• 전기학회논문지
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• 제59권12호
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• pp.2150-2156
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• 2010

In this paper, we investigate how an electricity capacity market design may encourage generators to exaggerate their available capacity. In order for an analytical approach, a two player game model is introduced. We focus on two pure strategy Nash equilibria: an equilibrium at which generators offer their true capacities, and an equilibrium at which generators offer exaggerated capacities. The latter case is caused by asymmetries of information between players and so called 'moral hazard' in terms of the economics literature. This paper shows that, considering practical electricity markets, the moral hazard case is highly probable. Moreover, it is shown that, with the considered capacity market design in the real world, the better the electricity energy market performs, the higher the risk of moral hazard becomes.

• 한국시스템다이내믹스연구
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• 제12권4호
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• pp.93-124
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• 2011

The introduction of competition in the generation of electricity has raised the fundamental question of whether markets provide the right incentives for the provision of the capacity needed to maintain system reliability. Capacity mechanisms are adopted around the world to guarantee appropriate level of investment in electricity generation capacity. In this study, we discuss these approaches and analyze the capacity pricing mechanisms from the adequacy perspective. We conclude that the design of capacity mechanism is very important to decrease electricity spot price and increase total electric capacity. Specifically, the constant of capacity pricing mechanism made a difference to the performance of electricity market. However, the slope of capacity price mechanism is better than the constant of that in improving performance of electricity market.

• 대한전기학회논문지:전력기술부문A
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• 제53권6호
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• pp.350-357
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• 2004

In a deregulated electricity generation market, the sufficient capacity of transmission lines will promote the competition among generation companies (Gencos). In this paper, we show that Gencos' possession of rights to collect congestion rents may increase the competition effects of the transmission lines. In order for concrete analysis on this effect, a simple symmetric market model is introduced. In this framework, introducing the transmission right to the Gencos has the same strategic effects as increasing the line capacity of the transmission line. Moreover, the amount of effectively increased line capacity is equal to the amount of the line rights. We also show that the asymmetric share of the financial transmission rights may result in an asymmetric equilibrium even for symmetric firms and markets. We also demonstrate these aspects in equal line rights model and single firm line rights model. Finally, a numerical example is provided to show the basic idea of the proposed paper.

• 전기학회논문지
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• 제57권9호
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• pp.1531-1535
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• 2008

In the past vertically integrated power system, the power utility forecasted power demand and invested new power plants to keep a system adequacy. However, in the competitive electricity markets, a principle part of the capacity investment is market participants who decided the investment to maximize their profit. Especially, one of the main factors in their long-term decision making is the retrieval of fixed costs (construction costs). This paper presents the capacity payment in electricity power markets. The capacity payment (CP) in Cost Based Pool (CBP) is needed to recover fixed costs. However, CP in CBP was applied not only recovering fixed costs but also ensuring supply reliability. In order to operate harmonious power markets, pool needs reasonable CP mechanism. This paper analysis CP using capacity proportion and Reliability Pricing Model (RPM).

• 대한전기학회논문지:전력기술부문A
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• 제53권9호
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• pp.521-528
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• 2004

The demise of the native franchise markets and the emergence of competitive markets in electricity generation service is substantially altering the way that operation and planning activity is conducted and is making it increasingly difficult for market participants such as generation firms to prospect the future electricity markets. Traditional generation expansion planning (GEP) problems which centrally determine the least-cost capacity addition plan that meets forecasted demand within pre-specified reliability criteria over a planning horizon (typically 10 to 20 years) is becoming no more valid in competitive market environments. Therefore, it requires to develop a new methodology for generation investments, which is applicable to the changed electric industry business environments and is able to address the post-privatization situation where individual generation firms seek to maximize their return on generation investments against uncertain market revenues. This paper formulates a new generation expansion planning problem and solve it in a market-oriented manner.

• 대한전기학회:학술대회논문집
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• 대한전기학회 2006년도 제37회 하계학술대회 논문집 A
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• pp.398-399
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• 2006

The procurement of generation and transmission/Distribution capacity in vertically-integrated electric industry is sufficient by facility construction in suitable time. However, the introduction of competitive electricity market increase the efficiency of availability for facilities and fuels. As a result, long-term capacity procurement is required for stable demand-supply balance since it is expected to maintain their generation capacity at a minimum for profit maximization. In this paper, a new long-term capacity procurement mechanism is proposed, which is able to assure supplemental contribution in competitive electricity market.

• 조명전기설비학회논문지
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• 제23권2호
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• pp.182-189
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• 2009

경쟁적 전력시장에서 발전회사의 전략적 행위를 분석하기 위해서 일반적으로 내쉬균형(Nash equilibrium) 이론이 널리 사용되고 있다. 기존 연구에 의하면 송전제약이 있는 전력시장에서는 최적반응의 불연속으로 인해 순수전략내 쉬균형이 존재하지 않게 되고, 이때는 혼합전략 내쉬균형이 전력시장의 균형이 된다. 본 논문에서는 송전제약이 있는 2-지역 전력시장에서 혼합전략 내쉬균형을 유도하고, 송전용량이 혼합전략 내쉬균형에 미치는 영향을 해석하였다.

• 자원ㆍ환경경제연구
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• 제16권1호
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• pp.99-127
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• 2007

시간대별 차등요금제(Time-based Pricing)를 포함하여 전력시장에 존재하는 다양한 수요반응(Demand Response) 제도를 개발하고 이를 활성화하기 위한 정책적 수단들이 해외 선진국 전력시장을 중심으로 활발하게 진행되고 있다. 미국의 경우, 2005년 발효된 에너지법에 의하여 이러한 수요반응의 활성화가 준비되고 있으며, 이에 따라 미국의 각 주에서는 신뢰할 수 있고 활용 가능한 수요반응 서비스를 소비자에게 제공하기 위한 다각적인 노력을 시행하고 있다. 즉, 실시간 요금제도(Real-Time Pricing)와 지역별 요금제도(Locational Pricing)의 도입을 통해 시간과 공간에 따른 차등 요금제를 채택하고 있으며, 다양한 인센티브기반 수요반응(Incentive-based DR) 프로그램에 기초하여 기존의 공급자 위주의 수요관리 프로그램들이 시장 친화적 프로그램인 수요반응 프로그램으로 빠르게 변화하고 있다. 우리나라 전력시장에서도 1970년대 이후로 현재까지 다양한 수요관리사업들이 시행되어 오고 있으나, 해외 전력시장의 사례와 같이, 소비자 중심적이고 시장 친화적인 수요자원 활용으로의 전환이 체계적으로 이루어지지 않고 있는 실정이다. 따라서 본 논문에서는 수요반응자원을 전력시장에 도입했을 때 발생할 수 있는 다양한 이익(전력시장 효율 증진 효과, 공급비용 회피 효과, 현물시장 가격감소 효과 등)에 대한 정량적이고 이론적인 분석을 수행하였으며, 이를 통해 수요반응제도 도입의 사회경제적 이익을 계량화하기 위한 방법을 제시하였다.

• KIEE International Transactions on Power Engineering
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• 제3A권1호
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• pp.35-41
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• 2003

To ensure resource adequacy in restructured electricity markets, policymakers have adopted installed capacity (ICAP) markets in some regions of the United States. These markets ensure that adequate generation exists to satisfy regional Loss of Load Probability(LOLP) criterion. Since the incentives created through ICAP mechanisms directly impact new generation and transmission investment decisions we examine one important factor that links ICAP markets with LOLP calculations;, determining the amount of ICAP credit assigned to particular generation units. First, we review and critique the literature on electric power systems' market failure resulting from demand exceeding supply. We then summarize the method of computing (the LOLP) as a means of assessing reliability and relate this method to ICAP markets. We find that only the expected value of available generation is used In current ICAP markets while ignoring the second and higher order moments, which tends to mis-state the ICAP value of a specific resource. We then consider a proposal whose purpose is to avoid this ICAP assignment issue by switching from ICAP obligations to options. We find that such a proposal may fail to not provide the benefits claimed and suffers from several practical difficulties. Finally, we conclude with some policy recommendations and areas for future research.

• 대한전기학회논문지:전력기술부문A
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• 제54권3호
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• pp.139-143
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• 2005

Several methods have been proposed to mitigate the market power in foreign electricity markets. In this paper, Hirfindahl-Hirschman Index(HHI) and supply margin assessment(SMA) are compared based upon the Korean future markets. The results show that SMA is better than HHI to estimate market power because it can reflect congestion and capacity reserve effectively.