• The Korean Journal of Air & Space Law and Policy
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• v.29 no.1
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• pp.67-95
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• 2014

Some Contracting States of the Chicago Convention issue FAOC(Foreign Air Operator Certificate) and conduct various safety assessments for the safety of the foreign operators which operate to their state. These FAOC and safety audits on the foreign operators are being expanded to other parts of the world. While this trend is the strengthening measure of aviation safety resulting in the reduction of aircraft accident. FAOC also burdens the other contracting States to the Chicago Convention due to additional requirements and late permission. EASA(European Aviation Safety Agency) is a body governed by European Basic Regulation. EASA was set up in 2003 and conduct specific regulatory and executive tasks in the field of civil aviation safety and environmental protection. EASA's mission is to promote the highest common standards of safety and environmental protection in civil aviation. The task of the EASA has been expanded from airworthiness to air operations and currently includes the rulemaking and standardization of airworthiness, air crew, air operations, TCO, ATM/ANS safety oversight, aerodromes, etc. According to Implementing Rule, Commission Regulation(EU) No 452/2014, EASA has the mandate to issue safety authorizations to commercial air carriers from outside the EU as from 26 May 2014. Third country operators (TCO) flying to any of the 28 EU Member States and/or to 4 EFTA States (Iceland, Norway, Liechtenstein, Switzerland) must apply to EASA for a so called TCO authorization. EASA will only take over the safety-related part of foreign operator assessment. Operating permits will continue to be issued by the national authorities. A 30-month transition period ensures smooth implementation without interrupting international air operations of foreign air carriers to the EU/EASA. Operators who are currently flying to Europe can continue to do so, but must submit an application for a TCO authorization before 26 November 2014. After the transition period, which lasts until 26 November 2016, a valid TCO authorization will be a mandatory prerequisite, in the absence of which an operating permit cannot be issued by a Member State. The European TCO authorization regime does not differentiate between scheduled and non-scheduled commercial air transport operations in principle. All TCO with commercial air transport need to apply for a TCO authorization. Operators with a potential need of operating to the EU at some time in the near future are advised to apply for a TCO authorization in due course, even when the date of operations is unknown. For all the issue mentioned above, I have studied the function of EASA and EU Regulation including TCO Implementing Rule newly introduced, and suggested some proposals. I hope that this paper is 1) to help preparation of TCO authorization, 2) to help understanding about the international issue, 3) to help the improvement of korean aviation regulations and government organizations, 4) to help compliance with international standards and to contribute to the promotion of aviation safety, in addition.

• Journal of Digital Convergence
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• v.10 no.11
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• pp.87-92
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• 2012

In the early 2012, European Union proposed new legal framework, including the right to be forgotten, for the protection of personal data. The new Proposal articulates kind of sweeping new privacy right and there has been debates on its potential threat to free speech in the digital age. While the situation is similar in Korea, I want to introduce the right to be forgotten in the Proposal. Then, I will analyze current legal system in Korea regarding the new privacy right and suggest some guidelines in searching direction for the coming legislation with respect to the right to be forgotten. The right to be forgotten should not have been promulgated without considering fully its effect on the free speech, especially in the society where the voice toward direct democracy or movement toward participation of the citizen, mainly through cyber space or Social Network Services, has risen much higher in Korea. Especially, the new right seems not to cover the control of data subject on a third party where the third party expressing his opinion by posting himself other's personal data on his blog or others.

• Strategy21
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• s.38
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• pp.221-249
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• 2015

The Royal United Services Institute(RUSI) was founded in the middle of the 19th century in Britain. It was developed through 'Naval Historical Revitalization Movement' in that time. Many celebrities and people who were interested in the Navy participated in the activities of the RUSI. For example, the forums and lectures were held by prestigious persons, like Sir Garnet Wolseley and the Duke of Cambridge. It also became the milestone for guiding the flow of the Royal Navy's thought with the Naval Intelligence Department and the Naval Records Society. The forum of the RUSI was the place for debating naval hot issues. The journal of the RUSI was the space for suggesting an idea and gathering public opinions for developing Britain's sea power. Therefore, the RUSI was the public sphere for the Royal Navy in the 19-20th Century. And especially, the paper prize contest of the RUSI was the culmination of the RUSI's activities for the Royal Navy. Naval prize essays gave messages to the Royal Navy about the changing situation of European naval powers. Also, they made many meaningful debates for the Royal Navy to overcome the difficult situations in that time. Those essays were reflecting the issues of the Royal Navy and leading the way for getting over it. Besides, some people appeared through the contest and they played important roles for making the contingency and planning the war. The contest reflected the past, anticipated the future, and selected the talented persons to shape the future. This developing aspects of the RUSI could apply to the Korea Institute for Maritime Strategy(KIMS). The KIMS already carries out the role of the RUSI very similarly. If the KIMS changes to the way for open-door policy to more people, it will work more efficiently for their goal. In this respect, the messages of the RUSI will be very useful for improving the activities of the KIMS.

• The Journal of Korean Institute of Communications and Information Sciences
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• v.39B no.11
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• pp.779-789
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• 2014

Cognitive radio (CR) technology based on geo-location database access approach and/or wideband spectrum sensing approach is absolutely vital in order to recognize available frequency bands in white spaces (WSs), and efficiently utilize shared spectrums. This paper presents a new structure for the TVWS database access protocol implementation based on Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) Protocol to Access WS database (PAWS). A wideband compressive spectrum sensing (WCSS) scheme using a modulated wideband converter is also proposed for the TVWS utilization. The developed database access protocol technology which is adopted in both the TV band device (TVBD) and the TVWS database operates well in the TV frequency bands. The proposed WCSS shows a stable performance in false alarm probability irrespective of noise variance estimation error as well as provides signal detection probabilities greater than 95%. This paper also investigates Federal Communications Commision (FCC) regulatory requirements of TVWS database as well as European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI) policy related to TVWS database. A standardized protocol to achieve interoperability among multiple TVBDs and TVWS databases, which is currently prepared in the IETF, is discussed.

• The Korean Journal of Air & Space Law and Policy
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• v.35 no.2
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• pp.3-40
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• 2020

The term "accident" in the Warsaw Convention of 1929 and the Montreal Convention of 1999, which govern carrier liability in international air transport, is an important criterion for determining carrier liability. However, because there is no explicit definition of the term in the treaty provisions, the term is largely subjected to the judgment and interpretation of the courts. Although there have been numerous changes in purpose and circumstance in the transition from the Warsaw regime to the conclusion of the Montreal Convention, there was no discussion on the concept of "accident" therefore, even after the adoption of the Montreal Convention, there is no doubt that the term is to be interpreted in the same manner as before. On this point, the United States Supreme Court's Air France v. Saks clarified the concept of "accident" and is still cited as an important precedent. Recently, the CJEU, in GN v. ZU, presented a new concept of "accident" introduced in the Montreal Convention: that "reference must be made to the ordinary meaning" in interpreting "accident" and that the term "covers all situations occurring on aboard an aircraft." Furthermore, the CJEU ruled that the term does not include the applicability of "hazards typically associated with aviation," which was controversial in previous cases. Such an interpretation can be reasonably seen as the court's expansion of the concept of "accident," with a focus on "protecting consumer interests," a core tenet of both the Montreal convention and the European Union Regulations(EC: No 889/2002). The CJEU's independent interpretation of "accident" is a departure from the Warsaw Convention and the Saks case, with their focus on "carrier protection," and instead focuses on the "passenger protection" standard of the Montreal Convention. Consequently, this expands both the court's discretion and the carrier's risk management liability. Such an interpretation by the CJEU can be said to be in line with the purpose of the Montreal Convention in terms of "passenger protection." However, there are problems to be considered in tandem with an expanded interpretation of "accident." First, there may be controversy concerning "balance" in that it focused on "passenger protection" in relation to the "equitable balance of interests" between air carriers and passengers, which is the basic purpose of the agreement. Second, huge losses are expected as many airlines fly to countries within the European Union. Third, there is now a gap in the interpretation of "accident" in Europe and the United States, which raises a question on the "unity of rules," another basic tenet of the Convention. Fourth, this interpretation of "accident" by the CJEU raises questions regarding its scope of application, as it only refers to the "hazards typically associated with aviation" and "situations occurring aboard an aircraft." In this case, the CJEU newly proposed a novel criterion for the interpretation of "accident" under the Montreal Convention. As this presents food for thought on the interpretation of "accident," it is necessary to pay close attention to any changes in court rulings in the future. In addition, it suggests that active measures be taken for passenger safety by recognizing air carriers' unlimited liability and conducting systematic reforms.

• The Korean Journal of Air & Space Law and Policy
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• v.32 no.2
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• pp.3-31
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• 2017

On 12 October 2017, the English Royal Courts of Justice delivered its decision about air carrier's compensation liability for the flight delay. In the cases the passengers suffered delays at a connecting point and, consequently, on arrival at their final destination. They claimed compensation under Regulation 261/2004 (the "Regulation"), as applied by the Court of Justice of the European Union (the "CJEU") in Sturgeon v. Condor [2009]. The principal issues were whether delays suffered by the passengers during the second leg of their respective journeys were compensable under the Regulation, whether there was jurisdiction under the Regulation and whether the right to compensation under the Regulation is, insofar as non-Community air carriers are concerned, excluded by virtue of the exclusive liability regime established under the Montreal Convention 1999. The passengers, the plaintiff, argued that the relevant delay was not that on flight 1 but that suffered at the "final destination". They maintained that there was no exercise by the EU of extraterritorial jurisdiction as the delay on flight 2 was merely relevant to the calculation of the amount of compensation due under the Regulation. The air carrier, the defendant, however argued that the only relevant flights for the purpose of calculating any delay were the first flights (flights 1) out of EU airspace, as only these flights fell within the scope of the Regulation; the connecting flights (flights 2) were not relevant since they were performed entirely outside of the EU by a non-Community carrier. Regarding the issue of what counts as a delay under the Regulation, the CJEU held previously on another precedents that the operating carrier's liability to pay compensation depends on the passenger's delay in arriving at the "final destination". It held that where the air carrier provides a passenger with more than one directly connecting flight to enable him to arrive at their destination, the flights should be taken together for the purpose of assessing whether there has been three hours' or more delay on arrival; and that in case of directly connecting flights, the final destination is the place at which the passenger is scheduled to arrive at the end of the last component flight. In addition, the Court confirmed that the Regulation applied to flights operated by non-Community carriers out of EU airspace even if flight 1 or flight 2 lands outside the EU, since the Regulation does not require that a flight must land in the EU. Accordingly, the passengers' appeal from the lower Court was allowed, while that of air carrier was dismissed. The Court has come down firmly on the side of the passengers in this legal debate. However, this result is not a great surprise considering the recent trends of EU member states' court decisions in the fields of air transport and consumer protection. The main goal of this article is to review the Court's decision and to search historical trend of air consumer protection especially in EU area.

• The Korean Journal of Air & Space Law and Policy
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• v.4
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• pp.167-176
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• 1992

1957년에 서명된 로마조약(條約)을 처음 개정한 단일(單一)유럽법(法)이 1987년 7월 1일에 발효(發效)되었을 때 유럽공동체(共同體) 12개 회원국(會員國)들은 공동정책(共同政策)에 의거 상업(商業), 농업(農業), 운송(運送), 금융(金融) 및 기타 관련부분에 있어 단일역내시장(單一域內市場)을 형성하기로 약속했다. 물론 완전한 역내공동시장(域內共同市場)은 자유로운 운송시장(運送市場)을 전제로 한다. 따라서 EC조약(條約)은 모든 회원국(會員國)들이 서어비스의 자유에 근거하여 공동운송정책(共同運送政策)을 따를 것을 강제하고 있다. 항공운송(航空運送)에 있어서의 목표도 역시 다른 모든 경제활동의 목표와 마찬가지로 로마조약(條約)이 적용되는 공동운송정책(共同運送政策)의 일부를 구성하고 있다. 종합적인 공동체항공정책(共同體航空政策)의 작업에는 운임(運賃), 공급량(供給量), 시장진출(市場進出) 및 경쟁상(競爭上)의 일괄적인 자유화 조치 이상의 것을 내포하고 있다. 그것은 국가장벽으로 방해되지 않는 공동체(共同體)의 항공운송망(航空運送網)의 개발과 확장뿐만 아니라 경제(經濟), 안전(安全), 환경(環境) 및 사회적(社會的) 요인(要因)들 간에 합리적인 균형을 이루는 공동체항공운송정책(共同體航空運送政策)의 개발을 위한 공동항공운송정책(共同航空運送政策)의 공식화(公式化)를 요한다. 1987년의 항공(航空)에 관한 일괄입법조치, 1989년의 제 2 차 항공(航空)에 관한 일괄입법조치 및 1992년 이후로 예정된 제 3 차 일괄입법조치에 따라 EC는 초국가적(超國家的)인 항공운송(航空運送) 분야에 있어서의 개방적인 국제경쟁(國際競爭)을 본격적으로 추구하고 있다. 결국 이러한 일괄규칙은 EC와 제(第) 3 국(國)들간의 관계에 중대한 의미를 가지게 될 것이다. EC항공운송정책(航空運送政策)이 아시아 항공산업(航空産業)의 상업운선(商業運船)에 어떠한 영향을 미칠 것인가는 모든 아시아 국가들이 알아야 할 중요한 문제이다. 이론적으로 말해서, 역내공동체(域內共同體) 항공운송(航空運送)의 자유화는 아시아 국가들에 대한 치외법권적(治外法權的) 효과를 일으킬 수 있는 로마조약(條約)과 유럽사법재판소(司法裁判所)에 의해 형성된 원칙들에 필연적으로 영향을 미칠 것이다. 이와 관련하여 아시아 항공산업(航空産業)은 무차별원칙(無差別原則), 설립(設立)의 자유(自由), 서어비스의 자유(自由) 및 EEC 경쟁법(競爭法)과 같은 제(第) 3 국(國)의 국제항공운송에 영향을 미치는 일련의 새로운 원칙과 법률의 출현에 큰 관심을 갖고 있다. 실무적인 관점에서, 1992년 이후의 종합적인 공동체항공운송정책(共同體航空運送政策)의 작업에는 항공운화(航空運貨), 시장진출(市場進出), 제(第)3 및 제(第)4의 운륜자유권(運輪自由權), 복수지정(複數指定), 제(第)5의 자유(自由), 캐보타지(cabotage), 손상(損傷)(derogation), 공급량(供給量), 편수(便數), 불정기운항(不定期運航) 및 기타 부문항공기소음(部門航空機騷音), 최저(最低) 안전(安全) 및 사회적(社會的) 조치(措置), 항공종사자면허(航空從事者免許), 감항증명(堪航證明), 운항시간제도(運航時間制度), 컴퓨터 예약제도(豫約制度), 탑승거절보상의 공동최저기준(共同最低基準), 공중혼잡(空中混雜), 공항이착륙시간할당법(空港離着陸時間割當法), 공항시설(空港施設), 정부지원(政府支援 등). 이와 같은 모든 공동체항공운송정책(共同體航空運送政策)의 주요문제들은 아시아 항공산업(航空産業)에 여러 각도로 영향을 미치게 될 것이다. 위와 같은 문제들 가운데, 제(第) 3국(國) 항공사(航空社)들의 역내공동체(域內共同體) 항로(航路)의 접근, 공급량(供給量), 운임(運賃), 제(第)5의 자유(自由) 및 캐보타지가 아시아 항공산업(航空産業)에 관심이 큰 문제가 되고 있다. 아시아 항공사(航空社)들의 EEC시장(市場)에로의 상업운항(商業運航)이 다소 영향을 받게 될 것이다. 첫째, 복수(複數) 목적지(目的地) 문제이다. 둘째, 항공(航空)서어비스의 운임(運賃) 및 료솔(料率)문제이다. 셋째, 항공운송구역(航空運送區域)에서의 사업에 대한 경쟁원칙의 적용 문제이다. 넷째, 제(第)5 자유(自由) 운륜권(運輪權) 문제이다. 다섯째, 캐보타지(cabotage)문제이다. 끝으로, 유럽 항공사(航空社)들간의 합병(合倂)의 문제이다. 결론적으로 유럽공동체항공운송(共同體航空運送)의 자유화는 1993년까지 공동체(共同體) 역내(域內)와 역외(域外)의 항공운송법제(航空運送法制)의 현재의 모습을 극적으로 바꾸어 놓을 정도로 가속화(加速化)되고 있다. 한편 항공운송(航空運送)의 자유화(自由化)에 대한 EC의 제의는 대담하고 급진적이다. 반면에 그것이 아시아 항공산업(航空産業)에 미칠 영향 또한 중대하다. 의심할 여지없이 항공사(航空社)와 고객들의 이익면에서 EEC와 비(非)EEC국가들의 항공운송산업(航空運送産業)에서 더욱 경제적으로 경쟁적이 되도록 할 필요가 있다. 전세계 항공운송산업(航空運送産業) 운영(運營)의 대부분을 정부가 소유하거나 통제하는 것은 정말로 국제항공운송(國際航空運送)의 발전에 불필요한 장애를 일으킨다. 따라서 國內航空社와 전세계 항공사(航空社)들간의 이해관계의 조화를 협상하는 것이 중요하다. 아마도 아시아 항공사(航空社)들간의 지역적 협조가 미국(美國)뿐만 아니라 유럽으로 부터의 압력 증가에 대해 균형을 이루는 힘이 될 수 있을 것이다.

• Current Industrial and Technological Trends in Aerospace
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• v.6 no.1
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• pp.56-64
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• 2008

Although the EGSE (Electrical Ground Support Equipment) and MCS (Mission Control System) have many similar or even identical functions, the EGSE used for assembly, integration and validation phase and the MCS for the mission operations phase are normally developed separately and used by different groups of engineers. However, the common ground system for EGSE and MCS has developed and many space missions such as PROBA (PRoject for On-Board Autonomy), ROSETTA, MARS EXPRESS, CRYOSAT (Cryosphere Satellite), GOCE (Gravity field and steady state Ocean Circulation Explorer), and GALILEO have used or will use it to minimize risk, reduce cost and improve overall product quality. It is based on ECSS (European Cooperation for Space Standards) E70 which is the international standard for ground systems and operations published by ECSS E70 Working Group. The ECSS E70 contains the basic rules, principles and requirements applied to the engineering of the ground systems and the execution of mission operations. This paper introduces standardization policy, organization and standard documentation in ECSS. The overview of ECSS E70 such as status, purpose and contents is also described in this paper.

• The Korean Journal of Air & Space Law and Policy
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• v.33 no.2
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• pp.267-290
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• 2018

This paper reviews and criticizes the EU Case of C-452/13, Germanwings GmbH v. Ronny Henning. Under this case, Ronny Henning later sued Lufthansa's budget carrier Germanwings after it refused to pay him 250 euros compensation for a delay he said totalled more than three hours. Germanwings, however, maintained his flight had arrived only two hours and 58 minutes behind schedule. In those circumstances, the following question to the European Court of Justice (ECJ) for a preliminary ruling: What time is relevant for the term time of arrival used in Articles 2, 5 and 7 of Regulation [No 261/2004]: (a) the time that the aircraft lands on the runway (touchdown); (b) the time that the aircraft reaches its parking position and the parking brakes are engaged or the chocks have been applied (in-block time); (c) the time that the aircraft door is opened; (d) a time defined by the parties in the context of party autonomy? ECJ says that the situation of passengers on a flight does not change substantially when their aircraft touches down on the runway at the destination airport, when that aircraft reaches its parking position and the parking brakes are engaged or when the chocks are applied, as the passengers continue to be subject, in the enclosed space in which they are sitting, to various constraints. Therefore, it is only when the passengers are permitted to leave the aircraft and the order is given to that effect to open the doors of the aircraft that the passengers may in principle resume their normal activities without being subject to those constraints. ECJ rules that it is apparent that Articles 2, 5 and 7 of Regulation No 261/2004 must be interpreted as meaning that the concept of 'arrival time', which is used to determine the length of the delay to which passengers on a flight have been subject, corresponds to the time at which at least one of the doors of the aircraft is opened, the assumption being that, at that moment, the passengers are permitted to leave the aircraft.

• The Korean Journal of Air & Space Law and Policy
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• v.29 no.2
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• pp.109-134
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• 2014

Regulation (EC) No 261/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 February 2004 establishing common rules on compensation of assistance to passengers in the event of denied boarding and of cancellation or long delay of flights (Regulation No 261/2004) provides extra protection to air passengers in circumstances of denied boarding, cancellation and long-delay. The Regulation intends to provide a high level of protection to air passengers by imposing obligations on air carriers and, at the same time, offering extensive rights to air passengers. If denied boarding, cancellation and long-delay are caused by reasons other than extraordinary circumstances, passengers are entitled for compensation under Article 7 of Regulation No 261/2004. In Wallentin-Hermann v Alitalia-Linee Aeree Italiane SpA(Case C-549/07, [2008] ECR I-11061), the Court did, however, emphasize that this does not mean that it is never possible for technical problems to constitute extraordinary circumstances. It cited specific examples of where: an aircraft manufacturer or competent authority revealed that there was a hidden manufacturing defect on an aircraft which impacts on safety; or damage was caused to an aircraft as a result of an act of sabotage or terrorism. Such events are not inherent in the normal exercise of the activity of the air carrier concerned and is beyond the actual control of that carrier on account of its nature or origin. One further point arising out of the court's decision is worth mentioning. It is not just necessary to satisfy the extraordinary circumstances test for the airline to be excused from paying compensation. It must also show that the circumstances could not have been avoided even if all reasonable measures had been taken. It is clear from the language of the Court's decision that this is a tough test to meet: the airline will have to establish that, even if it had deployed all its resources in terms of staff or equipment and the financial means at its disposal, it would clearly not have been able - unless it had made intolerable sacrifices in the light of the capacities of its undertaking at the relevant time - to prevent the extraordinary circumstances with which it was confronted from leading to the cancellation of the flight.