• 중소기업융합학회논문지
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• 제5권4호
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• pp.37-42
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• 2015

ICT의 발달로 인해 다양한 공격들이 발달되고 있고, 활발해 지고 있다. 최근에 악성코드를 이용한 APT공격들이 빈번하게 발생하고 있다. 지능형 지속 위협은 해커가 다양한 보안 위협을 만들어 특정 기업이나 조직의 네트워크에 지속적으로 공격하는 것을 의미한다. 악성코드나 취약점을 이용하여 기업이나 기관의 조직 내부 직원의 PC를 장악한 후 그 PC를 통해 내부에서 서버나 데이터베이스에 접근한 뒤 기밀정보 등을 빼오거나 파괴한다. 본 논문에서는 APT 공격과정을 통하여 APT 공격에 어떻게 대응할 수 있는 지 방안을 제시하였다. 악성코드 공격자의 공격소요 시간을 지연시키는 방안을 모색하고, APT 공격에 대한 탐지 및 제거 할 수 있는 방안을 제시하였다.

• Strategy21
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• 통권42호
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• pp.5-52
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• 2017

Debates about introducing nuclear submarines have been a main issue in Korea. The highest officials and the government has started to think seriously about the issue. Yet there were no certain decision to this issue or any agreements with US but it is still necessary to review about introducing nuclear submarines, the technologies and about the business. The reason for such issues are the highest officials of Korea to build nuclear submarine, nK's nuclear development and SLBM launching. ROKN's nuclear submarine's necessity will be to attack(capacity to revenge), defend(anti-SSBN Operation) and to respond against neighboring nation's threat(Russia, Japan, China). Among these nations, US, Russia (Soviet Union), Britain, France had built their submarines in a short term of time due to their industrial foundation regarding with nuclear propulsion submarines. However China and India have started their business without their industrial foundation prepared and took a long time to build their submarines. Current technology level of Korea have reached almost up to US, Russia, Britain and France when they first built their nuclear propulsion submarines since we have almost completed the business for the Changbogo-I,II and almost up to complete building the Changbogo-III which Korea have self designed/developed. Furthermore Korea have reached the level where we can self design large nuclear reactors and the integrated SMART reactor which we can call ourselves a nation with worldwide technologies. If introducing the nuclear submarine to the Korea gets decided, first of all we would have to review the technological problems and also introduce the foreign technologies when needed. The methods for the introduction will be developments after loans from the foreign, productions with technological cooperations, and individual production. The most significant thing will be that changes are continuous and new instances are keep showing up so that it is important to only have a simple reference to a current instances and have a review on every methods with many possibilities. Also developing all of the technologies for the nuclear propulsion submarines may be not possible and give financial damages so there may be a need to partially introduce foreign technologies. For the introduction of nuclear propulsion submarines, there must be a resolution of the international regulations together with the international/domestics resistances and the technological problems to work out for. Also there may be problem for the requirement fees to solve for and other tough problems to solve for. However nuclear submarines are powerful weapon system to risk everything above. This is an international/domestically a serious agenda. Therefore rather than having debates based on false facts, there must be a need to have an investigations and debates regarding the nation's benefits and national security.

• Strategy21
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• 통권30호
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• pp.99-142
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• 2012

Withe increased North Korea's security threats, the South Korean navy has been faced with deteriorating security environment. While North Korea has increased asymmetric forces in the maritime and underwater with the development of nuclear weapons, and China and Japan have made a large investment in the buildup of naval forces, the power of the Pacific fleet of the US, a key ally is expected to be weakened. The biggest threat comes from China's intervention in case of full-scale war with North Korea, but low-density conflict issues are also serious problems. North Korea has violated the Armistice Agreement 2,660 times since the end of Korean War, among which the number of marine provocations reaches 1,430 times, and the tension over the NLL issue has been intensifying. With tension mounting between Korea and Japan over the Dokdo issue and conflict escalating with China over Ieo do Islet, the US Navy has confronted situation where it cannot fully concentrate on the security of the Korean peninsula, which leads to need for strengthening of South Korea's naval forces. Let's look at naval forces of neighboring countries. North Korea is threatening South Korean navy with its increased asymmetric forces, including submarines. China has achieved the remarkable development of naval forces since the promotion of 3-step plan to strengthen naval power from 1989, and it now retains highly modernized naval forces. Japan makes an investment in the construction of stat of the art warship every year. Since Japan's warship boasts of its advanced performance, Japan's Maritime Self Defense Force is evaluated the second most powerful behind the US Navy on the assumption that submarine power is not included in the naval forces. In this situation, naval power construction of South Korean navy should be done in phases, focusing on the followings; First, military strength to repel the energy warship quickly without any damage in case of battle with North Korea needs to be secured. Second, it is necessary to develop abilities to discourage the use of nuclear weapons of North Korea and attack its nuclear facilities in case of emergency. Third, construction of military power to suppress armed provocations from China and Japan is required. Based on the above naval power construction methods, the direction of power construction is suggested as follows. The sea fleet needs to build up its war potential to defeat the naval forces of North Korea quickly and participate in anti-submarine operations in response to North Korea's provocations. The task fleet should be composed of 3 task flotilla and retain the power to support the sea fleet and suppress the occurrence of maritime disputes with neighboring countries. In addition, it is necessary to expand submarine power, a high value power asset in preparation for establishment of submarine headquarters in 2015, develop anti-submarine helicopter and load SLAM-ER missile onto P-3C patrol aircraft. In case of maine corps, division class military force should be able to conduct landing operations. It takes more than 10 years to construct a new warship. Accordingly, it is necessary to establish plans for naval power construction carefully in consideration of reality and future. For the naval forces to safeguard maritime sovereignty and contribute to national security, the acquisition of a huge budget and buildup of military power is required. In this regard, enhancement of naval power can be achieved only through national, political and military understanding and agreement. It is necessary to let the nation know that modern naval forces with improved weapon system can serve as comprehensive armed forces to secure the command of the sea, perform defense of territory and territorial sky and attack the enemy's strategic facilities and budget inputted in the naval forces is the essential source for early end of the war and minimization of damage to the people. If the naval power construction is not realized, we can be faced with a national disgrace of usurpation of national sovereignty of 100 years ago. Accordingly, the strengthening of naval forces must be realized.

• 한국과 국제사회
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• 제2권2호
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• pp.157-184
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• 2018

이 연구는 파키스탄에서 9/11 테러 이후 외교정책 결정 과정을 추적하기 위해 4단계 "위기에서의 국가 행동 모델"을 적용했다. 그것은 알카에다의 미국에 대한 불길한 공격과 테러에 맞서 싸우기 위한 부시 대통령의 후속 선언이 t1 단계의 세계와 지역의 정치 안보 차원을 변화시켰다고 주장한다. 이웃 국가인 파키스탄의 지원은 테러와의 전쟁에서 불가피했고, 미국은 이슬람 바드의 협력을 얻기 위해 강압적인 외교를 취했다. 결과적으로, 미국의 요구를 수용하지 않을 경우 파키스탄은 국가의 기본 가치/목표에 대한 위협을 인식하고 동시에 시간 압박은 t2 단계에서 의사결정자들의 심리적 스트레스를 증폭시켰다. 따라서 의사결정 포럼은 t3 단계에서 시작되었고 파키스탄은 외교 정책 위기를 완화시킨 t4 단계로 미국에 합류하기로 결정했다.

• 한국항해항만학회지
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• 제33권7호
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• pp.491-500
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• 2009

In order to attract more transshipment cargoes, Busan Port Authority (BPA) has, since 2003, adopted the volume incentive policy by which more than US$ 10 million annually have been paid back to shipping lines that were called at the port. However, having been a transshipment port for the Northeast region of China, the port of Busan has come under threat from bold Chinese port development projects, notably Shanghai, as northern Chinese regionnl ports place more emphasis on building facilities capable of handling growing trade volumes. Undoubtedly this would lead to a decline in transshipment container traffic moved via Busan. The purpose of this paper is to identify some core factors that have been affecting the increase of transshipment cargoes of Busan and further to recommend BPA an improved incentive scheme with which more T/S cargoes can be attracted into the port of Busan To clarity the reason why T/S cargoes have increased in the port of Busan, several steps are made as follows: The first step is to make a quantitative model for explaining the development of T/S cargoes during the last decade. The second step is to define the dependent and the independent variables for multiple regressions after testing variable significance. For this, data collection and the accuracy of validation have been done by the direct interview with the experienced staffs in shipping companies of both domestic and foreign country. After validating the model with collected data, the final step is to find variables which are explaining the model mostly. In conclusion, 2 variables were clearly identified as core factors that explain well the development of T/S cargoes in the port of Busan: 'Mohring effect' and total cost. It is strongly recommended, by an empirical study, that an incentive scheme be changed to a way which more feeder vessels rather than mother vessels can reduce their direct costs to call in the port of Busan.

• 문화기술의 융합
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• 제10권3호
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• pp.25-29
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• 2024

NATO는 러시아-우크라이나 전쟁 이후 그동안 유지해오던 평화유지 전략에서 탈피하고 다자안보협의체 강화, 전략적 안정성 추구, 군비 확충, 협력안보 및 인도-태평양 지역까지 대화·협력을 강화할 것을 천명하였다. NATO의전략 변화는 직·간접적으로 한국의 안보환경에 영향을 미친다. 이를 명확히 분석하고 대응할 수 있는 정책 및 전략을수립해야 위협을 억제하고 국가이익을 보호할 수 있다. NATO는 중국과 러시아를 위협으로 명시하고 있다. 우리는NATO와 협력과 연대를 기회로 삼아 소다자 안보협력 및 동맹 강화, 방산시장 개척 및 확대, 우크라이나 재건사업참여 기회 확대를 얻을 수 있을 것이다.

• 국제지역연구
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• 제15권1호
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• pp.61-82
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• 2011

대중저항은 민주화 과정의 필수적인 요소였다. 이 때문에 중국의 민주화 논의에 있어서도 대중저항은 매우 중요한 요소로 인식되어 왔다. 최근 중국에 새로운 저항의 시대가 도래하고 있고, 특히 농민저항이 확대되고 있다. 본 연구는 중국 농민저항의 경향과 특징을 파악하고, 중국 국가-사회관계의 변화에 대한 탐색을 통해 밑으로부터의 민주화가 가능한지를 예측해 보고자 했다. 중국 농민저항의 급증은 중국 경제성장의 역설이다. 발전과정에서 농촌사회는 희생을 강요당해 왔기 때문에, 농민들의 불만표출이 확대되었다. 중국정부는 농민저항을 전통적인 억제와 진압의 방식으로 무마시키는 데 한계에 봉착했고, 점차 농민의 불만을 어느 정도 수용하고 무마시키는 자비로운 국가의 이미지 그리고 영리한 안정구매 전략을 구사하게 되었다. 그럼에도 불구하고, 지속적인 경제발전과 현대화 과정에서 도시와 농촌간의 격차는 더욱 확대되었고 농민들의 상대적 소외는 쉽게 치유되지 않았다. 이에 따라 중국 농민저항의 불씨는 쉽게 사그라지지 않고, 중국 전역에서 횡행하고 있다. 중국 농민저항의 특징 역시 변화했다. 과거에는 산발적이고 간접적인 저항방식이었다면, 최근에는 조직적이고 적극적인 저항 방식으로 변화하고 있다. 물론 아직까지 정부의 사회 통제력이 강하다는 것이 일반적 평가이고, 농촌 시민사회의 형성기반이 약하기 때문에, 정부의 안정구매 전략은 농민들의 불만이 체제 위협으로까지 확대되지 않게 하고 있다. 당분간은 긴장과 충돌이 중국정부로 하여금 국가-사회간의 상호작용을 제도화시켜 농촌 시민사회의 권력 성장을 억제시키고, 거리투쟁을 제도 내 투쟁으로 유도할 가능성이 높다. 그러나 국가와 농촌사회간의 갈등과 충돌이 끊임없이 지속되고 있으며, 농민 저항의 방식이 변화하는 것을 볼 때 중국 국가-사회관계에도 새로운 조정이 이미 진행되고 있다고 할 수 있다.

• 한국의류학회지
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• 제32권3호
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• pp.462-473
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• 2008

In recent years, Korea's apparel exports to the USA have faced a great threat, as the trade environment around the world has changed continually. The purpose of this study is to analyze the competitive position of Korean apparel exports to the USA, and to enhance export competitiveness by applying to offshore sourcing. The trade data of the Office of Textiles and Apparel(OTEXA) in the U.S. Department of Commerce were selected for inquiry about export competitiveness of apparel products made in Korea. In addition, we targeted members of the Korea Apparel Industry Association among the 500 exporters of clothing items in "The Import and Export Textile Product 2003." A total 70 sheets were analyzed. The results of this study were as follows: 1) Korean apparel exports to USA have decreased by 20-35 percent per year since 2005 under the Free Trade Area, showing that Korean apparel industries have not adapted to the new trade environment. Although Korean apparel exports to USA have indicated a trade surplus from now on, Korean apparel industries should find new ways to overcome this situation, diminishing exports and increasing imports. 2) Korean apparel companies selected more offshore sourcing than domestic sourcing. Also, as Korean apparel companies manufactured apparel products offshore, foreign subcontracting outranked manufacturing in their own foreign plants. When they chose foreign countries to source, they turned mainly to China and Vietnam. Also, they considered the target country's manufacturing price, labor stability, apparel products, quality, lead time, and so on. In order to increase apparel exports, Korean apparel industries should focus more on developing competitively new apparel products, improving the ability of sourcing management, and establishing on-the-spot agencies.

• 방사선산업학회지
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• 제17권4호
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• pp.411-416
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• 2023

From Cold War, Nuclear weapons have emerged military power into a very dangerous and important way of each national security. Throughout the era, the U.S. had stationed nuclear weapons in South Korea. But President George Bush initially started the withdrawal of nuclear tactical weapons deployed abroad in 1991. After that, under the protection of the nuclear umbrella, South Korea guarantees that the United States would operate its nuclear weapons to protect South Korea if it would be needed and the economy of South Korea has rapidly developed as more strong countries in the world. However, South Korea has seen and been realized the present state from the recent war between Russia and Ukraine. The protection of the U.S. nuclear umbrella from nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles of North Korea is unlikely to be permanently guaranteed. At the same time, South Korea should consider the security environment changes of surrounding nations such as China as military power acceleration and Russia as re-formation ambition. Because of these reasons, South Korea independently wants to protect itself and have the own nuclear weapons as a way to counter security threats. A majority of South Koreans also definitely believe that North Korea will not denuclearize or give up because North Korea has been having nuclear weapons as the final survival strategy of Kim Jong Un's regime. However, South Korea considers and makes new nuclear strategy through the role and effect of nuclear deterrence strategy in dispute between India and Pakistan and how to overcome the paradox of nuclear deterrence strategy. Therefore, this research is to suggest the effective nuclear deterrence strategy of South Korea from new security threats of surrounding nations through dispute between India and Pakistan. The focus of this research is that what is the role and paradox of nuclear deterrence strategy in dispute between India and Pakistan and how to find the effective nuclear deterrence strategy of South Korea.

• 안보군사학연구
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• 통권13호
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• pp.687-738
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• 2016

To prepare for the complicated international relationship regarding Korean Peninsula after reunification, this thesis started off with the awareness that Unified Korea should build its international posture and national security at an early stage by determining its appropriate military strength for independent defense and military strategies that Unified Korea should aim. The main theme of this thesis is 'The research on appropriate military strength of the Unified Korean military'. To derive appropriate military strength of Unified Korea, this research focuses on conflict scenario and relative balance strategy based on potential threats posed by neighboring countries, and this is the part that differentiates this research from other researches. First of all, the main objective of the research is to decide appropriate military strength for Unified Korea to secure defense sufficiency. For this, this research will decide efficient military strategy that Unified Korea should aim. Than by presuming the most possible military conflict scenario, this research will judge the most appropriate military strength for Unified Korea to overcome the dispute. Second, after deciding appropriate military strength, this research will suggest how to operate presumed military strength in each armed force. The result of this thesis is as in the following. First, Unified Korea should aim 'relative balance strategy'. 'Relative balance strategy' is a military strategy which Unified Korea can independently secure defense sufficiency by maintaining relative balance when conflicts occur between neighboring countries. This strategy deters conflicts in advance by relative balance of power in certain time and place. Even if conflict occurs inevitably, this strategy secures initiative. Second, when analyzing neighboring countries interest and strategic environment after unification, the possibility of all-out war will be low in the Korean Peninsula because no other nation wants the Korean Peninsula to be subordinated to one single country. Therefore appropriate military strength of the Unified Korean military would be enough when Unified Korea can achieve relative balance in regional war or limited war. Third, Northeast Asia is a region where economic power and military strength is concentrated. Despite increasing mutual cooperation in the region, conflicts and competition to expand each countries influence is inherent. Japan is constantly enhancing their military strength as they aim for normal statehood. China is modernizing their military strength as they aspire to become global central nation. Russia is also enhancing their military strength in order to hold on to their past glory of Soviet Union as a world power. As a result, both in quality and quantity, the gap between military strength of Unified Korea and each neighboring countries is enlarged at an alarming rate. Especially in the field of air-sea power, arms race is occurring between each nation. Therefore Unified Korea should be equipped with appropriate military strength in order to achieve relative balance with each threats posed by neighboring countries. Fourth, the most possible conflicts between Unified Korea and neighboring countries could be summarized into four, which are Dokdo territorial dispute with Japan, Leodo jurisdictional dispute with China, territorial dispute concerning northern part of the Korea Peninsula with China and disputes regarding marine resources and sea routes with Russia. Based on those conflict scenarios, appropriate military strength for Unified Korea is as in the following. When conflict occurs with Japan regarding Dokdo, Japan is expected to put JMSDF Escort Flotilla 3, one out of four of its Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force Escort Fleet, which is based in Maizuru and JMSDF Maizuru District. To counterbalance this military strength, Unified Korea needs one task fleet, comprised with three task flotilla. In case of jurisdictional conflict with China concerning Leodo, China is expected to dispatch its North Sea fleet, one out of three of its naval fleet, which is in charge of the Yellow Sea. To response to this military action, Unified Korea needs one task fleet, comprised with three task flotilla. In case of territorial dispute concerning northern part of the Korean Peninsula with China, it is estimated that out of seven Military Region troops, China will dispatch two Military Region troops, including three Army Groups from Shenyang Military Region, where it faces boarder with the Korean Peninsula. To handle with this military strength, Unified Korea needs six corps size ground force strength, including three corps of ground forces, two operational reserve corps(maneuver corps), and one strategic reserve corps(maneuver corps). When conflict occurs with Russia regarding marine resources and sea routes, Russia is expected to send a warfare group of a size that includes two destroyers, which is part of the Pacific Fleet. In order to balance this strength, Unified Korea naval power requires one warfare group including two destroyers. Fifth, management direction for the Unified Korean military is as in the following. Regarding the ground force management, it would be most efficient to deploy troops in the border area with china for regional and counter-amphibious defense. For the defense except the border line with china, the most efficient form of force management would be maintaining strategic reserve corps. The naval force should achieve relative balance with neighboring countries when there is maritime dispute and build 'task fleet' which can independently handle long-range maritime mission. Of the three 'task fleet', one task fleet should be deployed at Jeju base to prepare for Dokdo territorial dispute and Leodo jurisdictional dispute. Also in case of regional conflict with china, one task fleet should be positioned at Yellow Sea and for regional conflict with Japan and Russia, one task fleet should be deployed at East Sea. Realistically, Unified Korea cannot possess an air force equal to neither Japan nor China in quantity. Therefore, although Unified Korea's air force might be inferior in quantity, they should possess the systematic level which Japan or China has. For this Unified Korea should build air base in island areas like Jeju Island or Ullenong Island to increase combat radius. Also to block off infiltration of enemy attack plane, air force needs to build and manage air bases near coastal areas. For landing operation forces, Marine Corps should be managed in the size of two divisions. For island defense force, which is in charge of Jeju Island, Ulleung Island, Dokdo Island and five northwestern boarder island defenses, it should be in the size of one brigade. Also for standing international peace keeping operation, it requires one brigade. Therefore Marine Corps should be organized into three divisions. The result of the research yields a few policy implications when building appropriate military strength for Unified Korea. First, Unified Korea requires lower number of ground troops compared to that of current ROK(Republic of Korea) force. Second, air-sea forces should be drastically reinforced. Third, appropriate military strength of the Unified Korean military should be based on current ROK military system. Forth, building appropriate military strength for Unified Korea should start from today, not after reunification. Because of this, South Korea should build a military power that can simultaneously prepare for current North Korea's provocations and future threats from neighboring countries after reunification. The core of this research is to decide appropriate military strength for Unified Korea to realize relative balance that will ensure defense sufficiency from neighboring countries threats. In other words, this research should precisely be aware of threats posed by neighboring countries and decide minimum level of military strength that could realize relative balance in conflict situation. Moreover this research will show the path for building appropriate military strength in each armed force.