• Asian Journal of Business Environment
• /
• v.10 no.2
• /
• pp.5-15
• /
• 2020

Purpose: This study examines the impact of individual reciprocal preferences on coalition formation. The reciprocal model considers a player's own payoff, the player's perception of others' payoffs, and others' perceptions of the player's payoff. Research design, data and methodology: A reciprocal model is built to illustrate how reciprocity influences individual decisions in a coalition game and its formation. The prediction is examined with experimental evidences from a dictator game and a membership game. Results: The theoretical result suggests that the coalition formation could be unstable due to negative reciprocal kindness. The experimental findings support that negative reciprocal kindness could lead players participating in a coalition, no matter their dominant strategies are. When subjects were essential to make contributions to a coalition, they were more likely to cooperate if they were treated badly. In contrast, when subjects were unnecessary, the reciprocal kindness could enhance cooperative tendencies. Conclusions: This study reveals that the reciprocal behavior could influence individual decisions and reshape the coalition formation. In terms of policy implications, this study has shown that coalition formation could be reshaped by reciprocal prefe rences. Due to the strategic and complicated decision process in an interactive environment, a comprehensive investigation of factors would be required in a climate coalition in practice.

• Strategy21
• /
• s.41
• /
• pp.174-207
• /
• 2017

Human history shows diverse strategies for survival and prosperity. This study introduces the concept of the expansion of wealth as a key to explain choice and behavior of political entities. American scholar, -Bruce Bueno de Mesquita-, offers theoretical grounds for this concept in that the cores of selectorate theory is settled. The political entity consists of two groups, -the winning coalition that has power to replace leader and non-winning coalition that has not. Leaders implement policies serving for the welfare of winning coalition in return for their loyalty. Both internal problems caused by demographic changes and external ones of climate changes, epidemic disease, or invasion compel leader and winning coalition to adopt policies of expansion that they believe may lead to the acquisition of wealth needed to counter those problems. The process starts by occupying one spot where other entities reside and then connecting it to its own. The line between spots functions as a foothold to form a new line to other spots. By repeating this process, a space is created in which new laws and orders are instated. In the early stage of expansion, war is hardly avoidable. Once finished successfully, the political circumstance tilts to encourage economic activities in order to generate national revenues to strengthen political power of winning coalition. However, as scale of economic activities grows, so does political power of civic classes in production and trade. To gain financial support required to run the political entity, delegation of power or bestowing autonomy to non-winning coalition is inevitable. Thus, expansion is not the ultimate solution, only to prolong the political survival if succeed. Maritime power came to attractive option when overland expansion had become obstructed. It offered much greater advantages in terms of political risks and financial burdens in exploring new regions of precious commodities than overland expansion. Each political entity around world have been, for the first time in human history, connected by maritime means since 15th century. It is worthy of noting that land conditions propelled people out to sea. Political and economic situations created opportunities to exploit geographical position in pursuit of wealth. In the 21st century, we witness the operation of international winning coalition that presides over the rules of expansion. Competing for market is synonymous to the expansion in this era, the cause and aim of it has not been changed though. Energy and dollars are key factors of expansion since the end of the 2nd world war. No matter what the forms and conditions change, naval power is still the most relevant means for expansion as it retains unique characters of maneuver, flexibility, continuity, display and projection of power. The strategy for using naval power should be in line with two different approaches for expansion: Approaches to the international winning coalition by making contribution to world order, and approaches to the non-international winning coalition by enhancing military diplomatic activities. The former will serve our share of winning coalition while the latter will open chances to acquire further prosperity.

• Korean Journal of Health Education and Promotion
• /
• v.27 no.5
• /
• pp.73-78
• /
• 2010

Background: Although collaboration for community health is emphasized, the concept and process of collaboration are rather unclear. International research has classified the types of collaboration and focused on the factors influencing successful collaboration. Greater attention is needed for collaboration practice and research domestically. Findings: By the level of intensity, the types of collaboration range from simpler networking to more formal and sophisticated collaboration. A 4-stage collaboration development consists of formation, implementation, maintenance, and institutionalization stages. Influential factors for collaboration development include: shared goals; operational structure and process; sufficient resources; member and leadership characteristics; environment and climate for collaboration; and information exchange and communication. Discussion: Most of collaboration research so far has dealt with partnerships and coalition building with community-based organizations, and much attention is given to private-public partnership for health. Contextual understanding and collaborative environment are the foremost tasks for us to enhance collaboration for community health in our centralized public health system.

• Environmental and Resource Economics Review
• /
• v.15 no.2
• /
• pp.201-245
• /
• 2006

We applied general equilibrium model to analysis the economic impact of international emission trading by sector and the efficiency of the Convention to study whether Climate Change Convention satisfy the efficiency. We divided the world as 4 groups : USA, OECD members w/o USA (OEC), Former Soviet Union (FSU) and Developing countries (DEV). Compared to no trading, global trading would accomplish the same environmental effect with less cost as much as 97.8 billion$, which is the surplus of trading. However, half of it is taken by USA and 20% by OEC. FSU and DEV have only 18% and 10%. This result suggest the two things. First, the emission trading is effective as far as the participation of developing countries are guaranteed. If they do not take part in the coalition and emit the leakage, it may threaten the stability of the international trading coalition. Second, we found the logical ground of the side payment for developing countries. The permit buying countries take more share of the surplus under the emission trading, while the energy sector of developing countries shrinks to sell permits, which may adversely affect to economic growth of the countries. Therefore, the Annex-I countries need to provide side payment to lead the participation of the developing countries.

• Environmental and Resource Economics Review
• /
• v.24 no.2
• /
• pp.251-281
• /
• 2015

This paper examines the perceptions of sustainability, which is conceptualised as cross-generational social preferences, on the formation of international environmental agreements (IEAs) in a two-stage game in two periods. There are two scenarios are considered: myopic and sustainable development scenarios. The myopic scenario assumes the decision makers only concern the present welfare. Whilst the scenario of sustainable development has two characters: cross-generational fairness and altruism. When both are taken into account, a coalition will be expanded. The numerical example indicates that the marginal cost of the total emissions is the crucial factor for the formation of IEAs. Only when the marginal cost is low, a sustainable system can be succeeded. While, the technological advancement may lead to a more efficient production per unit of emissions, it also encourages countries to emit more in total and have a lower level of welfare. The results confirm the importance of sustainability to IEAs. The lesson learnt from this study is: when decision makers are myopic, the system is unsustainable even if an IEA is formed. Only when the perception of sustainability is considered, the system could be sustainable. Regardless of the existence of IEAs, international environmental conventions shall not neglect the fundamental goal to pursue sustainable development.

• Environmental and Resource Economics Review
• /
• v.27 no.2
• /
• pp.363-397
• /
• 2018

We study the impact of loss-aversion and the threat of critical damages from insufficient pollutant abatement, which we jointly call threshold concerns, on the outcome of international environmental agreements. We aim to understand whether concerns for a critical level of damages induce cooperation among countries faced with the well-known free-riding problem, and yield sufficient emission reductions to avoid exceeding the threshold. Specifically, we focus on loss-averse countries negotiating under the threat of either high or low environmental damages. Under symmetry, when countries display identical degrees of threshold concern, we show that such beliefs have a positive effect on reducing the emission levels of both signatories to the treaty and non-signatories, leading to weakly larger coalitions of signatories than in the absence of reference dependence. We then introduce asymmetry, by allowing countries to differ in the degree of concern about the damages. We show that stable coalitions are mostly formed by the countries with higher threshold concerns. When enough countries exhibit standard preferences, the coalition size may diminish, regardless of the degree of concern by the others.

• Korean Journal of Legislative Studies
• /
• v.27 no.3
• /
• pp.35-68
• /
• 2021

In the German federal election in 2021, the Social Democrats returned to power by a narrow margin and the Green Party emerged as the biggest winner. The two political parties took the lead by proposing policies that met the expectations of the people in the policies of climate and environment, pandemic response and health, and labor and social security. The Merkel effect did not play a significant role in the election, and it is highly likely that it will lead to government policy after the formation of a coalition. While the class cleavage in voting behavior has weakened, the generational cleavage has grown relatively large. Older people showed more support for the two major parties, while younger people showed higher support for the Green Party and the FDP. If the generational cleavage continues, it can be linked to the growth of the Green Party and the FDP, the continued weakening of the two major parties and the emergence of other new parties. In addition, the regional cleavage between the former East and West Germany still remain, which will affect the direction of the AfD and the Left and combine with other political cleavages. The 2021 German federal election can be said to be an election that heralds the realignment of the political party system.

• Journal of Practical Agriculture & Fisheries Research
• /
• v.23 no.1
• /
• pp.49-57
• /
• 2021

As the world marks the adoption of the landmark Paris Agreement on climate change, a promising movement for carbon neutrality is taking shape. This agreement would be needed to build a truly global coalition for carbon neutrality by 2050. Greenhouse gas(GHGs) emissions from agriculture come from livestock such as cows, agricultural soils and rice production has been reported by 10% in 2019. Rice cultivation would be reduced a GHGs and thus this research has conducted to minimize the emission of greenhouse gas with the mulching methodology using a biodegradable film in dry hill seeded rice and to conserve the environment through a cultural and ecological weed control instead of chemicals. We have developed the 5^th mulching dry hill seeder with the biodegradable film to determine the possibility of stable rice cultivation. There were so many difficulties and constraints in the field operations such as film mulching, hill seeding and effective weed control. The mulching dry hill seeder was so good performance in the 5^th trial but the biodegradable film tested was so faster in terms of biodegradation before the heading stage of the rice plant and thus there was not highly effective weed control which is ongoing research with a good performance since 2020.