• Journal of the Korean Society of School Health
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• v.20 no.2
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• pp.69-80
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• 2007

Purpose: The present study purposed to investigate the current state of harmful business places around schools and to survey and analyze how much middle school students know about school environment hygiene purification zones, which have not been much effective. Methods: In addition, this study clarified the problem of harmful environment around schools by inquiring into students' value and perception on worsening harmful environment around schools and provided basic materials necessary for making policies on school education and the protection of educational environment. For these purposes, we conducted a questionnaire survey of 1,000 middle school students in Gyeonggi-do on their perception on harmful environment around their schools, and drew conclusions as follows. Result: Students' knowledge about the School Health Act was low, and they generally thought that the law does not play its role substantially and efficiently in purifying and regulating harmful environment and regulations are superficial and temporary. To the question of whether harmful businesses observe laws for purifying environment around schools, most of the students replied negatively. In actuality, as most of harmful businesses running at school environment hygiene purification zones are stationeries with game rooms, comic book stores, PC rooms, etc., which are highly accessible to students, they become serious problems in school environment. Conclusion: As it is required to make continuous and systematic surveys and researches on the school environment hygiene purification zones, we need to manage school environment efficiently through cooperation among the government, education offices and individual schools.

• Proceedings of the Korean Society of Computer Information Conference
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• 2018.07a
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• pp.262-264
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• 2018

Many of users play Mobil Social Network Games (M-SNG). M-SNGs are played through social network, and typically features multiplayer and asynchronous gameplay mechanics. It is most often implemented as mobile devices with mobile instant messenger app. Kakaotalk provids mobile game platform. The purpose of this study is to find significant factors that have effects on the commitment of M-SNGs. We also conduct multi-group comparison test to study the difference in factors of models between time t and time t1. Time t is October, 2012 and time t1 is April, 2016. This study is to empirically test the research model using data collected from M-SNGs' users. We survey two different groups of time t and time t1 people with the same model. We use structural equation model analysis with AMOS 18.0 and compare two models of different times. This study is to give academicians and practitioners insight about its effects and implications

• Journal of Information Technology Applications and Management
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• v.31 no.1
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• pp.97-112
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• 2024

In order to verify the factors affecting the acceptance of Serious Games for Healthcare (SGHs), this study developed a hierarchical model of general and specific benefit and risk factors affecting the intention to use SGHs based on the valence framework. As a result based on 199 samples, it was revealed that perceived customization and perceived schedule flexibility had a positive effect on the perceived benefits, which, in turn, had a positive effect on the intention to use SGHs. However, among the specific risk factors, only privacy risk had a positive effect on perceived risk, but it did not have a effect on SGHs usage intention. The results related to the fact that the survey respondents were potential users of SGHs and the bias that may overestimate the benefits provided by SGHs called optimistic bias. Based on these findings, some implications were presented such as the spread and distribution of SGHs to the ordinary persons, improvement of negative perceptions of games, and the need for data-based services to refine customized services for SGHs.

• Journal of Korea Entertainment Industry Association
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• v.14 no.3
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• pp.1-13
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• 2020

Tencent is an internet-based entertainment platform corporation using technology to enrich the lives of Tencent platform users and assist the contents expansion. Since 2000, Tencent have developed a great growth and innovation in entertainment contents domain. Tencent have become the market leading innovator due to the imitative innovation and M&A. The present study designed case study analyses to investigate the mechanism with regard to the growth strategy of Tencent corporation. Tencent began with imitative internet-based game and social messaging services but then added its own wechat messenger platform, now being extended to other products or services. This imitative innovation strategy enabled Tencent corporation to grow rapidly, to achieve outstanding growth. In addition, Tencent's M&A investment drive is underpinned by a vision of top management team and flexible organizational culture, from building out the Tencent's entertainment platform, game, finance, e-commerce, to global market expansion. While our results shed light on the implications to understanding Tencent's growth, there are limitations of the current study that should be considered when designing next research.

• Smart Media Journal
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• v.11 no.7
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• pp.9-18
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• 2022

With the outbreak of COVID-19, the world is in unexpected chaos. In particular, the Korean economy, which has a large number of self-employed people, is experiencing enormous damage from COVID-19. The purpose of this study is to analyze the causal impact of start-ups and closures by industry due to the COVID-19 outbreak. For the causal impact analysis, we collected and analyzed 8,312,224 cases of start-up and closure of 190 businesses that occurred on the local administrative license data public site for 11 years from 2010 to 2020. As a result of the analysis of the causal impact of COVID-19, there were 29 industries in which start-ups increased(increase rate 313.14% ~ 6.39%), 23 industries in which start-ups decreased(decrease rate 70.62% ~ 11.27%), 21 industries in which closures increased(increase rate 157.55% ~ 13.57%), and 18 industries in which business closures decreased(reduction rate 49.45% ~ 12.91%). The industries in which start-ups increased and closures decreased due to the COVID-19 outbreak were disinfection, food transportation, and general sales of health functional food. The industries in where start-ups decreased and closures increased due to the COVID-19 outbreak were youth game providing industry, danran pub business, and general game providing industry. It is expected that the results of this study will help practitioners who manage various infectious diseases to understand the causal impact of infectious disease outbreaks and to prepare countermeasures.

• The KIPS Transactions:PartD
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• v.10D no.1
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• pp.161-166
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• 2003

Information lead time is defined as the time spent by processing orders from some buyers, whereas order lead time is defined as producing and supplying the products. The information lead time significantly serve to magnify the increase in variability due to demand forecasting. This paper models a decentralized supply chain composed of cascade type which has four type phases (or divisions) such as retailer, wholesaler, distributor, and factory. Each phases is managed by different centers individually with their own local inventory information. We investigate whether each phase's Information lead time affects companies networked a value chain. In particular, on several experiments performed with a programmed simulation (like a MIT beer game), we study the following question ; Can information lead times do better than material lead times in cost-benefit perspective\ulcorner Can more much Information lead times in downstream reasonably do worser than in upstream when playing the simulation\ulcorner In the conclusion, we show the importance of information lead time on a SC and, besides, guarantee that improvement of information lead time in upstream do more effective than one in downstream in cost-benefit perspective.

• Asia Marketing Journal
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• v.16 no.1
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• pp.35-69
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• 2014

The impact of competition on pricing has been studied in the context of counterfactual merger analyses where expected optimal prices in a hypothetical monopoly are compared with observed prices in an oligopolistic market. Such analyses would typically assume static decision making by consumers and firms and thus have been applied mostly to data obtained from consumer packed goods such as cereal and soft drinks. However such static modeling approach is not suitable when decision makers are forward looking. When it comes to the markets for durable products with indirect network effects, consumer purchase decisions and firm pricing decisions are inherently dynamic as they take into account future states when making purchase and pricing decisions. Researchers need to take into account the dynamic aspects of decision making both in the consumer side and in the supplier side for such markets. Firms in a two-sided market typically subsidize one side of the market to exploit the indirect network effect. Such pricing behaviors would be more prevalent in competitive markets where firms would try to win over the battle for standard. While such qualitative expectation on the relationship between pricing behaviors and competitive structures could be easily formed, little empirical studies have measured the extent to which the distinct pricing structure in two-sided markets depends on the competitive structure of the market. This paper develops an empirical model to measure the impact of competition on optimal pricing of durable products under indirect network effects. In order to measure the impact of exogenously determined competition among firms on pricing, we compare the equilibrium prices in the observed oligopoly market to those in a hypothetical monopoly market. In computing the equilibrium prices, we account for the forward looking behaviors of consumers and supplier. We first estimate a demand function that accounts for consumers' forward-looking behaviors and indirect network effects. And then, for the supply side, the pricing equation is obtained as an outcome of the Markov Perfect Nash Equilibrium in pricing. In doing so, we utilize numerical dynamic programming techniques. We apply our model to a data set obtained from the U.S. video game console market. The video game console market is considered a prototypical case of two-sided markets in which the platform typically subsidizes one side of market to expand the installed base anticipating larger revenues in the other side of market resulting from the expanded installed base. The data consist of monthly observations of price, hardware unit sales and the number of compatible software titles for Sony PlayStation and Nintendo 64 from September 1996 to August 2002. Sony PlayStation was released to the market a year before Nintendo 64 was launched. We compute the expected equilibrium price path for Nintendo 64 and Playstation for both oligopoly and for monopoly. Our analysis reveals that the price level differs significantly between two competition structures. The merged monopoly is expected to set prices higher by 14.8% for Sony PlayStation and 21.8% for Nintendo 64 on average than the independent firms in an oligopoly would do. And such removal of competition would result in a reduction in consumer value by 43.1%. Higher prices are expected for the hypothetical monopoly because the merged firm does not need to engage in the battle for industry standard. This result is attributed to the distinct property of a two-sided market that competing firms tend to set low prices particularly at the initial period to attract consumers at the introductory stage and to reinforce their own networks and eventually finally to dominate the market.

• Knowledge Management Research
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• v.24 no.4
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• pp.195-218
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• 2023

This study empirically analyzes the effect of a sports club's performance and social media operations on online information search volume, reflecting fan engagement. Additionally, it confirms that such effect can vary depending on the issuance of sports fan tokens. The analysis of the data resulted in the support of all four hypotheses presented in this study. The team's goal differentials during the games exhibited a significant and positive effect on the online information search volume by fans. Furthermore, the quantity of a team's social media posts also showed a significant and positive effect on the online information search volume. The aforementioned effects of the team's game-related performance and social media activity on the online information search volume appeared to be strengthened when the sports fan tokens of the team were issued. This study conducts an empirical analysis of fan engagement in sports clubs and delves into the marketing dimensions of sports fan tokens. By doing so, it broadens the research scope within sports marketing and offers practical insights for the development of marketing strategies by sports clubs.

• The Korean Journal of Financial Management
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• v.23 no.1
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• pp.227-242
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• 2006

This paper analyzes insurance crimes using a game theoretic model. In blackmailing cases involving automobile accidents, insurance criminals deliberately induce innocent drivers(victims) to commit a moving violation such as crossing over the center dividing yellow line, and collide with the victims. After the collision, the criminals and the victims effectively engage in a bargaining game over the amount of the settlement for the damage. Because the penalty for that kind of moving violation is very severe (even criminally prosecuted), the victims do not have much bargaining power. Exploiting the weak bargaining power of the victims, the criminals demand and receive huge compensation (including settlement) from the victims. In the model, it is shown that under the current law agents have perverse incentives leading to insurance crimes. The criminals have incentive to induce car collisions and extract huge settlement from the victims. Based on the analysis, it is suggested that lowering the severity of penalty for certain kind of violation may be needed to prevent insurance crimes, in addition to increasing the crime investigation activities and strengthening punishment for insurance criminals.

• Journal of the Korean Operations Research and Management Science Society
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• v.22 no.3
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• pp.209-222
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• 1997

In this paper, we study a bargaining order problem where one buyer sequentially bargains with two sellers whose reservation prices are unknown to the buyer but correlated. Our main question is who the buyer should bargain first with to maximize his expected payoff. This type of problem is widely applicable to business and political situations where one party negotiates with multiple parties sequentially. One of the most important element in a sequential bargaining is "linkage effect" which exists when the aggreement of the previous bargaining affects the outcome of the following bargaining. To examine "linkage effect", we assume that the sellers'objects are similar so that the sellers' reservation prices are correlated. In addition, to consider incomplete information aspect regarding reservation prices, it is assumed that the sellers' reservation prices are unknown to the buyer. That is, we deal with one sided incomplete information case. In our model, there are two stages in each of which the buyer meets one seller. Since we are concerned with the bargaining order, we consider two different bargaining orders. Using game theory, we find a perfect Bayesian equilibrium and compute the buyer's expected payoff for each bargaining order. Finally we identify the advantageous bargaining order for the buyer by comparing the expected payoffs obtained under two different bargaining orders. Our results are as follows: the advantageous bargaining order depends on the prior probability of the seller type. However, in general, the buyer should bargain first with the seller whose object is less valuable to the buyer. The basic reason for our result is that the buyer wants to experiment in the first stage to find out the sellers' reservation prices and in doing so, to minimize the experimental cost and maximize potential gain in case of negotiation failure in the first stage. in the first stage.