• Proceedings of the KIEE Conference
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• 2000.07a
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• pp.385-387
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• 2000

This paper discusses a scheme of the congestion management in the Korea electricity market under the deregulated environment. We investigated some cases of the congestion management in the world and the effects of the congestion management in a simple example. A basic idea of the congestion management in the Korea is presented based on the analysis of transmission congestion management in the competitive electricity market.

• Proceedings of the KIEE Conference
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• 1999.07c
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• pp.1501-1505
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• 1999

Highly Integrated Total Energy System for system operational planning and analysis is a totally integrated computerized system for various parts of power system operation planning and power system analysis. It is developed by KEPCO for about 8 years, named HITES. Nowadays restructuring, deregulation, privatization and competition of electricity market is introduced in the world. This paper describes HITES application for two typical models of a competitive electricity market.

• Proceedings of the KIEE Conference
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• 2003.07a
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• pp.593-595
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• 2003

The introduction of electricity industry provides generators incentives to recover the related cost through the market. Hence, the generator should sell his/her electricity at high market-clearing price with optimal operation of his/her power plant. The maintenance of power plant is the most critical factor in affecting generators' decision-making. This paper analyzes technique for establishing maintenance schedule reflecting recovery cost and considers differences in monthly load pattern in minimizing LOLP.

• International Journal of Control, Automation, and Systems
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• v.6 no.5
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• pp.627-638
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• 2008

With the shift of the electric power industry from a regulated monopoly structure to a competitive market environment, the focus of the transmission expansion planning has been moving from reliability-driven transmission expansion to market-based transmission expansion. In market-based transmission expansion, however, a growing demand for electricity, an increasing number of transmission bottlenecks, and the falling levels of transmission investment have created the need for an incentive to motivate investors. The expectation of profit serves as a motivational factor for market participants to invest in transmission expansion in a competitive market. To promote investment in transmission expansion, there is an increasing need for a systematic method to examine transmission expansion for investment incentives from multiple perspectives. In this paper, the transmission expansion problem in a competitive market environment is formulated from ISO and investors' perspectives. The proposed method uses parametric analysis to analyze benefits for investors to identify the most profitable location and amount for transmission addition. Numerical results are presented to demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed method.

• Proceedings of the KIEE Conference
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• summer
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• pp.713-715
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• 2004

In an electricity market with an imperfect competition, participants make plans of biddings and transaction strategies to maximize their own profits. The market price and the quantity are concerned with the operation reserve as well as the bidding system and demand curves in an electricity market. This paper presents a model of the combined market , energy market and operating teserve market. The Nash equilibrium is analyzed by using a hi-level optimization , maximization of Social welfare (SW) and maximization of the producers' profits.

• Proceedings of the KIEE Conference
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• 2003.11a
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• pp.422-425
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• 2003

CBP market which is the first stage of competitive electricity market has been operated and the KPX has been established since April, 2001 by restructuring plan for electricity industry. Baseload unit are settled with baseload CP and BLMP in CBP market. The other unit are settled with peakload CP and SMP. The difference of settlement between two groups occurs the profit changes of the unit. This paper analyzes the profit by units under settlement rule in CBP market. It analyzes the difference between market clearing price and variable costs, and fixed cost recovery through CP income. Finally, this paper suggests the plan how market was affected by the difference of fixed cost recovery by generators and how to improve Intermediate and peak load unit's profit.

• Journal of the Korean Solar Energy Society
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• v.37 no.1
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• pp.59-69
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• 2017

In 2012, Korea introduced a Renewable Portfolio Standard (RPS) scheme, replacing the Feed-in Tariff (FIT) scheme as a market support policy of renewable energy in the electricity market. RPS is to allocate obligatory quota of renewable energy sources for electricity suppliers, whereas FIT is to guarantee high prices for electricity from renewable energy sources. This study examines the effect of this policy change on solar photovoltaic market. According to the study, solar PV market grew fast under FIT as well as under RPS. However, under RPS the size of subsidy for solar PV suppliers was shrunk substantially. In addition, market risk increased severly under RPS due to the volatility of price of renewable energy certificate (REC) as well as of the electricity market price. The small and medium suppliers of solar PV were suffered the most severly from these policy effects. Therefore, the policy reform of RPS is needed to alleviate the market risk of small and medium suppliers of solar PV.

• The Transactions of The Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers
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• v.61 no.2
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• pp.187-193
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• 2012

Nash Equilibrium (NE) is as useful tool for investigating a participant's strategic generation quantity in a competitive electricity market. Cournot model may give a mixed strategy NE instead of a pure strategy when transmission constraints are considered. A mixed strategy is difficult to compute, complicated to understand conceptually, and hard to implement in an electricity market practically. This paper presents that a mixed strategy does not appear in Stackelberg leader-follower model even under a transmission congestion. A solution method is proposed for the leader-follower model under a nondifferentiable space of a strategy variable. Based on the pure strategy NE with a transmission line congested, the merit of leader-follower model is shown from a social welfare point of view.

• The Transactions of The Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers
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• v.59 no.12
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• pp.2150-2156
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• 2010

In this paper, we investigate how an electricity capacity market design may encourage generators to exaggerate their available capacity. In order for an analytical approach, a two player game model is introduced. We focus on two pure strategy Nash equilibria: an equilibrium at which generators offer their true capacities, and an equilibrium at which generators offer exaggerated capacities. The latter case is caused by asymmetries of information between players and so called 'moral hazard' in terms of the economics literature. This paper shows that, considering practical electricity markets, the moral hazard case is highly probable. Moreover, it is shown that, with the considered capacity market design in the real world, the better the electricity energy market performs, the higher the risk of moral hazard becomes.

• The Transactions of The Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers
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• v.63 no.7
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• pp.889-895
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• 2014

Korea electric power industry had been under vertical monopoly but is typically getting restructured for free competition. An ideal pricing system under the competitive market system is 'unbundled pricing system' and 'marginal pricing system', but the current pricing system still adheres to the traditional bundled system and the average cost pricing system. Especially, progressive electricity rates for residential use reflect governmental policy-making which is focused on income redistribution & welfare, industrial supports and energy saving. This study proposes new and reasonable residential electricity pricing systems which are Time-Of-Use (TOU) and Real-Time Pricing (RTP) to reflect variations in the wholesale price of electricity. It also presents examples of various tariffs for residential electricity pricing systems.