• The Transactions of The Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers
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• v.59 no.12
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• pp.2150-2156
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• 2010

In this paper, we investigate how an electricity capacity market design may encourage generators to exaggerate their available capacity. In order for an analytical approach, a two player game model is introduced. We focus on two pure strategy Nash equilibria: an equilibrium at which generators offer their true capacities, and an equilibrium at which generators offer exaggerated capacities. The latter case is caused by asymmetries of information between players and so called 'moral hazard' in terms of the economics literature. This paper shows that, considering practical electricity markets, the moral hazard case is highly probable. Moreover, it is shown that, with the considered capacity market design in the real world, the better the electricity energy market performs, the higher the risk of moral hazard becomes.

• Korean System Dynamics Review
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• v.12 no.4
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• pp.93-124
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• 2011

The introduction of competition in the generation of electricity has raised the fundamental question of whether markets provide the right incentives for the provision of the capacity needed to maintain system reliability. Capacity mechanisms are adopted around the world to guarantee appropriate level of investment in electricity generation capacity. In this study, we discuss these approaches and analyze the capacity pricing mechanisms from the adequacy perspective. We conclude that the design of capacity mechanism is very important to decrease electricity spot price and increase total electric capacity. Specifically, the constant of capacity pricing mechanism made a difference to the performance of electricity market. However, the slope of capacity price mechanism is better than the constant of that in improving performance of electricity market.

• The Transactions of the Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers A
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• v.53 no.6
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• pp.350-357
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• 2004

In a deregulated electricity generation market, the sufficient capacity of transmission lines will promote the competition among generation companies (Gencos). In this paper, we show that Gencos' possession of rights to collect congestion rents may increase the competition effects of the transmission lines. In order for concrete analysis on this effect, a simple symmetric market model is introduced. In this framework, introducing the transmission right to the Gencos has the same strategic effects as increasing the line capacity of the transmission line. Moreover, the amount of effectively increased line capacity is equal to the amount of the line rights. We also show that the asymmetric share of the financial transmission rights may result in an asymmetric equilibrium even for symmetric firms and markets. We also demonstrate these aspects in equal line rights model and single firm line rights model. Finally, a numerical example is provided to show the basic idea of the proposed paper.

• The Transactions of The Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers
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• v.57 no.9
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• pp.1531-1535
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• 2008

In the past vertically integrated power system, the power utility forecasted power demand and invested new power plants to keep a system adequacy. However, in the competitive electricity markets, a principle part of the capacity investment is market participants who decided the investment to maximize their profit. Especially, one of the main factors in their long-term decision making is the retrieval of fixed costs (construction costs). This paper presents the capacity payment in electricity power markets. The capacity payment (CP) in Cost Based Pool (CBP) is needed to recover fixed costs. However, CP in CBP was applied not only recovering fixed costs but also ensuring supply reliability. In order to operate harmonious power markets, pool needs reasonable CP mechanism. This paper analysis CP using capacity proportion and Reliability Pricing Model (RPM).

• The Transactions of the Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers A
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• v.53 no.9
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• pp.521-528
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• 2004

The demise of the native franchise markets and the emergence of competitive markets in electricity generation service is substantially altering the way that operation and planning activity is conducted and is making it increasingly difficult for market participants such as generation firms to prospect the future electricity markets. Traditional generation expansion planning (GEP) problems which centrally determine the least-cost capacity addition plan that meets forecasted demand within pre-specified reliability criteria over a planning horizon (typically 10 to 20 years) is becoming no more valid in competitive market environments. Therefore, it requires to develop a new methodology for generation investments, which is applicable to the changed electric industry business environments and is able to address the post-privatization situation where individual generation firms seek to maximize their return on generation investments against uncertain market revenues. This paper formulates a new generation expansion planning problem and solve it in a market-oriented manner.

• Proceedings of the KIEE Conference
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• 2006.07a
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• pp.398-399
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• 2006

The procurement of generation and transmission/Distribution capacity in vertically-integrated electric industry is sufficient by facility construction in suitable time. However, the introduction of competitive electricity market increase the efficiency of availability for facilities and fuels. As a result, long-term capacity procurement is required for stable demand-supply balance since it is expected to maintain their generation capacity at a minimum for profit maximization. In this paper, a new long-term capacity procurement mechanism is proposed, which is able to assure supplemental contribution in competitive electricity market.

• Journal of the Korean Institute of Illuminating and Electrical Installation Engineers
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• v.23 no.2
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• pp.182-189
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• 2009

Nash equilibrium is usually used to investigate a generator's strategic bidding in electricity markets. Some literatures show that the transmission constraints may induce no pure strategy equilibrium and make it hard to find the equilibrium. Using an analytical approach to find a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium in electricity market with transmission constraints, we analyze the influence of transmission capacity on the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium. Finally, a simple numerical example is provided to support the claims of this paper.

• Environmental and Resource Economics Review
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• v.16 no.1
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• pp.99-127
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• 2007

When the margin between available capacity and demand is thin in a liberalized electricity market, prices rise steeply and system reliability is threatened. The principal response to these circumstances is often an assumption that price spikes and electricity shortages are the result of a failure to build sufficient new supplying facilities. It is, of course, often the case that additional investments in generation and network facilities would improve reliability, and such investments are often needed. But focusing on additional generation and transmission facilities for restoring balance to the grid overlooks the essential fact that reliability is a function of the relationship between supply and demand, imposing unnecessary costs on electric system. When the relationship is out of balance, the search for solutions must consider not only investments supply-side resources but also cost-effective demand-side resources such as accelerated load management, efficiency measures, and price-responsive load programs. Integrating demand resources into electricity markets can add enormous value to the electric system, widening the capacity margin, lowering costs and enhancing system reliability at the same time. This paper studies several challenges now facing electricity markets: demand-side management-especially, economic effects of demand response, potential reliability problems, market and system operation, CBP market improvements and so on. The paper concludes with a series of policy recommendations in five areas: (i) The Effects of efficient improvement to incorporate demand responses and demand-side resources into modem electricity markets, (ii) Fosteing price based demand response and (iii) improving incentive based demand response, (iv) strengthen demand response analysis and valuation, (v) integrating demand response into resource planning and adopting enabling technologies.

• KIEE International Transactions on Power Engineering
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• v.3A no.1
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• pp.35-41
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• 2003

To ensure resource adequacy in restructured electricity markets, policymakers have adopted installed capacity (ICAP) markets in some regions of the United States. These markets ensure that adequate generation exists to satisfy regional Loss of Load Probability(LOLP) criterion. Since the incentives created through ICAP mechanisms directly impact new generation and transmission investment decisions we examine one important factor that links ICAP markets with LOLP calculations;, determining the amount of ICAP credit assigned to particular generation units. First, we review and critique the literature on electric power systems' market failure resulting from demand exceeding supply. We then summarize the method of computing (the LOLP) as a means of assessing reliability and relate this method to ICAP markets. We find that only the expected value of available generation is used In current ICAP markets while ignoring the second and higher order moments, which tends to mis-state the ICAP value of a specific resource. We then consider a proposal whose purpose is to avoid this ICAP assignment issue by switching from ICAP obligations to options. We find that such a proposal may fail to not provide the benefits claimed and suffers from several practical difficulties. Finally, we conclude with some policy recommendations and areas for future research.

• The Transactions of the Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers A
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• v.54 no.3
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• pp.139-143
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• 2005

Several methods have been proposed to mitigate the market power in foreign electricity markets. In this paper, Hirfindahl-Hirschman Index(HHI) and supply margin assessment(SMA) are compared based upon the Korean future markets. The results show that SMA is better than HHI to estimate market power because it can reflect congestion and capacity reserve effectively.