• The Journal of Korean Institute of Communications and Information Sciences
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• v.40 no.9
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• pp.1802-1807
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• 2015

The cloud computing service provides physical IT resources to VM instances to users using virtual technique and the users pay cost of VM instances to service provider. The auction model based on cloud computing provides available resources of service provider to users through auction mechanism. The users bid spot instances to process their a job until its deadline time. If the bidding price of users is higher than the spot price, the user will be provided the spot instances by service provider. In this paper, we propose a new bidding strategy to minimize the total cost for job completion. Typically, the users propose bidding price as high as possible to get the spot instances and the spot price get high. we lower the spot price using proposed strategy and minimize the total cost for job completion. To evaluate the performance of our strategy, we compare the spot price and the total cost for job completion with real workload data.

• The Transactions of The Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers
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• v.58 no.4
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• pp.694-699
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• 2009

Combined cycle plants which feature distinct advantages for power generation such as fast response, high efficiency, environmental friendliness, fuel flexiblity represent the majority of new generating plant installations across the globe. Combined cycle plants have different operating modes where the operating parameters can differ greatly depending which mode is operating at the time. This paper addresses the bidding strategy model of combined cycle plants in a competitive electricity market by using a characteristic of multiple operating modes of combined cycle plants. Simulation results of case studies show that an operating mode among multiple ones is selected strategically in generation bidding for more profit of generation company.

• The Transactions of the Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers A
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• v.55 no.9
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• pp.392-398
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• 2006

Maintenance scheduling of generating units (MSU) has strategic dimension in an oligopolistic market. Strategic MSU of gencos can affect a market power through capacity withdrawal which is related to bidding strategy in an generation wholesale market. This paper presents a combined framework that models the interrelation between competitive bidding and strategic MSU. The combined game model is represented as some sub-optimization problems of a market operator (MO) and gencos, that should be solved through bi-level optimization scheme. The gradient method with dual variables is also adopted to calculate a Nash Equilibrium (NE) by an iterative update technique in this paper. Illustrative numerical example shows that NE of a supply function equilibrium is obtained properly by using proposed solution technique. The MSU made by MO is compared with that by each genco and that under perfect competition market.

• Journal of the Korean Operations Research and Management Science Society
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• v.9 no.2
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• pp.9-14
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• 1984

The competitive bidding model with the reserve price has been studied by Riley and Samuelson. We extend their studies to the competitive model with the reserve price and the entry fee. First we present the bidder's optimal strategy, the winner's expected profit, the auctioner's expected revenue in the first-price sealed bidding model, and next those in the second-price sealed bidding model.

• Proceedings of the KIEE Conference
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• 2001.11b
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• pp.63-66
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• 2001

In the Poolco model, the bidding game is executed periodically. The player participating to the bidding game accumulates the information of others' strategies and payoffs through the repeated process. Thereby, he is able to map out how he gets his maximum profit, and proceed to the optimal strategy region. This paper shows the algorithm for a player to determine his strategy in t period based the information of the game results of t-1, t-2 period. And this algorithm can be formulated by using Dynamic game theory.

• Journal of KIISE:Software and Applications
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• v.32 no.11
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• pp.1099-1110
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• 2005

As auctions become popular, developing good agent bidding strategies has been an important focus in agent-based electronic commerce research. Especially for the continuous double auctions where no single dominant strategy is known, the agent bidding strategy has practical significance. This paper introduces an adaptive agent strategy for the countinuous double auction. The central idea is to let the agent figure out at run time when the sophisticated strategy (called the p-strategy) is beneficial and when a simpler strategy is better. Balance between exploration and exploitation is achieved by using a heuristic exploration function that trades off the expected profits and the number of tries of each strategy. We have experimentally evaluated the performance of the adaptive strategy in a wide variety of environments. The experiment results indicate that the adaptive strategy outperforms the plain p-strategy when the p-strategy performs poorly, while it performs similar to the p-strategy when the p-strategy dominates the other simple strategies.

• Journal of the Korean Operations Research and Management Science Society
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• v.11 no.2
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• pp.27-36
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• 1986

This paper deals with four types of multiple unit simultaneous auctions such as the discriminating. uniform-price, lowest accepted-price, and progressive auctions. These auctions have been studied by Vickrey, Ortega-Reichert, Herris and Raviv and so forth. In this paper, their studies are extended to the case with a reserve price and an entry fee, and then the equilibrium bidding strategy are presented. Further, those are analyzed with respect to the change of a reserve price, an entry fee, and the number of bidders and objects.

• KSII Transactions on Internet and Information Systems (TIIS)
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• v.11 no.3
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• pp.1336-1356
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• 2017

The spectrum scarcity crisis has resulted in a shortage of resources for many emerging wireless services, and research on dynamic spectrum management has been used to solve this problem. Game theory can allocate resources to users in an economic way through market competition. In this paper, we propose a bidding game-based spectrum allocation mechanism in cognitive radio network. In our framework, primary networks provide heterogeneous wireless service and different numbers of channels, while secondary users have diverse bandwidth demands for transmission. Considering the features of traffic and QoS demands, we design a weighted interference graph-based grouping algorithm to divide users into several groups and construct the non-interference user-set in the first step. In the second step, we propose the dynamic bidding game-based spectrum allocation strategy; we analyze both buyer's and seller's revenue and determine the best allocation strategy. We also prove that our mechanism can achieve balanced pricing schema in competition. Theoretical and simulation results show that our strategy provides a feasible solution to improve spectrum utilization, can maximize overall utility and guarantee users' individual rationality.

• International conference on construction engineering and project management
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• 2022.06a
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• pp.11-17
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• 2022

Design-bid-build (DBB) is the most common project delivery method among highway projects. State Highway Agencies (SHAs) usually apply a low-bid approach to select contractors for their DBB projects. In this approach, the Federal Highway Agency suggests SHAs heighten contractors' competition to lower bid prices. However, these attempts may become ineffective due to collusive bidding arrangements among certain contractors. One common strategy is the rotation of winning bidders of a group of contractors who bid on many of the same projects. These arrangements may also be specific to a particular region or vary in time. Despite the practices' adverse effects on bidding outcomes, an effective model to detect red-flag bidding patterns is lacking. This study fills the gap by proposing a novel framework that utilizes pattern mining techniques and statistical tests for unusual pattern detection. A case study with historical data from an SHA is conducted to illustrate the proposed framework.

• Proceedings of the Korea Inteligent Information System Society Conference
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• 2001.01a
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• pp.83-88
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• 2001

To get the items that a buyer wants in Internet auction. he must search for the items through several auction sites. When the bidding starts, he(the buyer) needs to connect to these auction sites frequently so that he can monitor the bid stats and re-bid. A reserve-price auction reduces the number of connections, but this limits the user's bidding strategy. Another problem is equity between the buyer and the seller. Both the buyer and the seller should profit together within proper limits. In this paper, we propose an auction agent system using a collaborative mobile agent and a brokering mechanism called MoCAAS (Mobile Collaborative Auction Agent System), which mediates between the buyer and the seller and executes bidding asynchronously and autonomously. This reduces connection costs. offers more intelligent bidding and solves the equity problem.