• 한국융합학회논문지
• /
• 제11권12호
• /
• pp.243-251
• /
• 2020

본 연구에서는 내부회계관리제도의 취약점 보고유형과 경영자보상사이의 관계를 확인한 후, 지배구조 특성에 따라 이러한 관계가 달라지는지를 분석하고자하였다. 분석 자료는 2011년-2016년까지 금융업을 제외한 6,343개의 KOSPI&KOSDAQ기업을 이용하였다. 연구결과 첫째, CL의 취약점을 보고하는 기업에서 경영자보상은 감소하였다. 둘째, 지배구조에 따라 이러한 관련성은 더욱 강화되는 것으로 나타났다. 본 연구는 제도의 운영결과에 대한 정보가 경영자 보상에 반영됨을 확인함에 따라, 향후 제도를 보다 효과적으로 구축하도록 경영자 노력을 유인하기 위해서는 기업에 맞는 합리적인 보상정책과 지배구조를 연구할 필요성이 있음을 시사한다. 향후 보상위원회를 비롯하여 경영자보상에 영향을 미치는 내부통제장치를 추가하여 분석한다면, 연구결과를 보다 강력하게 지지하는 근거를 마련할 수 있을 것이다.

• The Journal of Asian Finance, Economics and Business
• /
• 제7권8호
• /
• pp.297-308
• /
• 2020

This study exemines the roles of corporate social activity (CSR) and executive compensation structure on the pricing of seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) with special focus on the role of CSR in reducing the level of information asymmetry between managers and future shareholders of issuing firms through SEOs. This study also investigates the interaction between executive compensation structure and CSR on the discounting of SEOs. We use a sample of 2,102 seasoned equity offerings of U.S. firms with CSR scores from 1995 to 2015 in our OLS fixed effect regression analysis. The results show that issuing firms with high CSR are more likely to expericence a lower degree of the SEO discount. The results also document a positive association between CSR and a high proportion of equity-based compensation of issuing firms' executives. The findings of this paper confirm that CSR attenuates the impact of information asymmetry and the pre-SEO price uncertainty on the pricing of the offers and hence the SEO discount. Furthermore, CSR reinforces the impact of executive firm-related wealth on the discounting of seasoned equity offerings. It appears that firm-related wealth motivates managers to actively engage in reducing information asymmetry activities before SEOs, thereby decreasing the SEO discount.

• The Journal of Asian Finance, Economics and Business
• /
• 제4권3호
• /
• pp.35-43
• /
• 2017

This paper explores the impact of corporate control, measured by ownership structure, on top-executives' compensation in Japan. According to agency theory, the pay-performance link is expected to be affected by the firm's ownership structure. Using a sample of 4,411 firm-year observations (401 firms for the 11-years period from 2001 to 2011) for Japanese non-financial firms publicly traded on the first section and second section of the Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE), this study demonstrates that institutional ownership (both financial and corporate) is negatively related to the level of executives' compensation. Such finding is in line with efficient monitoring hypothesis which claims that the presence of institutional shareholders provides direct monitoring over managers, limits managerial self-dealing and curves the increase in top-executives pay. On the other hand, the results also show that managerial ownership is positively related to their compensation which supports managerial power theory hypothesis, i.e. management-controlled firms are more likely to extract more compensation from the business than other firms. Overall, this study confirms that corporate control has significant impact on cash compensation paid to Japanese top-executives after controlling the conventional pay-performance relationship.

• The Journal of Asian Finance, Economics and Business
• /
• 제9권3호
• /
• pp.135-147
• /
• 2022

This study was conducted to determine whether there is a significant relationship between board structure and board committee qualities and corporate cash holdings in Pakistan. For this objective, 168 listed enterprises on the PSX for the period 2016 to 2020 were chosen as a sample from a population of 436 non-financial firms. Multiple regression analysis was used in the study to discover a relationship between board structure and board committee features and cash holdings. The study's findings revealed that board size, executive directors, and board independence have no significant impact on the firm's cash holding because they play no important part in the firm's cash holding. Auditors, audit committee size, audit committee meetings, and the compensation committee, on the other hand, have no major impact on the firm's cash holdings because they are not relevant indicators to compare with cash holdings. While board meeting frequency and leadership structure both have a negative influence on cash holding, board meeting frequency increases firm costs, whereas leadership structure causes agency problems. Results were supported by the pecking order theory, cash flow theory, and agency theory.

• 재무관리논총
• /
• 제2권1호
• /
• pp.189-214
• /
• 1995

We examine the existence of the investment signaling equilibrium without assuming a specific utility function for the managers of the corporations. We assume the managers have the initial holdings of their own corporations as a form of the executive compensation. Under the different financing schemes to finance the investment, the new equity financing and the risky debt financing, we derive the investment signaling equilibrium and compare the the investment signaling equilibrium under each financing scheme. We show that the investment signaling equilibrium with each financing will obtain with the underinvestment of the high quality firm and that the investment signaling equilibrium with the risky debt financing will dominate the investment signaling equilibrium with the new equity financing.

• 경영과정보연구
• /
• 제23권
• /
• pp.75-97
• /
• 2007

In the meantime hospital system of Korea has institutionally performed its errand in stable circumstance, however the system now faces with new environment of change of customer's satisfaction, of regime, deepening of competition, and opening market. Under the rapidly and complicatedly changing circumstance, the hospital system is required to promote getting a dominant position in the competition, enhancing outcome, creating value added, and customer satisfaction in both internally and externally likewise other organizations, as they continuously introduce a knowledge management and originate, accumulate, and put the knowledge to practical use. This organization capacity of knowledge management involves a process of management that requires great change of all organizations and individuals and it is brought up through four steps which are Initiation, Propagation, Integration, and Networking. The main factors of successful knowledge management are intension of the chief executive officer(CEO), organizational culture, appraisal and compensation of work, knowledge controlling system, and organizational structure, and each of these five stage has got different characteristic. To be successful by introducing knowledge management, hospital organization should be based on these premises. Not only CEO or the director of a hospital, but also the constituent members should be fully aware of knowledge, the characteristic of knowledge management, and successful factors of this operation. Should understand step-by-step characteristic of knowledge management, therefore able to analyse a situation of specific hospital and see which step corresponds to that hospital. By analysing, constituents should make up for the weak points and ready to move on to next step. CEO or the director of a hospital should be aware of knowledge management as a strategic factor which is able to get a dominant position in the rapidly changing environment, and also it should be firm in the director's intention to introduce the knowledge management into the hospital. By continuously carrying out education and training constituent members, the director of a hospital should promote their interest and participation in knowledge management, and build an organization culture that ultimately creates, accumulates, shares, and put the knowledge to practical use. The hospital organization needs to systematize an institution of objective compensation that corresponds to objective appraisal of knowledge management outcome. The hospital ought to build knowledge controlling system in stages, in order to take the initiative in rapidly changing environment. By considering the characteristic of hospital system, it is required to change the organizational structure into self-managing team which is a sort of horizontal structure that allows members to make decisions and take the responsibility by themselves. The limitation of this study is experimental study. Positive investigation about successful factors of hospital knowledge management and characteristic of each steps is expected with following study.