• Korean Security Journal
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• no.62
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• pp.255-276
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• 2020

The mandatory police system, which plays a pivotal role in securing security and securing social safety as a security assistant, is expected to face difficulties in supplying the mandatory police manpower and securing absolute police manpower in the future according to the Ministry of Defense's abolition of the conversion service system. In this situation, this study intends to provide a concrete plan to replace the mandatory police officers as security assistants, recruiting contractors from civilians who are not military service resources or regular police officers, and using them for security assistance. More ultimately, this study goes beyond securing obligatory police to reduce or abolish mandatory police, which has been dealt with in previous studies. It aims to present the rescue and operation directions so that the police can provide quality public security services. In order to achieve the purpose of this study, this study 1) analyzes the current situation of police personnel, derives the necessity and justification of securing the police personnel or increasing the number of police personnel due to changes in security demand and security environment, and 2) After discussing the necessity and direction of reorganization, 3) deriving policy implications through analysis of foreign cases operating similar systems to derive specific plans for the introduction of security contractors for private contract workers in Korea. This study reviewed the specific operation plan and legal and institutional maintenance plan of private contract workers. In order to achieve these research objectives, this study 1) analyzes the current status of the police manpower and derives the necessity and justification of securing an absolute police manpower or increasing the manpower of the police in response to changes in security demand and security environment, and the current security aid system. 2) After discussing the necessity and orientation of reorganization of exinsting system of assistant police officer, 3) derive policy implications through analysis of foreign cases utilizing security aids similar to Korea, and 4) The specific operation plan and legal and institutional maintenance plan were presented. including security aids for private contract workers in Korea, from recruitment procedures to activities.

• The Korean Journal of Air & Space Law and Policy
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• v.26 no.1
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• pp.271-297
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• 2011

Recently, risk of space accident possibility increased in according to commercial space activity and space debris. It failed launch satellite second times in South Korea. Therefore was discussed on liability and insurance issue. Generally, discuss of space insurance be divided two type. Firstly, space insurance relevant to launching satellite and in-orbit. Satellite Launch Insurance and In-Orbit Insurance by the Satellite Operator Secondly, space insurance relevant to Third Party Liability. The former is to protect owner of satellite and operator. The latter is to liable and indemnify owner of satellite and operator's liability. US, UK, France, Russia, South Korea forced to buy space insurance following to domestic law. This is a brief overview of risk allocation and insurance practices in the commercial space transportation industry today. We begin with traditional space transportation, i.e., commercial satellite launches. This is a mature industry with known players. Industry practices have developed and legislation has been adopted in the U.S. and other countries over the past decades to address liability and insurance issues. The primary focus here is on U.S. law, but the discussion of industry practice applies more generally. We then move on to a more exotic form of space transportation: Commercial human space flight. Several private companies are now signing up space tourists for commercial suborbital human space flight, advertised to become available in the near future. The United States amended its launch legislation in 2004 to promote commercial human space flight. But questions remain as to how this new industry will respond to the risk allocation regime established by the U.S. legislation, which leaves both the space flight operator and space tourist exposed to risk and potential liability. As a general proposition, state statutes and contractual waivers alone cannot be relied upon to provide adequate liability protection, and insurance will be required. Federally mandated contractual waivers by space flight participants or liability caps would be helpful to complement insurance solutions. Eventually, as the industry matures, such practices could be extended to an international legal regime. For all the issues mentioned above, I have studied the existing international treaties and several country's domestic law to the space by referring U.S's Commercial Space Launch Amendment Act of 2004 and concluded that uniform legal regime to govern these insurance issues should be established domestically and internationally in the future.

• The Southeast Asian review
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• v.28 no.2
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• pp.213-247
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• 2018

Thailand in 2017 the public sentiment has turned against the military government. The four pledges the military declared immediately after the 2014 coup, restoration of democracy, addressing of divisive politics, eradication of corruption, and stimulation of the economy have all failed. In the same year, however, Thai military junta began to recover it's diplomatic relationship with western countries including US and EU owing to promulgation of the new constitution endorsed by King Maha Vajiralongkorn and the lavish funeral of late King Bhumibol Adulyadej which was attended by huge number of condolence delegations from around the world including US Defense Secretary James Mattis. Since the 2014 coup, US has sanctioned the country under military junta led by General Prayuth Chan-o-cha for urging them back to the barracks. EU also joined this sanction measures. US signaled change in it's policy when General Prayuth got the chance to visit US and meet President Donal Trump in 2017. General Prayuth Chan-o-cha's military junta could start to restore it's reputation internationally. Domestically, he used absolute powers based on section 44 of the interim constitution, also guranteed in the new constitution. Oversea and national human rights groups have criticized that the interim constitution for permitting the NCPO, Thai military junta's official name, to carry out policies and actions without any effective oversight or accountability for human rights violations. On 1 December 2017, Thailand marked the one-year anniversary of King Maha Vajiralongkorn's accession to the throne as the country's new monarch, Rama X. In the first year of King Rama X's reign, arrests, prosecutions, and imprisonment under Article 112 of Thailand's Criminal Code (lese-majeste) have continued unabated in Thailand. NCPO has continued to abuse Article 112 to detain alleged violators and curb any form of discussion regarding the monarchy, particularly on social media. In this worsening human rights environment General Prayuth Chan-o-cha enforced continuously campaign like Thai-style democracy- an effort to promote largely autocratic 'Thainess' in such a way that freedom of expression is threatened. It is a resurgence of 'Sarit Model'. In the beginning of 2017 Thai military government raised the slogan of 'opportunity Thailand' in the context of 'Thailand 4.0' project which attempts to transform Thai economy based on industry-driven to innovation-driven for recovering robust growth. To consider freedom and liberty as a source of innovation, 'Thailand 4.0' led by 'Sarit Model' without democracy would be skeptical.

• The Korean Journal of Air & Space Law and Policy
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• v.35 no.1
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• pp.63-101
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• 2020

'Flight safety zone' means a zone that the Minister of National Defense designates under Articles 4 and 6 of the Protection of Military Bases and Installations Act (hereinafter 'PMBIA') for the safety of flight during takeoff and landing of military aircrafts. The purpose of flight safety zone is to contribute to the national security by providing necessary measures for the protection of military bases and installations and smooth conduct of military operations. In this case, when the state set and used the flight safety zone, the landowner claimed restitution of unjust enrichment against the country. This article is an analysis based on the existing legal theory regarding the legitimacy of plaintiff's claim, and the summary of the discussion is as follows. A person who without any legal ground derives a benefit from the property or services of another and thereby causes loss to the latter shall be bound to return such benefit (Article 741 of the Civil Act). Since the subject matter is an infringing profit, the defendant must prove that he has a legitimate right to retain the profit. The State reserves the right to use over the land designated as a flight safety zone in accordance with legitimate procedures established by the PMBIA for the safe takeoff and landing of military aircrafts. Therefore, it cannot be said that the State gained an unjust enrichment equivalent to the rent over the land without legal cause. Expropriation, use or restriction of private property from public necessity and compensation therefor shall be governed by Act: provided, that in such a case, just compensation shall be paid (Article 23 (1) of the Constitution of The Republic of KOREA). Since there is not any provision in the PMBIA for loss compensation for the case where a flight safety zone is set over land as in this case, next question would be whether or not it is unconstitutional. Even if it is designated as a flight safety zone and the use and profits of the land are limited, the justification of the purpose of the flight safety zone system, the appropriateness of the means, the minimization of infringement, and the balance of legal interests are still recognized; thus just not having any loss compensation clause does not make the act unconstitutional. In conclusion, plaintiff's claim for loss compensation based on the 'Act on Acquisition of and Compensation for land, etc. for Public Works Projects', which has no provision for loss compensation due to public limits, is unjust.

• Korean Security Journal
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• no.33
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• pp.103-135
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• 2012

The object is that this research searches the relationship of the office given condition actual condition of the country important facility private security guard and job satisfaction degree. In order to grasp and analyze the real state of the country important facility private security guards directly, the questionnaire, that is the general measurement tool, was utilized and the guard whom it works in the airport, the port region and general work place, that is the national important facility of Busan and Ulsan area, was aimed at. The enough survey object was illustrated to the facility and person in charge in the security company and the item was previewed and the total 400 sheets was distributed and 331 sheets (82.8%) except the doubleness subject intention and incongruent questionnaire was utilized for the analysis. The statistic processing of collected data utilized the SPSS version 15.0 the statistical package program through data coding and cleaning process and performed the frequency analysis, reliability analysis, t-test, one way analysis of variance, Pearson analysis, and regression analysis. The relationship of the office given condition actual condition of the guard about the national important facility and job satisfaction degree was classified into the interpersonal relationship, task characteristic, office environment, and complement factor and the difference of the job satisfaction degree according to the general characteristic was verified. If the conclusion obtained through the method of study described in the above looked at, for as to general tendency, the low wages and poor field environment was continued. In the general characteristic, the man was higher than the excitation about the job satisfaction level. As there was lots of the age and the scholarship was low, the age was high. And as there was lots of the career and income, the police of a petition or search and guide staff was high and the job satisfaction degree in which relatively the employee and the other job group is high so that the case of being the former student incidence can be the poorest was shown rather than the facility security agent. As the interrelation analysis result job satisfaction was high, the change of occupation pseudo was low and the organizational commitment degrees was increased. The regression analysis result job satisfaction degree was exposed to reach the meaningful effect on the change of occupation pseudo and organizational commitment. It had an effect on the change of occupation pseudo as the task characteristic and office ambient level was low. It had an effect on the organizational commitment as the extend of satisfaction about the task characteristic and interpersonal relationship, complement, and office ambient level were high. If the research result of this time is integrated, the support of the political system including the interpersonal relationship thesis between top and bottom of the organized I and substantial complement actualization is urgently needed between the office given condition improvement effort in the country important facility defense manpower field and police of a petition and special guard.

• Korea and Global Affairs
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• v.2 no.1
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• pp.69-92
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• 2018

North Korea conducted a total of six nuclear tests from the 1st test of 2006 to September, 2017. North Korea developed an armed forces security strategy at the level of regime protection and defense to respond to U.S. hostile policy. However, it is certain that strategic goals of North Korea's nuclear test were to overcome a crisis in North Korea's regime through US-North Korea negotiation and complete nuclear armed forces for socialist unification on the Korean Peninsula. North Korea's continuous nuclear test is a direct factor in threatening peace on the Korean Peninsula and an indirect factor in security dynamics of Northeast Asia. The U.N. Security Council has enforced sanctions against North Korea through six resolutions against North Korea's reckless nuclear test for the past 10 years. However, Kim Jong-Un's regime is in a position to stick to simultaneous pursuit of nuclear and economic development in spite of anti-North sanction of international society including U.N. and U.S.A. It is understood that North Korea was stimulated to conduct intense nuclear test as U.N. and U.S.A's anti-North sanction was not effective on North Korea. Full-scale and local wars are expected as military options, one of anti-North sanctions of the Trump administration. The Trump administration has attempted diplomatic pressure strategy as a secondary boycott unlike previous administrations. Nevertheless, North Korea has stood against U.N. and U.S.A's anti-North sanction with brinkmanship tactics, announcing full-scale military confrontation against U.S. It is judged that North Korea will pursue simultaneous nuclear weapons and economic development in terms of regime survival. North Korea will have less strategic choices in that its regime may collapse because of realistic national strategy between U.S.A. and China.

• Journal of the Daesoon Academy of Sciences
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• v.36
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• pp.227-266
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• 2020

The purpose of this paper is to review the representative Buddhist policies enforced during the reign of Gwanghaegun (光海君), the 15th king of the Joseon Dynasty, and the aspects of the Buddhist community affected by them. Through this, the influence and dynamism of Buddhism during the reign of Gwanghaegun will be revealed. Some of the findings will run contrary to what is popularly known about Joseon Buddhism and the policy of Sungyueokbul (崇儒抑佛), 'Revering Confucianism and Supressing Buddhism.' During the Joseon Dynasty, Neo-Confucianism was taken as an ideological background, and consequently, Buddhism was ostracized by the ruling class who advocated the exclusion of heretical views. This also characterized King Gwanghaegun's reign during the Mid-Joseon Dynasty. In reality though, the ruling class held mixed opinions about Buddhism, and this influenced the Buddhist community in the Gwanghaegun Period. The military might of Japan demonstrated during the Japanese Invasion of Korea in 1592, led the ruling class to recognize Buddhism, and as a result, the status of Buddhism rose to a certain extent. Based on its elevated status and the aftermath of the Japanese Invasion of Korea, the Buddhist community engaged in social welfare activities inspired by the notion of requiting favors, and the Buddhist community gained recognition for providing relief services. As a result, the number of monks increased, and the economic situation improved as land ownership was granted to temples and monks. This is the means by which the Japanese Invasion of Korea influenced the Buddhist policies of the Gwanghaegun Period and changed the religious topography of Buddhism. During the reign of King Gwanghaegun, the ruling class regarded Buddhism as heretical, but offered posthumous titles to monks who engaged in meritorious services during the Japanese invasions of 1592~1598. Favorable and/or preferential treatment was also granted to some Buddhist monks. In addition, monks began to perform labor projects that demanded organizational and physical strength, such as those which related to national defense and architecture. However, throughout the Gwanghaegun Period, the monks were paid a certain amount of compensation for their labor, and the monks' responsibility for labor increased. This can be understood as a partial reconciliation with Buddhism or an acceptance of Buddhism rather than the suppression of Buddhism often presented by historians. As for policies which affected Buddhism, the Buddhist community showed signs of cooperation with the ruling class, the creation and reconstruction of temples, and the production of Buddhist art. Through close ties with the ruling class, Buddhism during the Gwanghaegun Period saw the Buddhist community actively responded policies that impacted Buddhism, and this allowed their religious orders to be maintained. In this way, it was also confirmed that the monk, Buhyu Seonsu (浮休 善修) and his disciple Byeogam Gakseong (碧巖 覺性), took up leadership roles in their Buddhist community. The Buddhist-aimed policies of Gwanghaegun were implemented against the backdrop of the Buddhist community, wherein the ruling class held mixed opinions regarding Buddhism. As such, both improvements and set backs for Buddhism could be observed during that time period. The ruling class actively utilized the organizational power of Buddhism for national defense and civil engineering after the Japanese invasions of 1592~1598. Out of gratitude, they implemented appropriate compensation for the Buddhists involved. The Buddhist community also responded to policies that affected them through exchanges with the ruling class. They succeeded in securing funds and support to repair and produce Buddhist temples and artworks. A thoughtful inspection of the policies towards and responses to Buddhism during the Gwanghaegun Period, shows that Buddhism actually enjoyed considerable organizational power and influence. This flies in the face of the general description of Joseon Buddhism as "Sungyueokbul (revering Confucianism and supressing Buddhism)."

• Strategy21
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• s.31
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• pp.27-56
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• 2013

The United Nations Command (UNC) and the communist North failed to reach an agreement on where the maritime demarcation line should be drawn in the process of signing a truce after the Korean War because of the starkly different positions on the boundary of their territorial waters. As a result, the Armistice Treaty was signed on July 1953 without clarification about the maritime border. In the following month, Commander of the UNC unilaterally declared the Northern Limit Line (NLL) as a complementing measure to the Armistice. Referring to this, North Korea and its followers in South Korea wrongfully argue that the NLL is a "ghost line" that was established not based on the international law. However, one should note that the waters south of the NLL has always been under South Korea's jurisdiction since Korea's independence from Japan on August 15, 1945. There is no need to ask North Korea's approval for declaring the territorial waters that had already been under our sovereign jurisdiction. We do not need North Korea's approval just as we do not need Japan's approval with regard to our sovereign right over Dokdo. The legal status of the NLL may be explained with the following three characteristics. First, the NLL is a de facto maritime borderline that defines the territorial waters under the respective jurisdiction of the two divided countries. Second, the NLL in the West Sea also serves as a de facto military demarcation line at sea that can be likened to the border on the ground. Third, as a contacting line where the sea areas controlled by the two Koreas meet, the NLL is a maritime non-aggression line that was established on the legal basis of the 'acquiescence' element stipulated by the Inter-Korea Basic Agreement (article 11) and the Supplement on the Non-aggression principle (article 10). Particularly from the perspective of the domestic law, the NLL should be understood as a boundary defining areas controlled by temporarily divided states (not two different states) because the problem exists between a legitimate central government (South Korea) and an anti-government group (North Korea). In this sense, the NLL problem should be viewed not in terms of territorial preservation or expansion. Rather, it should be understood as a matter of national identity related to territorial sovereignty and national pride. North Korea's continuous efforts to problematize the NLL may be part of its strategy to nullify the Armistice Treaty. In other words, North Korea tries to take away the basis of the NLL by abrogating the Armistice Treaty and creating a condition in which the United Nations Command can be dissolved. By doing so, North Korea may be able to start the process for the peace treaty with the United States and reestablish a maritime line of its interest. So, North Korea's rationale behind making the NLL a disputed line is to deny the effectiveness of the NLL and ask for the establishment of a new legal boundary. Such an effort should be understood as part of a strategy to make the NLL question a political and military dispute (the similar motivation can be found in Japan's effort to make Dokdo a disputed Island). Therefore, the South Korean government should not accommodate such hidden intentions and strategy of North Korea. The NLL has been the de facto maritime border (that defines our territorial waters) and military demarcation line at sea that we have defended with a lot of sacrifice for the last sixty years. This is the line that our government and the military must defend in the future as we have done so far. Our commitment to the defense of the NLL is not only a matter of national policy protecting territorial sovereignty and jurisdiction; it is also our responsibility for those who were fallen while defending the North-Western Islands and the NLL.

• Maritime Security
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• v.5 no.1
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• pp.113-136
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• 2022

China has been pushing for a systematic strategy for territorialization over a long period of time to invade Korea's West Sea (Yellow Sea) in order to create China's territorial water. China's strategy for territorializing the West Sea is an activity in which China curbs the use of South Korea and enforces the illegal use of China in order to dominate the West Sea exclusively. China aided Chinese fishing boats that engaged in illegal fishing in Korea's jurisdiction as a means to territorialize the West Sea, and is opposed to combined exercise and training of Korea and the United States Naval Forces in the West Sea, while intentionally entering KADIZ(Korea Air Defense Identification Zone). In addition, Beijing used 'scientific exploration and research' measures as a pretext for its strategies in order to encroach on Korea's West Sea. China is carrying out such work to announce to the world that China is a systematic and organized country while consistently attempting to dominate the West Sea. China's activities in the West Sea seriously infringe South Korea's sovereignty. In order to respond to China's strategies of territorialization in the West Sea stated above, I analyzed the rejection effect of the ROK-US combined military training in the West Sea and presented a 'proportional response strategy centered on the ROK-US combined forces'. Korea should be able to respond proportionally to China's activities in the seas around the Korean peninsula, and Korea should be able to neutralize China's attempt to a Fait Accompli. In addition, just as China installs buoys in the Korea-China Provisional Measures Zone, Korea should be able to install and actively utilize some devices in the West Sea and for the use of free and open West Sea. Korea should not just wait for the tragic future to come without preparing for China's gradual and long-term strategy, and Seoul needs to respond to China's maritime policy in the West Sea with a more active attitude than it is now. China has historically taken a bold and aggressive response to neighboring countries that are consistent with a passive attitude, on the other hand, Beijing has taken a cautious approach to neighboring countries that respond with an active attitude. It should not be forgotten that Korea's passive response to the Chinese strategy in the name of a 'realistic approach' such as Korea's economic dependence on China for economy will result in China's success for territorialization of the West Sea.

• Journal of Technology Innovation
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• v.17 no.1
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• pp.1-48
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• 2009

Recently we have found some symptoms that R&D fiscal incentives might not work well what it has intended through the analysis of current statistics of firm's R&D data. Firstly, we found that the growth rate of R&D investment in private sector during the recent decade has been slowdown. The average of growth rate (real value) of R&D investment is 7.1% from 1998 to 2005, while it was 13.9% from 1980 to 1997. Secondly, the relative share of R&D investment of SME has been decreased to 21%('05) from 29%('01), even though the tax credit for SME has been more beneficial than large size firm, Thirdly, The R&D expenditure of large size firms (besides 3 leading firms) has not been increased since late of 1990s. We need to find some evidence whether fiscal incentives are effective in increasing firm's R&D investment. To analyse econometric model we use firm level unbalanced panel data for 4 years (from 2002 to 2005) derived from MOST database compiled from the annual survey, "Report on the Survey of Research and Development in Science and Technology". Also we use fixed effect model (Hausman test results accept fixed effect model with 1% of significant level) and estimate the model for all firms, large firms and SME respectively. We have following results from the analysis of econometric model. For large firm: i ) R&D investment responds elastically (1.20) to sales volume. ii) government R&D subsidy induces R&D investment (0.03) not so effectively. iii) Tax price elasticity is almost unity (-0.99). iv) For large firm tax incentive is more effective than R&D subsidy For SME: i ) Sales volume increase R&D investment of SME (0.043) not so effectively. ii ) government R&D subsidy is crowding out R&D investment of SME not seriously (-0.0079) iii) Tax price elasticity is very inelastic (-0.054) To compare with other studies, Koga(2003) has a similar result of tax price elasticity for Japanese firm (-1.0036), Hall((l992) has a unit tax price elasticity, Bloom et al. (2002) has $-0.354{\sim}-0.124$ in the short run. From the results of our analysis we recommend that government R&D subsidy has to focus on such an areas like basic research and public sector (defense, energy, health etc.) not overlapped private R&D sector. For SME government has to focus on establishing R&D infrastructure. To promote tax incentive policy, we need to strengthen the tax incentive scheme for large size firm's R&D investment. We recommend tax credit for large size film be extended to total volume of R&D investment.