• Journal of the Korea Academia-Industrial cooperation Society
• /
• v.14 no.11
• /
• pp.5434-5441
• /
• 2013

Using longitudinal data of 575 sample from 122 firms in large business conglomerates from 2001 to 2008, this study examines the impact of controlling shareholders' control-ownership disparity on executive compensation. The empirical study finds that controlling shareholders' control-ownership disparity is negatively related to the level of executive compensation and moderate negatively the relation between firm performance and executive compensation. This finding suggests that controlling shareholders' control rights in excess of ownership rights lead to decreased executive compensation in order to relieve the concerns of stakeholder about the potential agency costs of controlling shareholder, and have, on the other hand, entrenchment effects on the decision of executive compensation by decreasing its sensitivity on firm performance.

• Journal of Digital Convergence
• /
• v.20 no.5
• /
• pp.585-592
• /
• 2022

The purpose of this paper is to examine the relation between executive excesss compensation and credit rating. According to the prior research which show the negative effects of excess compensation on a firm's future performance, this paper expects the negative effect of excess compensation on credit rating. Using a sample of Korean listed non-financial firms from 2014 to 2019, I perform the multivariate regressions analysis of excess compensation on credit rating. I find that excess compensation is negatively related to credit rating when executive compensation exceed expected executive compensation. Moreover, I find that the result is constant when a fim belongs to small-medium business. These results show that credit rating is affected by executive excess compensation and the relation could be different by the type of firm's size. Therefore, this study contributes to the literature by suggesting the possibility that capital market is aware of negative effect of executive excess compensation.

• The Journal of Asian Finance, Economics and Business
• /
• v.6 no.3
• /
• pp.91-101
• /
• 2019

This paper finds some stylized facts about executive pay in South Korea. Using aggregate data of the listed companies since 2002, we find that 1) the director's remuneration has risen faster than the employee compensation, thus, the pay ratio of executive and employee has escalated from 3.0 to 4.5; 2) the executive compensation for large business group fluctuates more widely than that for small and medium enterprises does, hence the pay ratio for large firms changes widely too; 3) the median pay ratio has not grown monotonically but it rather rises to remain still around year 2011, which is accounted for mostly by small and medium enterprises. New information on executive compensation by compulsory disclosure starting from 2013 made further analysis of CEO compensation attainable. Based on the conventional regression analysis for 2013-2017, we find that 1) the elasticity of CEO pay with respect to firm value is about 0.18; 2) the volatility of stock return is negatively related to CEO pay; 3) contemporaneous stock return is positively associated with the pay; 4) there is insufficient evidence that large business groups pay their CEOs more than small and medium enterprises do. These results are robust under various model specifications.

• KDI Journal of Economic Policy
• /
• v.38 no.3
• /
• pp.17-35
• /
• 2016

In many advanced countries, most outside directors are executives, active or retired, at other firms; in other words, executives from other companies make executive compensation decisions. This situation may hinder the board of directors (BOD) in their efforts to optimize executive compensation levels objectively. Using a panel data analysis of the S&P 1500 companies, we provide supplemental evidence of whether, and to what extent, the concurrent executive employment of outside directors distorts the executive pay decisions at a given company. An unbiased fixed-effect estimation confirms that a $1.00 increase in CEO pay at outside directors' primary companies results in an approximate increase of $0.22 in CEO pay at the given company. From a policy perspective, this added agency problem - caused by the BOD and not by management - is noted as difficult to control; although a firm may establish board independence, the inherent concurrent employment of directors on a board continues to exist.

• The Journal of the Korea Contents Association
• /
• v.20 no.11
• /
• pp.184-191
• /
• 2020

Using 850 disclosures of individual executive compensation from 2014 to 2017, this study examines the impact of female auditors on the sensitivity of executive compensation-performance relation. The major findings as follow: First, Female auditors have positive effects on the sensitivity of executive compensation to performance, implying that when auditors are appointed to be females who are more ethical, of high moral development, risk averse and conservative as well, they play an efficient monitoring role in aligning executive compensation to performance. Second, the monitoring effects of female auditors on the sensitivity of executive compensation to performance are significant when they are full time employed, suggesting that gender-based differences are more likely to be realized on the condition that they are in position to commit to their jobs for their owns. The results overall support that female auditors exercise efficient monitoring roles in aligning executive compensation to performance in Korean listed firms. The research contribute to complement the study of gender effects on corporate decision making, which have been focused on gender diversity of the board, by providing empirical evidence of the impact of female auditors on the sensitivity of executive compensation-performance relation.

• Journal of the Korea Convergence Society
• /
• v.11 no.2
• /
• pp.207-214
• /
• 2020

The objective of this study is to analyze the effect of the quality of the Internal Accounting Control System(IACS) on Executive compensation, and to determine whether this relationship depends on the effectiveness of corporate governance. For the analysis, 6,343 firm-year data listed on the Korea Exchange from 2011 to 2016 were used. The results are as follows. First, Executive compensation was decreased in companies with low quality of IACS to provide a penalty for management. Second, the negative relationship between the weaknesses of IACS and Executive compensation was found to be strengthened when the corporate governance was effectively operated. These findings suggest that information about the quality of the IACS can be usefully used to reasonably identify the executive compensation policy, and that corporate governance needs to be operated more efficiently.

• Journal of the Korea Convergence Society
• /
• v.11 no.12
• /
• pp.243-251
• /
• 2020

The purpose of the study is to explore the relationship between the type of reporting weaknesses in the Internal Accounting Control System and executive compensation, and then analyze whether such relevance varies depending on the characteristics of governance structure. The analysis data used 6,343 KOSPI&KOSDAQ companies excluding the financial industry from 2011 to 2016. As a results of the study, First, executive compensation decreased in companies reporting the weaknesses of CL. Second, this relevance was further strengthened according to the governance structure. This study confirms that information on the operation results of system is an important factor in determining manager compensation. It implies that it is necessary to study reasonable compensation policies and governance structures suitable for companies. If an internal control system that affects executive compensation is added, the basis for stronger support of the research results can be prepared.

• The Journal of Asian Finance, Economics and Business
• /
• v.7 no.8
• /
• pp.297-308
• /
• 2020

This study exemines the roles of corporate social activity (CSR) and executive compensation structure on the pricing of seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) with special focus on the role of CSR in reducing the level of information asymmetry between managers and future shareholders of issuing firms through SEOs. This study also investigates the interaction between executive compensation structure and CSR on the discounting of SEOs. We use a sample of 2,102 seasoned equity offerings of U.S. firms with CSR scores from 1995 to 2015 in our OLS fixed effect regression analysis. The results show that issuing firms with high CSR are more likely to expericence a lower degree of the SEO discount. The results also document a positive association between CSR and a high proportion of equity-based compensation of issuing firms' executives. The findings of this paper confirm that CSR attenuates the impact of information asymmetry and the pre-SEO price uncertainty on the pricing of the offers and hence the SEO discount. Furthermore, CSR reinforces the impact of executive firm-related wealth on the discounting of seasoned equity offerings. It appears that firm-related wealth motivates managers to actively engage in reducing information asymmetry activities before SEOs, thereby decreasing the SEO discount.

• Journal of the Korea Convergence Society
• /
• v.10 no.9
• /
• pp.221-228
• /
• 2019

Companies are making great efforts to integrate CSR into various aspects of their management strategies. A lot of research has been conducted on what management intends to do indirectly and indirectly. Was performed. In this study, we conducted additional research considering executive compensation as an indicator of the motivation for management to participate in CSR. The main purpose of this study was to analyze whether accounting performance measures or market performance measures are given more weight when providing rewards for performance to corporate managers conducting CSR activities. The analysis of the relationship between CSR and executive performance-reward sensitivity showed that corporate executives who actively implement CSR pay more weight to market performance measures rather than accounting performance measures. Considering the long-term performance of CSR when paying executives' compensation, the company pays more for market performance than accounting performance. This study is expected to be useful for executives to design compensation contracts to actively induce CSR implementation.

• Korea Trade Review
• /
• v.41 no.1
• /
• pp.67-90
• /
• 2016

This study examines whether there is any significant relation between executive compensation and future firm performance for the Korean export manufacturing small and medium-sized firms. We sorted the whole sample firms into the sub-groups of 10 deciles by firm size and the KSIC standard. We found the following empirical results. First, Korean export manufacturing small and medium-sized firms typically showed lower or even negative profitability in terms of return on equity and operating profit ratio to sales. Foreign equity ownership is very low with an average of 3.77%. Second, for the firms with higher ratio of excess executive compensation to asset had lower future firm performance. It implies that the typical owner-manager in Korean export manufacturing SMEs earns excess pay, but do not contribute much to firm performance. Third, as for future cumulative abnormal returns for future one- and three-year periods, firms with higher owner-executive pay had lower returns compared with firms with lower pay. So the stock market investors set a lower value on them. Fourth, there is a positive relation between excess executive pay and executive overconfidence, and it implies that owner-CEOs with higher pay may become overconfident, thereby lowering future firm performance somehow.