction between partners.

• Journal of Institute of Control, Robotics and Systems
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• v.17 no.4
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• pp.304-312
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• 2011

In an oligopolistic market, only a few firms account for most or all of total production, e.g., automobile, steel, and computer industries. For a dynamic oligopolistic market with two firms competing in quantities, we show that supervisory control theory of discrete event systems provides a novel approach to solve the dynamic oligopoly problem with the aim of maximizing the profits of both firms. Specifically, we show that the controllability, observability, and nonblocking property (which are the core concepts in supervisory control theory) are the necessary and sufficient conditions for two oligopolistic firms in disequilibrium to eventually reach equilibrium states of maximizing the profits of both firms.

• Journal of the Korean Operations Research and Management Science Society
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• v.14 no.2
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• pp.43-52
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• 1989

The present paper analyzes performance of a variant of rate-of-return regulation called the ex-post adjustment regulation put in effect in the Korean petroleum refinery sector. Unlike the traditional rate-of-return regulation on a monopoly, the regulation is first for the oligopolistic industry as a whole and second of the ex post nature. Under the regulation, at the end of each year, each firm is responsible to pay a certain portion of the excess of the total realized profits in the industry over the allowed profits. It is shown that if the excess profits are completely collected(including the interests), the social optimum can be realized. When only a portion of the excess profits can be collected, the regulation generally increases consumer surplus by making the firms more competitive. Each individual firm's production under the regulation depends on whether the firm's output is regarded as a strategic substitute or complement of other firms'output.

• 한국경영정보학회:학술대회논문집
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• 2007.06a
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• pp.141-146
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• 2007

The importance of the net-based customer service in delivering supplementary after-sale services associated with product has been well documented. The strategic advantages of a well-implemented the net-based customer service are enhanced customer loyalty and higher lock-in of customers, and the resulting reduction in competition and the consequent increase in profits. However, not all customers utilize such the net-based customer service. This is partly due to the e-commerce divide, and partly due to privacy and security concerns of the customer for sharing personal information with firms. The limited level of customer adoption of the net-based customer service affects the firm profits and the customers' welfare. We use a game-theoretic model in which we model the net-based customer service system as a mechanism to enhance customers' loyalty. We find that an increase in adoption of the net-based customer service by the customer base is not always desirable for firms. and that customers who utilize such services are better off only when the overall adoption is limited.

• The Transactions of the Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers A
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• v.53 no.1
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• pp.67-72
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• 2004

This paper addresses the bidding strategies of generating firms in a competitive market where the firms are provided with payment for generating reactive power. Reactive support for voltage control is an integral and critical part of power system operations. Since reactive support is unbundled in a competitive market under open access transmission, it is treated as one of ancillary services. The operation costs and opportunity costs for reactive support are compensated by payment to the firms, hence their bidding strategies will be affected. The opportunity costs are evaluated from the foregone profits of a generator in making sales in real power market by providing reactive support instead of real power. Game theory approach is used to analysis the transaction strategies of real power by the bimatrix method in this paper. Through computing the Nash equilibrium in a sample system, an incentive of a generator for improving the reactive generating capacity is found to be effective and the variations of the profits are analyzed as the demand power factor changes.

• KDI Journal of Economic Policy
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• v.14 no.3
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• pp.3-21
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• 1992

By localizing the production of core parts and intermediate goods previously imported from Japan, Korean firms have been striving to increase their market share and profit in the final goods market in which Japanese firms are dominating. Korean producers' efforts, however, have often been thwarted by Japanese suppliers' "strategic" behavior. This competitive strategy involves Japanese exporters supplying parts and intermediate goods at very high prices until Korean firms must locally develop them, and then setting the prices far below the previous level so that the profitability of localization is dramatically reduced, or even means a loss for the Korean manufacturer. This paper intends to explain the strategic behavior of Japanese firms through the concepts of strategic interactions and joint economies. Strategic interactions can be aggressive or accommodating depending on whether competitors are dealing with strategic substitutes or complements. Joint economies exist in multi-stage competition when competition in the previous state favorably influences "profits" of the ensuing stage. Competiton between Korean and Japanese firms (a two-stage game involving production and technology rivalries) can be characterized by joint economies and strategic substitutes: joint economies since technological improvement results in more profits in the production stage; and strategic substitutes since an increase in marginal profits of one firm brings about a decrease in marginal profits of the other in a duopolitic production stage. This implies that the flood of "low price" Japense substitutes is an almost "natural" phenomenon in the context of the duopolistic market described in this paper. In the technology competition stage, on the other hand, technology development and technology transfer can be either strategic complements or substitutes. This implies that, in typical comparative static analyses, the effect of changes in exogenous variables cannot be expected a priori. Thus it becomes very difficult to determine the desirability of applying various policy measures such as countervailing duties, R&D subsidies, and creating demand for localized products. For these reasons, it is indeed likely that the measures suggested as means of circumventing the strategic behavior of Japanese firms (and enhancing technological development of Korean firms) may not work.

• Journal of Technology Innovation
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• v.11 no.2
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• pp.27-39
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• 2003

This study empirically examines the relationship between technology licensing and licetnsee firms' profitability. A significant positive effect of licensing on profitability is generally demonstrated in both the short run and the long run. Further, the magnitude of positive effect is bigger in the long run than that in the short run. The paper suggest that, for firms, aggressive management strategy of collaborating with technology holders through licensing agreements is beneficial. It also argues that transferred technology requires time to be implemented, modified and mastered better by companies.

• The Journal of Fisheries Business Administration
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• v.26 no.1
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• pp.29-40
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• 1995

Since the coastal countries, such as Unite States and other Latin America countries, proclaimed their 200 nautical mile Exclusive Economic Zone, these countries have attention to the need to develop effective coastal management and resource conservation But these countries often perceive themselves as being in competition with each other for profitable for the expansion of the vested EEZ. In such a situation, Exclusive Economic Zone expansion can appear as attractive policy tools in a coastal fishing firms in a noncooperative rivalries with pelagic countries, enable them to expand their fishing share and earn more profits. In reality, the coastal countries strategic Exclusive Economic Zone expansion change the initial condition of the game that both countries' fishing firms play. In this case, the coastal countries' fishing, such as South Korea, Japan and others, act as a followers. As result, the coastal countries' welfare is improved because of pelagic countries profit share shifts to the coastal countries profit share. In this paper, we find that coastal countries strategic EEZ expansion policy may not improve the coastal contries welfare if the shifting profits are dominated by the direct lobbying costs and related resource depletion.

• The Journal of Asian Finance, Economics and Business
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• v.8 no.7
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• pp.365-373
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• 2021

This paper investigates the presence of momentum profits in the Saudi stock market. The study applied a quantitative method by utilizing monthly closing prices of 194 listed firms on Tadawal (Saudi Stock Market). The data from January 2010 to February 2019 is taken from the Tadawal market database for analysis. The sample is further divided into two equal sub-samples based on the structural changes that occurred in the Saudi stock market. Moreover, the high- and low-value traded portfolios are also constructed to examine the presence of momentum profits. Sixteen investment strategies are formed for each sample. The results show a very strong presence of momentum profits in the Saudi stock market for the full sample as well as for the sub-samples. The momentum profits are observed for a longer investment horizon. The results confirm that the short or medium-term formation of portfolios produces negative momentum returns for high-value traded stocks. The low-value traded stocks portfolios give similar results to the full sample results in terms of momentum profits. The results suggest that an investor should keep an eye on the past performance of desired stocks for at least three-nine months in which they are willing to invest.

• Proceedings of the Korea Technology Innovation Society Conference
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• 2014.10a
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• pp.29-46
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• 2014