• 한국경영과학회지
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• 제27권1호
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• pp.19-32
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• 2002

This paper examines the effect of the producer-supplier quality contract parameters and the magnitude of the quality related variables on the quality of the final products. Our analysis focuses on the parties' equilibrium behavior In a quality game environment where the supplier should choose among the two production technologies, one requiring high cost but producing high quality Parts and the other requiring low cost but producing low quality parts and where the producer should decide whether to do the inspection of the parts. The game framework is employed to depict the potential conflicts existing between the Producer and the supplier because the Producer can not observe the supplier's choice and each party wants the other to bear the cost of producing high quality products. In our model, we specifically consider the competitive situation where the producer competes with a firm producing the same product. We employ the market share attraction model to Incorporate the competitive situation and completely characterize the equilibrium by using the Nash equilibrium concept for the game solution. Our results show that the equilibrium depends on the contract terms and the magnitude of the quality related variables. Compared to the non-competitive situation, the probability of producer's Inspection and the probability of supplier's choosing the high quality technology increases in a competitive situation. This is true even when the competitor's quality is lower than the producer's lowest. As a result, the quality of the final product increases In a competitive situation. And as the failure cost borne by the supplier increases, the probability of choosing the high quality technology Increases and the probability of inspection decreases. The net effect of this results in the decrease of the final product quality.

• 산업경영시스템학회지
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• 제33권3호
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• pp.137-145
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• 2010

The objective of this paper is to evaluate the equilibrium price between PSTN and VoIP telephony services in the case of non-linear utility function. Currently there are two types of wired phone services we are known PSTN (Public Switched Telephone Network) and VoIP (Voice over Internet Protocol). The PSTN telephony which provide high quality service and VoIP which provides relatively low quality service form a vertically differentiated oligopoly. Therefore, the evaluation of the equilibrium price between PSTN and VoIP services is very important to wired phone service providers. The equilibrium price depends on the state of the service cost function has been proved different value. This paper was evaluated each equilibrium price for the state of the linear cost function and non-linear cost function. Subsequently, this paper analyzed the demand of both services and the equilibrium profit which can maximize the profit of both service providers.

• 대한교통학회:학술대회논문집
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• 대한교통학회 2002년도 제41회 학술발표회논문집
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• pp.97-139
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• 2002

The aim of the present study is to find a good quality user equilibrium assignments under time varying condition. For this purpose, this study introduces a dynamic network loading method that can maintain correct flow propagation as well as flow conservation, and it develops a novel solution algorithm that does not need evaluation of the objective function by modifying the Schittenhelm (1990)'s algorithm. This novel algorithm turns out to be efficient and convenient compared to the conventional Frank-Wolfe (1956) algorithm because the former finds solutions based on routes rather than links so that it can maintain correct flow propagation intrinsically in the time-varying network conditions. The application of dynamic user equilibrium (DUE) assignment model with this novel solution algorithm to test networks including medium-sized one shows that the present DUE assignment model gives rise to high quality discrete time solutions when we adopt the deterministic queuing model for a link performance function, and we associate flows and costs in a proper way.

• 재무관리논총
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• 제2권1호
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• pp.189-214
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• 1995

We examine the existence of the investment signaling equilibrium without assuming a specific utility function for the managers of the corporations. We assume the managers have the initial holdings of their own corporations as a form of the executive compensation. Under the different financing schemes to finance the investment, the new equity financing and the risky debt financing, we derive the investment signaling equilibrium and compare the the investment signaling equilibrium under each financing scheme. We show that the investment signaling equilibrium with each financing will obtain with the underinvestment of the high quality firm and that the investment signaling equilibrium with the risky debt financing will dominate the investment signaling equilibrium with the new equity financing.

• Asia Marketing Journal
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• 제19권4호
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• pp.37-59
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• 2018

This study investigates the effects of the distribution channel structure on quality decisions under duopoly competition. I considers a set-up in which two retailers compete on product quality and retail price. In the set-up, the integrated retailer has the power to determine the quality of its exclusive product, while the decentralized retailer does not. For the decentralized retailer, the supplier determines product quality. I find that asymmetric pairs of a decentralized channel by one retailer and an integrated channel by the other retailer can be a Nash equilibrium in a simultaneous-channel-choice model. The two retailers select different levels of quality, and this quality competition benefits retailers by softening price competition. In a sequential-channel-choice model, I find that the leader can obtain a first-mover advantage. From the perspective of the supplier, which can decide the distribution channel structure and level of quality, both suppliers choose the decentralized channel in equilibrium.

• 한국정보과학회논문지:정보통신
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• 제33권2호
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• pp.183-192
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• 2006

이 논문은 QoS (Quality of Service) 네트워크 서비스를 위한 우선순위 방식의 스케줄링에서, 각 서비스 레벨의 가격을 정하는 문제를 분석한다. 특히 본 논문에서는 균형 분석 (equilibrium analysis)에 근거한 가격정책의 문제점을 파악하는 것에 중점을 둔다. 균형분석은 다음과 같은 두 가정하에 이루어진다. 첫째, 각각의 사용자들이 시스템 전체에 미치는 영향은 극히 미약하여 무시할 수 있다. 둘째, 사용자들은 전체 시스템 상태에 대한 최신의 정보를 알고 있다. 그러나 이러한 가정들은 실제 상황을 정확하게 반영하지 못하는 경우가 종종 있고, 따라서 균형분석에 의한 가격의 결정은 문제점이 있다고 본다. 본 논문에서는 시스템 작동상황을 분석하기 위해 '동적모델'을 개발하고, 이를 이용하여 현존하는 균형분석 방법의 정확성을 평가하였다. 연구결과에 의하면 균형분석은 실제적인 환경에서의 시스템의 작동 현황을 정확하게 반영하지 못하는 경우가 많은 것으로 나타났다.

• 지역사회간호학회지
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• 제20권4호
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• pp.391-402
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• 2009

Purpose: This study was to show the effects of a Physical activity promotion program with tele-coaching on physical fitness (grip strength, static and dynamic equilibrium) and quality of life in the frail elderly. Methods: Data were collected from May 30 to October 19, 2008. The subjects were divided into 2 groups, an experimental group (n=27) and a control group (n=26). The experimental group participated in the Physical activity promotion program, and the control group did not participate in any Physical activity promotion program. Results: The results of this study supported the hypothesis that "the experimental group will have higher physical fitness (right grip strength, left grip strength and static equilibrium except dynamic equilibrium) and quality of life than the control group." Conclusion: Physical activity promotion programs with tele-coaching are strongly recommended as health promotion for the frail elderly.

• 산업경영시스템학회지
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• 제34권3호
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• pp.41-48
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• 2011

Recently, the increasing power of distributors has given them the opportunity of introducing private brand (PB) products. Based on the game theory, this study analyzes the decision making of a distributor regarding the optimal pricing and quality strategies for the PB product. By analyzing the game model, it is shown that the pricing mechanism heavily depends not only on the market power of the distributor but on the quality of the PB product. It is also shown that, counter intuitively, as the market power of the distributor increases, the optimal quality of the PB product should be decreased.

• 한국전산유체공학회지
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• 제1권1호
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• pp.123-141
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• 1996

In this paper the upwind flux difference splitting Navier-Stokes method has been applied to study the perfect gas and the equilibrium chemically reacting hypersonic flow over an axisymmetric sphere-cone(5°) geometry. The effective gamma(γ), enthalpy to internal energy ratio was used to couple chemistry with the fluid mechanics for equilibrium chemically reacting air. The test case condition was at altitude(30km) and Mach number(15). The equilibrium shock thickness over the blunt body region was much thinner than that of perfect gas shock. The pressure difference between perfect gas and equilibrium gas was about 3 ∼ 5 percent. The heat transfer coefficient were also calculated. The results were compared with VSL results in order to validate the current numerical analysis. The results from current method were compared well VSL results ; however, not well at near nose. The proper boundary condition and grid system will be studied to improve the solution quality.

• KSII Transactions on Internet and Information Systems (TIIS)
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• 제8권4호
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• pp.1192-1207
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• 2014

Dynamic spectrum sharing is a key technology to improve spectrum utilization in wireless networks. The elastic spectrum management provides a new opportunity for licensed primary users and unlicensed secondary users to efficiently utilize the scarce wireless resource. In this paper, we present a game-theoretic framework for dynamic spectrum allocation where the primary users rent the unutilized spectrum to the secondary users for a monetary profit. In reality, due to the ON-OFF behavior of the primary user, the quantity of spectrum that can be opportunistically shared by the secondary users is limited. We model this situation with the renewal theory and formulate the spectrum pricing scheme with the Bertrand game, taking into account the scarcity of the spectrum. By the Nash-equilibrium pricing scheme, each player in the game continually converges to a strategy that maximizes its own profit. We also investigate the impact of several properties, including channel quality and spectrum substitutability. Based on the equilibrium analysis, we finally propose a decentralized algorithm that leads the primary users to the Nash-equilibrium, called DST. The stability of the proposed algorithm in terms of convergence to the Nash equilibrium is also studied.