• Journal of the Korean Institute of Intelligent Systems
• /
• v.14 no.3
• /
• pp.253-261
• /
• 2004

Game theory is mathematical analysis developed to study involved in making decisions. In 1928, Von Neumann proved that every two-person, zero-sum game with finitely many pure strategies for each player is deterministic. As well, in the early 50's, Nash presented another concept as the basis for a generalization of Von Neumann's theorem. Another central achievement of game theory is the introduction of evolutionary game theory, by which agents can play optimal strategies in the absence of rationality. Not the rationality but through the process of Darwinian selection, a population of agents can evolve to an Evolutionary Stable Strategy (ESS) introduced by Maynard Smith. Keeping pace with these game theoretical studies, the first computer simulation of co-evolution was tried out by Hillis in 1991. Moreover, Kauffman proposed NK model to analyze co-evolutionary dynamics between different species. He showed how co-evolutionary phenomenon reaches static states and that these states are Nash equilibrium or ESS introduced in game theory. Since the studies about co-evolutionary phenomenon were started, however many other researchers have developed co-evolutionary algorithms, in this paper we propose Game theory based Co-Evolutionary Algorithm (GCEA) and confirm that this algorithm can be a solution of evolutionary problems by searching the ESS.To evaluate newly designed GCEA approach, we solve several test Multi-objective Optimization Problems (MOPs). From the results of these evaluations, we confirm that evolutionary game can be embodied by co-evolutionary algorithm and analyze optimization performance of GCEA by comparing experimental results using GCEA with the results using other evolutionary optimization algorithms.

• International Journal of Control, Automation, and Systems
• /
• v.2 no.2
• /
• pp.247-255
• /
• 2004

The majority of real-world problems encountered by engineers involve simultaneous optimization of competing objectives. In this case instead of single optima, there is a set of alternative trade-offs, generally known as Pareto-optimal solutions. The use of evolutionary algorithms Pareto GA, which was first introduced by Goldberg in 1989, has now become a sort of standard in solving Multiobjective Optimization Problems (MOPs). Though this approach was further developed leading to numerous applications, these applications are based on Pareto ranking and employ the use of the fitness sharing function to maintain diversity. Another scheme for solving MOPs has been presented by J. Nash to solve MOPs originated from Game Theory and Economics. Sefrioui introduced the Nash Genetic Algorithm in 1998. This approach combines genetic algorithms with Nash's idea. Another central achievement of Game Theory is the introduction of an Evolutionary Stable Strategy, introduced by Maynard Smith in 1982. In this paper, we will try to find ESS as a solution of MOPs using our game model based co-evolutionary algorithm. First, we will investigate the validity of our co-evolutionary approach to solve MOPs. That is, we will demonstrate how the evolutionary game can be embodied using co-evolutionary algorithms and also confirm whether it can reach the optimal equilibrium point of a MOP. Second, we will evaluate the effectiveness of our approach, comparing it with other methods through rigorous experiments on several MOPs.

• International Journal of Control, Automation, and Systems
• /
• v.2 no.4
• /
• pp.463-474
• /
• 2004

Game theory is a method of mathematical analysis developed to study the decision making process. In 1928, Von Neumann mathematically proved that every two-person, zero-sum game with many pure finite strategies for each player is deterministic. In the early 50's, Nash presented another concept as the basis for a generalization of Von Neumann's theorem. Another central achievement of game theory is the introduction of evolutionary game theory, by which agents can play optimal strategies in the absence of rationality. Through the process of Darwinian selection, a population of agents can evolve to an Evolutionary Stable Strategy (ESS) as introduced by Maynard Smith in 1982. Keeping pace with these game theoretical studies, the first computer simulation of coevolution was tried out by Hillis. Moreover, Kauffman proposed the NK model to analyze coevolutionary dynamics between different species. He showed how coevolutionary phenomenon reaches static states and that these states are either Nash equilibrium or ESS in game theory. Since studies concerning coevolutionary phenomenon were initiated, there have been numerous other researchers who have developed coevolutionary algorithms. In this paper we propose a new coevolutionary algorithm named Game theory based Coevolutionary Algorithm (GCEA) and we confirm that this algorithm can be a solution of evolutionary problems by searching the ESS. To evaluate this newly designed approach, we solve several test Multiobjective Optimization Problems (MOPs). From the results of these evaluations, we confirm that evolutionary game can be embodied by the coevolutionary algorithm and analyze the optimization performance of our algorithm by comparing the performance of our algorithm with that of other evolutionary optimization algorithms.

• Journal of the Korean Institute of Intelligent Systems
• /
• v.17 no.7
• /
• pp.869-874
• /
• 2007

In searching for solutions to multiobjective optimization problem, we find that there is no single optimal solution but rather a set of solutions known as 'Pareto optimal set'. To find approximation of ideal pareto optimal set, search capability of diverse individuals at population space can determine the performance of evolutionary algorithms. This paper propose the method to maintain population diversify and to find non-dominated alternatives in Game model based Co-Evolutionary Algorithm.

• Journal of Korea Game Society
• /
• v.2 no.1
• /
• pp.36-41
• /
• 2002

Recently, The online role playing games (RPG) get into spotlight of worldwide game marketing area because of the rapid growth of high speed Internet environment during a decade. The almost online RPGs are made of campaign scenario that constructed in series. In this paper, we propose the Distributed Server Model for the Evolutionary Online RPGs which have series scenario (Campaign). In order to represents evolutionary online RPGs, We configure the online RPG server uniquely by means of one to one mapping between logical and physical game world. We also configure the game worlds using circular queue form to express the evolution of civilization by reconstruction of game world.

• Journal of the Korean Operations Research and Management Science Society
• /
• v.35 no.4
• /
• pp.55-79
• /
• 2010

This study deals with a model for platform competition in a two-sided market. We suppose there are both direct and indirect network externalities between suppliers and users of each platform. Moreover, we suppose that both users and suppliers are distributed in their relative affinity for each platform type. That is, each user [supplier] has his/her own preferential position toward each platform, and users [suppliers] are horizontally differentiated over [0, 1]. And for analytical tractability, some parameters like direct and indirect network externalities are the same across the markets. Given the parameters and the pricing profile, users and suppliers conduct subscription game, where participants select the platform that gives them the highest payoffs. This game proceeds according to a replicator dynamics of the evolutionary game, which is simplified by properly defining gains from participant's strategy in the subscription game. We find that depending on the strength of these network effects, there might either be multiple stable equilibria, at which users and suppliers distribute across both platforms, or one unstable interior equilibrium corresponding to the market tipping in favor of either platform. In both cases, we also consider the pricing power of competing platform providers under the framework of the Stackelberg game. In particular, our study examines the possible effects of the type of competition between platform providers, which may constrain the equilibrium selection in the subscription game.

• Journal of Korea Game Society
• /
• v.11 no.2
• /
• pp.57-68
• /
• 2011

This study approaches how newly emerged game companies has implemented strategies for product diversification according to market growth cycle(beginninggrowing-mature) by empirical case study through evolutionary theory and resource based theory approach. At the beginning, online game companies had grown with different strategies(technology based, service based) by initial condition(genre, technological level, user attribute). After market growth, for product diversification, these companies carried out path-dependent alliance strategy(complementary, competitive) depending on resource base(technology capacity, service capacity based). As online game market getting mature, these companies has adapted flexibly in responding to market growth cycle by integrated strategy(naturally selected to mobilize every possible resource capability). By analyzing the alliance strategies pattern of online game companies in newly emerged game industry according to market growth cycle through combination of resource based theory and evolutionary theory, these results suggest that new industrial, theoretical, policy model is required.

• KSII Transactions on Internet and Information Systems (TIIS)
• /
• v.6 no.12
• /
• pp.3133-3151
• /
• 2012

The optimal price strategy selection of two bounded rational cognitive mobile virtual network operators (MVNOs) in a duopoly spectrum sharing market is investigated. The bounded rational operators dynamically compete to sell the leased spectrum to secondary users in order to maximize their profits. Meanwhile, the secondary users' heterogeneous preferences to rate and price are taken into consideration. The evolutionary game theory (EGT) is employed to model the dynamic price strategy selection of the MVNOs taking into account the response of the secondary users. The behavior dynamics and the evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) of the operators are derived via replicated dynamics. Furthermore, a reward and punishment mechanism is developed to optimize the performance of the operators. Numerical results show that the proposed evolutionary algorithm is convergent to the ESS, and the incentive mechanism increases the profits of the operators. It may provide some insight about the optimal price strategy selection for MVNOs in the next generation cognitive wireless networks.

• Journal of Korean Institute of Industrial Engineers
• /
• v.28 no.1
• /
• pp.87-98
• /
• 2002

A competitive coevolutionary algorithm is a probabilistic search method that imitates coevolution process through evolutionary arms race. The algorithm has been used to solve adversarial problems. In the algorithms, the selection of competitors is needed to evaluate the fitness of an individual. The goal of this study is to compare and analyze several competition strategies in terms of solution quality, convergence speed, balance between competitive coevolving species, population diversity, etc. With two types of test-bed problems, game problems and solution-test problems, extensive experiments are carried out. In the game problems, sampling strategies based on fitness have a risk of providing bad solutions due to evolutionary unbalance between species. On the other hand, in the solution-test problems, evolutionary unbalance does not appear in any strategies and the strategies using information about competition results are efficient in solution quality. The experimental results indicate that the tournament competition can progress an evolutionary arms race and then is successful from the viewpoint of evolutionary computation.

• Industrial Engineering and Management Systems
• /
• v.14 no.1
• /
• pp.44-57
• /
• 2015

In recent years, for the purpose of solving the problem regarding environment protection and resource saving, certain measures and policies have been promoted to establish a reverse supply chains (RSCs) with material flows from collection of used products to reuse the recycled parts in production of products. It is necessary to analyze behaviors of RSC members to determine the optimal operation. This paper discusses a RSC with a retailer and a manufacturer and verifies the behavior strategies of RSC members which may change over time in response to changes parameters related to the recycling promotion activity in RSC. A retailer takes two behaviors: cooperation/non-cooperation in recycling promotion activity. A manufacturer takes two behaviors: monitoring/non-monitoring of behaviors of the retailer. Evolutionary game theory combining the evolutionary theory of Darwin with game theory is adopted to clarify analytically evolutionary outcomes driven by a change in each behavior of RSC members over time. The evolutionary stable strategies (ESSs) for RSC members' behaviors are derived by using the replicator dynamics. The analysis numerically demonstrates how parameters of the recycling promotion activity: (i) sale promotion cost, (ii) monitoring cost, (iii) compensation and (iv) penalty cost affect the judgment of ESSs of behaviors of RSC members.