• Title/Summary/Keyword: Bidders

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Prediction Models on Internet Auctions

  • Hong, Chong-Sun;Song, Ki-Yong
    • Journal of the Korean Data and Information Science Society
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    • v.17 no.3
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    • pp.795-804
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    • 2006
  • Most internet auction sites open to users the bid history with the ascending order of bid amounts. Whereas eBay.com presents second bid prices, auction.co.kr provides highest bid prices. In this paper, the bidhistory is arranged according to the passage of tim, which can help to understand the situations and trends of bid prices, especially for multiple auctions. This manipulated data can be visualized by using profile plots. The successful bid prices could be estimated based on some prediction models with appropriate prior informations. Both sellers and bidders can be provided useful informations with these statistical analyses, and then fair online auctions in Korea will grow actively and rapidly.

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Optimal Auction Design and All the Winners' Expected Profit in the Multiple Unit Auction (다품목단일입찰경매의 최적경매설계와 전체낙찰자기대이익)

  • Kim, Yeo-Geun;Park, Sun-Dal
    • Journal of Korean Institute of Industrial Engineers
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    • v.13 no.1
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    • pp.31-38
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    • 1987
  • This paper is concerned with the multiple unit auction under the following assumptions: 1) multiple identical objects are to be sold to the highest bidders, but a bidder may obtain at most one, 2) each bidder has a fixed reservation value and draws his reservation value independently in the same distribution, 3) The greater a bidder's reservation value is, the more a bidder will bid for the object, and 4) a bidder will bid when his expected profit is more than zero. The purpose of this paper is to design the optimal auctions, in terms of the reserve price and entry fee, that can be applied in any types of multiple unit auctions under the above assumptions. Further, auctioneer's expected revenue and profit, and all the winners' expected profit are analyzed.

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A New Dynamic Auction Mechanism in the Supply Chain: N-Bilateral Optimized Combinatorial Auction (N-BOCA)

  • Choi, Jin-Ho;Chang, Yong-Sik;Han, In-Goo
    • Proceedings of the Korea Inteligent Information System Society Conference
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    • 2005.11a
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    • pp.379-390
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    • 2005
  • In this paper, we introduce a new combinatorial auction mechanism - N-Bilateral Optimized Combinatorial Auction (N-BOCA). N-BOCA is a flexible iterative combinatorial auction model that offers optimized trading for multi-suppliers and multi-purchasers in the supply chain. We design the N-BOCA system from the perspectives of architecture, protocol, and trading strategy. Under the given N-BOCA architecture and protocol, auctioneers and bidders have diverse decision strategies for winner determination. This needs flexible modeling environments. Hence, we propose an optimization modeling agent for bid and auctioneer selection. The agent has the capability to automatic model formulation for Integer Programming modeling. Finally, we show the viability of N-BOCA through prototype and experiments. The results say both higher allocation efficiency and effectiveness compared with I-to-N general combinatorial auction mechanisms.

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A Secure Auction Protocol without Any Dispute

  • Ha, Jung-Hoon;Kwak, Dong-Jin;Moon, Sang-Jae
    • Proceedings of the Korea Institutes of Information Security and Cryptology Conference
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    • 2003.12a
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    • pp.518-522
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    • 2003
  • We propose a new auction protocol scheme that uses the publicly verifiable secret sharing (PVSS) scheme. Unlike the existing scheme where a verifiable encryption scheme is employed when there is a dispute between a bidder and the auctioneer, the proposed scheme essentially removes the potential of a dispute. In addition, it has a robust registration phase and any entities participating in or observing the auction can verify the correctness of the auction process. The manager does not directly chooses the private key for the bidders, but only verifies the correctness between the private key and the public key, thereby improving the security, such as a bid submission of a malicious manager using the private key of a bidder.

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Reliability Metrics Design and Verification for the Acquisition of Small and Mid-Sized Web Application (중소규모 웹어플리케이션 개발업체 신뢰성평가를 위한 신뢰도 메트릭의 설계 및 유효성 검증)

  • Choi, Kwoung-Hee;Rhew, Sung-Yul
    • Asia pacific journal of information systems
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    • v.16 no.3
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    • pp.193-203
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    • 2006
  • Software reliability prediction is a statistical method to put in place a timely software development practice useful for objective assessment of bidders. The current study suggests one research method that enables reliability assessment of such previous projects by studying user satisfaction and project management history. If incorporated into the existing acquisition process, the reliability assessment method will further enhance objectivity and accuracy in bidder selection process. The GQM(Goal Question Metric) paradigm was used to identify assessment metrics for bidder evaluation and questionnaires were collected from users to create user satisfaction indexes. In addition, 'weight of evidence', the most appropriate categorical method, was used to isolate attributes of each variable that may contribute to reliability assessment.

COMPETITOR ANALYSIS IN CONSTRUCTION BIDDING

  • B. L. Oo
    • International conference on construction engineering and project management
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    • 2009.05a
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    • pp.161-167
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    • 2009
  • This paper offers a competitor analysis model for use by contractors as parts of more informed approach in identifying key competitors, and as a basis for formulating bidding strategies. Linear mixed model approach is used in measuring competitiveness between bids (by using bid competitiveness percentage) according to: (i) project size, (ii) work sector; (iii) work nature; and (iv) number of bidders. The model was tested empirically by application to a bidding dataset obtained from a large Hong Kong contractor. Allowing for heterogeneity across competing contractors (i.e. with the model parameters that varied across contractors), the results indicate that competitiveness in bidding of this contractor is generally greater than the majority of his competitors.

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Assessing Contractor Competition in Competitive Bidding for Highway Construction Projects Using Network Analysis

  • Le, Chau;Arya, Minakshi;Moriyani, Muhammad Ali;Le, Tuyen
    • International conference on construction engineering and project management
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    • 2022.06a
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    • pp.18-24
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    • 2022
  • State highway agencies (SHAs) typically apply a competitive procurement procedure to select contractors for their design-bid-build projects. Since the level of competition affects construction bid prices and project outcomes, the Federal Highway Agency (FHWA) suggests SHAs seek ways to improve competition among contractors continuously. However, they rarely conduct an empirical assessment of the current competition level necessary to identify room for improvement. Besides the number of bidders on a project, other factors such as winning or losing rates among the contractors in previous projects can also indicate the degree of competition; only a few contractors may have won the majority of the projects in a specific region. However, few studies have investigated such factors. This paper proposes a network analysis-based approach to evaluating contractor competition levels of highway projects using historical bid tabulation data. The proposed method provides insights into overall competition levels, the determination of competitive contractors, and winning rate distribution among contractors.

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Detecting Red-Flag Bidding Patterns in Low-Bid Procurement for Highway Projects with Pattern Mining

  • Le, Chau;Nguyen, Trang;Le, Tuyen
    • International conference on construction engineering and project management
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    • 2022.06a
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    • pp.11-17
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    • 2022
  • Design-bid-build (DBB) is the most common project delivery method among highway projects. State Highway Agencies (SHAs) usually apply a low-bid approach to select contractors for their DBB projects. In this approach, the Federal Highway Agency suggests SHAs heighten contractors' competition to lower bid prices. However, these attempts may become ineffective due to collusive bidding arrangements among certain contractors. One common strategy is the rotation of winning bidders of a group of contractors who bid on many of the same projects. These arrangements may also be specific to a particular region or vary in time. Despite the practices' adverse effects on bidding outcomes, an effective model to detect red-flag bidding patterns is lacking. This study fills the gap by proposing a novel framework that utilizes pattern mining techniques and statistical tests for unusual pattern detection. A case study with historical data from an SHA is conducted to illustrate the proposed framework.

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Effects of the Methods for Generating and Selecting Multiple Preliminary Prices on Budget Prices in Bidding Processes (복수예비가격 생성 및 추첨방법이 예정가격에 미치는 영향)

  • Kang, Minseok;Riew, Moon Charn
    • Journal of the Korea Institute of Building Construction
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    • v.15 no.1
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    • pp.89-97
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    • 2015
  • In bidding processes conducted by government agencies, local governments or public agencies, budget prices are critical to both ordering bodies and bidders since budget prices are bases for selecting a successful bidder. Since a high budget price goes against ordering bodies and a low one goes against bidders, most ordering bodies adopt a system using multiple preliminary prices for determining a budget price to ensure fair and transparent manners. Discussed are how budget prices change depending on the methods of sampling 15 preliminary prices and the methods of sampling 4 out of 15 prices. Computer simulation is conducted to analyze budget prices for various methods to determine multiple preliminary prices. It is more likely for budget prices to be close to base prices when splitting a range of generating preliminary prices into 15 intervals and taking 4 preliminary prices from 15 intervals than when taking 4 preliminary prices from a whole range. In cases when splitting a range of generating preliminary prices, if we take 2 preliminary prices out of intervals above 100% and take 2 out of intervals below 100%, the expected budget prices are equal to a base price and the standard deviations are about half in comparison with those when taking 4 out of 15 intervals.

External Factors Influencing Bid/No-Bid Decision for Supervision Consultant Service: A Case of Construction Project in Hanoi

  • HA, Son Tung;TRAN, Manh Linh;HOANG, Huy Viet;TRAN, Van Hung
    • The Journal of Asian Finance, Economics and Business
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    • v.7 no.6
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    • pp.417-425
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    • 2020
  • This paper investigates the potential impact of external factors on bid/no-bid decision for supervision consultant service on construction project in Hanoi, the capital of Vietnam. The data used in this study are secondary data taken from annual reports and sourced from the Department of Public Procurement, Ministry of Planning and Investment in Hanoi. Besides, to identify the impact of external factors on bid/no-bid decision for supervision consultant service on construction project in Hanoi, the study collected data from 272 qualified questionnaires from bidders doing business in Hanoi. Cronbach's Alpha, EFA and regression model are used to explore the impact of each independent variable on bid/no-bid decision for supervision consultant service on construction project. The results show that three external determinants, including Project characteristic (PC), Legal codes (LC) and Competition (C) are affecting bid/no-bid decision for supervision consultant service on construction project in Hanoi. Among them, Project characteristic (PC) and Legal codes (LC) have positive relationships with bid/no-bid decision for supervision consultant service on construction project, whereas Competition (C) negatively affects bid/no-bid decision for supervision consultant service on construction project. It means the more contractors actually participate in a bid, the less bid/ no-bid decisions are made.