• Journal of Korean Institute of Industrial Engineers
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• v.42 no.3
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• pp.222-230
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• 2016

As the global game market has been more competitive, it has been important to analyze success factors of game products. In this paper, we applied a Bass Diffusion Model and Clustering Analysis to identify the success factors of games based on data from Steam, an international game platform. By using a diffusion model, we first categorize game products into two groups : successful and unsuccessful games. Then, each group has been analyzed by using clustering analysis based on product features such as genres, price, and minimum system requirements. As a result, success factors of a game have been identified. The result shows that customers in game industry appreciate sophisticated contents. Unlike many other industries, price is not considered as a key success factor in the game industry. Expecially, advanced independent video games (commonly referred to as indie games) with killer contents show competitiveness in the market.

• Journal of Korea Multimedia Society
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• v.23 no.12
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• pp.1565-1575
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• 2020

This study examines the game balance of the MOBA game genre, which was selected as a model item for the Asian Games. The "bird-eye view" was used for a more efficient representation of 3D modeling. Based on that, statistical analysis was conducted to present appropriate game camera settings and camera balance to match the competitive structure of the MOBA game. A review of the game camera settings reveals that 64° to 70° is the angle that minimizes the difference in vision between the two-player teams the most. Through a one-way ANOVA analysis, we found that the user ranking level and SVB value are closely related. Therefore, the factor of the regression equation using the SVB value must have a user ranking level. As a result of the optimized camera focus analysis of , the camera setting methods were classified into 3 types. For main action games, the recommended camera angle is 64°~66°, and the recommended camera focus is 11.2 mm~19.3 mm. For action and strategy games, the camera angle is 66°~68°, camera focus - 19.3 mm~27.3 mm. And lastly, for the main strategy game, the recommended camera angle is 68°~70°, and the camera focus is 27.3 mm~35.3 mm.

• Journal of the military operations research society of Korea
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• v.5 no.1
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• pp.137-153
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• 1979

The duel is an extreme case of game situations. The duel is of zero-sum type, but a infinite game. This duel situation appears not only in extreme competitive situations such as war, but also in economic situations such as bidding. The study on duel situations started from late 1940's, but considerable contributions have been made in 1960's by Ancker, Restrepo, Yanovskaya, Kimeldorf among others. Specially Kimeldorf recently has made big contribution in developing the theory of the game-theoretic duel. The purpose of this paper is to summarize and systemize the theory of the game-theoretic duel. In the first part, noisy duel situations shall be dealt with, and in the second part, silent duel shall follow. Finally these two situations shall be generalized in the form of continuous firing model.

• International Commerce and Information Review
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• v.6 no.3
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• pp.297-318
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• 2004

This paper examines export promotion plans of digital content industries, particularly of game, animation & character industry based on the OSMU(One-source Multi-Use) strategy. As the digital content industry is one of the newest industries as a source of strategic export, we must promote the export of digital contents that hold so much international competitiveness and through that promotion, we have to strengthen the international competitive power. The game, animation & character contents are very easy to adapt each other for creating new contents by omnidirectional OSMU. Therefore, it is intended to present some primary factor for export promotion of game, animation & character contents through the OSMU strategy.

• ETRI Journal
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• v.31 no.1
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• pp.89-91
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• 2009

This letter considers the problem of resource sharing among a relay and multiple user nodes in cooperative transmission networks. We formulate this problem as a sellers' market competition and use a noncooperative game to jointly consider the benefits of the relay and the users. We also develop a distributed algorithm to search the Nash equilibrium, the solution of the game. The convergence of the proposed algorithm is analyzed. Simulation results demonstrate that the proposed game can stimulate cooperative diversity among the selfish user nodes and coordinate resource allocation among the user nodes effectively.

• The Transactions of the Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers A
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• v.53 no.1
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• pp.56-66
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• 2004

As deregulation evolves, pricing electricity becomes a major issue in the electric industry. Participants of competitive marketplace are able to improve their profits substantially by adequately pricing the electricity. In this paper, game theory is applied to analyze the price-clearing in the generation bidding competition and the competition is modeled as the noncooperative and complete information. The result of this analysis can be useful in understanding spot price-clearing of electricity and generating entity's strategic behavior in the competitive electricity market.

• The Transactions of the Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers A
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• v.55 no.6
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• pp.259-264
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• 2006

This paper addresses the collusive bidding that functions as a potential obstacle to a fully competitive wholesale electricity market. Cooperative game is formulated and the equation of its Nash Equilibrium (NE) is derived on the basis of the supply function model. Gencos' willingness to selectively collude is expressed through a bargain theory. A Collusion Incentive Index(CII) for representing the willingness is defined through computing the Gencos' profits at NE. In order to keep the market non-cooperative, the market operator has to know the highest potentially collusive combination among the Gencos. Another index, which will be called the Collusion Monitoring Index(CMI), is suggested to detect the highest potential collusion and it is calculated using the marginal cost functions of the Gencos without any computation of NE. The effectiveness of CMI for detecting the highest potential collusion is verified through application on many test market cases.

• The Transactions of the Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers P
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• v.59 no.3
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• pp.263-267
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• 2010

Although electricity market structures may be different from each country, they have a long-term forward market and a short-term spot market in general. Particularly, a bilateral contract transacted at a long-term forward market fixes the electricity price between a genco and a customer so that the customer can avoid risk due to price-spike in the spot market. The genco also can make an efficient risk-hedging strategy through the bilateral contract. In this paper, we propose a new mechanism for deriving the optimal bilateral contract price using game theory. This mechanism can make the customer reveal his true willingness to purchase so that an adequate bilateral contract price is derived.

• The Transactions of the Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers A
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• v.51 no.12
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• pp.597-602
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• 2002

The restructuring of power industry is still going on all over the world for last several decades. Many kinds of restructuring model have been studied, proposed, and applied. Among those models, power pool is more popular than other. This paper assumes the power pool market structure having competitive generation sector, and a new method is presented to build a bidding strategy in that market. The utilities participating in the market have the perfect information of their cost and price functions, but they don't know which strategy to be chosen by others. To define one's strategy as a vector, we make utility's cost/price functions into discrete step functions. An utility knows only his own strategy, so he estimates the other's cost/price functions into discrete step functions. An utility knows only his own strategy, so he estimates the other's strategy using Nash equilibrium or stochastic methods. And he also has to forecast the system demand. According to this forecasting result, his payoffs can be changed. Considering these all conditions, we formulate a bidding game problem and apply noncooperative game theory to that problem for the optimal strategy or solution. Some restrictive assumption are added for simplification of solving process. A numerical example is given in Case Study to show essential features and concrete results of this approach.

• Journal of Korea Game Society
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• v.15 no.5
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• pp.19-28
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• 2015

The game industry has been seeing rapid change brought on by the competitive environment globally. As a result, game design skill is being magnified as a key to success. Because of lack of game design skills, Korean game market is in crisis recently. The game analysis is necessary to enhance game design skills. However, criteria and definition of game analysis is not clear and it is difficult to use for game development. This paper will suggest H-G model which has two factors that are 'human role' and 'the scope of game analysis'. This model segments 9 types of game analysis method. This study finds the limitation of leading researches and tries to improve it mapping the major leading researches to H-G model. This paper would help to make the game analysis be integrated and systemic research as regards 9 types of H-G model.