• Strategy21
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• 통권33호
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• pp.65-112
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• 2014

Recent trends show that the PRC has stepped aside its "army-centered approach" and placed greater emphasis on its Navy and Air Force for a wider range of operations, thereby reducing its ground force and harnessing its economic power and military technology into naval development. A quantitative growth of the PLA Navy itself is no surprise as this is not a recent phenomenon. Now is the time to pay closer attention to the level of PRC naval force's performance and the extent of its warfighting capacity in the maritime domain. It is also worth asking what China can do with its widening naval power foundation. In short, it is time to delve into several possible scenarios I which the PRC poses a real threat. With this in mind, in Section Two the paper seeks to observe the construction progress of PRC's naval power and its future prospects up to the year 2020, and categorize time frame according to its major force improvement trends. By analyzing qualitative improvements made over time, such as the scale of investment and the number of ships compared to increase in displacement (tonnage), this paper attempts to identify salient features in the construction of naval power. Chapter Three sets out performance evaluation on each type of PRC naval ships as well as capabilities of the Navy, Air Force, the Second Artillery (i.e., strategic missile forces) and satellites that could support maritime warfare. Finall, the concluding chapter estimates the PRC's maritime warfighting capability as anticipated in respective conflict scenarios, and considers its impact on the Korean Peninsula and proposes the directions ROK should steer in response. First of all, since the 1980s the PRC navy has undergone transitions as the focus of its military strategic outlook shifted from ground warfare to maritime warfare, and within 30 years of its effort to construct naval power while greatly reducing the size of its ground forces, the PRC has succeeded in building its naval power next to the U.S.'s in the world in terms of number, with acquisition of an aircraft carrier, Chinese-version of the Aegis, submarines and so on. The PRC also enjoys great potentials to qualitatively develop its forces such as indigenous aircraft carriers, next-generation strategic submarines, next-generation destroyers and so forth, which is possible because the PRC has accumulated its independent production capabilities in the process of its 30-year-long efforts. Secondly, one could argue that ROK still has its chances of coping with the PRC in naval power since, despite its continuous efforts, many estimate that the PRC naval force is roughly ten or more years behind that of superpowers such as the U.S., on areas including radar detection capability, EW capability, C4I and data-link systems, doctrines on force employment as well as tactics, and such gap cannot be easily overcome. The most probable scenarios involving the PRC in sea areas surrounding the Korean Peninsula are: first, upon the outbreak of war in the peninsula, the PRC may pursue military intervention through sea, thereby undermining efforts of the ROK-U.S. combined operations; second, ROK-PRC or PRC-Japan conflicts over maritime jurisdiction or ownership over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands could inflict damage to ROK territorial sovereignty or economic gains. The PRC would likely attempt to resolve the conflict employing blitzkrieg tactics before U.S. forces arrive on the scene, while at the same time delaying and denying access of the incoming U.S. forces. If this proves unattainable, the PRC could take a course of action adopting "long-term attrition warfare," thus weakening its enemy's sustainability. All in all, thiss paper makes three proposals on how the ROK should respond. First, modern warfare as well as the emergent future warfare demonstrates that the center stage of battle is no longer the domestic territory, but rather further away into the sea and space. In this respect, the ROKN should take advantage of the distinct feature of battle space on the peninsula, which is surrounded by the seas, and obtain capabilities to intercept more than 50 percent of the enemy's ballistic missiles, including those of North Korea. In tandem with this capacity, employment of a large scale of UAV/F Carrier for Kill Chain operations should enhance effectiveness. This is because conditions are more favorable to defend from sea, on matters concerning accuracy rates against enemy targets, minimized threat of friendly damage, and cost effectiveness. Second, to maintain readiness for a North Korean crisis where timely deployment of US forces is not possible, the ROKN ought to obtain capabilities to hold the enemy attack at bay while deterring PRC naval intervention. It is also argued that ROKN should strengthen its power so as to protect national interests in the seas surrounding the peninsula without support from the USN, should ROK-PRC or ROK-Japan conflict arise concerning maritime jurisprudence. Third, the ROK should fortify infrastructures for independent construction of naval power and expand its R&D efforts, and for this purpose, the ROK should make the most of the advantages stemming from the ROK-U.S. alliance inducing active support from the United States. The rationale behind this argument is that while it is strategically effective to rely on alliance or jump on the bandwagon, the ultimate goal is always to acquire an independent response capability as much as possible.

• Strategy21
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• 통권40호
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• pp.5-36
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• 2016

Recently, the Japanese government revised the three guidelines of its security policy, the National Security Strategy(NSS), the National Defense Program Outline and Midterm Defense Buildup Plan, exceptionally at one time. This means Japan has been seeking the new strategy and strengthening military power considering changing regional security environment. Moreover, Japan revised the security laws for the right to collective self-defense, which authorized the use of force even when Japan is not under attack. Also, Japan renewed the Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation in twenty years, and has expanded JSDF's scope of activity to a worldwide level. These changes imply Japan would constantly seek to build military forces focusing on naval forces. Because Japan's naval forces, the JMSDF is the means that allow Japan to use its force at anywhere overseas and expand its roles and missions in international society by the basis of the right to collective self-defense. This research will analyze Japan's new maritime strategy and trend of force development and eventually look for the implication on our maritime security These days, Japan has perceived Chinese rapid increase of naval power and pursuing of maritime hegemony as a grave threat. In response to this, Japan is designing new maritime strategy, which are "remote islands defense and recapture" and proactively develop a new type of naval forces to accomplish this new strategy. The Japan's "remote island defense and recapture strategy" is to harden its defensive posture in Nansei islands which correspond to China's 1st island chain for chinese A2/AD strategy and directly encounter with China and to protect its own dominium and maritime interest while supporting US national strategy in East Asia. Japan continues to build compact, multi-functional ship to accomplish "remote island defense and recapture strategy" and keep strengthening its maritime power projection capability to include build of new amphibious ship, and large, multi-functional ship which can provide effective C2. These changes imply that Japan is shifting its strategy from passive and defensive to proactive and aggressive way and continues to pursue naval buildup.The implication of Japan's new maritime strategy and naval buildup needs to be observed carefully and we need to keep developing naval power required to protect our maritime sovereignty and interest.

• 안보군사학연구
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• 통권8호
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• pp.1-48
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• 2010

The purpose of this study is to examine and analyze the Untied Nations' efforts for peace on Korean peninsular after CCF's participation in Korean War. The Untied Nation tried to negotiate th peace plan between two sides from the end of 1950. Once the CCF's entry into the war had been confirmed, the war situation moved to a new phase, and the UN forces, which had guided the war in an effort to destroy the NKP A forces, and to punish North Korea, had to set up new guidelines to cope with the new situation. Accordingly, in late November, 1950, the UN forces camp, mainly the US Joint Chiefs of Staff and the United Nations Command, discussed various options, such as an expansion of the war up to the Chinese territory, a cease fire along the 38th Parallel, or a forced and inevitable evacuation. The Korean delegation to the UN insisted that "the unification of Korea should be achieved only by victory in the war. The Chinese intervention in the war is a Challenge to the UN in the same way as the North Korean invasion. The UN participation in the war was to repulse the invasion. With the same spirit we should drive back the Chinese Communists." The Korean delegation also emphasized to the friendly nations the political objective and will of unification, and that a cease fire at a threshold of unification might return us to the status quo ante bellum, and would be contrary to the Korean nation's desire. At that time, particularly, the US strongly considered the employment of nuclear weapons as one of the new strategies to cope with the Chinese invasion. The international effects of these casual remarks were realized almost at once. The British Prime Minister who had not wanted the expansion of war in the Far East, especially from the view point of the interest of NATO's security, visited Washington. so the conference had a very important meaning for the UN forces' new strategy. On the other hand, at the UN, on the 5th of December, the very day Truman and Attlee agreed to seek a cease-fire under UN auspices, a group of thirteen Asian and Arab states proposed to ask China and North Korea not to cross the 38th Parallel, and sounded out both sides about a cease fire along the 38th Parallel. The United States and the United Kingdom gave their assent, but China and North Korea gave no direct response. The CCF, who were securing the initiative of operation, were not agreeable with the proposal of the UN forces. The Untied Nation has tried to negotiate th peace plan between two sides from the December of 1950 and January of 1951. The Untied Nations' has achieved great results to negotiate for the peace plan on Korean peninsular after CCF's participation in Korean War. It's the results considering both the operation situation and political opinions.

• 해양안보
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• 제1권1호
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• pp.149-173
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• 2020

COVID-19 위기로 인해 미국을 비롯한 서구 세력들이 혼란에 빠져 있는 상황에서도, 중국은 회색지대 전략으로 공세적인 해양팽창을 계속하고 있다. 중국이 남중국해를 중심으로 사용하고 있는 회색 지대 전략이란 전쟁도, 평화도 아닌 불분명한 상태를 창출함으로써 국제정치의 현상변경을 추진하는 전략을 말한다. 동아시아 전역으로 영향력을 확대하려 하는 중국은 앞으로 한반도에도 회색지대 전략을 투사하려 할 것이다. 한국이 남중국해 분쟁에 우발적으로 연루되는 경우, 서해에서 중국어선의 불법조업으로 부터 양국의 군사적 갈등이 초래되는 경우, 중국이 이어도에 충돌을 일으키고 개입하려는 경우, 가능성은 낮으나 독도문제를 이용해 한일갈등을 일으켜 한중 결속을 시도하는 경우들이 예상된다. 이에 대처하기 위해 한국은 장기적인 관점에서 아시아 해양안전 선단 창설 및 국가함대라는 틀을 통한 해군과 해경의 통합운용 활성화, 중국의 도발에 대한 대응체계 강화 등을 추구해야 할 것이다.

• Strategy21
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• 통권33호
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• pp.5-36
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• 2014

This article aims to analyze the diplomatic challenges currently facing China as well as the foreign policy the Xi Jinping administration is adopting to address them. With these purposes in mind, it will look into three areas: first, diplomatic tasks confronting the Xi leadership; second, foreign policy that the Xi administration has implemented since the 18th Party Congress in 2012; and third, the prospects for China's foreign policy under the Xi leadership. As the Xi Jinping administration entered into office, it has encountered two major diplomatic challenges. One is the searching for a new foreign policy, and the other the restructuring of the existing foreign affairs and national security systems. The Xi administration, during its first year in office, has responded actively to tackle these issues. To begin with, it has attempted to make some adjustments on foreign policy while maintaining the Deng Xiaoping line of foreign policy. One of these modifications is placing emphasis on national "core interest," as illustrated by changes in guideline for maritime conflicts, pushing for building maritime power, and proclamation of Air Defense Identification Zone in the East China Sea. Second is the decision on the new guideline for peripheral diplomacy. That is, the administration regarded creating peaceful and stable environments to realize "Chinese Dream" as an important goal of foreign policy, and proposed such new guiding ideology as "familiarity, integrity, benefit, and accommodation." In additoin, the Xi administration restructured the existing foreign affairs and national security systems. Establishing the Central State Security Committee and the Internet Leading Small Group (LSG) are cases in point. As comprehensive organizations for policy coordination that encompass party, government, and military, the two LSGs are in charge of enacting related policies and fine-tuning policy implementation, based upon leadership consisting of chiefs of each relevant organs. Moreover, since Xi himself became the chief of these two newly-found organs, the conditions under which these LSGs could demonstrate unified leadership and adjusting role in its implementation of military, diplomatic, and security policies were developed. The future Chinese diplomacy will be characterized with three main trends. First, peripheral diplomacy will be reinforced. The peripheral diplomacy has become far more important since the Work Conference on Peripheral Diplomacy in October 2013. Second, economic diplomacy will be strengthened with an eye on reducing the "China Threat Theory," which still exists in Asia. Third, the policies to isolate the Philippines and Japan will continue in regard to maritime disputes. All in all, Chinese diplomacy in the Xi Jinping era is likely to feature practical diplomacy which combines both hard and soft approaches to best realize Chinese national interest.

• Strategy21
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• 통권43호
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• pp.249-271
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• 2018

최근 카자흐스탄이 러시아나 서구제국들이 아닌 중국과의 에너지 외교에 큰 진전을 보이고 있듯이, 중국은 미국이나 러시아를 자극하지 않은 채로 중앙아시아제국들과의 경제협력을 확대하고 이를 통한 성공적인 에너지안보체제를 구축하고자 한다. 그러나 역사적으로 일정지역에 중국인들의 진출이 늘어나거나 중국인들의 경제적 영향력이 제고되면, 중국정부의 대상지역에 대한 영향력도 제고되었다는 사실로 미루어, 중국의 해외투자 또는 해외이주와 연관된 중국정부의 연계전략에 대한 주의가 요구된다. 중국정부는 해외투자 또는 해외이주지원이라는 명목으로 제주도의 해군기지 주변 강정마을에 대한 부동산 구매를 시도하고 있으며, 그 밖의 한국 내 미군기지 주변에도 중국인타운을 형성하는데 보이지 않는 정부차원의 지원을 확대하고 있다. 이와 같은 현상은 일본 내 미군기지, 특히 오키나와 미군기지 주변과 사스마섬의 일본 자위대 기지 주변에서도 동일하게 전개되고 있다. 이런 중국정부의 의도는 한국과 일본에 주둔하고 있는 미군기지에 대한 견제장치인 동시에 해당지역 주민들에 대한 중국의 영향력 제고를 목적적 결과물로 노정하고 있는 것이다. 중국자본과 중국인들의 한국과 일본 현지진출은 경제적 이해를 넘어서는 외교적, 군사적 문제까지도 야기할 수 있고 이로 인한 국가간 갈등요인이 제고될 수 있는 만큼, 중국의 해외투자 연계전략에 대한 보다 철저한 관리 감독이 필요하다.

• Strategy21
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• 통권45호
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• pp.33-59
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• 2019

본 논문의 목적은 최근 중국의 해양안보전략의 수단과 실행방법, 그 특징을 구체적으로 분석하는 것이다. 중국은 급격한 경제성장 및 강화된 군사력을 바탕으로 '해양강국 건설'이라는 국가목표를 설정하고 이를 달성하기 위해 노력하고 있다. 특히 해양강국을 뒷받침하기 위해 자국의 해양영토주권 수호, 배타적 해양권익 확보 등을 중점적으로 추진하고 있다. 이러한 목표 아래 추진되고 있는 중국의 해양안보전략은 그 수단과 방법 면에서 과거와는 많은 차이를 보인다. 과거 해양안보전략의 주 구현 수단이 해군이었다면 현재는 해군 뿐 아니라 준군사력이 해경과 예비전력인 해상민병도 적극 참여하고 있다. 또한 과거에는 해양에서 전면적인 무력행동을 통해 전략적 목표를 달성하려 했지만 최근은 직접적 충돌 보다는 살라미 자르기 전략, 회색지대전략 및 양배추 전략 등의 전면적 전쟁까지는 이르지 않는 분쟁 수준의 통제를 통해 자신들의 목적을 달성하려 하고 있다. 이러한 중국의 해양안보전략 추구에 대응하여 한국은 적절한 대응방안을 모색할 필요가 있다. 먼저 서해에서의 해군력 현시를 강화해야 하며, 전면전이 아닌 중강도 분쟁에 대비한 전력을 발전시켜야 한다. 또한 회색지대전략, 양배추 전략 등을 활용한 중국의 공세적 해양활동에 효과적으로 대응하기 위해 '해양전장 선점 전략'개념을 발전시킬 필요가 있다.

• Strategy21
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• 통권44호
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• pp.28-53
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• 2018

The U.S. has recently developed Free and Open Indo-Pacific strategy and Distributed Lethality strategy based on a common perception that they are responding to China's threats. In the future, it is anticipated the following. Strengthen cooperation of the U.S.-India-Vietnam navy, Maximizing the combined combat power between the U.S. and regional navies, Improving its ability to restore damage control, Economic cooperation between the Pacific and Indian countries. The meanings given to the Korean navy are as follows. First, South Korea should pursue cooperation with the Indian Navy, which will grow into a regional balance on China's growth. The growth of the Indian navy is expected to increase cooperation with other Pacific countries. The government should seek ways to promote cooperation with india navy in various fields. Secondly, it is a joint drill between the U.S. Navy and the Korean Navy. Recently, the Korea-U.S. joint drill has not been conducted and many changes are expected to be made regarding the implementation of the joint drill in the future. Therefore, it is necessary to respond to possible changes in the naval relationship between Korea navy and the U.S. navy Also, due to distributed lethality strategy, preparations for operations and training with U.S.navy will be necessary. Lastly, it should contribute to cooperation among regional countries in preparation for maritime territorial disputes. The growth of the Chinese navy and the territorial disputes in the East and South China sea has raised the possibility of accidental military clashes at sea. Therefore, the government should make efforts to create multilateral security cooperation systems that can continue to promote the prevention of armed conflict.

• Strategy21
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• 통권43호
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• pp.5-28
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• 2018

The tensions between the U.S and China, which form the two pillars of the G2 era, seem to have persisted even after the Trump administration inaugurated. The strong confrontation between the two in recent foreign security issues may drive to develop an inadvertent military conflict, and it is high likely to occur in the maritime are. The purpose of this study is not only to analyze the balance of modernized naval forces in the PLAN through naval strategy changes and weapons system modernization trend, but also to predict the impact of the geographical proximity difference on the balance of naval forces in the disputed areas. It examined the impact of distance and geography on naval power by assessing the modernization pattern of the PLAN and capabilities in the context of two scenarios at different distances from China by 2020: one centered on Taiwan and the other on the Spratly Islands. The PLAN's strategy had impact on operational concept and forces construction. First, from the viewpoint of operation operational concept, it can be seen that the passive defense is changing into active defense. Second, in terms of power construction, it can threaten the surface and submarines of U.S power from a distance. And they generated follow three features; The ocean is not the focus of Chinese submarines, Horizontal and vertical expansion of Chinese naval vessels, The improvement of the suppression ability as the Chinese naval modernization ratio increases. The strength of the PLAN is dominant over the U.S in terms of reserves, and it can complement the qualitative deterioration by utilizing nearby bases in the vicinity of the mainland, such as the Taiwan Strait. However, due to the shortage of aircraft carriers, there is a possibility that it will take some time to secure the advantage of air and ocean in the amphibious operation. Therefore, as the dispute is prolonged, China may fail to achieve its original goal. In addition, the lack of cutting edge Commanding Ships may bring to weaken the C2 capabilities. At results, it is expected that PLAN will not be able to have a superiority in the short term due to lagging behind U.S advanced technology. Nevertheless, PLAN has strengthened its naval power through modernization sufficiently and it is highly likely to use force. Especially, it is more likely in the region where the naval power operation like the Taiwan Strait is possible with the almost equality to that of the United States. China will continue to use its naval forces to achieve a rapid and decisive victory over U.S in the close area from the land.

• 해양안보
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• 제5권1호
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• pp.1-53
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• 2022

중러 관계 강화는 강대국 경쟁이 재개되고 있음을 보여주는 한 가지 징후라고 볼 수 있다. 공식적인 방위동맹을 체결하지 않았음에도 불구하고 양국의 군사관계가 강화되고 있다는 사실을 눈여겨 볼 필요가 있다. 특히, 중국과 러시아가 세계 최강의 해군력을 보유하고 있다는 점에 비추어 본다면, 양국간 해양안보협력 강화는 최근 수년 간 나타난 국제안보 전개상황 중 가장 중요한 양상으로 꼽을 수 있다. 여러 플랫폼과 장소에서 펼쳐진 중러 해상합동훈련은 고위급 인사교류와 중국의 대규모 러시아 무기 구매, 중러 우호조약 체결 및 다양한 협력형태로 수년간 지속되었다. 양국간 해상합동훈련은 냉전기의 대치국면이 종식된 직후 시작되었으나, 그 중요성은 최근 십년의 기간 동안 더욱 부각되고 있다고 볼 수 있다. 해상합동훈련이 양국 국방동맹의 핵심으로 부상하고 있기 때문이다. 양국은 그 어느 때보다도 다양한 장소에서 다양한 무기체계를 활용해 해상훈련에 임하고 있다. 앞으로 양국의 합동군사훈련은 북극, 초음속 운반수단, 아프리카, 아시아, 중동의 신규 파트너를 비롯해 새로운 위치와 전력을 동원해 펼쳐질 가능성이 크다. 또한, 경비함정 및 제병 연합부대를 동원한 해상합동 훈련을 수행하는 등 최근에 보여준 획기적인 전개를 지속할 것으로 보인다. 중국과 러시아는 양자간 해군협력을 토대로 일련의 목표를 추구하고 있다. 중화인민공화국과 러시아 연방 사이에 체결된 선린우호협력조약 (Treaty of Good-Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation)은 공동방어 조항을 포함하고 있지는 않지만, 공동의 위협에 대해 상호 논의하도록 언급하고 있다. 전통적/비전통적 군사작전 (예: 대해적 작전, 인도적 구호 및 최고수준의 전투수행)을 모의하는 해상훈련은 합동군사활동을 통해 공동의 도전과제에 대한 양국의 대응력을 강화하는 수단이 된다. 이러한 합동훈련이 전투력 측면에서 높은 수준의 상호운용성을 구현하지 못하더라도, 이를 통해 중러 양국이 단합된 해군력을 동원할 수 있는 역량을 갖추고 있다는 사실을 국제사회에 알릴 수 있다. 양국의 해상무역의존도나 영해를 둘러싼 국가간 갈등을 감안하면 이는 중요한 메시지라고 할 수 있다. 한편으로는 해상합동훈련을 통해 자국의 전투력을 향상시키고, 동시에 서로의 전략, 전술, 전투기술 및 절차에 대한 이해를 강화할 수 있다. 점차 부상하고 있는 중국 해군은 특히 러시아군으로 부터 많은 혜택을 얻을 수 있다. 러시아군은 복수의 제병협동작전을 중심으로 중국인민해방군 (People's Liberation Army, PLA) 보다 훨씬 많은 해상임무수행 경험을 보유하고 있기 때문이다. 그러나 한편으로는 전투력 강화를 통해 양국 정치지도자들이 군사력을 동원하거나 다른 국가와 대치할 경우, 긴장을 더 고조시키는 방향을 선택할 가능성이 더욱 커졌다는 부정적인 측면이 지적된다. 이러한 모든 영향은 양국 해군이 대부분의 해상합동훈련을 수행하는 동북아시아 지역에 더욱 큰 파급력을 미친다. 동북아시아 지역은 중국과 러시아가 미국 및 일본과 벌이는 그리고 불편한 상태로 한국을 사이에 둔 해상에서의 대치상황이 펼쳐지는 격전지가 되고 있다. 중러 해군 협력 강화가 공고해지면서 한미 군사계획이 더욱 복잡해지고, 북한에 집중되어야 할 자원이 전환되어 결국 지역 안보환경을 악화시키는 결과로 이어지고 있다. 한미일 해군 실무자의 입장에서는 중러 해군이 모두 포함된 시나리오를 수립해야 할 필요성이 더욱 커지고 있다. 가령, 한미 정책 결정가들은 중러 군사력의 공동 무력대응에 대비하기 위해 미 국방부가 과도한 지출을 하게 만들고, 한반도에서 한미안보 부재가 발생하지 않도록 대한민국 해군을 신속하게 보충해야 하는 상황이 발생하게 되었다. 북한이 한국 및 동맹국과 해상에서 대치할 경우 이를 중러 해군이 지원할 수 있다는 가능성은 또다른 심각한 도전을 제기한다. 이 같은 긴급사태 발생 가능성을 고려해 안보결속을 강화하겠다는 한일 간의 약속을 토대로, 한미일 3국 공동군사훈련을 더욱 확대할 필요가 있다.