• Journal of the Korean Operations Research and Management Science Society
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• v.27 no.1
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• pp.19-32
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• 2002

This paper examines the effect of the producer-supplier quality contract parameters and the magnitude of the quality related variables on the quality of the final products. Our analysis focuses on the parties' equilibrium behavior In a quality game environment where the supplier should choose among the two production technologies, one requiring high cost but producing high quality Parts and the other requiring low cost but producing low quality parts and where the producer should decide whether to do the inspection of the parts. The game framework is employed to depict the potential conflicts existing between the Producer and the supplier because the Producer can not observe the supplier's choice and each party wants the other to bear the cost of producing high quality products. In our model, we specifically consider the competitive situation where the producer competes with a firm producing the same product. We employ the market share attraction model to Incorporate the competitive situation and completely characterize the equilibrium by using the Nash equilibrium concept for the game solution. Our results show that the equilibrium depends on the contract terms and the magnitude of the quality related variables. Compared to the non-competitive situation, the probability of producer's Inspection and the probability of supplier's choosing the high quality technology increases in a competitive situation. This is true even when the competitor's quality is lower than the producer's lowest. As a result, the quality of the final product increases In a competitive situation. And as the failure cost borne by the supplier increases, the probability of choosing the high quality technology Increases and the probability of inspection decreases. The net effect of this results in the decrease of the final product quality.

• Journal of Korean Society of Industrial and Systems Engineering
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• v.33 no.3
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• pp.137-145
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• 2010

The objective of this paper is to evaluate the equilibrium price between PSTN and VoIP telephony services in the case of non-linear utility function. Currently there are two types of wired phone services we are known PSTN (Public Switched Telephone Network) and VoIP (Voice over Internet Protocol). The PSTN telephony which provide high quality service and VoIP which provides relatively low quality service form a vertically differentiated oligopoly. Therefore, the evaluation of the equilibrium price between PSTN and VoIP services is very important to wired phone service providers. The equilibrium price depends on the state of the service cost function has been proved different value. This paper was evaluated each equilibrium price for the state of the linear cost function and non-linear cost function. Subsequently, this paper analyzed the demand of both services and the equilibrium profit which can maximize the profit of both service providers.

• Proceedings of the KOR-KST Conference
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• 2002.02a
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• pp.97-139
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• 2002

The aim of the present study is to find a good quality user equilibrium assignments under time varying condition. For this purpose, this study introduces a dynamic network loading method that can maintain correct flow propagation as well as flow conservation, and it develops a novel solution algorithm that does not need evaluation of the objective function by modifying the Schittenhelm (1990)'s algorithm. This novel algorithm turns out to be efficient and convenient compared to the conventional Frank-Wolfe (1956) algorithm because the former finds solutions based on routes rather than links so that it can maintain correct flow propagation intrinsically in the time-varying network conditions. The application of dynamic user equilibrium (DUE) assignment model with this novel solution algorithm to test networks including medium-sized one shows that the present DUE assignment model gives rise to high quality discrete time solutions when we adopt the deterministic queuing model for a link performance function, and we associate flows and costs in a proper way.

• The Korean Journal of Financial Studies
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• v.2 no.1
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• pp.189-214
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• 1995

We examine the existence of the investment signaling equilibrium without assuming a specific utility function for the managers of the corporations. We assume the managers have the initial holdings of their own corporations as a form of the executive compensation. Under the different financing schemes to finance the investment, the new equity financing and the risky debt financing, we derive the investment signaling equilibrium and compare the the investment signaling equilibrium under each financing scheme. We show that the investment signaling equilibrium with each financing will obtain with the underinvestment of the high quality firm and that the investment signaling equilibrium with the risky debt financing will dominate the investment signaling equilibrium with the new equity financing.

• Asia Marketing Journal
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• v.19 no.4
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• pp.37-59
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• 2018

This study investigates the effects of the distribution channel structure on quality decisions under duopoly competition. I considers a set-up in which two retailers compete on product quality and retail price. In the set-up, the integrated retailer has the power to determine the quality of its exclusive product, while the decentralized retailer does not. For the decentralized retailer, the supplier determines product quality. I find that asymmetric pairs of a decentralized channel by one retailer and an integrated channel by the other retailer can be a Nash equilibrium in a simultaneous-channel-choice model. The two retailers select different levels of quality, and this quality competition benefits retailers by softening price competition. In a sequential-channel-choice model, I find that the leader can obtain a first-mover advantage. From the perspective of the supplier, which can decide the distribution channel structure and level of quality, both suppliers choose the decentralized channel in equilibrium.

• Journal of KIISE:Information Networking
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• v.33 no.2
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• pp.183-192
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• 2006

This paper analyzes the price-selection problem under priority-based scheduling for QoS (Quality of Service) network services, i.e., how to determine the price associated with each service level. In particular, we focus on the problems with the pricing mechanism based on equilibrium analysis. We claim that the assumptions needed to produce equilibrium nay not hold in some important environments. Specifically, (a) the individual user's impact on the system is not infinitesimal and (b) users do not always have up-to-date global system-status knowledge crucial for optimal user decisions required for equilibrium. These may make the equilibrium models inaccurate in realistic environments. We examine the accuracy of some existing equilibrium methods by using a dynamic model that we have developed for system behavior analysis. The analysis indicates that equilibrium methods fail to model accurately the system behavior in some realistic environments.

• Research in Community and Public Health Nursing
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• v.20 no.4
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• pp.391-402
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• 2009

Purpose: This study was to show the effects of a Physical activity promotion program with tele-coaching on physical fitness (grip strength, static and dynamic equilibrium) and quality of life in the frail elderly. Methods: Data were collected from May 30 to October 19, 2008. The subjects were divided into 2 groups, an experimental group (n=27) and a control group (n=26). The experimental group participated in the Physical activity promotion program, and the control group did not participate in any Physical activity promotion program. Results: The results of this study supported the hypothesis that "the experimental group will have higher physical fitness (right grip strength, left grip strength and static equilibrium except dynamic equilibrium) and quality of life than the control group." Conclusion: Physical activity promotion programs with tele-coaching are strongly recommended as health promotion for the frail elderly.

• Journal of Korean Society of Industrial and Systems Engineering
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• v.34 no.3
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• pp.41-48
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• 2011

Recently, the increasing power of distributors has given them the opportunity of introducing private brand (PB) products. Based on the game theory, this study analyzes the decision making of a distributor regarding the optimal pricing and quality strategies for the PB product. By analyzing the game model, it is shown that the pricing mechanism heavily depends not only on the market power of the distributor but on the quality of the PB product. It is also shown that, counter intuitively, as the market power of the distributor increases, the optimal quality of the PB product should be decreased.

• Journal of computational fluids engineering
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• v.1 no.1
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• pp.123-141
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• 1996

In this paper the upwind flux difference splitting Navier-Stokes method has been applied to study the perfect gas and the equilibrium chemically reacting hypersonic flow over an axisymmetric sphere-cone(5°) geometry. The effective gamma(γ), enthalpy to internal energy ratio was used to couple chemistry with the fluid mechanics for equilibrium chemically reacting air. The test case condition was at altitude(30km) and Mach number(15). The equilibrium shock thickness over the blunt body region was much thinner than that of perfect gas shock. The pressure difference between perfect gas and equilibrium gas was about 3 ∼ 5 percent. The heat transfer coefficient were also calculated. The results were compared with VSL results in order to validate the current numerical analysis. The results from current method were compared well VSL results ; however, not well at near nose. The proper boundary condition and grid system will be studied to improve the solution quality.

• KSII Transactions on Internet and Information Systems (TIIS)
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• v.8 no.4
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• pp.1192-1207
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• 2014

Dynamic spectrum sharing is a key technology to improve spectrum utilization in wireless networks. The elastic spectrum management provides a new opportunity for licensed primary users and unlicensed secondary users to efficiently utilize the scarce wireless resource. In this paper, we present a game-theoretic framework for dynamic spectrum allocation where the primary users rent the unutilized spectrum to the secondary users for a monetary profit. In reality, due to the ON-OFF behavior of the primary user, the quantity of spectrum that can be opportunistically shared by the secondary users is limited. We model this situation with the renewal theory and formulate the spectrum pricing scheme with the Bertrand game, taking into account the scarcity of the spectrum. By the Nash-equilibrium pricing scheme, each player in the game continually converges to a strategy that maximizes its own profit. We also investigate the impact of several properties, including channel quality and spectrum substitutability. Based on the equilibrium analysis, we finally propose a decentralized algorithm that leads the primary users to the Nash-equilibrium, called DST. The stability of the proposed algorithm in terms of convergence to the Nash equilibrium is also studied.