• Strategy21
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• s.32
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• pp.160-191
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• 2013

This article is focused how the maritime strategy between continental powered country(the Soviet, the China) and maritime powered country(the U.S.) interact with attack and defense theory. We will know, what is the maritime strategy that the U.S. of military superiority has pursued with the point of view of attack, on the other hand, relatively what is the maritime strategy that the Soviet-Sino of military inferiority has pursued with the point of view of defense. In cold war, the Soviet has counteracted to 'blue belt defense' in active defense as to the U.S. 'sea strike' and in post cold war, the China counteract to 'A2/AD' as to the U.S. 'Air-Sea Battle'. The difference between the Soviet-Sino maritime strategy is that the China has emerged the second an economic power and their leadership has a strong's will to strengthen their navy's power. although the U.S. declare the pivot to Asia, the influence on Asia of the U.S. tend to decrease because of sequest. therefore, the China will seek to the more active defense beyond the first island chain. Meanwhile, the U.S. has reinforced of 'hub and spoke strategy' to solidify the U.S. formal allies to band together regional powers and to overcome the A2/AD challenge, the U.S. has been developed that the Air-Sea Battle concept meshes with Washington's 'rebalancing' policy toward the Asia-Pacific as its vital missions to safeguard core island or semi-island allies-namely, Korea and Japan-and crucial sea lanes of communication in the region are conducted mostly from or over the sea.

• Industry Promotion Research
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• v.8 no.1
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• pp.35-45
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• 2023

This paper addressed the analysis of the trend and direction of the US defense strategy based on their third offset strategy and presented the practical policy implication of ensuring the security of South Korea appropriately in the future national defense environment. The countermeasures for the development ability of advanced weapon systems and secure core technologies for Korea were presented in consideration of the US third offset strategy for the future national defense environment. First, to carry out the innovation of national defense in Korea based on artificial intelligence(AI), the long-term basis strategy for the operation of the unmanned robot and autonomous weapon system should be suggested. Second, the platform for AI has to be developed to obtain the development of algorithms and computing abilities for securing the collection/storage/management of national defense data. Lastly, advanced components and core technologies are identified, which the Korean government can join to develop with the US on a basis of the Korea-US alliance, and the technical cooperation with the US should be stronger.

• Strategy21
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• s.42
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• pp.196-223
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• 2017

The aim of this paper is to analyze China's naval strengthening and threat reflected in submarines, aircraft, destroyers and missile capabilities and US Navy's counter-forces. China is strengthening its naval forces in accordance with its three-step naval force build-up plan, and the introduction of Russian destroyers and submarines is a foothold for China's naval enforcement. The Chinese Navy also converted the concept of the First-Second Island Chain Defense, which it had already maintained, to the concept of maritime layer defense. Currently, the Chinese Navy maintains the concept of a Three-Maritime Layer Defense which includes the South China Sea, where artificial islands are being built by China, in the First Layer Defense and the East China Sea in the Third Layer Defense. Along with the advancement of Chinese Navy's submarines, surface vessels and aircraft's operational capabilities, ballistic and cruise missile capabilities become a major threat to the US Navy. If a crisis occurs in the East China Sea or in the Taiwan Waters, the US Navy will face more difficulties in employing the Carrier Strike Group to manage the crisis. Meanwhile, if a crisis occurs on the Korean Peninsula, it will be a burden to dispatch Carrier Strike GroupS to the East and West Seas of the Korean Peninsula. For the stable future, the US Navy should develop a strategy to respond more effectively to the Chinese Navy, which is challenging new maritime supremacy in East Asia.

• The Korean Journal of Ecology
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• v.25 no.1
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• pp.25-28
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• 2002

The advertisement call of anurans functions to attract potential mates. The dominant frequency of an advertisement call is generally getting lower with increased snout-vent length (SVL) of the caller Rana rugosa has an advertisement call tilth a particularly high frequency modulation. We conducted a playback experiment to verify the function of frequency modulation, and investigated the territorial behavior of the frog. The frog has five types of territory defense strategy. Strategy choice depended on the caller's SVL. Small males became satellites or lowered the dominant frequency of their advertisement call, whereas large males actively defended their territory with encounter calls. In response to high frequency (1107 Hz) playback, the frogs lowered their advertisement call frequency, and towered them further in response to the low frequency (1028 Hz) playback. In addition, the number of pulses in a call was increased in response to the playback. These results indicate that the frog avoids physical conflict with competitors by selecting a territory defense strategy suitable for the caller's size, and by lowering its call frequency to disguise its SVL.

• Journal of the Korean Society of Systems Engineering
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• v.18 no.1
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• pp.90-98
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• 2022

On February 12, 2019, the U.S. Department of Defense newly established and announced the "Defense AI Strategy" to accelerate the use of artificial intelligence (AI) technology for military purposes. As China and Russia invested heavily in AI for military purposes, the U.S. was concerned that it could eventually lose its advantage in AI technology to China and Russia. In response, China and Russia, which are hostile countries, and especially China, are speeding up the development of new military theories related to the overall construction and operation of the Chinese military based on AI. With the rapid development of AI technology, major advanced countries such as the U.S. and China are actively researching the application of AI technology, but most existing studies do not address the special topic of defense. Fortunately, the "Future Defense 2030 Technology Strategy" classified AI technology fields from a defense perspective and analyzed advanced overseas cases to present a roadmap in detail, but it has limitations in comparing private technology-oriented benchmarking and AI technology's maturity level. Therefore, this study tried to overcome the limitations of the "Future Defense 2030 Technology Strategy" by comparing and analyzing Chinese and U.S. military research cases and evaluating the maturity level of military use of AI technology, not AI technology itself.

• IE interfaces
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• v.20 no.3
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• pp.363-375
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• 2007

Under the fast technology changes and budget constraints, the organizations related to national defense face increased demands to develop innovative strategy and methodology to maximize performance with drastically reduced cost. In this context, the management of innovation and change in the defense acquisition area is vital to the Ministry of National Defense, related organizations and industries. In this paper, we discuss three comprehensive innovation strategies and methodologies for the defense acquisition area preparing for next-generation warfare; EVMS (earned value management system), PBL (performance based logistics) and SBA (simulation based acquisition). These collaborating innovative efforts enable us to tackle defense challenges for government and industries with a flexible and optimistic approach that maximizes productivity and performance with minimum cost.

• Journal of the Korea Institute of Military Science and Technology
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• v.27 no.3
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• pp.387-394
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• 2024

This paper describes a progressive test and evaluation strategy for verification of Korean Fighter eXperimental (KF-X) AESA(Active Electronically Scanned Array) radar development. Three progressive stages of development test and evaluation were officially performed from simulated test conditions to actual operating conditions according to standards: radar function/performance and avionics integration. KF-X AESA radar development is repeatedly verified by progressive stages consisting of five tests: Roof-lab ground test, System Integration Laboratory(SIL) ground test, Flying Test Bed(FTB) test, KF-X ground test, and KF-X flight test. As a result, the risk factor decreases as stages and tests progress. Therefore, development test and evaluation of KF-X AESA radar are successfully performed at low development risk.

• Journal of the military operations research society of Korea
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• v.27 no.2
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• pp.88-109
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• 2001

Defense minister of the ROK, Kim Bong-sin suggested that the ROK′s military build-up policy will change from "scenario-based" to "capability-based". Entering the 1990s the ROK′s military build-up policy met difficulties to accomplish its goal, modernizing and strengthening of its force structure and weapon systems because of limited budget. The concept of capability-based military build-up could commit a fault in estimating total amount of defense resources required for force planing. This is because that the total amount of defense resources related to force plan for the 15 years is fixed to embody military strategy. The concept of capability-based military build-up plays a role as a constraint in choosing a military strategy. This has no connection with military build-up. Therefore the resources of mid-term military build-up program and scale of annual defense budget could be affected by the situations of its national economy. In this respect, the scale of annual defense budget and resources could be changed in accordance with national economic condition, however, the total amount of resources required to build-up military force for 15 years, namely resources of military force planing requirement for 15 years, is given already for the accomplishment of military strategy. The purpose of this study is to seek a direction of the ROK′s military build-up policy in a viewpoint of capability-based military build-up.

• Korea and Global Affairs
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• v.3 no.1
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• pp.39-76
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• 2019

This paper is to analyze the trend and implications of the publication of China's defense and security white papers. To this end the paper is composed of 5 chapters titled instruction; publication details and composition of China's defense and security white paper; the gist of the white paper on national defense and security during the Chinese president Xi Jinping era; the implications of Chinese white paper on national defense and security during the Chinese president Xi Jinping era; and conclusion. The Chinese Ministry of National Defense had published seven books every two years since 1998 to 2010. In 1995, the ministry published a white paper titled 'China's arms control and disarmament' for the first time. In 2013, it published a white paper titled 'The Diversified Employment of China's Armed Forces' and 'China's Military Strategy' in 2015. All have the common characteristic of being a propaganda policy reflecting China's strategic calculations. It seems that China has began to publish defense white papers in a proactive manner, due to the following factors: (1)pressure on China to demand military transparency from neighboring countries such as the United States; (2)the erosion of the 'China threat.' and (3)confidence in the achievement of China's military modernization. The 'active defensive strategy' and the 'strong defense strategy' of Si Jinping are implied in the words "China's dream is a dream of a powerful country and dream of a strong nation is essential to construct a strong nation." His these strategies have raised security concerns for neighboring countries. We need to maintain and reinforce strong ROK-US security cooperation, and hedging strategies to harmoniously promote ROK-China economic cooperation.

• Proceedings of the Korean Institute of Information and Commucation Sciences Conference
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• 2017.05a
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• pp.371-372
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• 2017

The United States has built a missile defense system from the Cold War era, but since the end of the Cold War era, there have been many changes in international situation and threats. The forces of power divided between the United States and the Soviet Union have become increasingly threatened by China's willingness to expand its external influence, declaration of strong Russia and North Korea and Iran's nuclear armament and advanced ballistic missile technology. In response to this threat change, the Missile Defense Agency(MDA) has established strategies and policies, but its parent law has not been revised. United States changed to the FY2017 National Defense Authorization Act (FY2017 NDAA) including changed missile defense strategy. In this paper, I check US ballistic missile defense strategies included in the FY2017 NDAA and compare what changes have been made in existing strategies.