• Biomedical Science Letters
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• v.22 no.3
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• pp.65-74
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• 2016

The critical aspects of biosafety and bio-containment have been increasingly important in recent years. Biological agents involved in biological research projects at the Nanyang Technological University (NTU) Singapore are usually those with low risks. Biosafety level 2 or BSL 2 laboratories are widely used. However, biosafety measures which refer to the implementation of laboratory practices and procedures, specific construction features of laboratory facilities and safety equipment must be in place to reduce the exposure of laboratory personnel, the public or the environment to potentially infectious agents or other biological hazards. It is also required to pay more attention to laboratory-acquired infections (LAIs) which may occur in research laboratories, clinical laboratories or animal facilities. BSL 2 audit and certification program is implemented as an internal exercise covering laboratories in the university where biological agents are handled or biological research works are carried out. We have put some efforts to raise biosafety standards university-wide in both laboratory infrastructure and laboratory practices to a higher level. Common audit findings are briefly discussed in this presentation.

• Safety and Health at Work
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• v.15 no.1
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• pp.118-122
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• 2024

To understand biosafety's current situation in laboratory animal research and risk factors affecting occupational health. Compliance surveys were conducted by questionnaire via Questionnaire Star (an application app on the Internet) in Chinese. Thirty-nine anonymous questionnaires were collected. The surveyed institution has established 24 types of ABSL (Animal Biosafety Laboratory) and biosafety management organizations and systems equipped with safety equipment. Our study also suggests that the principal of the laboratory establishment fails to perform supervision and inspection responsibilities, the inappropriate design of the animal biosafety laboratory, non-standardized personnel training and health management, non-strict waste management, and insufficient emergency management. The administrative department and work units should address certain safety and occupational health risks in laboratory animal research. The author proposes control strategies based on organizational guarantee, personnel management, emergency management, etc., to help prevent risks and ensure occupational health. Due to regional limitations and small sample size, the results may not be generalisable to all parts of the world. However, some of the key common issuesmay also be present in other regions, sowe believe that this research still has some relevance.

• Safety and Health at Work
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• v.8 no.1
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• pp.49-58
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• 2017

Background: This study determined current status of laboratory biosafety in Nigerian veterinary research facilities. Methods: A questionnaire was developed to obtain information from researchers across Nigeria from July 2014 to July 2015. Information regarding demographics, knowledge of laboratory biosafety, availability and proper use of personal protective equipment (PPE), any priority pathogens researched, attitude on and use of standard laboratory practices, and biosafety awareness was obtained using a numeric scoring system. Data were analyzed with descriptive statistics, and univariate and multivariate logistic regression. Results: A total of 74 participants from 19 facilities completed the questionnaire. General knowledge scores ranged from 3 to 28 (out of 28 possible points), with 94.6% of respondents receiving low scores (scores < mean + 1 standard deviation). Very few (17.6%) reported availability or use PPE. Many participants (63.5%) reported no access to biosafety level (BSL)-1-3 facilities. None reported availability of a BSL-4 facility. Knowledge scores pertaining to biosafety management practices ranged from 0 to 14 (out of 14 possible points) with 47.3% of respondents receiving good scores (scores > mean + 1 standard deviation). Only 16.2% of respondents (from four facilities) reported having biosafety officers. Rabies virus was the most researched pathogen (31.1% of respondents). The majority (71.6%) were unaware of laws guiding biosafety. Researchers [odds ratio (OR) = 18.0; 95% confidence interval (CI): 1.63, 198.5; p = 0.023], especially in BSL-2 (OR = 258.5; 95% CI: 12.71, 5256; p < 0.001) facility of research institute (OR = 25.0; 95% CI: 5.18, 120.6; p < 0.001), are more likely to have adequate access to and properly utilize biosafety devices and PPE. Conclusions: Current knowledge of laboratory biosafety is limited except among a few researchers.

• Korean Journal of Clinical Laboratory Science
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• v.50 no.1
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• pp.71-76
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• 2018

This study examined the status of the laboratory biosafety of researchers in Korea during 03 Jan 2017~25 Mar 2017. Questionnaires were given out to 500 researchers working with pathogens in the laboratory of universities and institutes. According to the results, the respondents showed a high level of awareness but not compliance on the overall biosafety rules and regulations. Regarding the Biosafety facility level, 279 (55.8%) of respondents answered "know" and 221 (44.2%) of respondents answered "no". Despite the insufficient safety equipment and biosafety plans, researchers believed that appropriate safety measures could protect the workers and that their laboratories are safe. In a study involving biosafety education, 80% of the researchers had been trained in laboratory safety and 20% had never received safety education. The need for biosafety education was 66% and the satisfaction rate of education was 46%. These results suggest that the researchers already had experience in biosafety training, but they believed that continuing education is necessary. In addition, there were opinions that the most important thing to improve the biosafety status is to strengthen the training program and education system. In conclusion, it is necessary to develop a better training system for laboratory biosafety regarding the exposure risks.

• International conference on construction engineering and project management
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• 2005.10a
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• pp.587-591
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• 2005

The case of laboratory-acquired SARS Corona virus infection in Taiwan has revealed a number of weaknesses in management, construction, and oversight of laboratories. Also, with the increased demands for bio-safety laboratory, there is an urgent need to develop a uniform and comprehensive guidance for architects and construction engineers in the preparation of design and construction. This research investigates the key elements for designers, engineers, and potential owners in biosafety laboratory design and construction. It defines key elements and determines major relationships and standards that should be adhered to when developing site layout. In addition to layout planning and design guidance of biosafety laboratory, this research also interviews the perspective of architects and survey the state-of-the-art technology in Taiwan. It represents the portraits by site investigation. The purpose of the research is to provide guideline of design and avoid potential future conflict to ensure the critical continuity of functions.

• Journal of the Korea Institute of Military Science and Technology
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• v.18 no.3
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• pp.335-342
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• 2015

Laboratory facilities for biology are designed as biosafety level 1, biosafety level 2, biosafety level 3, and biosafety level 4. Biosafety level designations are based on a composite of the design features, construction, containment facilities, equipment, practice and operation procedures required for working with agents from the various risk groups. Generally, biosafety level 3 means the facility that is appropriate for the experiments using pathogens which can cause serious diseases by aerosol transmission. The biosafety level assigned for the specific work to be done is driven by professional judgement based on a risk assessment, rather than by automatic assignment according to the particular risk group designation of the pathogenic agents to be used. In this paper, we introduced the biosafety level 3 facility operated in ADD(Agency for defense development). It contains the overview of facility, microbiological experiment, animal experiment, decontamination and waste disposal. Biosafety level 3 laboratory in ADD has served the vital role in the research of biological agents and antidote development.

• Proceedings of the SAREK Conference
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• 2008.06a
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• pp.84-89
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• 2008

The biosafety laboratory HVAC control technology may be applied in order to protect contamination of the researcher, supervisor and to prevent diffusion of biological pollution. In this study, a biosafety level, general configuration of control system, differential pressure control, distributed control system and network structure were discussed. These systems able to increase laboratory safety and efficiency of HVAC system.

• Korean Journal of Clinical Laboratory Science
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• v.50 no.2
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• pp.77-84
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• 2018

In Singapore, biosafety and biosecurity measures are controlled by the Biological Agents and Toxins Act (BATA) and other requirements by regulatory agencies. The law prohibits and otherwise regulates the possession, use, import, transhipment, transfer, and transportation of biological agents, inactivated biological agents, and toxins that are of public health concern. The law also defines the facility requirements for high risk biological agents and toxins. The containment facility (BSL 3) is a minimum requirement to handle biological agents that falls under Schedule 1 (Risk Group 3). The Nanyang Technological University School of Biological Sciences Biosafety Level 3 Facility (NTU-SBS BSL 3) was designed specifically for research involving potential hazardous biological materials. The facility requires yearly re-certification by an approved facility certifier to meet the local requirements and international biosafety standards for a containment facility in many instances. On the other hand, most NTU researchers conduct biological projects involving biological agents with low or moderate risk groups (Risk Groups 1 and 2 or biological agents described in schedule 3 and 4 of BATA) and GMOs, which need only a BSL 2 laboratory. BSL 2 laboratories are yet to be legally certified or registered in Singapore. Institutional Biosafety Committee (IBC) identifies the requirements; defines a minimum standard in the safe control of biological risks and registers all BSL 2 laboratories in the NTU. Therefore, under the guidance of the IBC, the University Biosafety and Biosecurity Programme includes the audit and certification program as a unique and an internal exercise to bring NTU biosafety to a higher level.

• Journal of Environmental Health Sciences
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• v.40 no.3
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• pp.187-203
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• 2014

Objectives: As the demand to deal with pathogens in domestic research institutions has expanded and biological accidents have increased, the need for systematic biosafety management in infectious disease laboratories has grown. According to international standards, risk assessment (RA) is required for biosafety management. However, RA criteria have not been clearly established in Korea, so to this end I have attempted to determine RA criteria meeting international levels Methods: In order to provide RA criteria for application, I analyzed the RA criteria in use in the U.S., Europe and at international organizations. In order to ensure the public nature of the RA criteria, I constructed the research model through modified management consulting methodology reflecting the model of Radnor and O'Mahoney. Results: According to the results of the study, existing laboratory biosafety regulations were comparable to domestic laboratory safety laws. Existing laboratory biosafety standards that are designed around risk factors were found to be insufficient. An RA case to be carried out in infectious disease laboratories at the National Institute of Health of KCDC was identified. Conclusion: To establish a systematic risk management system meeting international standards, it was necessary first to harmonize the systems of national and international standards. In addition, in order to provide specific biosafety management on-site, I recognized a need for methodology and planning strategies to discover biosafety management so that it can be carried out as required through the RA of individual laboratories.

• Korean Journal of Clinical Laboratory Science
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• v.53 no.1
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• pp.68-80
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• 2021

An uncertified facility is a facility not certified, as defined in the Biological Agents and Toxins Act (BATA) in Singapore, but has met the requirements of the Ministry of Health to possess First and Fifth Schedule biological agents and toxins. This type of facility is also known as a Biosafety Level 2 Plus (BSL 2+) facility. Registration as an uncertified facility or a BSL 2+ facility requires a certain process and procedure to be sought with the Biosafety Branch of the ministry. This review, shares first-hand knowledge on the journey to achieving registration of the authors' facility. The procedure involved considerable preparation, setting up facility requirements, biosafety precautions, procedures and practices, and training and competence of laboratory users. The ministry conducted a thorough onsite facility audit to ensure that the facility requirements and biosafety procedures and practices were in place. It then issued an approval letter of possession for the first-time use of biological agents and registered the laboratory as an uncertified facility. The expectation is that the comprehensive information shared may be of great benefit to other facilities with similar interests.