• KIEE International Transactions on Power Engineering
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• v.3A no.1
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• pp.47-52
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• 2003

This paper presents a schematic process based on the method of eliminating dominated strategies to obtain the optimal bidding strategy Pursuing the Nash equilibrium Point. The Proposed approach is demonstrated for a bidding game in a generation competitive market with 2-dimensional bidding strategy vectors constituting a price-quantity strategy curve.

• Proceedings of the KIEE Conference
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• 2001.11b
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• pp.60-62
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• 2001

This paper shows the optimal bidding strategy determination method using Nash equilibrium concept by defining bidding strategy vector. This vector is 2-dimension vector whose components are generation amount and generation cost. Thereby we are able to make all possible strategies and their's payoff table. And then we erase dominated strategies one by one so that we obtain Nash equilibrium, the optimal bidding strategy of generation bidding game.

• The Transactions of the Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers A
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• v.51 no.4
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• pp.202-208
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• 2002

In a dynamic game where the players move in a periodical sequence, each player observes the strategy of the others. So the players who move later in a game get to know the moves of others having made before them. Those who move earlier must take this into account in devising their optimal strategy. In the Poolco model, the bidding game is executed periodically. The player participating in the bidding game accumulates the information of its own and others'strategies, and payoffs through the repeated bidding process. Thereby, the players in this game would be able to map out how get the maximum profit, and get closer to the optimal strategy. This paper presents a mathematical modeling for a player to determine his or her optimal strategy at period T, based on the information acquired from the previous rounds for the periods, T-1, T-2, and so on. The proposed modeling is demonstrated with a dynamic fame theory.

• Journal of the military operations research society of Korea
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• v.14 no.1
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• pp.63-83
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• 1988

This study is concerned with the equilibrium bidding strategy and the optimal auction design of sequential auction with a reserve price and an entry fee. It is assumed that each bidder has a fixed reservation value and draws the reservation values of other bidders independently in the same distribution and may obtain at most one object to be sold. Under such assumptions, the sequential auction will be analyzed by the game theoretic approach. The purpose of this paper is, in the sequential auction, to find the equilibrium bidding strategy and to design the optimal auction under the equilibrium bidding strategy. The equilibrium bidding strategy and the optimal auction design are further analyzed with respect to change of the reserve price, the entry fee, and the number of bidders and objects. Specially, the auctioneer's expected revenue for each auction is obtained and analyzed.

• Journal of the military operations research society of Korea
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• v.13 no.2
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• pp.63-83
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• 1987

This study is concerned with the equilibrium bidding strategy and the optimal auction design of sequential auction with a reserve price and an entry fee. It is assumed that each bidder has a fixed reservation value and draws the reservation values of other bidders independently in the same distribution and may obtain at most one object to be sold. Under such assumptions, the sequential auction will be analyzed by the game theoretic approach. The purpose of this paper is, in the sequential auction, to find the equilibrium bidding strategy and to design the optimal auction under the equilibrium bidding strategy. The equilibrium bidding strategy and the optimal auction design are further analyzed with respect to change of the reserve price, the entry fee, and the number of bidders and objects. Specially, the auctioneer's expected revenue for each auction is obtained and analyzed.

• Proceedings of the KIEE Conference
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• 2002.11b
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• pp.369-371
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• 2002

In a competitive electricity market, the transactions of the electric power can be accomplished through the bidding which is submitted by suppliers and consumers. It is essential that the optimal decision for the bidding is required to take a dominant position in the competition. Therefore, in this paper we presents bidding variables from bidding curves of suppliers and consumers and proposes the algorithm of an optimal bidding strategy using optimal power flow. Furthermore, the variation of the optimal bidding is investigated through numerical studies.

• The Transactions of the Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers A
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• v.51 no.12
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• pp.597-602
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• 2002

The restructuring of power industry is still going on all over the world for last several decades. Many kinds of restructuring model have been studied, proposed, and applied. Among those models, power pool is more popular than other. This paper assumes the power pool market structure having competitive generation sector, and a new method is presented to build a bidding strategy in that market. The utilities participating in the market have the perfect information of their cost and price functions, but they don't know which strategy to be chosen by others. To define one's strategy as a vector, we make utility's cost/price functions into discrete step functions. An utility knows only his own strategy, so he estimates the other's cost/price functions into discrete step functions. An utility knows only his own strategy, so he estimates the other's strategy using Nash equilibrium or stochastic methods. And he also has to forecast the system demand. According to this forecasting result, his payoffs can be changed. Considering these all conditions, we formulate a bidding game problem and apply noncooperative game theory to that problem for the optimal strategy or solution. Some restrictive assumption are added for simplification of solving process. A numerical example is given in Case Study to show essential features and concrete results of this approach.

• Proceedings of the KIEE Conference
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• 2001.11b
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• pp.411-413
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• 2001

This paper discusses on an optimal bidding strategy of a generator in a competitive electricity spot market using the information of predicted spot price with some assumptions. Optimal bidding strategy of a generator is derived by solving a profit-maximizing optimization problem with a constraint where the forecasted spot price is treated as a constant value. The main advantage of this methodology is that the optimal bidding strategy of each generator can be obtained independently where the gaming characteristics of generators are merged into the forecasted spot price.

• The Transactions of the Korea Information Processing Society
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• v.7 no.5S
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• pp.1620-1628
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• 2000

Existing internet auction systems have adopted the form which gives a win to the auction bidder who proposes the top bid price for the goods posted on the auction board. But they haven't been satisfying the automatical one-step processing for user's convenience because they must require continuous care of user for bidding and checking as well as neglecting the convenience of user interface while participating in the electronic bidding system. The AuctionBot system of Michigan Univ. is known as the representative internet auction system. It has merit allowing the various kids of bidding. But it does not support automatic a process which can replaces what user has to do using an agent. To improve this kind of user interface, we propose an automatic bidding price strategy algorithm which composes the auction system using agent and design for auto-bidding system using agent so that I can replace user's bidding activity. This mechanism gives an auction system the efficient bidding price strategy.

• Architectural research
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• v.13 no.3
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• pp.49-56
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• 2011

Competitive bidding in construction is concerned with contractors making strategic decisions in respect of determination of bid price if contractors opt to bid. This study presents a strategy model for deciding optimum tender price with reflecting appropriate profit in competitive bidding using Bayesian regression analysis (BRA). The purpose of the developed model is to help contractors to secure suitable profitability by predicting the actual profit based on key variables. They may affect construction cost at bidding phase, ultimately which help contractors to secure high quality output. The model was tested empirically by application to a bidding dataset collected from a large South Korea contractor. BRA allows contractors to estimate more accurate actual profit by reflecting not only objective information but also subjective experiences and judgments. Consequently, the model can contribute to improvement of decision-making process for setting an optimum tender price.