• Journal of Communications and Networks
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• 제12권2호
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• pp.114-121
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• 2010

In this paper, an auctioning strategy is proposed for cellular networks that ensures net energy savings. The pricing scheme, in conjunction with a two dimensional bid structure, incentivizes cooperation at the terminal nodes for better interference management at receivers and for cooperative relaying. It is shown that, for the proposed auctioning strategy, network operators are guaranteed revenue gains, mobile nodes' dominant strategy is to bid their true valuation of their energy resources, and overall effective energy gains occur under the assumption of a reserve price for bidding. Simulation results show that significant energy savings can be achieved by employing this auctioning mechanism for a 3G cellular set-up.

• Architectural research
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• 제13권3호
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• pp.49-56
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• 2011

Competitive bidding in construction is concerned with contractors making strategic decisions in respect of determination of bid price if contractors opt to bid. This study presents a strategy model for deciding optimum tender price with reflecting appropriate profit in competitive bidding using Bayesian regression analysis (BRA). The purpose of the developed model is to help contractors to secure suitable profitability by predicting the actual profit based on key variables. They may affect construction cost at bidding phase, ultimately which help contractors to secure high quality output. The model was tested empirically by application to a bidding dataset collected from a large South Korea contractor. BRA allows contractors to estimate more accurate actual profit by reflecting not only objective information but also subjective experiences and judgments. Consequently, the model can contribute to improvement of decision-making process for setting an optimum tender price.

• 한국지능정보시스템학회:학술대회논문집
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• 한국지능정보시스템학회 2001년도 The Pacific Aisan Confrence On Intelligent Systems 2001
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• pp.78-82
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• 2001

Most of current Internet auction systems are simple server programs that partly automated the function of the conventional auction house. These system do not provide sufficient independence, distribution and parallelism between the functions of the conventional auction house. In there are automated by server program, but still users need to execute a repetitive task to monitor the dynamic progress of a certain auction, decide proper bid price, and submit the bid. Another problem is that they support only single as English auction and Dutch auction, but they do not support the double auctions are superior to the single auction with respect to speed., efficiency, and the fair distribution of profit. In this paper, we present design and implement of an agent-based continuous double auction system, called CoDABot, in order to mitigate the limitations of current auctions system. CoDABot supports continuous double auction, provides various bidding agent for users to select, and has been implemented into a multi-agent system that realize more independent, distributed, and parallel subsystems.

• 한국지능정보시스템학회:학술대회논문집
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• 한국지능정보시스템학회 2001년도 The Pacific Aisan Confrence On Intelligent Systems 2001
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• pp.73-77
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• 2001

In this paper, we propose a virtual action system based on information agents, We call the system the MultiHammer, MultiHammer can be used for studying and analyzing online actions. MuiltiHammer provides functions of implement-ing a meta online action site and an experiment environ-ment. We have been using MultiHammer as an experiment as an experiment environment for BiddinBot. BiddingBot aims at assisting users to bid simultaneously in multiple online auctions. In order to bid simultaneously in multiple online auctions. In order to analyze the behavior of BiddngBot, we need to pur-chase a lot of items. It is hard for us to prepare a lot of fund to show usability and advantage of BiddingBot. MultiHam-mer enables us to effectively analyze the behavior of BiddingBot. MultiHammer consists of three types of agents for information collecting data storing and auctioning. Agents for information wrappers. To make agent work as wrarp-pers, we heed to realize software modules for each online action site. Implementing these modules reguires a lot of time and patience. To address this problem, we designed a support mechanism for developing the modules. Agents for data storing record the data gathered by agents for informa-tion collecting. Agents for auctioning provide online services using data recorded by agents for data storing. By recording the activities in auction sites. MultiHammer can recreate any situation and trace auction for experimentation, Users can participate in virtual using the same information in real online auctions. Users also participate in real auc-tions via wrapper agents for information collecting

• 한국콘텐츠학회논문지
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• 제19권7호
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• pp.36-46
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• 2019

주식시장이 효율적이라면 아무리 잘 고안된 투자전략이라도 시장의 평균 수익을 장기적으로 초과하는 것은 어렵다. 본 연구의 목적은 일부 시장 참여자들 사이에 회자되고 있는 호가잔량 정보효과를 이용하여 장기적으로 높은 수익을 얻을 수 있는지를 실증 분석하는데 있다. 이를 위하여 호가잔량정보를 이용하는 데이트레이딩 전략을 제안하고, 2001년부터 2018년까지의 코스피200 주가지수선물시장에 적용하여 과연 꾸준하게 돈을 벌 수 있는지를 분석하였다. 구체적으로 매수강도지수가 50% 이상이면 가격이 상승할 것으로 예상하고, 반대로 매수강도지수가 50% 미만이면 가격이 하락할 것으로 예상하여 각각 매수포지션과 매도포지션을 진입하여 수익성을 검증하였다. 실증분석 결과는 거래에 수반되는 거래비용을 제하고도 연 평균 71% 이상의 매우 높은 수익을 보여주고 있다. 발생된 수익 역시 분석 기간 전체에서 장기적, 안정적으로 나타나고 있음을 밝혔다. 유전자알고리즘을 이용하여 제안된 투자전략의 수익성을 개선함으로서, 호가잔량정보를 이용하는 투자자들에게 많은 도움이 될 것으로 기대된다.

• 한국정보처리학회:학술대회논문집
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• 한국정보처리학회 2000년도 제13회 춘계학술대회 및 임시총회 학술발표 논문집
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• pp.111-116
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• 2000

경매는 인간에 의해 만들어진 복잡한 형태 시장이다. 전자상거래의 확산과 더불어, 많은 인터넷 경매 사이트가 나오고, 최근 경매의 자동화에 대한 연구가 진행 중에 있다. 인간 대신, 에이전트는 상품의 검색, 입찰등을 대신 수행하게 된다. 그러나, 현재의 입찰 알고리즘은 효율적이지 못하다. 본 연구는 통계적 방법을 이용하여 현재의 알고리즘보다 효율적인 알고리즘을 만들고자 한다.

• 정보처리학회논문지D
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• 제9D권5호
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• pp.955-962
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• 2002

최근에 전자상거래가 보편화되면서 전자경매를 통한 거래가 급증하고 있다. 그러나, 기존 전자경매 시스템들은 낙찰 예정가 결정을 판매자에게만 의존하고 있으므로, 물품의 낙찰가가 낮게 결정되거나 유찰되는 경우가 많다. 본 논문에서는 이러한 문제점을 해결하고자, 과거의 경매 기록과 인터넷 전자상거래 사이트의 가격 정보로부터 사례 유사도를 적용하여 적합한 낙찰 예정가를 자동으로 생성하고 이를 판매자에게 추천하는 시스템을 제안한다. 성능실험 결과 추천된 낙찰 예정가를 사용할 경우 지나치게 높은 낙찰 예정가로 인한 유찰을 줄임으로써 경매 성공률이 향상될 뿐만 아니라, 물품에 대한 낮은 평가를 방지할 수 있음을 보인다. 또한, 본 논문에서는 낙찰 예정가 자동 생성에이전트를 이용하여 인터넷 경매 시스템을 설계 및 구현한다.

• 전기학회논문지
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• 제58권3호
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• pp.455-461
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• 2009

This paper proposes Direct Load Control(DLC) operation scheme using a bidding system and the methodology to value proper quantity decided by the DLC program, which is a kind of resources for stabilization of electricity market price during peak times by managing consumer electricity demand. Since DLC program in Korea is based on the contract with the customers participating in this program, it is difficult to anticipate voluntary participation. That is, incentive for participants in DLC program is insufficient. To cope with this point, it is necessary to develop a new market mechanism and market compatible operation scheme for DLC programs. DLC market mechanism is deemed to be equipped with iterative bidding system, independent operation from energy market, and interactive with bidding information on energy market. With this market mechanism, it is important to find the optimal operation point of DLC allowing for the factors of stabilizing the electricity market price and compensating DLC implementation. This paper focuses on the mathematical approaches for the bid-based DLC operation scheme and examines several scenarios for the following technical justifications: 1) stabilization of electricity market price during peak times, 2) elasticity of demand.

• 한국경영과학회:학술대회논문집
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• 한국경영과학회 2004년도 추계학술대회 및 정기총회
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• pp.68-98
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• 2004

Although the internet is useful for transferring information, Internet auction environments make fraud more attractive to offenders because the chance of detection and punishment are decreased. One of fraud is phantom transaction which is a colluding transaction by the buyer and seller to commit illegal discounting of credit card. They pretend to fulfill the transaction paid by credit card, without actual selling products, and the seller receives cash from credit card corporations. Then seller lends it out buyer with quite high interest rate whose credit score is so bad that he cannot borrow money from anywhere. The purpose of this study is to empirically investigate the factors to detect of the phantom transaction in online auction. Based up on the studies that explored behaviors of buyers and sellers in online auction, bidding numbers, bid increments, sellers' credit, auction length, and starting bids were suggested as independent variables. We developed an Internet-based data collection software agent and collect data on transactions of notebook computers each of which winning bid was over 1,000,000 won. Data analysis with logistic regression model revealed that starting bids, sellers' credit, and auction length were significant in detecting the phantom transaction.

• 경영과학
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• 제21권2호
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• pp.273-289
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• 2004

Although the Internet is useful for transferring information, Internet auction environments make fraud more attractive to offenders, because the chance of detection and punishment is decreased. One of these frauds is the phantom transaction, which is a colluding transaction by the buyer and seller to commit the illegal discounting of a credit card. They pretend to fulfill the transaction paid by credit card, without actually selling products, and the seller receives cash from the credit card corporations. Then the seller lends it out with quite a high interest rate to the buyer, whose credit rating is so poor that he cannot borrow money from anywhere else. The purpose of this study is to empirically investigate the factors necessary to detect phantom transactions in an online auction. Based upon studies that have explored the behaviors of buyers and sellers in online auctions, the following have been suggested as independent variables: bidding numbers, bid increments, sellers' credit, auction lengths, and starting bids. In this study. we developed Internet-based data collection software and collected data on transactions of notebook computers, each of which had a winning bid of over W one million. Data analysis with a logistic regression model revealed that starting bids, sellers' credit, and auction length were significant in detecting the phantom transactions.