• KSII Transactions on Internet and Information Systems (TIIS)
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• v.13 no.1
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• pp.152-171
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• 2019

In opportunistic networks, nodes may appear some selfishness while transmitting the message, however, most of the existing research works consider the individual selfishness or social selfishness respectively, and these two types of selfishness may coexist in opportunistic networks. In this paper, we propose an Incentive Aware Routing based on Game Theory for selfish OPPNETs, named IAR-GT, which uses Rubinstein-Stahl bargaining game model to incentivize selfish nodes cooperation in data forwarding. IAR-GT scheme not only considers the resources of nodes, but also uses a new method to calculate the social ties between them. Trace-driven simulations show that our incentive aware routing scheme achieves better performances than comparing schemes under two types of selfishness coexistence environments.

• Journal of Environmental Policy
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• v.9 no.2
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• pp.57-81
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• 2010

Recently, labor unions' active participation in social issues is drawing people's attention as their concerns are expanding from the conventional wage raise and employment to others such as the environment and poverty eradication. This derives from the notion that a trade union with bargaining power is also an economic agent responsible and able to take a positive role in social issues. This paper explains through a micro economic analysis model that labor union movements can also contribute to social issues such as the global environment. Based on the international oligopoly trade theory, the study analyzes the principal-agent model whereby firms and labor unions pursue their strategic choices based on their interest and influence the implementation of regulatory policies on pollution emission. The analysis confirmed that labor unions' bargaining power and international cooperation are influential in alleviating global pollution emission and in improving social welfare. This conclusion could be presented as a basis for arguing for and requesting the participation and cooperation of labor unions to solve environmental problems discussed at WILL 2006.

• Journal of Communications and Networks
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• v.14 no.6
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• pp.614-618
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• 2012

Smart grid is widely considered to be a next generation power grid, which will be integrated with information feedback communications.However, smart grid communication technologies are subject to inefficient spectrum allocation problems. Cognitive radio networks can solve the problemof spectrumscarcity by opening the under-utilized licensed bands to secondary users. In this paper, adaptive cognitive radio spectrum sensing and sharing algorithms are developed for smart grid environments. Simulation results are presented to demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed scheme in comparison with other existing schemes.

• Environmental Engineering Research
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• v.21 no.4
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• pp.420-426
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• 2016

Climate change imposes a huge treat on the sustainability of our environment. One of the major reasons for the increasing impacts of climate change is the emission of greenhouse gases. Therefore, cooperative greenhouse gas emission reduction schemes with a general consensus are needed in order to reduce the impacts of climate change. Due to the strong link between greenhouse gas emission and economic development there is disagreement among countries on the designing and implementation of emission reduction plans. In this paper the authors proposed a two-stage concession game to analyze emission reduction plans and determine a balanced emission range that improves the utilities of the bargaining parties. Furthermore the game was applied to a hypothetical example. Our results from the case study indicated that even though the utilities of the bargaining parties is highly affected by emission reductions, after making concessions their utilities can be improved given their emission reductions are within in a certain desirable range. The authors hope that this article provides insights which could be useful for understanding emission reduction plans and their consequences on the negotiating parties.

• The Journal of The Korea Institute of Intelligent Transport Systems
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• v.11 no.1
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• pp.66-71
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• 2012

In this paper, using the bargaining game theory, we propose a bandwidth management scheme that allocates bandwidth in an efficient and proportionally fair manner between the service classes with different service requirements. Since the traffic input rates of the classes are asymmetric in most of the time, the proposed scheme allocates bandwidth in proportion to the traffic input rates to increase the bandwidth utilization while protecting the quality of service of a class against the excessive traffic input of the other classes. In addition, the proposed method considers the weights of classes so that the bandwidth is allocated differentially among the classes.

• Journal of Korean Society of Water and Wastewater
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• v.24 no.1
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• pp.63-72
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• 2010

This study aims to make a decision about the rational option for a multipurpose dams development of the Tumen river basin so that the adjoining countries will effectively deal with the chronic problems and fully satisfy the fast growing demand of water and power. It has been thus far investigated that the interests between North Korea and China closely depend on the selected option, and they are not well compatible with each other. These situations are defined in terms of the cooperative two-person nonzero-sum game. The Nash bargaining model is then applied to contemplate the rational option, considering two scenarios of economic growth of the North Korea. After analyzing the model, it was expected that 1) two multipurpose dams must be cooperatively developed, and 2) their benefits should be allocated according to demand of each country. The authors finally suggest that a cooperative organisation be established to effectively manage the dams beyond the border of the countries.

• Asian Journal of Business Environment
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• v.11 no.4
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• pp.31-38
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• 2021

Purpose: This paper uses the resource-dependency theory to present the case of the Pakistan sugar industry to highlight how the industry uses a strategic alliance to gain a powerful bargaining position over its critical dependencies. The case of the Pakistan sugar industry is well-known and it is common knowledge that the alliance or the cartel within it is responsible for frequent price hikes and sugar supply shortages in the country. Research design, data and methodology: We use a case study, qualitative document analysis design to trace how the alliance overcomes its various dependencies, and in doing so, how does it harm various stakeholder interests. Results: This paper finds that the sugar industry alliance maintains its bargaining power by manipulating sugar supply through horizontal alliances, political affiliations, underselling and under-reporting sugar stocks, purchasing sugarcane from the black market, and by gaining billions of rupees in export subsidies by hoarding stock and using its political connections. Conclusion: The paper concludes by providing a summary of the measures which the government has taken to curb this anticompetitive conduct; the most important of which is the removal of protectionist measures for sugar trade and allowing market forces to control the demand and supply of sugar in the local market.

• Journal of the Institute of Electronics Engineers of Korea TC
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• v.46 no.5
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• pp.36-47
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• 2009

There exists RFID reader-to reader frequency which can not recognize tag in dense reader nude because the interference causes low SIR. To solve this frequency, the many algorithms based on TDM have been proposed. But the most of existing algorithms not obtain the optimal time allocation but propose heuristic scheduling algorithm. In this paper, we apply game theory which deals with interest between players of game to RFID reader-to reader interference and analyze the time allocation problem of reader based on TDM in terms of cooperative game which the players bind agreements using Nash Bargaining Solution(NBS) and non-cooperative game which the players do not bind agreements using Nash Equilibrium(NE). The applied results show that in dense reader mode, NBS of cooperative game is superior to NE of non-cooperative game and present optimal time allocation in dense reader mode.

• Journal of the Korean Geographical Society
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• v.51 no.5
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• pp.667-690
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• 2016

This paper reviews the evolution process of global production network(GPN) discourse, from its origin to the recent theorization, namely GPN 2.0. In so doing, the discursive formation of global production networks is introduced in comparison with a competing discourse global commodity/value chains, with particular attention to conceptual and analytical lacunae in the latter. This article also outlines how the global production network perspective has become a useful discursive and practical tool that allows the examination of the nexus of global economy, transnational corporations, and regional development. Subsequently, a theoretical dearth in the approach is discussed in reference to key critiques, and in this context Yeung and Coe's recent theorization GPN 2.0, which is centered on casual mechanisms and network configurations is reviewed. This paper suggests that the theory adequately addresses the problem of casuality lacking in its precedented conceptual framework, and that it helps exploring the formation and evolution processes of varied production networks(including intrafirm coordination, interfirm control, strategic partnership, and extrafirm bargaining) in connection with competitive dynamics and risky environments. As a result of the theorization, the difference between GPN and the chain approaches has become more apparent, and the idea of extrafirm bargaining is particularly important in the differentiation. Extrafirm bargaining is seen to be a comprehensive networking form inclusive of such GPN 1.0 analytical concepts as value, embeddeness, and power, and research attentive to, and engaging with, the extrafirm networks is expected to help transcending the chain governance approaches' analytical excess of interfirm linkages and industry-centeredness.

• Korea Trade Review
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• v.44 no.1
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• pp.31-44
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• 2019

This study examines the normalization of Korean GM management between the Korean government and GM in terms of external negotiation game and internal negotiation game using Putnam's Two-Level Games. In addition, GM's Win-set change and negotiation strategy were analyzed. This analysis suggested implications for the optimal negotiation strategy for mutual cooperation between multinational corporations and local governments in the global business environment. First, the negotiation strategy for Korea's normalization of GM management in Korea can be shifted to both the concession theory and the opposition theory depending on the situation change and the government policy centered on the cautious theory. Second, GM will maximize its bargaining power through 'brink-end tactics' by utilizing the fact that the labor market is stabilized, which is the biggest weakness of the Korean government, while maintaining a typical Win-set reduction strategy. GM will be able to restructure at any time in terms of global management strategy, and if the financial support of the Korean government is provided, it will maintain the local factory but withdraw the local plant at the moment of stopping the support. In negotiations on the normalization of GM management in Korea, it is necessary to prepare a problem and countermeasures for various scenarios and to maintain a balance so that the policy does not deviate to any one side.