• Convergence Security Journal
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• v.17 no.5
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• pp.143-151
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• 2017

The purpose of this study is to provide the future development of the PRC Marine Corps by analyzing the changing functions via its historical development. The PRCMC is an elite regular military forces and was established by the Central Military Commission(China) in 1953 in order to project the national military power toward the enemy's territory by overcoming maritime obstacles such as seas and lakes. The PRCMC is relatively smaller personnel strength compared with the whole size of the PRC military forces. Thus its functions were limited in the areas of amphibious and land operations, island and land defense against Taiwan before the PRC pursues expanding policy toward outside. However, in the 2000s, China pursues its policy for obtaining absolute national interest so that its functions are rapidly enlarged into defense of the forward naval bases, and those for evolving its power toward outside according to not only the island territorial dispute with Japan, but also Xi Jinping's active expanding policy what we call 'the one belt and one road'. So its personnel strength is slowly increased. If the increasement of the PRC Navy and Marine Corps would develop into the level of which they can contain the status and influence of the US military power in Asia-Pacific area, it is possible that the security environment of the North-east Asia including the Korean peninsula will be fluctuated. Consequently, the ROK also needs to reevaluate the functions and the size of the joint strength of the ROK Navy and Marine Corps considering the transition of the changing security environment.

• Strategy21
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• s.34
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• pp.149-177
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• 2014

Today distant oceans around the world are regarded as a major 'global commons' for international trade and transportation. Korea is not an exception, because Korea hugely depends on sea lines of communication (SLOC) for supplying vital commodities such as food and energy resource. As a result, assuring a free and safe use of distant ocean beyond territory is also an important agenda for Korea's maritime security. However there are a number of challenges for Korea to enjoy a free and safe use of distant ocean; dangers of regional maritime conflict in East Asia, naval arms race of China and Japan, and concerns on possible decline of U.S naval presence and power projection capabilities. These factors provide a reasonable basis for Republic of Korea Navy (ROKN) to pursue capabilities for major naval operations at distant ocean in a long-term perspective toward the year 2030. The introduction of aircraft carrier and nuclear-powered submarine is a key requirement for achieving this goal. ROKN needs to acquire a 'multi-role strategic landing platform' type of light aircraft carrier, which takes a role to escort naval task force by providing air superiority at distant ocean. Additionally nuclear-powered submarine will offer ROKN a formidable power to carry out offensive missions effectively at distant ocean.

• Strategy21
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• s.33
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• pp.113-147
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• 2014

While China's military rise is an issue of growing importance to regional security, it is worthwhile to note that it is not China's military modernization per se, but its capacity to project and sustain power along and beyond its borders--in particular, the possibility to resolve forcefully its outstanding maritime disputes and various contingencies. This essay argues that China's "anti-access capability"--a U.S.-coined term originally developed for a Taiwan contingency--is equally applicable to other major regional cases such as the Spratly disputes and a North Korean contingency. Furthermore, notwithstanding China's continuos efforts to develop and deploy various types and classes of weapons/platforms, it is the Russian systems and technologies that are most capable and thus likely assigned to the highest mission-critical areas. In assessing China's current and likely future military capability as well as their implications for the region, it is necessary to take note of the following: • There exists asymmetry of military capability between China and its weaker neighbors. While the PLAN is weak in several important aspects, for instance, many of its neighbors' navies are weaker still. • Some have argued that China's foreign policy behavior apparently became more "assertive" in 2009-2013, but it is wiser to keep in mind that China has almost always been assertive and aggressive when it comes to what China defines as "sovereignty and territorial issues" as well as its newest "core interests." • On the South China Sea disputes it is the function of U.S. presence in the theater--in the form of overseas bases and the freedom of navigation--and the PLA's own limitations to project and sustain power for an extended period of time that have largely prevented armed. • While Taiwan remains the idee fixe of China's diplomacy and military, it is and will be a tough nut to crack. China's recent creeping attempts for economic integration with Taiwan should be seen in this context. • China and Japan, the two regional heavyweights and traditional rivals, will likely have a bilateral relationship that is replete with difficulties and tension. China's unilateral announcement of its ADIZ in November 2013 as well as the occasional yet persistent disputes with Japan over the Senkaku/Diaoyudao/Diaoyutai islands are only the latest manifestation of this deeper and difficult relationship. • For Korean security it is imperative to take into account the geostrategic and historical factors. On top of the existing military threats from North Korea, the ROK should be able to employ a) hedging strategy, b) "limited defense sufficiency" strategy, and c) rock-solid relations with the United States.

• Maritime Security
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• v.1 no.1
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• pp.273-310
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• 2020

This study aims at empirically analyzing the overall mechanism of the "Gray Zone Strategy", which has begun to be used as one of Chinese major maritime security strategies in maritime conflicts surrounding the South China Sea and East China Sea since early 2010, and comparing the resulting conflict patterns in those reg ions. To this end, I made the following two hypotheses about Chinese gray zone strategy. The hypotheses that I have argued in this study are the first, "The marine gray zone strategy used by China shows different structures of implementation in the South China Sea and the East China Sea, which are major conflict areas.", the second, "Therefore, the patterns of disputes in the South China Sea and the East China Sea also show a difference." In order to examine this, I will classify Chinese gray zone strategy mechanisms multi-dimensionally in large order, 1) conflict trends and frequency of strategy execution, 2) types and strengths of strategy, 3) actors of strategy execution, and 4) response methods of counterparts. So, I tried to collect data related to this based on quantitative modeling to test these. After that, about 10 years of data pertaining to this topic were processed, and a research model was designed with a new categorization and operational definition of gray zone strategies. Based on this, I was able to successfully test all the hypotheses by successfully comparing the comprehensive mechanisms of the gray zone strategy used by China and the conflict patterns between the South China Sea and the East China Sea. In the conclusion, the verified results were rementioned with emphasizing the need to overcome the security vulnerabilities in East Asia that could be caused by China's marine gray zone strategy. This study, which has never been attempted so far, is of great significance in that it clarified the intrinsic structure in which China's gray zone strategy was implemented using empirical case studies, and the correlation between this and maritime conflict patterns was investigated.

• Strategy21
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• s.33
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• pp.37-64
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• 2014

The year 2010 has been regarded as a year of China's assertive diplomacy. A series of China's behavior--including China's critical reaction to the U.S. for its sales of weapons to Taiwan, the Dalai Lama's visit to President Obama, China's arbitrary designation of 'core interests' over the South China Sea, China's inordinate reactions to the sinking of the Cheonan and Yeonpyeong bombardment, and China's activities in the Senkaku/Diaoyu island areas--has served as the witnesses to China's assertive diplomacy in 2010. The major causes of China's assertive diplomacy can be summed up by three factors: potential power transition from U.S. to China; emerging China's nationalism; and the recession of the Tao Guang Yang Hui as a diplomatic principle. But a majority of Western sinologists claim that China's assertive diplomacy is defensive in terms of its character. China's neighboring states, however, perceive its assertive diplomacy as diplomatic threat. Due to these states' geographical proximity and capability gaps with China, these neighbors experience difficulties in coping with China's behavior. In particular, China's coercive economic diplomacy, in which China tends to manipulate the neighbors' economic dependency on China for its diplomatic leverage, is a case in point for China's assertive diplomacy. China's assertiveness seems to be continued even after the inauguration of Xi Jinping government. Although the Xi government's diplomatic rhetorics in "New Type of Great Power Relationship" and the "Convention for Neighboring States Policy" sound friendly and cooperative, its subsequent behavior, like unilateral announcement of Chinese Air Defense Identification Zone (CADIZ), does not conform with its rhetoric. Overall, China's assertiveness has been consolidated as a fashion of its diplomacy, and it is likely to continue in its relations with neighbors. As a neighboring state, the ROK should approach to it with more balanced attitude. In addition, it needs to find out a new diplomatic leverage to deal with China in accordance with its security environment, in which China plays a growing role.

• Strategy21
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• s.33
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• pp.5-36
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• 2014

This article aims to analyze the diplomatic challenges currently facing China as well as the foreign policy the Xi Jinping administration is adopting to address them. With these purposes in mind, it will look into three areas: first, diplomatic tasks confronting the Xi leadership; second, foreign policy that the Xi administration has implemented since the 18th Party Congress in 2012; and third, the prospects for China's foreign policy under the Xi leadership. As the Xi Jinping administration entered into office, it has encountered two major diplomatic challenges. One is the searching for a new foreign policy, and the other the restructuring of the existing foreign affairs and national security systems. The Xi administration, during its first year in office, has responded actively to tackle these issues. To begin with, it has attempted to make some adjustments on foreign policy while maintaining the Deng Xiaoping line of foreign policy. One of these modifications is placing emphasis on national "core interest," as illustrated by changes in guideline for maritime conflicts, pushing for building maritime power, and proclamation of Air Defense Identification Zone in the East China Sea. Second is the decision on the new guideline for peripheral diplomacy. That is, the administration regarded creating peaceful and stable environments to realize "Chinese Dream" as an important goal of foreign policy, and proposed such new guiding ideology as "familiarity, integrity, benefit, and accommodation." In additoin, the Xi administration restructured the existing foreign affairs and national security systems. Establishing the Central State Security Committee and the Internet Leading Small Group (LSG) are cases in point. As comprehensive organizations for policy coordination that encompass party, government, and military, the two LSGs are in charge of enacting related policies and fine-tuning policy implementation, based upon leadership consisting of chiefs of each relevant organs. Moreover, since Xi himself became the chief of these two newly-found organs, the conditions under which these LSGs could demonstrate unified leadership and adjusting role in its implementation of military, diplomatic, and security policies were developed. The future Chinese diplomacy will be characterized with three main trends. First, peripheral diplomacy will be reinforced. The peripheral diplomacy has become far more important since the Work Conference on Peripheral Diplomacy in October 2013. Second, economic diplomacy will be strengthened with an eye on reducing the "China Threat Theory," which still exists in Asia. Third, the policies to isolate the Philippines and Japan will continue in regard to maritime disputes. All in all, Chinese diplomacy in the Xi Jinping era is likely to feature practical diplomacy which combines both hard and soft approaches to best realize Chinese national interest.

• Analyses & Alternatives
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• v.4 no.1
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• pp.63-87
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• 2020

This article not only theoretically explores the necessity and effect of constructive minilateralism and subregionalism in Northeast Asia, but also delves into a series of practical solutions from viewpoint of seeking common ground while reserving differences in this region. The main contents are as follows: First, the various obstacles that hinder the formation of regionalism, subregionalism and minilateralism in the Northeast Asia are discussed. That is to say, geopolitical realism, My Country First ideology, exclusive nationalism in the socio-historical context, and North Korea's latest provocations, etc. Second, this article explores the philosophy and basic principles of realizing Northeast Asia regionalism and minilateralism. Third, in the 21st century, Northeast Asia becomes the center of the world. It examines the core points, controversial focus and platform for building sub regionalism in the region. Finally, based on the institutional platform such as minilateralism and sub regionalism, the various ideas and practical plans of cross-border cooperation among major countries in Northeast Asia were discussed. Because there are a lot of obstacles, so first of all it is more appropriate to promote economic or functional minilateralism or sub regionalism than multilateral cooperation. In order to promote the formation of regionalism and minilateralism in Northeast Asia, the issues to be considered are as follows: First, for the sake of leading regional solidarity and minilateral economic cooperation, it is advisable for China, as a regional economic power, to implement a stable and responsible diplomacy. Secondly, regional solidarity based on credible politics and security should be promoted for a long time beyond the level of economic cooperation. Third, the primary prerequisite for the realization of Northeast Asian regionalism is that in the process of denuclearization of North Korea, the stability and peace mechanism of the Korean Peninsula should be established. Fourth, with the continued hegemonic competition between the United States and China in Northeast Asia, under the circumstance that countries in the region are pushed into so-called "East Asian Paradox", it is profoundly important for them to consider transition from the hostile relationship as the "Thucydides trap" to the order of "coexistence" in which competition and cooperation run side by side, and the two countries should explore a conversion plan for the foreign policy line. This mutual cooperation and peaceful coexistence of the US-China relationship will create a friendly atmosphere for the formation of regionalism in Northeast Asia. In the future, the cooperation of minilateralism in Northeast Asia will break the existing conflict between the maritime forces and the continental forces in order to promote peace. And along with the philosophy that "peace is economy", recent policies of common prosperity as the framework, such as China's "Belt and Road Initiative", North Korea's "Special Zone and Development Zone Policy", Russia's "New Eastern Policy", Japan's participation in the Belt and Road Initiative and South Korea's The "Korean Peninsula New Economy Map" are organically linked and it should promote the so-called "networked regionalism".

• Korean Security Journal
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• no.22
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• pp.91-111
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• 2010

Around the middle of the ninth century the strict bone-rank system of Silla frustrated many people who had political ambition but lacked nobility. They had to seek other ways, including maritime trade. Such an undertaking reflected and also increased their economic and military power. Trade prospered with T'ang China and with Japan as well. The threat of piracy to Silla's thriving maritime trade caused to create a succession of garrisons at important coastal points. Chonghae Jin (Chonghae garrison) was regarded as the most important of these. It was established in 828 by Chang Pogo. Chonghae Jin was on Wando, an island just east of the southwestern tip of Korea and a key place at this time in the trade between China, Korea, and Japan. From this vantage point Chang Pogo became a merchant-prince with extensive holdings and commercial interests in China and with trade contacts with Japan. Although piracy was rampant in East Asia at that time, either the Chinese or Silla government was not able to control it due to inner political strife and lack of policing resources. Infuriated by the piracy and the government's inability to control it, Chang Pogo came back to Silla to fight against the pirates and to protect maritime trade. He persuaded the king of Silla and was permitted to control the private armed forces to sweep away the pirates. In 829 he was appointed Commissioner of Chonghae-Jin with the mission of curbing piracy in that region. Chang's forces were created to protect people from pirates, but also developed into traders among Silla Korea, T'ang China, and Japan in the 9th century. This was geographically possible because the Chonghae Garrison was situated at the midpoint of Korea, China, and Japan, and also because Chang's naval forces actually dominated the East Asia Sea while patrolling sea-lanes. Based on these advantages, Chang Pogo made a great fortune, which might be collected from a charge for protecting people from pirates and the trades with China and Japan. Chang's forces could be termed the first private security company in the Korean history, at least in terms of historical documents. Based on historical documents, the numbers of private soldiers might be estimated to exceed tens of thousands at least, since Chang's forces alone were recorded to be more than ten thousand. Because local powers and aristocratic elites were said to have thousands of armed forces respectively, the extent of private forces was assumed to be vast, although they were available only to the privileged class. In short, the domination of Chang's forces was attributable to the decline of central government and its losing control over local powers. In addition it was not possible without advanced technologies in shipbuilding and navigation.

• Journal of Fisheries and Marine Sciences Education
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• v.20 no.3
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• pp.416-428
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• 2008

In the end of 2007, Korea Government promulgated the Rule of 'Basic Act of Logistics Policy' for improving international logistics forwarding business. The goals of these rules are to achieve the development of our nation's economics for providing the security and efficiency of logistics system and enforced competition of logistics enterprises. This is established the basic principles of the legal basis for expanding into the Logistics Hub Center of North-east Asia. However In May 1999 new licensing requirements for ocean freight forwarders and NVOCCs operating in the USA were established by the US Federal Maritime Commission(FMC). Due to these regulations, each ocean transportation service provider in the USA acting as ocean freight forwarder, NVOCCs, or NVOCC agent must obtain a license to operate as Ocean Transportation Intermediary(OTI) before it begins operations. Only licensed OTIs may act as US transportation agents or receiving agents of other NVOCCs, on both US exports and imports. In this context, I think this study will be contributes for the development of korean freight forwarding system by analysis and comparing with between the Rule of the Basic Act of Logistics Policy of Korea and OTI freight forwarder & NVOCCs of USA.

• Maritime Security
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• v.1 no.1
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• pp.149-173
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• 2020

While the United States and other Western states are in trouble with COVID-19 crisis, China is continuing its aggressive ocean expansion with its Gray-zone strategy. The Gray-zone strategy, which China uses around the South China Sea, refers to a strategy that promotes a change in international politics by creating an unclear state, neither war or peace. China, which is trying to expand its influence across East Asia, will also try to project a Gray zone strategy on the Korean Peninsula. The possible scenarios are as follows: 1) South Korea is accidentally involved in a dispute in the South China Sea, 2) Military conflicts between South Korea and China is caused by illegal fishing of Chinese boats in Yellow Sea, 3) China tries to interfere with Socotra Rock, 4) Unlikely, but possible in the future that China induce the military conflicts between Korea and Japan on the Dokdo issue. In order to cope with these scenarios, Korea should prepare the following measures from a long-term perspective: the creation of an Asian maritime safety fleet, the integ rated operation of the navy and the coast guard in the framework of the national fleet, and strengthening the conflict control system for China's provocations.