• Journal of Korean Society of Transportation
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• v.22 no.2 s.73
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• pp.65-76
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• 2004

교통망설계문제란, 교통시스템을 최적상태로 만들기 위한 최적의 설계변수를 결정하는 문제이다. 대표적인 교통망설계문제로는 도로를 신설하거나 확장하는 문제가 있으며, 이외에 교통신호시간의 결정, 교통정보의 제공, 혼잡통행료 부과, 새로운 교통수단의 도입 등 여러 교통정책분야가 교통망설계문제에 포함된다고 볼 수 있다. 일반적으로 교통망설계문제는 bi-level 구조로 구축되는데, 기존 대부분의 연구들은 상위문제와 하위문제를 서로 협력없이(Noncooperative) 자신들만의 목적을 최적화시키는 Cournot-Nash게임형태로 구성하여 풀고 있으나, 실제 교통분야에서 다루는 문제들은 리더(leader)와 추종자(follower)가 존재하는 Stackelberg게임에 가깝다고 할 수 있다. 기존 bi-level 문제들이 Cournot-Nash게임형태로 구성되어 풀고 있는 이유는 Stackelberg게임으로 구성할 경우 풀기가 어렵기 때문이다. 이런 측면에서 본 연구는 리더와 추종자가 존재하는 Stackelberg게임으로 교통망설계문제를 구성하며, 설계 변수값에 따른 통행자의 행태변화도 인지오차(perceived error)를 고려한 확률적 통행배정문제로 구성하여 좀더 현실적인 결과를 도출하도록 한다. 제시된 모형을 풀기 위하여 민감도분석(Sensitivity analysis)을 이용하며, 설계문제의 해를 구하는 알고리듬도 제시한다. 또한, 이 기법을 일반 도로교통망(general transportation road network)에 적용할 수 있도록 민감도(sensitivity) 유도과정을 자세히 기술하였다. 개발된 모형을 평가하기 위하여 2개의 예제 교통망을 대상으로 모형을 적용한 결과, 합리적인 값들을 도출하고 있음을 확인할 수 있었다.

• Journal of Environmental Policy
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• v.14 no.4
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• pp.63-101
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• 2015

Banking and borrowing under the ETS may affect the low carbon technology investment level. If the indirect implementation measures are allowed, firms can gradually adjust their carbon reduction costs between implementation periods based on their carbon reduction costs and emission price forecasts. This implies that banking and borrowing may reduce or increase the level of low carbon technology R&D investment. In an oligopoly market, the effects of the measures are quite different from the ones in a perfectly competitive market. This is because the indirect implementation measures can shift market competition in Cournot competition model. The effects of banking and borrowing on the carbon reduction R&D investments depend on emission reduction costs, marginal production costs, discount rate, initial free allocation, and the cost reduction effects of R&D investment.

• Journal of Korea Trade
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• v.24 no.2
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• pp.53-67
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• 2020

Purpose - The purpose of this paper is to study strategic trade policies under international process research and development (R&D) competition with or without market leaders for free trade and a subsidy regime and compare the effects of R&D subsidies and export subsidies on the equilibrium levels of firm profit and social welfare. Design/methodology - For the analysis, we use previous work by Haaland and Kind (2008) and construct a differentiated goods duopoly model, wherein two firms compete via quantity in a third-country market for free trade and the subsidy regime. We consider simultaneous-move quantity competition when the two firms choose their quantities simultaneously and sequential-move quantity competition when they choose their quantities sequentially. The results are compared to those of Balboa, Daughety and Reinganum (2004), who studied export subsidies. Findings - The following are the findings. First, the results of firm preference orderings regarding firm position from Dowrick (1986) and Balboa, Daughety and Reinganum (2004) may not hold in our model when the firms' strategies are strategic substitutes under free trade. Second, the preference rankings under Cournot competition for free trade and a subsidy regime are the same as those in the strategic trade policy of export subsidy. Third, except for the cases of too close substitutes and complements, the results of firm and government preferences regarding firm position are different from those of Balboa, Daughety and Reinganum (2004) in that Stackelberg leadership in a subsidy regime is advantageous when the goods are substitutes but is disadvantageous when the goods are complements. Moreover, the equilibrium level of firm profit is the highest in the Cournot-Nash play when the goods are substitutes in a subsidy regime. Fourth, except for the cases of too close substitutes and complements, the results of firms' and their respective governments' trade regime preferences are similar to those of Balboa, Daughety and Reinganum (2004) in that a Stackelberg leader firm and government prefer free trade if the goods are substitutes and prefer a subsidy regime if the goods are complements. Furthermore, a Stackelberg follower firm and government strongly prefer a subsidy regime to free trade. Originality/value - By analyzing the effects of R&D subsidies and export subsidies in international markets, we can find similarities and differences between them in international markets.

• The Transactions of the Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers A
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• v.51 no.8
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• pp.403-408
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• 2002

As the electricity industry undergoes a process of fundamental restructuring, horizontal market power appears as a potential obstacle to a fully competitive wholesale electricity market. Market power is the ability profitably to maintain prices above competitive levels by restricting output below competitive levels. In models for imperfect competition under the consideration of the transmission constraints, the Nash equilibrium has the form of a mixed strategy. In this paper, the models for analyzing imperfect competition are compared using the solution of pure and mixed equilibria. The relation between market power and the capacity of a transmission line is investigated by imperfect competition analysis methods: Cournot, Bertrand, and Supply Curve model.

• Korea Trade Review
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• v.41 no.2
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• pp.29-60
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• 2016

Research and Development(R&D) investment is an issue of central importance in any economy. In this paper we analyze the relationship between R&D spillovers and trade-related variables, using a two-stage model where duopolists simultaneously decide on R&D in the first stage and engage in Cournot competition in the second stage. We characterized and compared the free-trade and trade-restriction R&D equilibrium in a two-stage game of R&D investment followed by Cournot market competition. We also assessed the impact of varying the R&D spillover on the equilibrium outcomes and tariff. We showed for both free trade and protection cases that there exists a unique symmetric solution(subgame perfect Nash equilibrium). As the solution, while analytical, cannot be stated in closed form, we resorted to numerical experiments to investigate the equilibrium results. Our estimates indicate for both free trade and protection cases that the level of R&D investment and the rate of R&D expenditure decrease as the degree of R&D spillovers increases, and that there is an inverse relation between the degree of R&D spillovers and level of protection. The latter implies that the larger the degree of R&D spillovers, the lesser the level of protection.

• Review of Culture and Economy
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• v.20 no.1
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• pp.3-20
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• 2017

This study proposes that the cultural corporation can be more profitable by adopting the 'Buy-One Give-One' Business Model (BOGO BM) under certain conditions. Specifically, the conditions are that 1) consumers' utility for donating is high enough and 2) the production cost is low enough due to economies of scale or process innovation from employee's intrinsic motivation. We adopt a mathematical model where the demand function is a simple linear function and two companies compete with each other by choosing their quantity of output (the Cournot model). Specifically, we investigate the profitability of the BOGO BM in four situations: 1) a monopolist enjoying reduced cost due to process innovation from employee's intrinsic motivation, 2) a monopolist enjoying reduced cost due to economies of scale, 3) the duopoly with BOGO BM and a general company, 4) the duopoly with two BOGO BM companies. In each situation, BOGO BM can be more profitable than other general companies can under certain conditions.

• The Transactions of the Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers A
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• v.53 no.5
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• pp.302-307
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• 2004

As deregulation of power industry is becoming a reality, there has been an intense interest in the strategic bidding for suppliers to maximize their profits. The profit gained by a supplier is related not only to its energy-price bid curve but also to its submitted operational parameters such as generation capacity, etc. So suppliers are willing to use those strategic parameters that can be manipulated by themselves and are effective to their profit. This paper deals with the competition model with compound strategies: generation capacity and bidding curve. The parameter space is modeled by dividing into the two strategies, so the problem is made up of the four types of sub-game in a two player game. This paper analyzes the global Nash Equilibrium (NE) over the whole divisions by computing the sub-game NEs in some divisions and by deriving the best response curves which have discontinuities in other divisions. The global NE is shown to correspond to the Cournot NE where the quantity variable is realized by a constraints of a generation capacity.

• Journal of Korea Trade
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• v.23 no.2
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• pp.46-58
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• 2019

Purpose - This paper analyzes how Research and Development (R&D) cartelization and Research Joint Ventures (RJV) affect firms that engage in Cournot competition in their product market using a model in which the Home and Foreign firm produce differentiated products and export their total output to a third country's market. Design/Methodology - In a two-stage game, research expenditures incurred in the first stage improve product quality and are subject to various degrees of spillovers. We consider four different scenarios. Findings - In a symmetric equilibrium we observe the following: (i) an RJV that cooperates in R&D decision yields the highest R&D expenditure. However, the scenario which yields the lowest expenditure depends on the extent of differentiation between the goods and the degree of spillovers; (ii) RJV cartelization yields the highest product quality, output, and consumer surplus in the third country; however, the lowest is produced by R&D competition if spillovers are strong and by R&D cartelization if spillovers are weak; and (iii) each firm's profit is at its minimum in R&D competition and its maximum in RJV cartelization. Furthermore, if spillovers are strong, the profit of each firm in R&D cartelization is greater than that in RJV competition, and vice versa. Originality/value - By analyzing product innovation in international markets, we can find similarities and differences between process R&D and product R&D in international markets.

• ETRI Journal
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• v.44 no.6
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• pp.945-954
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• 2022

The 5G mobile network is promising to handle the dynamic traffic demands of user equipment (UE). Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) equipped with wireless transceivers can act as flying base stations in heterogeneous networks to ensure the quality of service of UE. However, it is challenging to efficiently allocate limited bandwidth to UE due to dynamic traffic demands and low network coverage. In this study, a blockchain-enabled bandwidth allocation framework is proposed for secure bandwidth trading. Furthermore, the proposed framework is based on the Cournot oligopoly game theoretical model to provide the optimal solution; that is, bandwidth is allocated to different UE based on the available bandwidth at UAV-assisted-based stations (UBSs) with optimal profit. The Cournot oligopoly game is performed between UBSs and cellular base stations (CBSs). Utility functions for both UBSs and CBSs are introduced on the basis of the available bandwidth, total demand of CSBs, and cost of providing cellular services. The proposed framework prevents security attacks and maximizes the utility functions of UBSs and CBSs.

• Journal of the Korean Operations Research and Management Science Society
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• v.19 no.2
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• pp.45-56
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• 1994

This paper the profit maximizing order quantity model to the symmetric oligopoly consisting of sellers of a homogeneous product who compete with each other for the same potential buyers. Buyers are classified by type, each selecting an optimal purchase quantity in response to the nonlinear quantity discount pricing schedule given by the sellers. Symmetric equilibrium and the economic quantities that sellers must determine are analysed in a Cournot framework, which explicitly depend on the number of sellers. Economic implications are obtianed from the optimality conditions based on themarket share paraments which are used to characterize the competitior's marketing strategy.