• Journal of the Korean Institute of Landscape Architecture
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• v.48 no.4
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• pp.41-54
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• 2020

This study was conducted to provide basic data for a transparent and fair bidding system by identifying problems and suggesting improvement measures through an analysis of the bidding status for construction projects and service-related landscaping of multi-family housing. To this end, we used the data from the "Multi-Family Housing Management Information System (K-apt)" that provides the history of apartment maintenance, bidding information, and the electronic bidding system to examine the winning bid status and amount, along with the size and trends of the winning bids by year, and the results of the selection of operators by construction type. As a result, it was found that out of the total number of successful bids (36,831), 4.4% (16,631) were in the landscaping business, and the average winning bid value was found to be about 24 million won. According to the data, 73% of the landscaping cases were valued between 3 million won and 30 million won, and 58.6% of the cases were in the field of "pest prevention and maintenance". 36% of the total number of bids were awarded from February to April, with "general competitive bidding" accounting for 59.8% of the bidding methods. As for the method of selecting the winning bidder, 55% adopted the "lowest bid" and "electronic bidding method," and 45% adopted the "qualification screening system" and "direct bidding method." As an improvement to the problems derived from the bidding status data, the following are recommended: First, the exception clause to the current 'electronic bidding method' application regulations must be minimized to activate the electronic bidding method so that a fair bidding system can be operated. Second, landscaping management standards for green area environmental quality of multi-family housing must be prepared. Third, the provisions for preparing design books, such as detailed statements and drawings before the bidding announcement, and calculating the basic amount shall be prepared so that fair bidding can be made by specifying the details of the project concretely and objectively must be made. Fourth, for various bidding conditions in the 'business operator selection guidelines', detailed guidelines for each condition, not the selection, need to be prepared to maintain fairness and consistency. These measures are believed to beuseful in the fair selection of landscaping operators for multi-family housing projects and to prepare objective and reasonable standards for the maintenance of landscaping facilities and a green environment.

• Proceeding of Spring/Autumn Annual Conference of KHA
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• 2009.04a
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• pp.211-216
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• 2009

Bidding systems in the domestic public construction work have been amended many times since the lowest-bidding system was implemented in 1951. However, this hasn't had much success. Competition in technical development among companies has declined as the contracts for buildings are given to company which submits the lowest price without considering traits of projects. In addition, as the construction market turns to the limitless competition system due to FTA(Free Trade Agreement), advanced techniques are needed to promote the national competitive power. Considering the needs of the times, Korean government announced that "Best Value Contract (Design-Bid-Build)" and "Bridging Contracts (Design-Build)" are included to 4 existing bidding systems in October 2007. Thus this study aims to suggest devised the evaluation criteria including major items for evaluating bidders, in order to establish and revitalize the best-value bid system successfully.

• Proceedings of the KIEE Conference
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• 2001.07a
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• pp.550-552
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• 2001

The vertically integrated power industry was divided into six generation companies and one market operator, where electricity trading was launched at power exchange. In this environment, the profits of each generation companies are guaranteed according to utilization of their own generation equipments. Especially, the electricity demand shows seasonal and weekly regular pattern, which the some capacity should be provided into ancillary service based on the past demand forecasting error and operating results of electricity market. Namely, if generation cost function is applied to SMP and BLMP as announced the previous day, the available generation capacity of the following day could be optimally distributed, and therefore contract capacity of ancillary service applied to CBP(Cost Based Pool) and TWBP(Two-Way Bidding Pool) is determined. Consequently, it is Possible to use the retained equipments optimally. This paper represents on efficient bidding strategies for generation equipments through the calculation of the contract and the application of each generator cost function based on the past demand forecasting error and market operating data.

• Proceedings of the KIEE Conference
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• 2009.07a
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• pp.569_570
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• 2009

This paper presents a methodology to find the profit maximized Nash Equilibriums of each generator(or GenCo), which considers the Ramp-rate of each generator under a competitive market environment. The ramp-rate of a generator is one of the physical or technical constraints of a generator and means the ability to increase or decrease the output instantaneously. In this paper, we found several Nash Equilibriums of the generation allocation problem through Dynamic Programming in a competitive market. Individual generators participate in a game to maximize its profit through competitions and play a game with bidding strategies of its generation quantities in a spot market.

• The Transactions of The Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers
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• v.59 no.12
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• pp.2143-2149
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• 2010

Market price and curtailment amounts of the Demand Resource Market(DRM) are determined by competition between electricity consumers. An important aspect of the DRM involves the assessment of strategic behavior of participants for maximizing their profits. This paper presents economic equilibrium models for simulating imperfect competition among electricity consumers in the DRM and analyzes the models at Nash Equilibrium of Game Theory. The proposed demand functions and supply functions of DRM are based on the Demand Resource Market Rules in Korean electricity market. Simulation results show that the models are adequate for obtaining Nash Equilibrium of consumers' competitive curtailment.

• The Transactions of the Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers A
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• v.52 no.6
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• pp.333-339
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• 2003

Competition among electric generation companies is a major goal of restructuring in the electricity industry. In electricity market, a huge volume of commodities will be traded through competitive bidding. The choice between uniform and pay-as-bid pricing for electricity auction has been one of most important issues in deregulated electricity market. This paper proposes a constrained Bertrand model for analyzing the electricity auction market of price competition model. The issue of the two pricing rules of uniform and pay-as-bid is studied from the viewpoint of consumer's benefit. This paper also shows that transmission congestion depends on the pricing mechanism. Pay-as-bid pricing gives less possibility of transmission congestion by price competition, and less burden to consumers in the simulation results.

• The Transactions of the Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers A
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• v.52 no.6
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• pp.340-346
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• 2003

This paper presents a game theory application for an analysis of uniform price auction in a simplified competitive electricity market and analyzes the properties of Nash equilibrium for various conditions. We have assumed that each generation firm submits his bid to a market in the form of a sealed bid and the market is operated as a uniform price auction. Two firms are supposed to be the players of the market, and we consider the maximum generation quantity constraint of one firm only. The system demand is assumed to have a linear relationship with market clearing prices and the bidding curve of each firm, representing the price at which he has a willingness to sell his generation quantity, is also assumed to have a linear function. In this paper, we analyze the effects of maximum generation quantity constraints on the Nash equilibrium of the uniform price auction. A simple numerical example with two generation firms is demonstrated to show the basic idea of the proposed methodology.

• The Transactions of the Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers A
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• v.49 no.6
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• pp.266-271
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• 2000

The electric power industries are moving from the conventional monopolistic or vertically integrated environments to deregulated and competitive environments, where each participant is concerned with profit maximization rather than system-wide costs minimization. Consequently, the conventional least-cost approaches for the generation resource schedule can not exactly handle real-world situations. This paper presents a game theory application for analyzing power transactions and market design in a deregulated energy marketplace, where the market participants determine the net profits through the optimal bidding strategies. The demand elasticity of the energy price is considered for the realistic modeling of the deregulated marketplace.

• Proceedings of the KIEE Conference
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• 2001.11b
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• pp.429-431
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• 2001

The vertically integrated power industry was divided into six generation companies and one market operator, where electricity trading was launched at power exchange. In this environment, the profits of each generation companies are guaranteed according to utilization of their own generation equipments. This paper represents on generator maintenance scheduling and efficient bidding strategies for generation equipments through the calculation of the contract and the application of each generator cost function based on the past demand forecasting error and market operating data.

• KDI Journal of Economic Policy
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• v.33 no.4
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• pp.143-177
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• 2011

Upon selecting preferred bidder in Public-Private Partnership projects, multi-dimensional procurement auction, where price factor and non-price factor are evaluated, is used. This paper tries to analyze bidding data in BTO road projects. It is shown that a winner tends to get higher score in bidding evaluation, which is partly due to increase in base score as well as fiercer competition among bidders. It turns out that score margin in non-price factor was determinant in selecting winner. Also, there was no competition when the level of bonus point was set too high. For price factor, it costs 730 million KRW per score in construction subsidy by government, while it costs 2.43 billion KRW per score in toll revenue. For non-price factor, it was estimated to cost 2.30 billion KRW. Based on the results, it was suggested that we should have appropriate level of bonus point for first initiator, change in scoring rule in construction subsidy part, adjustment of base score in evaluation.