• 무역상무연구
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• 제38권
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• pp.47-68
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• 2008

I have observed the validity of open-offer from a point of European contract law in comparison with International Trade Law in this paper. Generally we know that an offer is an expression of willingness bo be bound to the contract. In English law if there are no intention it will be considered such as circulation of price lists or catalogues. As for French law these activities could be considered as an offer. However German law is closer to English law as to an offer. A contract which does not ascertained price is open-price terms and it can be applied not only for general commercial contracts but also for franchise or for distributorship agreements especially in Europe. When open-price terms applied to reserve a exclusive right to the contract the validity of contract can be a serious matter between principals. In English law an offer must be sufficiently complete to be capable of acceptaqnce. English law does not require that price terms should be indicated on offer. English law allow a open-price terms in the contract. In French law a contract will be valid in the absense of a price which is either determined or objectively determinable. A price by the market price of similar products is not enough to be valid offer. It should be recognized and accepted objectively by third parties. French law require that price terms should be indicated on offer. Open-price terms are not enough to be an effective offer. However German law shows more flexible than French law. In German law if the price is not fixed in the contract there are four ways to determine it. The seller may determine the price by the time of deliver. By reason of thess backgrounds I have made comparison with European contract law and International trade law on the validity of open-price offer in this paper. It seems that we are not familiar with open-price terms although franchise contract or special terms of contract have been increased in these days. So I hope this paper will be helpful to show a new point of view.

• Industrial Engineering and Management Systems
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• 제8권4호
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• pp.201-212
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• 2009

This study analyzed the structure of pricing in the automobile auction market by using real trade data. We focused on the bidding behavior of bidders and the contract price of exhibits. First, we proposed a relational framework among exhibits, number of bidders, and the contract price. Next, we utilized a neural network model to estimate the number of bidders and the contract price. Subsequently, we investigated the relationship between the number of bidders and the contact price, and evaluated our method through an analysis that employed verifying data. Lastly, we listed our suggestions for bidding in auction markets.

• Industrial Engineering and Management Systems
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• 제12권2호
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• pp.85-94
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• 2013

This research investigates the supply chain contract between a distributor and a supplier in which the selling period is relatively short in comparison with long production lead time. At the first stage, supplier who is a Stackelberg leader offers the distributor a contract with a set of parameters, and subjected to those parameters, the distributor places the number of initial orders as well as options. In order to purchase the option, the distributor pays non-linear option premium price with respect to the number of purchased options. At the second stage, based on realized demand, the distributor has the right to exercise option as either put or call which is limited up to the number of purchased options. The wholesale price contract is used as a benchmarking contract. This research has confirmed that the supply chain contract with a non-linear option premium price can help to coordinate the supply chain.

• 대한산업공학회지
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• 제27권4호
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• pp.345-351
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• 2001

We are concerned with a multiple replenishment contract with a purchase price discount in a supply chain. The chain is composed of one supplier, one buyer and consumers for a product. The replenishment contract is based upon the well-known (s, Q) policy but allows contracting several firmed orders at a time with a price discount. Due to a larger forecast error of the future demand, the buyer should keep a higher level of safety stock to provide the same level of service of the usual (s, Q) policy but can reduce his purchase cost by placing larger quantity. Thus there exists a trade-off between the price discount and inventory holding cost. We present a model for the contract and an algorithm to find the optimum number of the firmed orders. Computer experiments show that the algorithm finds the global optimum solution very fast.

• 전기학회논문지P
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• 제59권3호
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• pp.263-267
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• 2010

Although electricity market structures may be different from each country, they have a long-term forward market and a short-term spot market in general. Particularly, a bilateral contract transacted at a long-term forward market fixes the electricity price between a genco and a customer so that the customer can avoid risk due to price-spike in the spot market. The genco also can make an efficient risk-hedging strategy through the bilateral contract. In this paper, we propose a new mechanism for deriving the optimal bilateral contract price using game theory. This mechanism can make the customer reveal his true willingness to purchase so that an adequate bilateral contract price is derived.

• 한국IT서비스학회지
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• 제15권1호
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• pp.81-96
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• 2016

This study analyzes how breach fee under long-term contract and/or cap regulation on the breach fee can affect the impacts of "Mobile Device Distribution Improvement Act" on handset bundle price, average revenue per unit (ARPU), and social welfare. We conduct comparative analysis with an economic model of duopoly competition in price when users are under long-term contract and the breach fee can be regulated. The results show that the Act lowers the equilibrium prices, lower than incumbent price without the Act. Price of non-dominant Mobile Network Operator (MNO) can be lower than poaching price without the Act if significant portion of switching cost is breach fee or the market is significantly asymmetric. Under the significant circumstances, the Act can raise ARPU even though it improves social welfare. By contrast, the Act increases consumer surplus without affecting social welfare if breach fee is the only source of user's switching cost and is capped by the regulation, and more symmetric market and the stronger cap leads to higher consumer surplus.

• 무역상무연구
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• 제77권
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• pp.23-42
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• 2018

This study compares the SGA and CISG to find out the difference of the criteria for calculating damages. and it intends to give some important points in trade practice. The damages is intended to compensate the victim for the breach of contract but there are differences between SGA and CISG as follow. First, the SGA and CISG have the same purpose of claiming damages. Both laws and regulations are subject to a full indemnification to compensate for the breach of the contract by the amount equivalent to the loss suffered by the victim. Second, in the general principle related to the calculation of damages, both law enforcement officials are required to be able to predict damages caused by breach of contract. In the case of SGA, however, a foreseeability test or remoteness of damages is required for the relationship between the contract violation and the loss. In other words, it can be said that the causal relation between the contract violation and the damage is strictly applied rather than the CISG. Finally, both laws and regulations of SGA and CISG have a big difference in criteria for calculating damages. In the CISG, after the contract is canceled, it is classified according to the existence of the alternative transaction and the damage amount is calculated based on the contract price. On the other hand, the SGA estimates the loss based on the market price at the delivery of the goods, reflecting the change in the market price instead of the contract price of the goods.

• 한국무역상무학회:학술대회논문집
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• 한국무역상무학회 2004년도 제32회 산학협동 세미나
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• pp.79-104
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• 2004

The buyer must pay the price under the contract and must take delivery of the goods of contract. The buyer's obligation to pay the price includes taking such steps and such formalities under the contract. The remedial system of the rights of the seller is easier than that of the buyer, for the obligations of the former are less complicated. The seller has the right to avoid a contract provided two conditions are fulfilled : (a) the buyer must have committed a fundamental breach of contract, or (b) the additional period for performance set by the seller in the case of non-performance must have expired. A decision is more difficult to take in the case of a delay where there is no fixed-term contract, to clarify the situation the seller may set a Nachfrist. It is essential that the contracting parties in Korea should understand the provisions of CISG.

• 대한전기학회:학술대회논문집
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• 대한전기학회 2004년도 하계학술대회 논문집 A
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• pp.701-703
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• 2004

Although the electricity market structure worldwide may be different in kinds, there generally exists long-term forward market and short-term spot market. Particularly, the bilateral contract in long-term forward market fixes the price between a genco and a customer so that the customer can avoid risks due to price-spike in spot market. The genco also can make an efficient risk-hedge strategy through this bilateral contract. In this paper, we propose a new mechanism for evaluating the optimal bilateral contract price using game theory. This mechanism makes a customer reveal his/her own willingness to purchase electricity so that a fair bilateral contract price can be derived.

• 한국건축시공학회:학술대회논문집
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• 한국건축시공학회 2004년도 학술대회지
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• pp.83-86
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• 2004

Index adjusted ration method has been widely utilized in public construction secter for contract sum adjustment by price fluctuation. In this method. the Production Price Index are used for calculating the base ratio. but the PPI can't reflect the property of construction project in respect of the selected item and weight structure. In this research we prove the problem of using the index adjusted ration method in contract sum adjustment by price fluctuation. and improve it by using the construction cost index. which has the property of construction project. And the result. we figure out the difference between the PPI and CCI by $6.7\%$ in maximum value.