• Journal of the Korean Operations Research and Management Science Society
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• v.32 no.1
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• pp.27-51
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• 2007

We analyze the effects of the sellers' strateiges on the final bid prices in internet auctions. We focus on the following three strategies of the seller adoption of the buy-price, setting the starting bid price, and adoption of 'the effective fixed price' which means that the starting bid price is set near the buy-price. In addition, the number of units sold single-unit or multi-unit, and item characteristics, such as whether the food is a search product (functional product) or an experience product (non-functional product), are also considered. We use real data on bids for 4 items from an online auction site. We find that in an auction for experience products when sold as single units, adopting the buy-price strategy raises the final bid price. We also find that in multi-unit auctions, starting the auction at 'the effective fixed price' raises the final bid price.

• Journal of Information Technology Applications and Management
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• v.11 no.3
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• pp.23-33
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• 2004

Internet bid systems have been widely used recently. In those systems, the bid price is provided by the seller. When the bid price is set too high compared with the normal price, the successful bid rate can be decreased. Otherwise, when it is set too low based on inaccurate information, it can result in a successful bid with no profit at all. To resolve this problem, we propose an agent that automatically generates bid prices for sellers based on various costing methods such as the high-low point method, the scatter diagram method, and the learning curve method. Through performance experiments, we have found that the number of successful bids with appropriate profit can be increased using the bid pricing agent. Among the costing methods, the learning curve method has shown the best performance. Also, we discuss about how to design and implement the bid pricing agent.

• International conference on construction engineering and project management
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• 2022.06a
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• pp.11-17
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• 2022

Design-bid-build (DBB) is the most common project delivery method among highway projects. State Highway Agencies (SHAs) usually apply a low-bid approach to select contractors for their DBB projects. In this approach, the Federal Highway Agency suggests SHAs heighten contractors' competition to lower bid prices. However, these attempts may become ineffective due to collusive bidding arrangements among certain contractors. One common strategy is the rotation of winning bidders of a group of contractors who bid on many of the same projects. These arrangements may also be specific to a particular region or vary in time. Despite the practices' adverse effects on bidding outcomes, an effective model to detect red-flag bidding patterns is lacking. This study fills the gap by proposing a novel framework that utilizes pattern mining techniques and statistical tests for unusual pattern detection. A case study with historical data from an SHA is conducted to illustrate the proposed framework.

• Journal of Communications and Networks
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• v.12 no.2
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• pp.114-121
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• 2010

In this paper, an auctioning strategy is proposed for cellular networks that ensures net energy savings. The pricing scheme, in conjunction with a two dimensional bid structure, incentivizes cooperation at the terminal nodes for better interference management at receivers and for cooperative relaying. It is shown that, for the proposed auctioning strategy, network operators are guaranteed revenue gains, mobile nodes' dominant strategy is to bid their true valuation of their energy resources, and overall effective energy gains occur under the assumption of a reserve price for bidding. Simulation results show that significant energy savings can be achieved by employing this auctioning mechanism for a 3G cellular set-up.

• The Journal of the Korea Contents Association
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• v.19 no.7
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• pp.36-46
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• 2019

If stock market is efficient, any well-devised trading rule can't consistently outperform the average stock market returns. This study aims to verify whether the strategy based on bid-ask volume information can beat the stock market. I suggested a day trading strategy using order imbalance indicator and empirically analyzed its profitability with the KOSPI 200 index futures data from 2001 to 2018. Entry rules are as follows: If BSI is over 50%, enter buy order, otherwise enter sell order, assuming that stock price rises after BSI is over 50% and stock price falls after BSI is less than 50%. The empirical results showed that the suggested trading strategy generated very high trading profit, that is, its annual return runs to minimum 71% per annum even after the transaction costs. The profit was generated consistently during 18 years. This study also improved the suggested trading strategy applying the genetic algorithm, which may help the market practitioners who trade the KOSPI 200 index futures.

• Management Science and Financial Engineering
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• v.18 no.2
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• pp.1-4
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• 2012

We study optimal trading strategy of a market maker with stock inventory. Following Avellaneda and Stoikov (2008), we assume the stock price follows a normal distribution. However, we take a constant expected rate of the stock return and assume that the stock volatility is an inverse function of the stock price level. We show that the optimal bid-ask spread of the market maker is wider for a higher expected rate of stock returns.

• Architectural research
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• v.13 no.3
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• pp.49-56
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• 2011

Competitive bidding in construction is concerned with contractors making strategic decisions in respect of determination of bid price if contractors opt to bid. This study presents a strategy model for deciding optimum tender price with reflecting appropriate profit in competitive bidding using Bayesian regression analysis (BRA). The purpose of the developed model is to help contractors to secure suitable profitability by predicting the actual profit based on key variables. They may affect construction cost at bidding phase, ultimately which help contractors to secure high quality output. The model was tested empirically by application to a bidding dataset collected from a large South Korea contractor. BRA allows contractors to estimate more accurate actual profit by reflecting not only objective information but also subjective experiences and judgments. Consequently, the model can contribute to improvement of decision-making process for setting an optimum tender price.

• Journal of Life Science
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• v.24 no.7
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• pp.769-776
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• 2014

Anisomycin, also known as flagecidin, is an antibiotic produced by Streptomyces griseolus that inhibits protein synthesis by binding to the ribosomal 28S subunit. The tumor necrosis factor-related apoptosis-inducing ligand (TRAIL) is a protein that induces apoptotic cell death. TRAIL primarily causes apoptosis in tumor cells by binding to death receptors. Many human cancer cell lines are refractory to TRAIL-induced cell death. In this study, we investigated whether anisomycin could enhance TRAIL-mediated apoptosis in TRAIL-resistant human hepatocarcinoma Hep3B cells. Treatment with anisomycin and TRAIL alone did not reduce cell viability in Hep3B cells. However, in the presence of TRAIL, the anisomycin concentration dependently reduced the cell viability. Our results indicate that anisomycin sensitizes Hep3B cells to TRAIL-mediated apoptosis and that this occurs, at least partly, via caspase activation. Interestingly, Bid knockdown by small interfering RNA significantly reduced the induction of apoptosis in combination with anisomycin and TRAIL, indicating that anisomycin effectively acts to lower the threshold at which TRAIL-mediated truncated Bid triggers the mitochondrial-mediated apoptosis program in Hep3B cells. Therefore, the use of TRAIL in combination with anisomycin might provide an effective therapeutic strategy for the safe treatment of some TRAIL-resistant cancer cells.

• Proceedings of the Korea Inteligent Information System Society Conference
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• 2001.01a
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• pp.83-88
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• 2001

To get the items that a buyer wants in Internet auction. he must search for the items through several auction sites. When the bidding starts, he(the buyer) needs to connect to these auction sites frequently so that he can monitor the bid stats and re-bid. A reserve-price auction reduces the number of connections, but this limits the user's bidding strategy. Another problem is equity between the buyer and the seller. Both the buyer and the seller should profit together within proper limits. In this paper, we propose an auction agent system using a collaborative mobile agent and a brokering mechanism called MoCAAS (Mobile Collaborative Auction Agent System), which mediates between the buyer and the seller and executes bidding asynchronously and autonomously. This reduces connection costs. offers more intelligent bidding and solves the equity problem.

• KIEE International Transactions on Power Engineering
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• v.5A no.4
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• pp.396-402
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• 2005

In an electricity market with imperfect competition, participants devise bidding plans and transaction strategies to maximize their own profits. The market price and the quantity are concerned with the operation reserve as well as the bidding system and demand curves in an electricity market. This paper presents a market model combined by an energy market and an operating reserve market. The competition of the generation producers in the combined market is formulated as a gaming of selecting bid parameters such as intersections and slopes in bid functions. The Nash Equilibrium (NE) is analyzed by using bi-level optimization; maximization of Social Welfare (SW) and maximization of the producers' profits.